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# Monthly Historical Summary

US NAVAL FORCES VIETNAM

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MAY 1971

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DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
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COMMANDER

U.S. NAVAL FORCES

VIETNAM

# MONTHLY HISTORICAL SUMMARY

May 1971

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## FOREWORD

Naval actions continued to decrease in May, reaching a near standstill in four AOs and remaining very light in five AOs. However, in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO the activity was heavy, with an unprecedented 160 enemy slain; in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO the number of engagements doubled; while in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO, the U Minh forest campaign continued to be one of the key combat zones, accounting for 45 enemy casualties. The TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII Mekong Convoys were extended, and the three convoys of the month continued to bring POL safely to Phnom Penh, where the POL stocks were nearly exhausted.

The enemy again took recourse in sapper activity, with a drastic increase to 17 watermining incidents on the Cua Viet, including the sinking of a water taxi which caused the death of 30 civilians. Elsewhere, there were five minings in the U Minh and one on the Upper Saigon River. Enemy sappers, in an ambitious venture, succeeded in blowing up six POL tanks at Cam Ranh Bay on 23 May.

MARKET TIME operations underwent a revision of the Inner Barrier, shifting from fixed patrol stations to the "cloud concept" of specially formed task units patrolling in high threat areas.

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ADM E. R. Zumwalt, the CNO, arrived in South Vietnam on 27 May, his first appearance in country since his departure as COMNAVFORV which ended just over a year ago. The Admiral reviewed NAVFORV, and the Navy's Vietnamization and Helping Hand programs begun during his Vietnam tour.

The ACTOVLOG program was highlighted by the turnover of LSB An Thoi, while seven LCMs were turned over quietly elsewhere. The flagging ACTOVLOG program was given a boost by CHNAVADVGRP with the creation of Logistics Assistance Teams of up to 40 advisors to supplement the advisory personnel at ten LSBs and six lesser bases throughout the Delta.

The U.S. Navy in-country strength continued to decline in May. As of 3 June there were 11,310 naval personnel in South Vietnam, a reduction of just less than 1000 men in the course of the month.

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## CURRENT OPERATIONS

| VNN Designations | USN Designations |
|---|---|
| TRAN HUNG DAO II (TG 214.1) | GIANT SLINGSHOT |
| TRAN HUNG DAO IV (TG 214.2) | SOLID ANCHOR |
| TRAN HUNG DAO V (TG 216.1) | READY DECK |
| TRAN HUNG DAO VI (TG 212.5) | SEARCH TURN |
| TRAN HUNG DAO VII (TG 221.1) | SEA TIGER |
| TRAN HUNG DAO VIII (TG 217.1) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO IX (TG 212.3) | BARRIER REEF |
| TRAN HUNG DAO X (TG 212.6) | BREEZY COVE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XV (TF 213) | MARKET TIME<br>Inner Barrier |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XVII (TF 210) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII (TF 218) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XIX (TG 217.2) | NONE |
| TRAN HUNG DAO XX (TG 219.4) | NONE |
| RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE (TF 228) | NONE |

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TASK FLEET 21

Maintenance problems, particularly those relative to planned preventive maintenance, continued to plague VNN TRAN HUNG DAO Operations. The senior American advisor to Deputy Commander TRAN HUNG DAO sent a strong message to all TRAN HUNG DAO advisors urging them to offer creative guidance to help their counterparts with this tremendous task. He said, in part,

> "It is clear that one of the basic problems inhibiting operational performance in the TRAN HUNG DAO campaigns is the poor material condition of assigned units.... The only way to put more boats on the line is to reduce the need for major repairs."

Further, he stated,

> "A high state of readiness depends primarily on effective maintenance at the operational level.... It is imperative that the Vietnamese Navy be impressed with the need for such practices and concentrate on preventive maintenance."[1]

During the month of May plans were being drafted for the closing of ATSB Song Ong Doc and ATSB Ca Mau, to be replaced by ISB Ca Mau, now under construction across the Song Ong Doc from ATSB Ca Mau.

1. SA DEPCOMTHD msg 200856Z May 71

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In conjunction with the base closings at ATSBs Song Ong Doc and Ca Mau, a plan has been formulated to close out TRAN HUNG DAO X and TRAN HUNG DAO XVII, replacing them both with TRAN HUNG DAO XXI, probably in late June or early July.

Cambodian convoys continued to deliver vital POL products to Phnom Penh. Supplies of POL were down to the bare necessities toward the end of the month but the last of three convoys for May arrived and temporarily staved off complete exhaustion of the supply.

There was one special convoy in May, named Operation TRAN HUNG DAO XXII, which carried the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam to Phnom Penh for talks with Cambodian officials. The convoy departed Tan Chau on 25 May and returned to Tan Chau on 26 May. The trip was uneventful and the operation was dismantled on 26 May.

Training in the use of the new Air/Ground Brevity Code continued and during May various training missions were flown with good results. Limiting factors are unavailability of helicopter assets due to operational commitments and inability to get firing clearances.

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TRAN HUNG DAO II

Activities in the TRAN HUNG DAO II area of operation remained characteristically light throughout the month of May. Ho Chi Minh's birthday passed on 19 May without any special incident to break the routine of monsoon deluge. The personnel on PBRs encountered the enemy twice during the month, capturing three sampans and two women, with no fire having been returned from the five men who fled the scenes. Three mining attempts were unsuccessful on the upper Vam Co Dong River. USN Seawolves placed 19 strikes with undetermined results, four support strikes which destroyed two bunkers, and responded to two radar contacts of Viet Cong which resulted in 11 Viet Cong killed. DUFFLEBAG sensors proved the most valuable reliable source of intelligence on enemy movements in the area for the month. One hundred and fifty five millimeter artillery battery personnel fired harassment and interdiction fire at sensor activations on 49 different occasions, about 10 rounds each time for an average of 10 minutes, with the reaction time being generally less than 10 minutes. On 13 occasions PBRs in waterborne guardposts were alerted to sensor activations, and on 23 different occasions, friendly troops in the area of sensor activations were warned, with no artillery fire instigated in these instances. Base defense sensors were activated

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twice. On one occasion, artillery was out of range; and once communications with artillery could not be established; and twice, heavy rains invalidated the sensors' information.

A 13 April contact with the VC had a PSYOPS sequel ten days later. When a sampan was sunk by RPD 54 boats, some highly exploitable documents were recovered. From this intelligence, the 3rd RAIO produced PSYOPS taped broadcasts and leaflet drops. H & I fire was directed at known targets from Tra Cu and Bao Trai. A ground sweep was then conducted on 25 April; the final results were two Chieu Hoi's and additional exploitable information.

On 1 May two PBRs from RPD 64 made contact with three VC, 17 kilometers northwest of the ATSB Moc Hoa. The PBRs were on a day patrol in the vicinity of WS 875 948, escorting some "Mike" boats, when two men were seen fleeing on the north bank of the Vam Co Tay, which aroused the interest in the PBRs. A closer examination of two nearby sampans revealed suspicious ordnance, whereupon the area was taken under fire, with the patrol officer and the forward gunner pursuing the VC on foot, but to no avail. Two women were captured in the sampans, along with a CKC rifle, an M-1 rifle, some ammunition, and a

mine apparently fabricated from a 2.75 rocket projectile.

In the early hours of 5 May, a watermine exploded approximately 50 meters north of the Go Dau Ha Bridge on the Vam Co Dong River, lending credence to the report of a 50 man reconnaissance platoon operating nearby. A second incident occurred the next morning at the same bridge, when small arms fire from the guards exploded a mine floating towards the bridge. Two hours later, at Rach Re Bridge (XT 251 414) guards fired at VC sappers who fled leaving behind 30 kilos of C-4 blasting caps. The sapper battalions involved were believed to have come from Cambodia in February.

TIGHT JAW activations under the DUFFELBAG program were proving their worth in the area during the month of May. A 121030Z May message stated that the District Chief of Tuyen Nhon Province informed CTU 214.1.8 and his Senior Advisor that the TIGHT JAW activations were his major source of intelligence and that TIGHT JAW intelligence was the only intelligence that proved reliable. One hundred and fifty five millimeter artillery fire generally was used for harassment fire at the sensor activation areas. The artillery batteries fired for ten minutes duration at each of several targets each night. Troops were at

times alerted of enemy movements by sensor activations; on 21 May a troop sweep responding to a sensor activation resulted in the capture of three sampans, with two VC killed in the sweep. PBR crews also used sensor activation intelligence for choosing sites for waterborne guard posts.

A 19 May message from the Senior Advisor CTG 214.1 commented on the prosecution of night-rider contacts. Sources revealed that the reaction time of river craft to night-rider contacts resulted in less than optimum prosecution of targets. It was suggested that contacts detected within the triangle whose points were Go Dau Ha, Tuyen Nhon, and the river confluence be called in to Ben Luc where the Seawolf detachment had a scramble time of 20 minutes maximum anywhere within the triangle.

Ho Chi Minh's birthday passed on 19 May without the significant enemy activity that had long been predicted in the intelligence reports. The Tan Son Nhut weather predictions proved more reliable, as the monsoon rains poured daily, having a noticeable effect on the outlying areas of Long An Province. USN Seawolves observed large areas under water, allowing the enemy greater mobility throughout the area.

On 21 May, at 2108H, a Navy Seawolf of CTU 116.7.4 scrambled for a radar contact from the Tra Cu radar site. Ten to 15 people were observed in the vicinity of XS 439 019, where the helo placed multiple rocket and machine gun attacks after gaining the proper clearance. There was no enemy response, but the Tra Cu radar reported approximately five people retiring after the strike. It was considered that seven of the enemy were probably killed by the air strikes. Twenty four rockets, the normal Seawolf payload, were fired, as were 1350 rounds of 50 caliber and 5000rounds of 7.62mm from M-60 machine guns. Where the Seawolves normally placed up to several strikes each day at suspected VC sites, the results were generally unknown. Other gratifying instances than the 21 May strike were strikes supporting PF outposts and river boats under attack, where the results were well defined, and where allied gratitude had been forthcoming.

On 25 May at 2235H, crews of two PBRs of RPD 54, while in waterborne guardpost, spotted a sampan with three VC attempting a river crossing eight kilometers south of Ben Luc in the vicinity of XS 663 680. The sampan was taken under fire, giving no response, and was captured, along with an M-16 and a kilo of documents which indicated an infiltration route, and an enemy order of battle chart. The three enemy were believed to have been killed. This

was the first contact on the Vam Co Dong south of Ben Luc since 10 October 1970.

Four intelligence reports in the month of May, from different sources, told of enemy units moving from the Angel's Wing/Parrot's Beak areas of the Cambodian border to the vicinity of Go Dau Ha, as the enemy was apparently moving back into Vietnam with the onset of the wet season. A 6 May intelligence report noted that a VC commo-liaison and transportation unit crossed the Vam Co Dong (XT 469 039) by sampan with supplies and troops regularly. The crossing point was given as XT 468 039, and was guarded by two armed units posted 30 meters on each side, with regular crossing time at 1700H. Eight separate intelligence summaries reported small units of VC seeking to control roads within the southern area of TRAN HUNG DAO II, with routes 4, 225, and 226 specifically mentioned. Throughout the month, intelligence summaries indicated increased emphasis by the enemy on building resources for a "big operation" due to take place before July.

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## TRAN HUNG DAO IV

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO IV AO increased during May as a total of 38 firefights occurred, a twofold increase over April. These actions resulted in the death of 21 enemy troops and the wounding of 14 friendly troops, including five U.S. Four VC were captured in action and there were two mining incidents.

The first action of note in May occurred on 1 May when Seawolf helicopters on a routine visual reconnaissance patrol spotted a group of uniformed men armed with small arms and a B-40 rocket launcher at WQ 155 695. After receiving proper clearances, rocket and minigun strikes were placed in the area between 1410H and 1440H. The helos received small arms fire on all passes and probably killed two of the enemy.

At 0925H on 2 May the VC were up to their tried and true tactic of PCF ambush from the south bank of the Cua Lon River at WQ 195 705. Two PCFs, HQ 3902 and 3926, were on routine patrol when the VC opened up with two B-40 rockets which hit PCF 3926 in the superstructure amidships wounding one VNN (seriously) and causing moderate damage. Fire was returned and suppressed the enemy attack and a Seawolf strike provided additional firepower. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

On 5 May the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 075 082 was the scene of another ambush, this time against units of RID 46 in steaming order: HQ 9174, 2176, and 6540. The boats were heading north and were struck from the east bank, long a favorite position of the guerrillas, with one B-40 rocket striking HQ 9174 in the coxswain flat, wounding one USN advisor and four Vietnamese (one seriously). The American advisor called in a Seawolf strike which covered the withdrawal of the boats to a safe site. The wounded were then medevaced by Sealord helicopters. Enemy casualties were unknown. EN3 Robert C. Simmons received the Bronze Star Medal for his direction of return fire, air control of Seawolf and Sealord aircraft, and prompt attention to the wounds of his shipmates although wounded himself.

The ARVN Rangers were the main element in a combined operation with VNAF, Seawolf, and Sealord aircraft on 7 May in the vicinity of WQ 150 778. The Rangers were inserted at 0930H and during the sweep captured 33 VC sympathizers (three males, the remaining males had evaded), approximately 200 detonators, several grenades, and a quantity of foodstuffs. Twenty newly constructed shelters were destroyed in the two brief firefights, however, no casualties were incurred by either side. The Rangers were extracted at 1430H and returned with their prisoners to ISB

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Nam Can.

On 8 May, a patrol attached to RID 44, proceeding north on the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 078 770, spotted a watermine. The lead craft in the three boat convoy, HQ 5113, countermined the device with a concussion grenade from a distance of 50 meters. The advisor on the scene estimated that the mine weighed 150 pounds. No connecting wires or mooring arrangements were located and there was no damage or casualties.

Seawolf aircraft were again involved in an early morning firefight when, at 0715H, on 9 May, while on a routine patrol, they were fired upon with automatic weapons from a known VC stronghold at VQ 774 542. The "Wolves" returned and suppressed the enemy fire but one helo suffered moderate damage and one pilot was injured slightly. Enemy casualties were undetermined.

The largest and most sophisticated combined operation of the month took place on 10 May commencing at 1010H in the vicinity of WQ 053 658. Units of the 42nd Rangers, Seawolves, Black Ponies, Sealords, and RID 44 took part in this well executed maneuver of forces. After insertion by RID 44 rivercraft, the lead company of Rangers made immediate contact with an enemy

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force of unknown size. At 1025H the second company made contact with a similar enemy force at WQ 043 657. Both enemy groups evaded, the former to the south, the latter to the west, with Rangers in hot pursuit, never losing contact. At 1042H the ubiquitous Seawolves arrived and placed strikes under the direction of the command and control Sealord helo with the ARVN Battalion Commander and his U.S. counterpart embarked. At 1119H Black Ponies arrived overhead and subsequently placed fire suppressive strikes in support of the ARVN units. Seawolves placed a total of seven strikes, Black Ponies two, and the ARVN 105 battery at Nam Can contributed 23 rounds of artillery support. In the afternoon a third company was inserted at WQ 045 645 by helicopter as a blocking force. They swept north and were immediately fired upon by approximately one machine gun, claymores, and booby traps. They then linked up with the second company that had been inserted and were extracted by RID 44. The first company was resupplied by air and remained in the area in night ambush positions. Friendly troops suffered seven wounded while enemy losses were six personnel killed with numerous blood trails sighted. Two suspected VC, 12 claymore mines, 24 VC grenades, 11 launch bombs with launchers, and nine propellants were captured. Two bunkers, four sampans, seven houses, five kilos of rice and four kilos of dried fish were destroyed.

COMNAVFORV commended CTG 214.2 stating "It is most gratifying to note the results of the 42nd ARVN Battalion operations. Actions of this nature, utilizing all available assets, exemplify a high level of combat readiness and professional standards. Please extend a well done to all elements involved in the operation."[1]

A tragic incident occurred at 0900H on 11 May on the Cai Nhap Canal at WQ 082 752 when five Vietnamese civilians from Ham Rong Hamlet were abducted by the enemy. Included in the group were the Assistant Chief for Security, the Village Tax/ Customs Agent, and three PF soldiers. As soon as the abduction was reported, CTG 214.2 sent helicopters out to visually check the surrounding area. He also made a visit to the affected hamlet and re-emphasized that all GVN officials should be escorted by GVN naval craft during their travels. He further assured the people that all possible steps would be taken to find the missing persons.

While patrolling routinely on 12 May at WQ 115 676, 16 kilometers east of Nam Can, PCFs HQ 3902 and 3930 sighted an enemy rocket ambush site on the south bank of the Song Cua Lon at 1815H. No enemy personnel were in sight so the boats

1. COMNAVFORV msg 111149Z May 71

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beached and captured three B-40 rockets, four launch tubes, and 15 meters of wire. They also destroyed the bunker before proceeding back to the base.

Another mining incident, the second of the month, occurred on the Cai Nhap Canal on 13 May at WQ 079 760. Three craft of RID 46, HQ 1282, 6541 and 6542, were patrolling on the canal when a mine of indeterminate size and type detonated between a Tango and Zippo boat. There was no damage and no casualties, and after placing precautionary suppressing fire on both banks to ward off a possible ambush, the boats proceeded on patrol.

On 16 May, while engaged in a visual reconnaisance mission, Seawolves spotted five males with weapons evading at WQ 134 836. The enemy was taken under fire at 1740H and two were killed. No friendly casualties were incurred.

The Cai Nhap Canal was the scene of yet another ambush on 18 May at 1451H. Three rivercraft of RID 44, Alfas 5113, 5109 and Tango 1215 were proceeding on a routine Cai Nhap patrol when they were hit at WQ 078 770 by one or two B-40 rockets, striking HQ 5113 at the waterline. The boats quickly returned fire and the enemy evaded. Three other craft from RID 44 which were proceeding north on the canal were alerted and sped to the scene. At 1509H

Tango 1215 spotted and recovered three launch bombs on the east bank. At 1630H, Alfa 5113 lost its battle with the water and sank. A security detail of VNN Seals (LDNN) was set and salvage efforts were to commence the next day. There were no personnel injuries.

At 0826H on 19 May, PCFs were ambushed on the Song Cua Lon for the third time during May. This time the attack occurred at WQ 150 629, almost the identical spot where PCFs had broken up an ambush attempted on 13 May. This ambush was carried out with small arms fire only and the PCFs, HQ 3900 and 3927 quickly gained the upper hand using a devastating mortar barrage. Seawolves were called in and the enemy fire was completely suppressed. The boats beached and found three bunkers about ten meters apart and two B-40 rounds. The enemy had apparently evaded to the west and their casualties were not determined. There were no friendly casualties.

The alert Seawolves struck again on 19 May when on another routine patrol at 1845H three armed evading males were spotted running from a loaded sampan. They were taken under fire and the results were two dead VC and one sampan destroyed. Once again there were no friendly casualties.

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PCFs again came under the persistent guns of the An Xuyen guerrillas on 22 May as they once again struck from the south bank of the Cua Lon River at WQ 180 705. This time the B-40 attack occurred at 1250H and involved three PCFs, HQ 3926, 3902, and 3930. HQ 3930 was hit in the bow causing moderate damage but no personnel casualties. The retaliation was both swift and sure as all boats opened up with mortars and 50 caliber machine guns. The embarked advisor then directed a Seawolf strike on the enemy. When the fire had been suppressed a landing party went ashore and found one dead enemy soldier and one AK-47 rifle.

The last significant river engagement of the month occurred on 29 May at 1022H when LSSL HQ 228 was attacked from the north bank of the Song Bo De (WQ 246 675). The ship was fired upon by B-40 rockets and A/W fire and took three hits from the deadly rockets. One rocket exploded in a locker; one was a dud which an alert crewman threw over the side; and one hit the galley door main deck, causing shrapnel wounds to four VNN seamen. The ship cleared the kill zone, called for air support, cleaned up the damage and then re-entered the kill zone and beached at 1200H. The landing party recovered 11 launch bombs, 17 launch tubes, eight propellant charges and a document identified as the operation order for the ambush. There were also numerous enemy blood trails but no

bodies were sighted. PCFs were called in earlier at 1030H, to transport wounded Vietnamese crewmen to ISB Nam Can. Enroute they were taken under fire from the north bank of Song Cua Lon but the enemy missed his mark with three B-40 rockets and was rewarded for his boldness with a Seawolf strike which succeeded in suppressing all fire. There were no casualties and the PCFs continued on their medevac mission. In another combined operation, RID 46 inserted a company of the 42nd ARVN Rangers at WQ 063 775 on 30 May. The Rangers stormed ashore at 1300H and immediately made contact with a VC force estimated to be one squad. Seawolves, orbiting overhead in support of the operation, were called in and placed strikes on the guerrillas. The enemy force broke into three groups and fled leaving heavy blood trails. Two VC were killed; one sampan and one M-2 carbine were captured. There were no friendly casualties.

Four Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Oscar Platoon interdicted enemy lines of communication on four occassions, harassed the enemy infrastructure, and advised the local LDNN (VNN Seals) during the month of May.

On 12 May, eight Seals accompanied by an interpreter were inserted by SEALORD Slicks at 1830H in the vicinity of WQ 244 781

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in order to interdict a known commo-liaison route. Upon insertion the commandos patrolled to a hootch in the treeline 25 meters from the intended ambush site. Security was set and shortly thereafter an enemy male was captured as he made his way back to the hootch. At 2010H four sampans containing nine persons were hailed and they immediately made attempts to evade. The sampans were taken under fire and three VC were killed and three additional were probably killed. The four sampans were destroyed and the Seals were extracted by helicopter at 2030H and returned to ISB Nam Can.

On 13 May at 0700H, seven Seals, one guide, and one interpreter were inserted by a SEALORD helicopter at WQ 130 630 to find and destroy a VC training site. With Seawolf air cover overhead, the Seals patrolled 50 meters to a VC hootch. Three males evaded, were taken under fire and two were killed. The other enemy soldier was probably killed but his body could not be found. Further patrolling led to the discovery of the training site which was abandoned. A cache of rice totaling 2000 pounds was discovered, and the training site was leveled. The Seals extracted by helo at 0830H and returned to base.

The Seals struck again on 17 May when they carried out an

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ambush operation in the vicinity of WQ 098 834. The Seals inserted using one MSSC at 2245H on the 16th, patrolled 7000 meters from the Ba Hinh outpost and at 0530H set the trap. The ambush was abandoned at 0900H with no success and a search of the area was begun with Seawolves called in to provide air cover. Contact was made with three VC who evaded to the west and again with a small enemy force in a treeline. Seawolf strikes were placed in the treeline but fire was not suppressed. The volume of fire picked up forcing the Seals to withdraw to the other side of the canal with three wounded, one serious. The VC advanced to the canal and continued sporadic harrassing fire. The two wounded Americans and two other members of the patrol were extracted by Seawolf aircraft. At 1030H, under Seawolf air cover, the remaining Seals were extracted by an Army Slick. Results of the operation were three Seals wounded; four VC were killed and one was wounded.

Seals conducted an ambush operation again on 29 May at VQ 81 65. The Seals were inserted by sampan and patrolled to the target area. Upon reaching the target area the Seals came under fire from a sampan 50 meters to the south. They returned the fire, killing four of the enemy and capturing a sampan, two M-1 rifles and a carbine. The Seals then extracted and returned to ISB Nam Can.

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In a peculiar incident on 4 May at 1145H on the base at Nam Can, an Alfa boat of RID 44 tried to get underway while still moored to the berthing ammi. The ammi was pulled into the river causing the footbridge to the bank to fall into the river. Repair or salvage of the footbridge was not possible because of the absence of a heavy lift capability in the Nam Cam area. Due to this error in judgement by the boat captain there was no access to the base for sailors living on the ammi other than by sampan.

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TRAN HUNG DAO V

Enemy activity was light to moderate throughout the month of May. CTG 216.1 reported that his units engaged in five fire fights with the enemy, sustaining four Vietnamese casualties, (three killed and one wounded). No enemy casualties were reported.

TRAN HUNG DAO V assets increased during May by the return to Phu Cuong of River Patrol Division 52 boats that had been assigned to the Capital Military District and to the Rung Sat Special Zone. This brought the number of boats to 16 at Phu Cuong; four were still undergoing routine maintenance at Nha Be.

On the night of 9 May, three PBRs of RPD 52 thwarted a night crossing attempt by three VC 12 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong. The VC were taken under fire with one probably killed. On 12 May, five RAC of RAG 22 transiting south received ten B-40 rockets from the west bank. One LCM took several hits and one VNN received minor shrapnel wounds in the arm. On 18 May, four RAC of RAG 24 reconnoitered the shore line 15 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 679 226). A cache was found in a foxhole consisting of two M-16s, a claymore mine, and some explosives. On 24 May, five RAC of RAG 22 picked up two women VC suspects in a sampan eight kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 748 198). Two grenades were found in the boat.

On 28 May, nine and one half kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 735 202), three RAC of RAG 24 were in a night WBGP when an explosion occurred on the starboard side amidships of the center craft, a Monitor. The craft was beached with extensive material damage; however, no personnel casualties resulted. Later that morning, ten RAC of RAG 22, 24 kilometers northwest of Phu Cuong (XT 660 260), transiting south to assist in salvage operations of the stricken Monitor, received six B-40 rocket rounds from the west bank simultaneously as a command mine was detonated. The mine sank one FOM at XT 661 270 killing two VNN crewmembers. An LCM received three B-40 hits, while another received one B-40 hit; neither sustained personnel casualties, and the material damage was of a minor nature. Seawolves were scrambled to provide air cover for the stricken units.

Seawolf helicopters of HAL-3, Detachment 4, in addition to providing support for the river units in the TRAN HUNG DAO V AO, answered a call for help when the Phu Loi Base came under 107mm rocket attack on 31 May. Multiple rocket and machine gun strikes were placed on the suspected launch sites.

The TRAN HUNG DAO V AO communications problems came a step closer to being solved with the establishment of a retransmission site at FSB Phuoc on 10 May.

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The site utilizes two PRC 77 transmitters and two R-292 antennas on a 60 day loan from the Army. At the close of the month, PBRs north of the Mushroom Area and the TOC at Phu Cuong were utilizing the site satisfactorily.

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## TRAN HUNG DAO VI

Enemy activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO was moderate to heavy throughout May, with the enemy taking some of the heaviest casualties ever in this AO. Commander, CTG 212.5 reported that his men engaged the enemy in 20 firefights, suffering one VNN sailor killed and three VNN sailors wounded, while an unprecedented 160 of the enemy were slain.

The units of River Patrol Division 58 continued to do an outstanding job patrolling the various waterways throughout the AO. Late in the evening of 3 May, three PBRs of RPD 58 lay in wait in a WBGP in the Luynh Quynh Canal, 39 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia. Suddenly, 20 uniformed VC/NVA soldiers were sighted and taken under fire. The VNN patrol officer called in ARVN artillery, and Black Ponies and Seawolves were scrambled. The PBRs sustained no casualties. In the morning, a ground sweep revealed ten of the enemy killed by A/S, five B-40 rockets, and numerous bloody rags and drag trails. On 4 May, six kilometers northwest of Rach Gia, RPD 58 PBRs again sighted the enemy and the Seawolves were called in resulting in one enemy confirmed killed and five probably killed by air. Again, there were no friendly casualties.

On 20 May, RPD 58 PBRs again met with heavy enemy contact. The PBRs had divided into two night patrols; three boats in the first

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patrol and four in the second, and had assumed WBGPs in canals flanking a day long province contact (WS 154 075), six kilometers northeast and east of Rach Gia . At 0145H, on 20 May, the first patrol sighted a group of five or six VC/NVA and took them under fire. Return fire was received and suppressed, while Seawolf helicopters placed strikes in the area. At 0200H, the second patrol contacted a large group of approximately 30 VC attempting to move east. The boats opened fire and received intense automatic small arms fire in return. Seawolves were diverted to the scene to aid the PBRs. The melee continued for nearly four hours and then the enemy withdrew as dawn neared. The enemy suffered as many as 30 casualties. The VC persisted in returning to the contact scene to retrieve their dead and wounded. In so doing, they had to cross an open field in which they were extremely vulnerable to the air strikes and heavy fire from the PBRs. Incredibily, not one friendly casualty was sustained in the action. The spectacular results of this action prompted COMNAVFORV to make the following comments:

> "It is gratifying to note results of the WBPS (sic) conducted by RPD 58 units and the superior support provided by HAL-3 Det 8 .... Establishing ambushes and posts in areas of known infiltration cannot help but reap positive results. Actions of this nature exemplify a high level of combat readiness and professional standards.

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Please extend a well done to all elements involved in this most successful operation. RADM Salzer."[1]

Once again on 24 May units of RPD 58 ran into heavy contact with the enemy. The PBRs were returning to base from a WBGP when they were ambushed by a large enemy force from both banks of a canal, 12 kilometers southeast of Rach Gia (WS 180 890). Seawolves were scrambled, escorted the boats to safety, and then placed strikes in the area. The enemy fire continued and the Seawolves rearmed and again placed strikes in the area, and then medevaced the wounded. Black Ponies were scrambled while the ubiquitous Seawolves were once again rearming. The enemy strength was estimated at 40 VC/NVA on each bank, and they fought very tenaciously. SA RPD 58, embarked on the PBRs, reported that the enemy fire power was in excess of any enemy unit ever contacted by RPD 58. Friendly casualties were one Vietnamese killed, three wounded (one serious, two minor) and one PBR slightly damaged, while the enemy casualties were estimated at 20 killed and wounded. This action precipitated the following comments from SA DEPCOMTHD:

"The action...is yet another example of the fighting spirit that has become the hallmark of TRAN HUNG DAO VI, RPD 58, Det 8 and the Black Ponies. Likewise, it is a tribute to

1. COMNAVFORV msg 232352Z May 71

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the discipline, courage, and professionalism of the combined VNN and USN team. Please convey my congratulations to all personnel involved in this operation."CAPT Crowe[2]

On 27 May, personnel on three PBRs of RPD 58 operating in the Luynh Quynh Canal of the Three Sisters Area apprehended three VC males who wanted to "chieu hoi" to them, 29 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia. The boats, supporting the 15th Regiment, 9th ARVN Division, were approached by a sampan containing the three Hoi Chanhs. The men surrendered a MK-26 grenade, were taken aboard, and later turned over to 9th ARVN elements.

On 29 May, PBRs of RPD 61, operating from Kien An, medevaced a wounded civilian, 31 kilometers southeast of Rach Gia (WR 213 759). The man had multiple shrapnel wounds in both legs and in his right arm, and had a fractured right leg. The civilian was cutting wood west of the PBR position when he tripped an enemy grenade booby trap. Also on 31 May, RPD 61 PBRs were again approached by a sampan, this one carrying two wounded children. They had also been wounded by a booby trap grenade. The PBRs medevaced the children to ISB Rach Soi, where they were, in turn, taken to the Rach Gia Hospital.

2. SA DEPCOMTHD msg 252318Z May 71

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Acting on intelligence that a 20 man VC unit was in the area, on 30 May, RPD 61 inserted 15 PF troops at WR 146 880. The PFs made contact with the enemy unit four hours later. Four VC were killed, one AK rifle captured; no friendly casualties were sustained.

Seals in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO were very active throughout the month. Acting on intelligence of an enemy weapons cache, on 3 May, a mixed group of LDNNs (Vietnamese Seals), U.S., and Australian Seals were inserted by truck at WS 100 080. The cache was discovered at WS 100 100, and contained one 2.75 inch rocket, one M-33 hand grenade, and one time firing device, and helo instruments. The Seals extracted without further incident. On 11 May, three Seals of Romeo Platoon accompanied by MST 2 Det Echo, five Australian SAS, one interpreter, one guide, and one Kit Carson Scout inserted at 0300H by MSSC and LSSC on a mission of interdicting a VC squad. The group patrolled 300 meters through mud flats which were illuminated by an intermitantly exposed full moon. The group came to the mouth of a canal, set one squad up for security LP while the second squad continued on 400 meters further and set up a guard post at 0515H. At 0815H, an armed group of VC was sighted approaching the guard post and were taken under fire. The area was searched and the Seals successfully extracted, leaving behind three enemy dead. No friendly casualties were sustained.

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A similar mission occurred on 20 May; however, the mission was compromised by a local civilian wood cutter. When no results were obtained, the Seals extracted without incident.

A number of units were transferred or were planning to be transferred in the TRAN HUNG DAO VI AO during May. RPD 63 was preparing to depart ATSB Song Ong Doc and Ca Mau for Rach Soi in early June. Also, RPD 61, based at Kien An, shifted operational control from CTF 210 (TRAN HUNG DAO XVII) to CTG 212.5 (TRAN HUNG DAO VI) on 26 May. At the close of the month, the redoubtable RPD 58 was making preparations to transfer from ISB Rach Soi to Op Base Sa Dec in early June.

TRAN HUNG DAO VIII

During the month of May, activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO VIII AO was light. CTG 217.1 units participated in 25 troop movements or support missions for the Seventh ARVN Division. Seventeen special missions were conducted that varied from fire support for PF troops and Zippo operations, to investigating electronic emissions for the Seventh ARVN Division. Waterborne units engaged the enemy on three occasions resulting in two enemy being killed and the capture of two VC suspects. Two Vietnamese sailors were killed and five were wounded.

CTG 116.8 and 116.7.7 air units flew 38 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO VIII units resulting in the destruction of 61 bunkers, 21 hootches, 14 sampans, and various supplies. In addition they were credited with killing 24 enemy soldiers.

LTJG Clapp's Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Victor Platoon, conducted seven operations which resulted in the capture of three VC, one rifle, and assorted ammunition.

Frequent intelligence reports have indicated the impending enemy attacks of My Tho City and the adjacent Dong Tam Naval Base. Enemy units mentioned as being in the area included the 267B, 269B, 514C, 273, and 309 battalions. The enemy attacks,

scheduled to occur on 1 May, International Labor Day, failed to materialize.

The Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer at My Tho reported changes in the VC organization in My Tho Province. The changes divided the districts into smaller areas known as "Mangs" in order to achieve closer control over the population. As a result, there appeared to be a shift from military to political goals as was evidenced by the fact that the majority of district and "Mang"level positions are now staffed by VC rather than NVA as was previously the case. More emphasis was placed on the "Mangs" to establish a grass roots power base in the countryside with which to act as a springboard for political gains in the fall. It was expected that future enemy activity in VC My Tho Province will take the form of harassment, terrorism, and assassinations to effect economy of forces and material.

CTG 217.1 waterborne units continued to press the enemy but with little success as the enemy employed his familiar hit and run tactics. On 1 May at 0300H, a RAG 21/33 Commandament 6011 and RID 42 ASPB, while on normal patrol of Canal 28 (XS 043 513) in Dinh Tuong Province, were both struck by one B-40 rocket and then taken under automatic weapons fire by an estimated company of VC. The boats responded to the attack with suppressive fire and Seawolves

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were called in for additional assistance. However, prior to Seawolf arrival, the VC broke off the engagement and disappeared. In the brief encounter, one Vietnamese sailor was killed and four were wounded. Enemy casualties were unknown. RF troops were inserted at first light but did not encounter the enemy. A Dustoff aircraft, requested at 0300H, finally arrived at 0800H and medevaced the three seriously wounded Vietnamese sailors to My Tho.

On 6 May at 1500H, an LCM-6 on patrol of the Tong Doc Loc Canal detected six enemy personnel in the vicinity of XS 265 383, five kilometers southeast of My Phuoc Tay. As soon as the LCM-6 was spotted, the enemy attempted to evade and immediately were taken under fire. Additional fire power was provided by a monitor and another LCM-6 which were in the area. At the conclusion of the action, a landing party of eight Vietnamese sailors went ashore for investigation and found two VC dead, each with K-54 pistols and about one kilo of documents. The search of the surrounding area revealed a bunker used as a living area plus a sampan which was confiscated. Subsequent perusal of the captured documents by the senior advisor revealed that the enemy personnel were members of the 261A unit, and also listed the ambush results of the past four months, and proposed tactics for the next two months.

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On 13 May, HQ 7540 was placed into the water after overhaul at LSB Dong Tam and was accepted by the crew for operational use. On the morning of 14 May, HQ 7540 was found sunk by the stern alongside the seawall resting vertically on the bottom with the mooring line holding and awash to within a few feet of the bow. No crewmembers had remained aboard during the night for maintenance or security. The craft was immediately raised and the cause of the sinking was determined to be a broken one-quarter inch stud in the starboard sea suction hull flange. The disassembly and cleaning of engines and other repairs to the craft was estimated to require three days. On 17 May COMNAVFORV requested that the Senior Advisor RPD 53 furnish immediately the disciplinary measures taken or contemplated by VNN personnel against the boat crews or others responsible for the incident. On 18 May, the Senior Advisor RPD 53 stated that the Commanding Officer RPD 53 verbally reprimanded the boat captain and two crewmembers but that no other action was evidenced or contemplated.

On 24 May at 2300H, LCVP 2027 struck an underwater object while on routine patrol of the Kinh Hai Muoi Tam, resulting in what at the time was considered by the crew to be underwater hull damage. At the conclusion of the patrol, the boat was moored to Pier D at the Vietnamese Naval Station while the crew secured for the

evening, leaving three members on board. At 0345H, the boat started filling with water while the three crewmembers attempted to obtain pumps and dewater the craft. Their efforts were in vain however, for within ten minutes the craft sank and was at the bottom in 15 feet of water. On 25 May at 1830H, salvage operations were concluded and the LCVP recovered. The Vietnamese salvage team used the Seventh ARVN tow truck, two chain falls, and a two ton truck to right and raise the boat. An investigation of the hull revealed no damage, but it was believed that the craft sank due to a leak around the shaft packing. It was anticipated that the shaft packing would be completed during low tide and that the LCVP would be operational within 48 hours. No disciplinary action was intended for the crew as the situation indicated that the leak could not have been avoided or recognized prior to securing.

Seal Team One, Detachment Golf, Victor Platoon, continued their harassment of the enemy and interdicted the LOCs wherever intelligence sources reported favorable areas. On 1 May, an interdiction of the commo-liaison cadre at XS 523 475 was concluded without success and the group was extracted by truck and returned to Dong Tam at 0815H. Again on 8 May in the same type of operation at XS 875 282, the Seals reported no success. On 12 May, the Seal operation was concluded due to the lack of immediate extraction and

fire support capability. The lack of extraction resulted from the breakdown of the steering mechanism on the MSSC. On 14 May at 1400H, LTJG Young and one Seal captured a finance and economy cadre plus one kilo of documents and a sampan in the vicinity of XS 873 282. The VC and captured material were turned over to the district chief at Binh Dai.

In the most significant operation of the month, LTJG Young and five Seals departed Dong Tam at 1715H on 17 May in company with two squads of Vietnamese for XS 094 585 and XS 093 586, a scene of rice paddies and a treeline along a canal. While the two squads were inserted and searched the area, two VC were captured plus a huge cache of enemy weapons which were buried in 55 gallon drums with concrete covers and camouflaged. On being notified of this impressive discovery, COMNAVFORV stated:

> "Impressive results such as those achieved in action reported exemplify the combat readiness of your platoon and their expertise.[1]

In an unrelated development, EN1 William T. Doyle of Victor Platoon dislocated his left hip in a non-hostile action when his Jeep slid off the QL-4 highway, 71 miles west of Dong Tam on 20 May. He was medevaced to the 3rd Surgical Hospital, Binh Thuy

1. COMNAVFORV msg DTG 181323Z May 71

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for treatment where his condition was reported as good.

The other casualty for the month occurred on 29 May when AN Terry L. Mize of HAL-3, Detachment 7 sustained shrapnel wounds to the back when the helicopter in which he was a crewmember received enemy fire. AN Mize was treated locally and released the same day.

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## TRAN HUNG DAO IX

The TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO was devoid of any hostile action on the waterways during the month of May; there were no firefights and no casualties. The one noteworthy event was the destruction of the helicopter pad at the ATSB Phuoc Xuyen on 21 May at 0850H. This unfortunate event occurred when a smoke grenade inadvertantly was rolled onto an area under the pad which had served as a jettison area for fuel. The fuel and grass in the area ignited, were fanned by a helicopter attempting to land, and the end result was the destruction of the pad, 100 feet of wooded walkways, the fuel service tanks, and one watch tower. The fire was brought under control at 0930H and extinguished at 1030H. Thus, the only centrally located helicopter refueling and rearming station in the TRAN HUNG DAO IX AO was closed for an undetermined length of time.

Although action on the Ong Lon Canal was nil, Navy Seawolf helicopters carried the war to the enemy as they struck ten times killing eight soldiers, damaging five bunkers, and destroying one sampan. In addition, Seawolves, aided by Black Ponies, saved the outpost of Hoa Bien, located at WS 712 917, on the night of 23 May. The outpost came under heavy attack and just as it seemed that the enemy was going to break through the inner defense

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perimeter, Seawolves of Detachments Five and Nine configured as a heavy fire team. arrived on the scene and succeded in driving the VC back and keeping them at bay. When the Seawolves had exhausted their ordnance, Black Pony aircraft appeared and placed their deadly strikes. Results of the action were 13 friendly killed and 16 wounded. Seven of the enemy troops were killed and numerous blood trails were found. The airmen of CTF 116.7 and CTF 116.8 were commended for their courageous and aggressive action by COMNAVFORV.

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TRAN HUNG DAO X

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO X AO was light as for the third consecutive month a total of only 11 firefights were recorded. Five friendly troops were wounded while 21 of the enemy were killed.

An intelligence report that enemy sappers attached to the C-7 Local Force Company and the U Minh 11 Batallion were active on the Song Ong Doc in the vicinity of VQ 837 974 proved highly accurate, as no less than five ABFs occurred on river traffic in this area. There was also one attempted mining at the ATSB Song Ong Doc.

Seawolves of CTG 116.7.3 flew 15 missions in support of TRAN HUNG DAO X and had contact during 13 of them. They accounted for four enemy casualties; 15 hootches and 11 sampans were destroyed.

On 3 May at 0850H, units of RID 48, in transit to the mouth of the Song Ong Doc, received rocket and small arms fire from the south bank at VQ 853 997. The rivercraft returned the fire and the enemy guns were silenced. Seawolves were scrambled but did not fire because they were unable to obtain proper clearances. There were no friendly casualties and enemy casualties were unknown.

The night of 4 May marked the first of three incidents in which wounded civilians were brought to ATSB Ca Mau. A teen

aged Vietnamese male brought his 15 year old sister to the base suffering from small caliber gunshot wounds in her right shoulder and chest. The boy related that his sister was wounded and his father killed by the VC in the vicinity of WR 110 170 at approximately 2100H. The girl was given first aid and taken to the civilian hospital at Ca Mau.

The second such incident occurred on 13 May at approximately 1500H when an adult Vietnamese female was shot in the neck near her home at WR 106 168. She was treated by USN and VNN corpsmen at ATSB Ca Mau and driven to Ca Mau Hospital. Allied personnel were unable to determine who shot the woman or for what reason.

The guerrillas based along the Song Ong Doc struck once more on 16 May when they again turned to terror tactics, this time attacking an unarmed water taxi with B-40 rockets at WR 020 050. The attack at 1000H did no damage to the water taxi or its occupants. Units of RPD-63 on routine patrol in the vicinity were called, but the VNN patrol officer decided not to enter the area.

RAG 26 personnel were the next victims of the guerrillas as rivercraft of this unit were struck at VR 937 010 while proceeding to a PF troop insertion point. The attack occurred at 0914H and was

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carried out with small arms and automatic weapons. One VNN and two PF soldiers were wounded and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Later the same day, at 1530H, units of RAG 26 received B-40 rocket and automatic weapons fire from the south bank at VR 933 007. Units returned and suppressed the fire and continued on patrol. There was no damage, and no casualties incurred by friendly forces; enemy casualties were unknown.

A resupply convoy consisting of one LCM, two LCUs and various units of RAG 26 and RPD 63 was attacked on 19 May at VR 878 003, at 1245H. The enemy attacked with B-40 rockets, automatic weapons and small arms. The LCM-8 was hit with one B-40 rocket, as was the LCU HQ 1571, both suffering minor damage but fortunately no casualties. The units returned and suppressed the fire and probably killed one VC.

The third incident in which civilians bore the brunt of violence happened at 2130H on 23 May when a 13 year old girl was hit by a stray round from an RF/PF unit operating in the vicinity of VR 045 070. She was brought into ATSB Ca Mau by sampan, treated by the duty corpsman and rushed to the civilian hospital where she died.

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On 27 May at 1455H, VNN LCM-8 HQ 920 came under B-40 rocket attack as she made her way up the Song Ong Doc after receiving supplies from USS WHITFIELD COUNTY. The firing came from the south bank at VR 915 010 and was immediately answered by the LCM and her five escorts from RAG 26. They completely suppressed the fire; however, one rocket hit the conex box containing an acetylene bottle and a fire broke out. The fire was controlled and the convoy continued to ATSB Song Ong Doc. There were no friendly casualties, and enemy casualties were undetermined.

Excitement was generated at ATSB SongOng Doc on 29 May at 0237H and again at 0315H as the VC tried unsuccessfully to sneak mines past the alert sentries. The sentries destroyed both mines with concussion grenades; the explosions causing waterspouts 70 feet high. No friendly troops were injured, and enemy casualties were not determined.

Seals of Team One, Detachment Golf, Papa Platoon engaged in one operation in May; the purpose being to capture VC infrastructure. The Seal team, accompanied by an interpreter and eight National Policemen, inserted from a National Police Boat at 1545H on 12 May at WR 199 017. They patrolled toward

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the tax collector's hootch but enroute spotted eight males with weapons and opened fire. The enemy evaded and since the patrol was compromised due to the firing, the Seals decided to patrol to the extraction point via the tax collector's hootch. As they approached the tax collector's hootch, he was seen evading 500 meters east into a treeline. The Seals extracted by boat at 1915H and returned to the base empty handed.

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## TRAN HUNG DAO XVII

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO was moderate during the month of May. Units of CTF 210 engaged the enemy on 14 occasions, killing 45 VC and capturing five. Twenty-one structures and eight sampans were destroyed and five weapons, one watermine and miscellaneous supplies were captured. Five craft were mined, two of which were disabled and one sunk. The other two suffered slight damage but were able to carry out their operational committments. Two Americans, 12 Vietnamese, and four civilians were wounded; five Vietnamese sailors were killed, and one ARVN was declared missing. CTG 116.8 and 116.7.3 accounted for 26 VC killed and six wounded; 59 structures, 27 bunkers, 64 sampans, and miscellaneous supplies were destroyed in flying 86 sorties in support of TRAN HUNG DAO XVII Operations.

The majority of enemy activity occurred on the Can Gio Canal in an area about 25 to 29 kilometers southwest of Kien An. A study of the terrain in this area reveals small fields bordered by thick forest on either side of the canal. Because of the open rice fields lying behind the forest along the canal, these areas are much more conducive to minings than to ambushes. Since the first of the year there have been ten minings on the Can Gio Canal, four on the Trem Trem, and ten on the Can Tau (three of which were recorded this month). Ambushes on the other hand, would be vulnerable

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to air strikes, and the terrain would not facilitate a guerrilla team's concealment or retreat.

On the Trem Trem River, enemy activity was concentrated in an area from 14 to 21 kilometers northwest of Thoi Binh (WR 102 328). The banks of the river here are covered with thick foliage which extends a considerable distance back from both banks. This cover permits much easier retreat from the ambush site and affords good protection from air strikes.

Activity along the Cai Tau River was centered around hamlets 3 and 4 of An Khanh Village (WR 010 350). This area is heavily vegetated with interspaced rice fields and is thus conducive to both ambush and mining attacks.

During the past month, intelligence reports were received of enemy units resupplying along the U Minh coastline via small coastal type craft. Air assets, when utilized, proved effective in partially interdicting this enemy resupply operation. A review of the many different insertion points indicated that the enemy was not establishing a pattern by over-using any one canal or stream. Speculation as to possible points of origin included the Mo So MT area (VS 610 250) and the Three Sisters area (VS 870 180). It was also possible that the enemy was shuttling supplies down the coast, relaying them from one craft to another, until the final destination was reached.

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The Camp Sentinel Radar System located at Op Base Kien An reported heavy enemy movement on five different occasions during the month. At approximately 0310H on 6 May, the operator of the radar system reported heavy enemy movement from 200 meters to the 800 meter range that indicated enemy troop deployment for a possible attack on the Op Base. With clearance from the Kien An District, an 81 mm mortar barrage was laid on the area by a U.S. advisor mortar crew with concurrent 30 caliber machine gun fire from the south tower. Shortly after the initial mortar barrage, the CSR showed two groups retreating to the south and southwest. One group embarked in sampans and the other group reentered the area to recover their stricken numbers. A second mortar barrage was laid down along with 105 mm artillery to prevent withdrawing units from recovering the bodies. The mortar fire was lifted at 0730H when civilian traffic in the area prevented safe firing. A thorough sweep of the area by RF and PF forces plus USN advisors revealed considerable grass trails and fresh sandal prints but no bodies. The radar estimates of the enemy force placed the strength at approximately 100 men.

On 11 May, a group of approximately 10-15 suspected enemy were observed at WR 125 890. At 0230H, with clearance from the Kien An Sector, 81 mm mortar fire was unleashed upon the target. No sweep of the area was made by the RF/PF forces and the movement of the target

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indicated a possible reconnaissance patrol from an NVA unit supposedly located at WR 125 795.

On 18 May, a gate tower guard observed two muzzle flashes from a position located at WR 125 902. Immediately thereafter mortar rounds, evaluated as 62 mm, were received in the Can Gio Canal adjacent to the base. No additional fire was received and none was returned. Approximately 60 VC were detected at WR 080 904 and 60 VC at WR 133 873.

On 19 May, the CSR registered heavy movement between 200 and 800 meters in a southerly direction. A bombardment of 60 and 81 millimeter mortar fire plus 50 caliber and M-60 machine gun fire was directed at the target. An estimate of approximately 100 enemy personnel were reported at the target position. A sweep of the area by RF troops recovered no bodies. Again on 29 May, an estimated 20 enemy personnel were reported in the same vicinity and once again, mortars were fired. The enemy withdrew and the extent of enemy casualties could not be determined.

Firefights by waterborne units were comparatively light during the month and the number of minings and recovered mines seemed to ease. On 16 May, ASPB HQ 5122, the number two boat in a 12 boat convoy, experienced a watermine detonation near the bank at WR 009 357 on the Cai Tau River in An Xuyen Province. The trigger force of the mine detonation

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was described as very small, about equal to one or two concussion grenades or possibly a low order detonation of a larger mine. The crew checked the sweep gear immediately after the incident and recovered about 20 feet of nylon line. No casualties or damage occurred in the incident.

On 18 May, a 13 boat convoy from the 32nd Regimental CP enroute to Ca Mau with three lead boats minesweeping was delayed when the fifth boat, an ARVN LCM-8, was mined at WR 012 352 on the Cai Tau River in An Xuyen Province. The LCM-8 was heavily damaged by a large watermine that badly warped the hull. As a result, the boat was beached on the east bank in shallow water. A Seawolf strike was placed in the area and SEALORD 05 which was transitting the area responded immediately to the medevac request. One ARVN was killed, one wounded, and one was declared missing in the encounter.

The next day two ASPBs of RAID 75 were transitting south from the 32nd Regimental CP to the area of the LCM-8 sinking when the lead boat, HQ 5126, was struck and disabled by a watermine blast under the stern. No other fire was received and the boat was towed to the 32nd CP. Three Vietnamese sailors were wounded (all seriously). The enemy was not finished with the incident as one of the four boats (HQ 9171 of RAID 75), providing security around the wreck of the ARVN LCM-8, was the object

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of a sapper placed mine. Fortunately the discovery was made prior to detonation. The mine was placed near the bar armor below the waterline and removed by RAID 75 personnel. A VNN EOD team assigned to the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII salvage operations disarmed the mine, which was contained in a wooden box and weighed approximately 40 kilos.

On 21 May at 1350H, HQ 5122 and HQ 5123 of RAID 74 were each struck by B-40/41 rocket fire at WR 077 388 on the Song Trem Trem as they were proceeding in a 12 boat convoy north to the 32nd CP. The other craft returned fire to both banks and a Black Pony strike was requested. Both ASPBs, although slightly damaged, proceeded on their own power. One American, SF1 Donald F. Antonacci, received minor shrapnel wounds to the right thigh. Five Vietnamese sailors were also wounded (two seriously and three minor).

On 22 May, a 12 boat convoy under operational control of CTG 210.2, while proceeding south from the 32nd CP (WR 04 47) to Ca Mau, was attacked on two occasions by B-40 rocket fire. HQ 1234 received a B-40 rocket and small arms fire on the port side from the east bank at WR 079 394 at 1110H. All the boats beached and returned the fire. At 1115H, as the convoy resumed transit, HQ 1239 was struck by one B-40 rocket and again the boats were beached and returned the fire. Seawolves were called in to rake the west banks while one company of ARVN were inserted to patrol the east bank. At 1130H, another B-40 was fired but missed its target,

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HQ 1234. Immediately, the ARVN took under fire six VC running from their bunkers. In the ensuing fight, three ARVN were wounded by a VC grenade tossed by the retreating enemy personnel. The ARVN soldiers were withdrawn and the Seawolves placed strikes on the other bank. At 1415H, contact was terminated and the convoy resumed transit to Ca Mau without further incident.

On 24 May PBRs of RPD 61 were ambushed with B-40 rocket fire at WR 215 755, nine kilometers west of Kien Hung. The boats returned the fire and with the assistance of Black Ponies and Seawolves, suppressed the enemy fire. No casualties were reported from the incident.

On 25 May, HQ 1234 of RAID 75, in transit to a WBGP, experienced a mine detonation near its position at WR 008 363 on the Rach Soi Toi. The suspected mine was thought to be command detonated. No damage resulted as only mud was thrown on board the craft.

During May, accidents on two rivercraft effectively denied their use to TRAN HUNG DAO XVII. On 8 May, a fire was detected aboard a U.S. Army LCM-8 moored in a nest alongside the repair ammi at Op Base Kien An. The boat was loaded with approximately 9,000 gallons of JP-4 fuel in bladders. Response to the fire by all hands was immediate and professional, but the fire could not be contained , and the boat was set adrift to the north bank of the river. The fire was finally brought under control with a layer

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of foam and the bladders cooled. The boat was later towed back across the river and beached a safe distance from the Kien An piers. Both COMNAVFORV and DEPCOMTHD congratulated the personnel of Op Base Kien An for their actions in controlling the blaze. One U.S. Army soldier received slight burns in fighting the blaze.

The other incident occurred on 31 May when a USN LCM-3 sunk alongside the pier in approximately 20 feet of water. The boat was last pumped at 1900H on 30 May. The OIC TRAN HUNG DAO XVII Salvage Operations was directed to survey the craft at the first available opportunity. On 31 May, SENADV CTF 210 directed the Senior Advisor CTG 210.1 to appoint an officer to investigate the sinking in accordance with the directives prescribed in the JAG Manual. By month's end, the investigation of the sinking was still pending.

HCU-1 salvage personnel kept up the relentless struggle of clearing sunken craft from waterways in the TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AO with the salvage of HQ 8001 on 30 April, RID 48 ATCs HQ 1293 and 1294 on 13 May, and Zippo 6533 on 26 May. On 28 April, HQ 8001 was found in the Can Gio Canal facing the western bank and making a 45 degree angle to that bank at VR 995 699. The boat was sitting upright on the bottom of the canal in four feet of mud. The bow was in approximately eight feet of water and the stern in approximately ten feet of water. The boat had

extensive damage in the well deck and initial thoughts suggested that the forward voids could not be made watertight. The stern and engine room were damaged on the deck area probably due to counter mining. There was a split in the bottom from the bow ramp to a spot approximately two feet aft of the forward lifting pad. The whole part of the well deck was blown up and all the bulkheads and walls forward were buckled. On 29 April work progressed on the salvage and by the end of the day the LCMS-1 started pulling HQ 8001 onto the beach. On 30 April, the LCMS-2 was pressed into service for the final assault and by a constant effort dragged HQ 8001 partially onto the beach. The craft was left approximately 40 feet on the beach with the engine room completely out of the water and 30 feet in the water, secured from sliding back by a one inch wire. As a result of the salvage operation, LCMS-1 was declared to be of no further use due to the deficiencies in the electrical system and the attendant hazard to the personnel who could not start it at any given time.

On 11 May, the two USN salvage boats were escorted by two Fourth Coastal Zone units and completed the transit from Kien An to the USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (AGP 838). In the morning hours of the next day, the salvage boats continued to ATSB Song Ong Doc with escort by TRAN HUNG DAO X units to commence salvage operations in the southern U Minh. On 12 May, at 0630H, LCMSs 1 and 2 were positioned on each side

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of the sunken HQ 1293 and proceeded to raise the craft without incident. After completing the salvage on HQ 1293, the boats shifted to the sink site of HQ 1294 and, using the same technique, salvaged that craft on 13 May. Both boats were turned over to the commanding officer of RID 48 at ATSB Song Ong Doc.

After conducting repairs on LCMSs 1 and 2, at Ca Mau, the salvage teams again set out on 17 May for the sink site of Zippo HQ 6533. Combat Group 332 and An Xuyen Sector were detailed to provide security for the operation planned for the waterway on 20 May. On 20 May, as per schedule, LCMS-1 and 2 arrived at the sink site (VR 00 38) at 1430H and positioned the craft for a lift at 1500H. After considerable effort by the crewmembers, operations were secured at 1830H for the day. The next day met with little success, and after resurveying the wreck, a hole eight feet by four and a half feet was discovered along with tears along the bottom. On the 23rd and 24th, all effort was expanded in patching the hulk before proceeding to lift it. Finally, on the next day, the Zippo was raised and placed on the beach where more extensive patching was accomplished before attempting to refloat it. On 27 May, after much patching and refurbishing, the salvage crew pulled HQ 6533 off the beach and, with a skeleton crew aboard, attempted to tow it to Ca Mau. Before they could ascertain the problem, a Y-shaped split, a heretofore non-existing damage along the deck centerline

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which deteriorated rapidly, gave way, and in 45 seconds the boat sank again at WR 016 323. The extremely steep bank gradient precluded further salvage attempts and fortunately the craft was not blocking the channel. Due to the position and condition of the craft, the salvage personnel recommended that salvage efforts be abandoned and the hulk be blown in place. COMNAVFORV, however, refrained from granting approval due to the position of the craft which was causing no problem and due to other considerations which were not given. It was suggested that CTF 210 request approval for demolition from CNO VNN. At month's end, salvage efforts on HQ 6533 were abandoned in favor of continuing with more important salvage projects and the crew continued to the sink site of HQ 6002.

On 3 May, COMNAVFORV requested that a mobile diving team from TRAN HUNG DAO XVII conduct a survey on an ARVN LCM-8 (8545) which was supposed to have been sunk by B-40 rockets in October 1970 at WR 275 755. The Senior Advisor CTF 210 replied that no information existed on any boat sunk at those coordinates, however, an ARVN LCM-8 (8543 was sunk in the Nga Boi Cai Tau River (WR 266 734) on 2 October 1970 as it was transitting with bridging material. CTF 210 further stated that a survey was compatible with the present schedules and that a salvage survey would be attempted on 8 May. On 9 May, the survey was completed on HQ 8543 at WR 226 734. The sunken craft was beached

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stern first at a slope gradient of five degrees with considerable mud accumulation throughout and two B-40 rocket holes amidships. The hulk was in good condition and a recommendation was made for salvage. As of the end of the month, the salvage of HQ 8543 was still pending.

Another problem that surfaced during the month was posed by COMNAVSUPPACT Saigon and Senior Advisor VNN LOGSUPPCOM on 24 May over the disposition of beached boats. SENADV CTF 210 responded that no action was being taken by VNN operations at this time to recover the boats. The list of beached boats, locations, and CTF 210 comments were as follows:

| Craft | Location | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| HQ 1256 | VR 950 688 | Beyond economical repair; strike from records |
| HQ 8001 | VR 955 696 | Beyond economical repair; recommend survey |
| HQ 5134 | Op Base Kien An | Beyond repair; recommend survey |
| HQ 6001 | VR 973 750 | Beyond economical repair; recommend survey |

CTF 210 further stated that in view of the condition of the beached boats and questionable prospects of repair, as well as current demands on operational assets and salvage capabilities, renovation priority would be given to boats with high repair potential. All others would be beached for removal or survey, as appropriate, contingent on operational requirements and availability of salvage assets.

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The much heralded RADRAG system, which was slated to provide the electronic sweeping for TRAN HUNG DAO XVII units, met with failure as both units were declared inoperative. On 1 May, COMNAVFORV recommended that all critical electronic components of the RADRAG system be replaced. In addition, the NAVFORV Swimmer Defense Officer and an NRDU-V representative were ordered to Kien An to lend additional assistance to the personnel working with the RADRAG system.

What brought forth this decision was the message issued by the SENADV CTF 210 in which he stated that in a pre-mission test on 30 April, neither unit generated an audio signal. Efforts to correct the problem on the 30th of April met with no success and further testing revealed one unit was inoperative due to component failure and the other had a broken wire in the unit. However, both units were reported to have been repaired on the scene. He further stated that equipment tests and crew training included practice sweeps in the Cai Lon River and Can Gao Canal. The primary purpose of the training was to mark locations of mine wire detected by RADRAG so that mines could be destroyed by EOD personnel. This training was necessary in reducing the probability of false alarms due to operator error.

On 4 May, the RADRAG system was scheduled for a mine detection mission prior to employment on 5 May with a JP-4 convoy. After concluding the test, the mission was cancelled due to continuing electronic

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problems with the system. The NRDU-V representative at Kien An returned to Saigon for test equipment and skematics necessary for RADRAG repair. As a result of the breakdown, an Army LCM-8 minesweeper was pressed into service to accompany the convoy.

By mid-month after an exhausting study by the research personnel, COMNAVFORV requested that the Senior Advisor Op Base Kien An assemble all the components of the RADRAG devices for transport and repair to NRDU-V. For the present, TRAN HUNG DAO XVII units would have to rely on the minesweeping of the units assigned and the expertise of the personnel that have provided this service in the past.

The Dustoff operation which has been the subject of a series of messages came again to the fore as Senior Advisor CTG 210.4 responded to NAVLE DMAC's terse statements about generalized allegations unsupported by facts. (See CNFV Monthly Summary March, April 1971). Besides disputing DMAC's facts, CTG 210.4 again pointed out the Dustoff response time and also specified that descriminations did exist since six levels of priority were listed. He further stated that he recognized the limitations of Dustoff assets but felt that the time lag was due to inadequate planning. He stated:

"Significantly in a war for the hearts and minds of the people, it is the Vietnamese civilian that has been put on low priority. This seems

patently inconsistent with the successful prosecution of an anti-guerrilla war."[1]

One of the serious problems plaguing efforts to turnover completely the assets to the Vietnamese Navy was the subject of a message sent by Senior Advisor DEPCOMTHD to the Senior Advisor CTF 210. In it he stated:

It is clear that one of the basic problems inhibiting operational performance in the TRAN HUNG DAO Campaigns is the poor material condition of assigned units. The Vietnamese Navy is operating at full strength and there is no prospect of obtaining new or replacement units in the near future. The only way to put more boats on the line is to reduce the need for major repairs.

A high state of readiness depends primarily on effective maintenance at the operational level. The basic equipment was designed and built to operate for several thousand hours with normal attention to daily, weekly, and monthly routine planned maintenance. It is imperative that the Vietnamese Navy be impressed with the need for such practices and concentrate on preventative maintenance.

You are urged to devote maximum attention in your advisory efforts to achieving the following immediate goals:

A. Perform corrective maintenance on all machinery not presently in service. If it is within the capability of the boat force or advisory team embarked to initiate action to effect repairs. If the only thing keeping a boat from being repaired is technical advice, request it. The SA DEPCOMT staff will help you obtain assistance if you desire.

B. Keep equipment running via planned maintenance or PM. Use and study the material which has been distributed on this subject. If you need material, SA DEPCOMTHD staff will assist in obtaining it. During visits to your unit, SA DEPCOMTHD will expect a brief report on what you are doing to keep operational readiness high.

1. SA CTF 210.4 msg 041000Z May 71.

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Long range goals are:

A. Simple but an effective damage control program. Ensure that every craft has at least one DC Log and the minimum DC gear. Again originator will assist with this program.

B. Provide recognition and incentives for those craft commanders, engineers, and advisors that have consistantly kept their equipment at or near full operational readiness. Upon notification, originator will urge his counterpart to personnally recognize any noteworthy performance.

C. Promote friendly competition between your boats for superior standards of excellence. Establish a suitable incentive for the most improved RAD, best overall, or other category of your own choosing. Again, SA DEPCOMTHD will assist with any worthwhile scheme you devise.

U.S. repair ships are leaving before the ISBs and LSBs are completed, therefore, it is mandatory that each crewmember of every boat understands this and appreciates fully the importance of increasing the life of equipment between upkeeps. Part of your job is to help them develop an awareness of the value of routine maintenance practices.

Procedures and written material in this area, promulgated by the USN are often too complex and lengthy for VNN personnel to comprehend or use on the rivers. SA DEPCOMTHD welcomes suggestions from the field as to ways of making preventive maintenance procedures, damage control guides, and documentation simpler and more realistic.

SA DEPCOMTHD is fully aware of the difficulties of selling these concepts in the field and the ticklishness of the advisor's position. Hopefully, by working together, SA DEPCOMTHD can supplement your efforts by making the Vietnamese high command more aware of the problems and encouraging it to become more deeply involved. Your recommendations as to how DEPCOMTHD can help you achieve the above goals would be appreciated.[2]

In response to Senior Advisor DEPCOMTHD message, Senior Advisor RPD 61 stated:

It is concurred that locally performed PMS is an important aspect of the problem, however, an equally critical element is major preventive and corrective maintenance and logistic support from LSBs

2. SA DEPCOMTHD msg 200856Z May 71.

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and ISBs. Machinery designed to operate for several thousand hours will eventually fail and require major repairs. When this point is exceeded regardless of locally performed minor PMS actions such as checking oil and water levels, PBR PMS requires engine overhaul each two thousand hours. At this point U.S. RIVDIVs also gave the entire boat an overhaul. Almost all RPD 61 engines are in excess of two thousand hours since last overhaul. When an engine has a casualty, it is usually pulled and corrective maintenance performed, but not overhauled. The quality of this corrective maintenance frequently leads to further engine casualties. In practice a corrective maintenance system has replaced PMS in the VNN. It should be pointed out that ISB Rach Soi personnel are trying to do a good job but are severely hampered due to lack of spare parts and rotable spares as well as lack of capable VNN PBR enginemen. Although two RPDs have been based at Rach Soi since October 1970, the base has only had a spare parts allowance for one RPD. The situation will probably deteriorate further because of the "cluster" concept which will require RPD 61 to obtain repairs at Long Xuyen even though operating from Rach Soi, and even though Long Xuyen is not ready to operate yet. It has been noted with concern the gradual material condition deterioration since turnover regardless of local performance of PMS. RPD 58 craft show the same deterioration. It is felt that only a thorough overhaul can be obtained from either ISB Rach Soi or LSB Binh Thuy in reasonable amount of time based on past performance. RPD 61 now stages two PBRs at LSB Binh Thuy in time for routine repairs. Ninety percent or more of the time at Binh Thuy is spent waiting. Quality of work is usually poor and excessive time required is unbelievable. One RPD has had boats at Binh Thuy for seven months that are still awaiting repairs. Whereas Rach Soi tries, it is hard to give Binh Thuy much credit.

Performance of PMS at RPD level is a function of command attention and desire of the boat captain. Unfortunately the RPD 61 repair officer does not feel strongly about PMS and the other junior officers do not become involved. Some concientious boat captains do a creditable job on PMS despite lack of spare parts and tools. Others do zero. There are no checksheets turned in for documentation or supervision purposes because the unit cannot afford to buy paper or make its own. This problem was addressed to COMNAVFORV which offered assistance. Information on VNN consumable supplies is difficult to obtain. The Naval Supply Advisor's Handbook simply states consumables are underfunded. Information from LSB, ISB, and counterpart indicates each RPD received one thousand piasters per quarter for all administrative consumables. On the open market this would purchase about one ream of paper, insufficient for one months worth of check sheets. All units queried indicated at least some consumable support on the side from advisors.

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Some advisors hesitate to look closely at where their counterpart might be getting some of his supplies.

My counterpart is making some effort in this area, but effectiveness is difficult to judge. Competition between boats culminates each month with stand by for penalty inspection. Leading boats receive monetary prizes. The worst boats must stand by for penalty inspections. The problem is lack of suitable prizes.

The senior VNN command attention to promote PMS, and to distribute and make available adequate base support for major maintenance, is vital. This advisory unit has shifted prime emphasis from operations to logistics and maintenance.[3]

In a change of command, Captain Paul C. Gibbons, Jr., USN, relieved CDR Wyatt P. Watson, USN, as SENADV CATF 211 and SENADV CTF 210 on 22 May. On 8 May, LT C. Thompson, HCU-1 representative located at Vung Tau, was relieved by LTJG Borokowski.

3. SA RPD 61 msg 231045Z May 71.

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TRAN HUNG DAO XVIII

The Mekong Convoy operation was originated as a short term operation to keep POL and general supplies coming into the Khmer capital city when Route 4 from the port of Kompong Som was closed due to enemy activity. It had been officially extended for two more months as of the first of May. As a normal Mekong convoy consistently carried ten times as much POL as a regular 30 truck convoy, and as Route 4 remained only marginally open during the month while the Mekong convoys had always been getting through, and as the POL shortage in Phnom Penh remained critical in May, the decision to extend the river convoy was altogether logical. Security of shipping on the Mekong improved significantly in the past two months, with only minor harassing incidents occurring.

The attack on convoy TP-17 at the end of April was the first attack on a convoy since 17 March, and the 21st attack since the convoys began. The area bounded by WT 22 24 and WT 28 37 was the scene of eight previous attacks this year. Of the other 12 attacks, all but one were between WT 25 65 and WT 12 72.

Convoy TP-18, consisting of two merchant ships, two tankers with 1400 tons of POL, three tugs towing two barges of ammo,

two barges of general cargo, and one barge of POL, and a Leapdal towboat with a POL barge, departed Tan Chau at 0300H on 8 May. The escorting force had a standard composition: a mine sweeping force of six PBRs and four mine sweepers, an interdiction force of six PBRs, a blocking force of four ASPBs and two ATCs and one Monitor, a scouting force of two Cambodian PBRs, a convoy escort of three PCFs and 16 Vietnamese PBRs and five Cambodian PBRs, a reaction force of six ASPBs and four ATCs and one CCB, and finally a flagship of one LSSL. The USAF FACs gave continuous airborne cover, as did USAF fixed wing gunships, while USN Seawolf gunships of Detachment 5 and 9 stood by on ready alert. The Navy helicopters were only able to give support strikes when up to one half the distance to Neak Luong, as their staying time did not allow them to proceed further. As the entire route from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh was considered a "no-fire zone", a clearance was needed for each response to the enemy, somewhat slowing the reaction time. The convoy arrived at Phnom Penh at 1600H on the same day.

Convoy PT-18, composed of ten vessels with escorts was underway at 1010H on 9 May. Ten kilometers outside of Phnom Penh the tug VIKING was ordered to turn back by the convoy commander, since she was making less than four knots while five

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knots was the required minimal speed for escorting POL and ammo carrying craft. The tug VIKING was consistently one of the slowest main body units, and since she was a general cargo barge she was "expendable". The convoy arrived at Tan Chau without incident at 1945H on the same day.

At 0230H on 17 May, convoy TP-19 left the Tan Chau staging area, with a composition of four merchant ships with general cargo, four tankers with POL, a tug with two ammo barges, and a Leapdal towboat with a POL barge. The convoy was attacked at WT 298 380 at 0700H with 75mm recoilless rifle and B-40 rocket fire. The tanker VIRA received one hit, sustaining slight damage, as did the merchant ship ALLY. At 0710H the escort force returned fire and a reaction force landed to support bank security forces. The fire fight resulted in three casualties (one killed and two wounded). The convoy meanwhile had been split with six ships holding at Neak Luong and four ships south of the point of contact. All ships rejoined the convoy at 0945H and continued past the contact area, arriving at Phnom Penh at 1600H.

Convoy PT-19 was composed of three merchantmen, two tankers, three tugs, and a towboat. The convoy split into two segments, with the slow segment consisting of the two slow tugs, making 4.5 knots,

departing at 0800H on 18 May. The fast element departed at 0930H, two hours later, and the entire convoy arrived at Tan Chau without incident at 1930H.

Convoy TN-19, heading for Neak Luong with three LCUs with tanks and ammunition, escorted by two PBRs, six ASPBs, and five ATCs, departed Tan Chau at 1000H on 18 May. Aircover was provided as necessary. During the month a 26 tank convoy of trucks left Tan Chau and transited Route 1 without incident to Phnom Penh.

Mekong Convoy TP-20 departed the Tan Chau staging area at 0100H on 27 May, arriving at 1515H the same day without incident. The convoy was composed of two merchantmen with general cargo, a tanker, three tugs, and a Leapdal towboat. The convoy brought a total of 450,000 gallons of critically needed POL to the capital city.

The return convoy, PT-20, departed Phnom Penh at 0900H the following day, arriving at 1800H without incident. The convoy was composed of four merchantmen, two tankers, three tugs, and a Leapdal towboat. Besides general cargo the convoy carried 3000 tons of rice for the erstwhile "ricebowl of Asia", Vietnam.

The Mekong Convoy designation procedures in use were a modification of the system used for merchant ship convoys during

World Wars I and II. There have been three different types of convoys: commercial convoys between Tan Chau and Phnom Penh (designated TP-_);military resupply convoys for ARVN troops between Tan Chau and Neak Luong (designated TN-_); and special interest, high priority, military or civilian convoys between Tan Chau and Phnom Penh. Return convoys have been simply designated with the letters reversed. (e.g. PT-_). Planning of the commercial convoys started usually at least seven days ahead of the anticipated movement of the convoy. The military convoys between Tan Chau and Neak Luong have been more rapidly organized, with generally one day advanced warning. The air and surface escorts have been lighter and bank security troops have not been a prerequisite.

A 13 May message from Phnom Penh noted that industrial diesel oil was in very short supply. TP-18 had not carried any and oil company officials stated that several private industries were forced to temporarily shut down until the next convoy arrived with POL. TP-19 proved a disappointment to the oil companies, and industrial diesel reached extremely low levels, while mogas and auto diesel were almost exhausted. TP-20 brought almost 450,000 gallons of POL, which was, nonetheless, insufficient for the need; for at month's end, fuel oil in Phnom Penh was reported by TeiaKhmer to be still at a critically low state, so much so that a

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special escort for the tanker KHMER TRADER, with 569,400 gallons of POL, was requested in order to get the POL as soon as possible. The tanker finally left with convoy TP-21 on 2 June.

## TRAN HUNG DAO XIX

TRAN HUNG DAO XIX, the area of operation encompassing Kien Hoa Province and the area that was once termed as the least pacified region in South Vietnam, was unusually quiet during the month of May as activity came almost to a standstill. The apparent reasons for the lull were not attributed to the lack of VC in the area, but, rather to the persistent efforts of the GVN in thwarting the enemy intentions, and to the enemy's refitting in order to prepare for a giant onslaught at some future date. To support this, a Hoi Chanh debriefed on 6 May stated that the D-100 Transportation Company was a rear service company operating in the Binh Dai Secret Zone of Kien Hoa Province, and was responsible for the receipt, storage, and reissuance of weapons and ammunition in caches located in Binh Dai. As of February 1971, the D-100 was not responsible for actual transshipment, and supplies were received from the Thanh Phu Secret Zone via junks of another group and were reissued from caches (XS 91 19) in Binh Dai to operating forces of Go Cong and Kien Hoa Provinces. The operational forces were responsible for transport [to their respective areas] of supplies drawn in Binh Dai. He further reported that the coastal transshipment unit moving supplies from Thanh Phu to Binh Dai was staged out of an area along the Rach Con Minh and the Rach Ho Co (both XR 79 88).

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On 10 May, an intelligence report indicated that during the early parts of May, a Communist ocean going ship stopped offshore of the Thanh Phu Secret Zone and unloaded an unknown amount of weapons and ammunition onto motorized sampans which delivered the material to the area of the Bang Cung Canal (XR 798 980). The ammunition consisted of AK-47, 82 millimeter mortar, RPD/LMG and RPG-2 rounds which were to be distributed to the armed forces in Kien Hoa and Vinh Long Provinces. (CNFV INTSUM 116-71). This is the first report received concerning "ocean going" ships delivering war materials into the Thanh Phu Secret Zone. Such reports have been received however, of shipments into the Binh Dai Secret Zone. Reports have also been received of an unknown enemy transportation unit, probably the D-100 Transportation Company, delivering supplies from Thanh Phu to Binh Dai.

Although the CTG 217.2 units were not challenged by the enemy as frequently as in the past, nevertheless, they continued to patrol the area of operations and resupply the ARVN units. In the most significant action of the month, RAG 23/31 craft acted in direct support of the Second Battalion, Tenth Regiment on 15 May, when they were confronted by an estimated two platoons of VC. While acting as a blocking force for the ARVN, the RAG craft fired 81mm and 40mm mortars, and M-79 rounds in direct fire support. Seven VC were killed in the encounter.

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CTG 116.8 supported TRAN HUNG DAO XIX units with 30 sorties and was credited with the deaths of 30 VC as a result of the intense fire that was placed on suspected enemy positions. In addition, many bunkers and structures were destroyed along with various supplies and ammunition.

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## TRAN HUNG DAO XX

Activity in the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO was limited to anti-infiltration patrols conducted by PCFs and Yabuta junk assets of the Vietnamese Navy. Although naval units did not participate in any firefights, ARVN troops, supported by U.S. helicopters, accounted for six enemy killed while suffering no friendly casualties.

Intelligence reports indicate that infiltration from Cambodia into the Seven Mountains Area is occurring north of the TRAN HUNG DAO XX AO along the Vinh Te Canal toward Chau Doc. This could necessitate expansion of the entire Vinh Te Canal from the vicinity of Ha Tien to Chau Doc.




TRAN HUNG DAO XX, stretching from Ha Tien to VS 61 63 and the apparent enemy infitration route from the Cambodian border to the Seven Mountains Area.



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RUNG SAT SPECIAL ZONE

Enemy contact was light and infrequent in the Rung Sat Special Zone during the month of May, despite the insertion of units participating in three combined CHUONG DUONG search and destroy operations. The enemy proved elusive or scarce under the pressure of the CHUONG DUONG operations, but the cumulative results were 12 Viet Cong killed, 10 of whom were identified by body count, three of the enemy captured, and two of the enemy rallied as Hoi Chanhs. Four sampans were destroyed as well as 14 bunkers. Numerous supplies including seven weapons and three anti personnel mines were captured from the 14 base camps destroyed during the sweeps. The enemy initiated two fire fights against RF troops during the month. Navy Seawolves accounted for two bunkers destroyed. They flew 20 strikes on intelligence designated targets with no known results, and flew 15 support missions for the CHUONG DUONG sweeps and for ground force patrols. Three Vietnamese soldiers were medevaced by helo dustoff. Only one mission was aborted due to weather, despite the heavy onslaught of the monsoon. Fire was received from the ground twice, with no adverse effect.

The combined sweep operation CHUONG DUONG 21-71 commenced at 0700H on 5 May. It was organized by the commander

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A U.S. Marine, under the Naval Advisory Group, in the Rung Sat Special Zone with an RF soldier on a CHUONG DUONG search and destroy operation.

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of the RSSZ and was composed of several RF companies, a PRU team, river craft of RAG 27, RPD 57, and the 29th RF Boat Company, one US LCM, three US UH-1Ds, one US command helo, two US armed helos, one US OV-10, and one US L-19. The operation began around coordinates YS 040 797, YS 086 797, YS 105 790.... and finally included coordinates XS 880 673, XS 959 760, and XS 954 730. On the first day a VC equipment warehouse was damaged, and on 7 May, two VC were killed. This was followed by several uneventful days, and then on 10 May, at 0950H, a squad of RF Co. 809, while moving by junk, came under M-79 and AK-47 fire at YS 092 503. The commander of the RSSZ immediately maneuvered an armed helo and one platoon of RFs for support and commenced pursuit, with unknown results. The RFs were inserted by U.S. Army "Slick" helos. CDR Stewart, the SA RSSZ, who relieved CDR J.G. Williams on 5 May, rode in a CC helo with the Marine advisors and the commanders of the RF companies. CDR Stewart directed each operational sweep from the airborne vantage point.

Operation CHUONG DUONG 22-71 was conducted by the Can Gio Sub-Sector commander and had similar composition as CHUONG DUONG 21-71. It commenced at 0600H on 12 May, and had inconsequential results.

Operation CHUONG DUONG 23-71 was conducted in the Quang Xuyen sub-sector, and began at 0700H on 18 May. Covering the areas around XS 937 772, YS 000 750, and YS 035 556, the operation ended the next day at 1600H, with no significant encounters.

The operations in the RSSZ were not without effect, however, for the minimal enemy losses were consequential due to the shoestring VC organization existing in the Rung Sat. Information by a Hoi Chanh indicated that the Hong Hoa Chapter of the VC suffered severe setbacks due to heavy losses, including two ralliers, one man captured, and two killed in action. (The 20 intelligence strikes of the Seawolves very probably accounted for some of the VC troubles. Captured VC declared a great fear of the Seawolves, and confirmed that the RSSZ intelligence officer, Dai-Uy Dan, had been accurately pinpointing enemy targets for the Seawolves' strikes). The manpower shortages were reported to have severely curtailed the political activities of the Long Thanh Chapter of the NLF.

In addition to the support mission in the CHOUNG DUONG operations, the PBRs of the Rung Sat searched junks on the average of 96 per day. The search entailed lifting floorboards and checking ID cards, and 80% of the searching took place on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, with most of the remaining patrolling taking

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place on the Soi Rap. Sixty four boats, junks, and craft were assigned to the RSSZ, while 51 were operational and, on the average, 41 were employed during the month. The primary mission of the PBRs was escort for the merchant ships moving up the Long Tau Shipping Channel. The Long Tau has been described as the most valuable piece of real estate in the Republic of Vietnam. The PBRs did not escort the ships alone, for the primary mission of the Seawolves was also escort of shipping, and a Seawolf was always in the air when shipping was on the Long Tau. Historically, there has yet to be an attack on the Long Tau while a helo was overhead. The secondary mission of the American helos was observing the reliability of the PBRs and submitting a daily report to the VNN RPD commander that indicated when a particular PBR had failed to escort a ship up his leg of the channel. The reports, begun in April, produced marked results in increased escort reliability in the beginning, but overall they have resulted in only slight improvement by the PBRs. Since there had been no attack on the Long Tau in seven months, the Vietnamese possibly did not view a PBR absence from a merchant ship as a great risk.

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## LONG TAU SHIPPING CHANNEL

As in the past six months, activity by the enemy on the Long Tau Shipping Channel, the life line of Saigon, was absent. The minesweepers of MID 93 continued their regular sweeps of the mine-free channel, but not without difficulties. On 6 May at 0400H, a MSR collided with a Philippine tug on the Long Tau, at YS 028 655, while conducting regular minesweeping operations. Two MSRs were on patrol, with minesweeping lights showing, when the second MSR in the line was struck. Fortunately the damage was marginal and the craft continued on to the berthing pier.

On the last day of May, at 0745H, MSR HQ 1905 of MID 93 sank alongside the pier at LSB Nha Be. After a routine night sweep, the MSR returned at 0530H and the entire crew went to sleep. At 0715H the crew was awakened by a member who noticed the list on the boat and the heavy inflow of water as the craft was sinking rapidly. Efforts to control the flooding with a bilge pump were unsuccessful and by 0830H the boat was sunk. The weapons had been removed prior to the sinking. By 2 June the craft was raised by a VNN salvage team. The subsequent report indicated that the exhaust of the port engine, which had been out of commission, had been poorly plugged, and as they worked loose, the flooding of the bilges ensued.

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

An MSR (Mine Sweeper Remote) on the Long Tau Shipping Channel

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CTF 211

The following was the disposition of the RAID units at the end of May:

| RAID | OPCON | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 70 | CTG 210.1 | Kien An |
| 71 | CTG 210.1 | Kien An |
| 72 | CTU 218.1.3 | Cambodia |
| 73 | CTU 218.1.3 | Cambodia |
| 74 | CTF 210 | Ca Mau |
| 75 | CTF 210 | Ca Mau |

Each RAID is composed of approximately eight ATCs, five ASPBs, two MONs, one CCB, and one REF. The RAIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

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CTF 212

The following was the disposition of RPD units at the end of May.

| RPD | OPCON | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 51 | 228 | Cat Lai |
| 52 | 216.1, 228 | Phu Cuong, Nha Be |
| 53 | 217.1 | My Tho |
| 54 | 214.1 | Ben Keo |
| 55 | 218.2 | Tan Chau, Chau Doc |
| 56 | 217.2 | Vinh Long |
| 57 | 228 | Nha Be |
| 58 | 212.5 | Rach Soi |
| 59 | 218.2 | Tan Chau |
| 60 | 213.1 | Hoi An |
| 61 | 210.4 | Rach Soi |
| 62 | 212.6 | Phuoc Xuyen |
| 63 | 212.3 | Ca Mau |
| 64 | 214.1 | Moc Hoa, Tuyen Nhon |
| 65 | Training | Binh Thuy |

Each RPD is composed of approximately 20 PBRs and is reviewed in the operation in which it operates.

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CTF 214

The following was the disposition of RID units at the end of May:

| RID | OPCON | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 40 | 214.1 | Go Dau Ha |
| 41 | 218.2 | Chau Doc |
| 42 | 217.1 | Dong Tam |
| 43 | 216.1 | Phu Cuong |
| 44 | 214.1 | Tra Cu |
| 45 | 217.2 | Dong Tam |
| 46 | 116.1 | Nam Can |
| 47 | 116.1 | Nam Can |
| 48 | 218.2 | Tan Chau |

Each RID is generally composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, six ASPBs, one CCB, one Zippo, one REF, and one RECH. The RIDs are reviewed in their respective operations.

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## RIVER ASSAULT GROUPS

The following was the disposition of RAG units at the end of May:

| RAG | OPCON | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 22 | CTG 216.1 | Phu Cuong |
| 24 | CTG 216.1 | Phu Cuong |
| 26 | Commander, Fourth Riverine Area | Long Xuyen |
| 27 | CTF 228 | Nha Be |
| 28 | Commander, Third Riverine Area | Long Binh |
| 30 | Commander, Third Riverine Area | Long Binh |
| 32 | Commander, First Coastal Zone | Hue |
| 21/33 | CTG 217.1 | Dong Tam |
| 23/31 | CTG 217.2 | Vinh Long |
| 25/29 | CTG 210.3 | Ca Mau |
| 81 | Convoy Escort Fourth Riverine Area | Cat Lai |

Each RAG is composed of approximately five ATCs, one MON, one ASPB, four CCBs, and six LCM-6s. The RAGs are reviewed in their respective operations.

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## Special Warfare

The following was the disposition of the Seal Detachments operating in a combat capacity throughout the country at the end of May:

| Detachment | OPCON | Location | Officer-in-Charge |
|---|---|---|---|
| Team One<br>Det Golf<br>November Platoon | 217.1 | Dong Tam | LT Fletcher |
| Team One<br>Det Golf<br>Papa Platoon | 116.2 | Ca Mau | LT Antrim |
| Team One<br>Det Golf<br>Quebec Platoon | 116.12 | Ben Luc | LTJG Taylor<br>LTJG Campbell |
| Team One<br>Det Golf<br>Oscar Platoon | 116.1 | Nam Can | LT Ward |
| Team One<br>Det Golf<br>Romeo Platoon | 116.5 | Rach Soi | LTJG Boyhan<br>LTJG Dundas |

Seal units are reviewed in the operation in which they operate. On 1 May, Whiskey Platoon left country and was relieved by Oscar Platoon at Nam Can. On 25 May, Victor Platoon was replaced by November Platoon at Dong Tam. That same day Ten Platoon left Vi Thanh for "stateside" with no relief; the last of Seal Team Two to leave Vietnam.

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The following was the disposition of HAL-3 Detachments at the end of May:

| Det. | Task Org. | Location |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 116.7.1 | Nam Can |
| 2 | 116.7.2 | Nha Be |
| 3 | 116.7.3 | Ca Mau |
| 4 | 116.7.4 | Ben Luc |
| 5 | 116.7.5 | Chau Doc |
| 6 | 116.7.6 | Phu Loi |
| 7 | 116.7.7 | Dong Tam |
| 8 | 116.7.8 | Rach Gia |
| 9 | 116.7.9 | YRBM 21 (Tan Chau) |

Seawolf units are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate. A detachment usually consists of nine pilots and nine enlisted door gunners and two UH-1B helicopters. Only routine maintenance is done at the detachments, major tasks are accomplished at Binh Thuy, the "home" of the squadron.

In May the Seawolves flew 989 missions of which 135 missions were in contact with the enemy; 146 enemy were killed, 118 structures, 162 bunkers and 133 sampans were destroyed.

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CTG 116.8

The Black Pony Squadron located at Binh Thuy uses the OV-10 counter insurgency aircraft to give air support to the complete Delta region of South Vietnam. In May the "Ponies" flew 565 missions of which 74 missions were in contact with the enemy. 193 enemy were killed; 110 structures, 80 bunkers, and 34 sampans were destroyed.

Black Ponies are reviewed as a part of the operations in which they participate.

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## COASTAL SURVEILLANCE FORCES

MARKET TIME patrol units of the U.S. Navy and TRAN HUNG DAO XV units of the Vietnamese Navy continued to patrol against the seaborne infiltration throughout May. The Commander, Coastal Surveillance Forces, reported several incidents of suspicious activity by foreign merchant vessels. COMNAVFORV completed a study on MARKET TIME effectiveness and recommended a reorganization in the existing MARKET TIME patrol structure to increase its effectiveness. MARKET TIME outer barrier unit, USCGC RUSH, fired over 300 rounds of five inch ammunition in naval gunfire support, destroying two enemy structures and damaging nine others.

MARKET TIME VP aircraft sighted a possible SL-6 infiltration trawler at 0757Z on 1 May. The trawler's position was 13-56N 114-08E and was maintaining course 040 at a speed of 6 knots. The contact maintained this course throughout the night. The next day, FICPACFAC positively identified the ship as not an infiltration trawler and further surveillance was discontinued.

In another incident, MARKET TIME forces sighted a suspicious merchant off of An Xuyen Province. The incident began at 1212H on 24 May, when USCGC RUSH routinely reported the sighting of the Polish merchant HANKA SAWICKA at VQ 58 31, on course 310, speed 15 knots. At 1530H CTF 213 advised Coastal Surveillance Center

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An Thoi (US 935 065)of the 1212H sighting of the Polish ship. At 1615H, CSC An Thoi directed PGM616, which had been in the immediate vicinity of Poulo Obi Island (VQ 820 320), to proceed and investigate. The coordinates as received by PGM 616, however, were VQ 58 01 vice VQ 58 31. This position was approximately 17 miles south of the 1212H reported position of HANKA SAWICKA. At about 1900H, the PGM arrived in the vicinity of VQ 58 01 and detected a suspicious merchant at a position approximately 21 miles from Poulo Obi and 27 miles from the Nam Can Peninsula. While approaching the merchant, the PGM sighted four junks nearby. Three of the junks were anchored about one mile away from the merchant while the fourth was about one half mile away and appeared to be approaching the merchant. The Commanding Officer, PGM 616, reported the merchant was DIW when initially observed, but then got underway as the PGM approached. The merchant did not respond to a flashing light challenge from the PGM. The PGM gave chase for 20 minutes without being able to close, and then returned to apprehend the four junks.

No contraband was found on the junks, which were normally configured fishing junks from Rach Gia (WS 099 060). The junk crews reported that the merchant did not go DIW but had instead passed through their nets as it transitedthe area. The junks were

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towed to An Thoi, and a further search of the junks, and interrogation of their crews by a combined U.S. and VN team, revealed nothing suspicious.

The PGM Commanding Officer's description did not match that of the Polish ship HANKA SAWICKA. While the incident did not yield any conclusive results, it did suggest a possible enemy tactic of transferring supplies from trawlers to junks well outside the RVN contiguous zone.

On 7 May, an unfortunate incident occurred in which a Thailand fishing trawler was challenged by VNN PGM 603 five miles west of Hon Khoai (first Poulo Obi Island). The trawler did not stop and the PGM fired warning shots. At this time the trawler returned the fire with what appeared to be a gun shot. The PGM then commenced destructive fire, killing two Thai fishermen and wounding two others. The trawler was boarded, searched, and towed to An Thoi where the wounded were treated.

Salvage and recovery operations of the SL-8 trawler sunk in April were concluded on 19 May. No additional significant debris was recovered.

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During the month, COMNAVFORV, CNO VNN, and COMUSMACV conducted an extensive review of MARKET TIME operations with a view to improving its effectivness. The general conclusion was that the Inner Barrier could be made more effective by eliminating the patrolling of fixed barriers by individual units and forming, instead, task units of several ships and stationing them in the areas of high infiltration. This plan is called the "Cloud Concept" by the Vietnamese. Two of these task units were due to be formed by the end of the month off the Ca Mau Peninsula.

MARKET TIME Outer Barrier unit USCGC RUSH conducted NGFS throughout the month. On 5 May, RUSH fired 68 rounds of five inch ammunition in support of the 21st ARVN Division, resulting in one secondary explosion. On 28 May, RUSH expended 146 rounds destroying one sampan, six structures and one bunker, while on 29 May, RUSH expended 125 rounds, destroying two structures and damaging nine others, also in support of the 21st ARVN Division.

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FIRST COASTAL ZONE

Enemy mining activity on the Cua Viet increased sharply during May as 17 mining incidents occurred as opposed to 12 in April. These 17 incidents resulted in 37 people being killed and several others wounded. These incidents occurred along the entire waterway and reflected no pattern or particular tactics. The wide distribution of the mines demonstrated the enemy's capability to move freely throughout the AO. (CNFV INTSUM 115-71).

Water traffic on the Cua Viet increased during the month with the implementation of the MR-1 rock program. This program consisted of one barge per day being loaded with 500 tons of crushed rock and transported to Dong Ha in support of the U.S. Army 45th Engineer Battalion. The rock was hauled from a quarry at DaNang and was used for road construction at various fire support bases. While these rock barges were not strictly military targets, the sinking of one could have resulted in the blocking of the river and, therefore, could have been used as a propaganda victory by the enemy.

In order to counter this watermine threat, COMNAVFORV requested a pilot installation of the new Argus II swimmer deterrent device. The device is electrical in nature and has the potential to deter swimmers in both fresh or salt water. The device could be

made available by late June or early July.

During May, there were a number of mining incidents that involved explosions and detonations resulting in little or no damage. Single incidents occurred on 1 May, 6 May, 12 May, 16 May, 19 May, and on 27 May; and on 17 May, when three incidents occurred. However, on 9 May, a watermining incident occurred that resulted in the worst loss of life in almost one year. A civilian water taxi enroute to Dong Ha (vic YD 273 650) detonated two watermines. When the taxi struck the first mine, most of the passengers aboard were thrown into the water. Then a second mine detonated, probably in reaction to the first detonation, causing the majority of the casualties. Thirty six civilians were killed in this incident. In July1970, a water taxi was also sunk by mines resulting in 40 civilians killed, four wounded, and 13 missing. The only other incident involving civilian loss of life occurred on 29 April, 1971, when three civilians were killed when their sampan exploded a mine in the vicinity of YD 275 650.

On 17 May, another tragic incident occurred in which a VNN EOD team leader was killed and seven other team members including one USN were wounded while the leader attempted to disarm a mine. Late in the afternoon, a MID 92 sweeper reported a mine fouled in its sweep nets on the Thach Han River, one of the most heavily travelled waterways in Military Region One. Vietnamese Navy Explosive Ordnance Team

Zero Two responded to the call. Upon arriving at the location, Petty Officer Chap, the EOD team leader, made a preliminary dive and determined that the mine was a type seen only once before in Vietnam and that it was fully armed and extremely dangerous. Realizing the mine could be of important intelligence, Petty Officer Chap attempted to disarm the mine rather than to destroy it in place. During this attempt, the mine booster exploded, instantly killing the VNN. For his bravery, Petty Officer Chap was posthumously awarded the Bronze Star Medal. In order to replace this team, VNN EOD Team Zero One, presently assigned to CG-14 at Hoi An, was relocated to DaNang, in order to provide instantaneous response wherever they might be needed in the First Coastal Zone.

This month, watermining activity was not merely confined to the Cua Viet. On 8 May, a 19 month hiatus of mining activity on the Huong River (Perfume River) near Hue was broken when intelligence agents reported that sappers were reconnoitering the river for mining purposes from the RAG 32 pier area (YD 775 225) to the mouth of the river by Thuan An ISB (YD 83 32) (CNFV INTSUM 121-71). The intelligence report proved to be accurate, for on 17 May, a Viet Cong swimmer-sapper was captured in an attempted mining attack on Op Base Hue (YD 775 227), while on 27 May, the Army Corps of Engineers' dredge DAVIDSON experienced an explosion while dredging

the middle of the Tan My Channel. The blast resulted in only minor damage to the dredge.

The coastal groups were very active throughout May. In the Chi Lang I AO, Coastal Group 14 conducted sweep team operations on 18 May, destroying two bunkers; on 26 May, destroying three enemy bunkers; and on 26 May, supported a Vietnamese LDNN team with negative results. On 29 May, another sweep team operation was conducted, resulting in contact with 13 VC. Two VNN sailors were killed by a mine, two VNNs wounded, and two VC were probably killed in this encounter. On 5 May, CG-15, in Quang Tin Province, landed PF troops for a blocking operation. An unknown size enemy force was encountered, and a firefight ensued lasting about five minutes. There were no friendly or enemy casualties in the fracus; 300 pounds of rice were captured and destroyed. On 8 May, in Quang Ngai Province, eight VC suspects were apprehended by a night defensive position advance guard team from CG-16. The VC attempted to come ashore in a well known restricted area. On 12 May, a CG-16 Yabuta junk was fired on by VC RPG gunners barely 300 meters from the base. The junk received light hull and moderate engine damage from the B-40 rounds. The coastal group responded with mortar and automatic weapons fire.

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

A sweep team from Coastal Group 14 extracting from an operation by Yabuta Junk.

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## SECOND COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity in the coastal provinces of the Second Coastal Zone decreased sharply in May following the high point in late April. A possible reason for this decline in activity was the enemy's preoccupation with the May rice harvest (CNFV INTSUM 115-71).

Salvage operations continued on the SS ROBINHOOD, mined in Qui Nhon Harbor on 27 March. The final welding was finished on 3 May, completing salvage operations. The operations were conducted by Harbor Clearance Unit One, and the following message of comendation was received from Commander, Service Forces, Pacific:

> The successful completion of emergency repairs to SS ROBINHOOD is a further example of the "can do spirit", the professional effort, and tenacity for which HCU One is well known. Well Done. Rear Admiral L.J. Obrien, Jr. [1]

Despite the lull in the tempo of enemy operations, he made his presence felt by sapper attacks and ABF's. 107mm rocket attacks were made on Nha Trang on 1 May and 25 May, causing light damage on the former date; one U.S. personnel was wounded, while no damage or casualties resulted from the attack on the latter date. Also on 25 May, Cam Ranh Bay received a rocket attack in the vicinity of USASUPCOM CRB and the Cam Ranh Air Base.

1. COMSERVPAC msg 120402Z May 71

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The only damage sustained was a one quarter ton truck slightly damaged by shrapnel.

In Qui Nhon Harbor, on 5 May, a harbor defense skimmer with EOD personnel embarked discovered a floating mine. The mine was towed to a safe anchorage where it harmlessly exploded during the night. The last successful mining attempt occurred on 27 March when the SS ROBINHOOD was mined at the De Long Piers. On 27 May, in Nha Trang Harbor, EOD personnel on a routine inspection discovered a 40 pound mine attached to the Chinese National ship, GREAT FORTUNE. The mine was rendered harmless and taken to EOD headquarters.

The enemy's most lucrative attack occured on the night of 23 May, when a POL tank farm at Cam Ranh Bay (CP 075 208) came under a sapper attack resulting in the destruction of four JP-4 tanks and two AVGAS tanks. Early estimates of POL losses included 1,680,000 gallons of JP-4 and 210,000 gallons of AVGAS (CNFV INTSUM 122-71).

The coastal groups received their share of enemy activity throughout the month. Coastal Group 23 received attacks by fire on 3 May and 24 May. 82mm mortar rounds slightly damaged the buildings inside the district compound; two U.S. MACV personnel were wounded on the latter date. A Coastal Group 25 junk received small arms fire on 23 May, from an unknown number of VC in the vicinity of CP 165 733.

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One VNN sailor was wounded in the encounter. The CG-25 base received mortar rounds on 25 May resulting in no material damage to the base; however, three ARVN rangers were wounded.

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## THIRD COASTAL ZONE

Enemy activity remained light throughout the month of May. Several agent reports of units infiltrating from Cambodia were received; however, the enemy avoided contact whenever possible. His most effective form of attack was the sapper attack.

On the morning of 6 May, guards at the Go Dau Ha Bridge (XT 383 250) sighted a floating object in the Vam Co Dong River. Firing at the object resulted in an explosion. Two hours later, members of PF 56 on security duty thwarted a mining attempt by three VC at the Rach Re Bridge (XT 251 414). On 21 May, a water mine exploded under the port stern of a Mike boat of the 17th Boat Company. Fortunately, the mine did very little damage.

The Coastal groups were moderately active throughout May. On 11 May, CG-33 junks inserted an RF/PF sweep team at YS 306 542 and YS 300 538. Three VC were fired on with one probably wounded. No friendly casualties were sustained. On 17 May a CG-36 ambush team was fired on by an estimated force of seven VC at XR 254 630. One VNN was seriously wounded and one VNN slightly wounded in the fracas. Enemy casualties were not determined. On 28 May, four CG-34 junks were fired at by B-40 rockets in the vicinity of XS 655 040. One VNN and one RF soldier were wounded in the action.

On 17 May, LCDR William P. Needham, USN, relieved LT J.J. Donahue, USN, as Third Riverine Area Intelligence Officer.

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## FOURTH COASTAL ZONE

With the exception of the TRAN HUNG DAO IV and TRAN HUNG DAO XVII AOs, activity in the Fourth Coastal Zone decreased to a low level. This could possibly be attributed to enemy plans to reform and restrengthen his depleted ranks. There are also reports that the enemy had withdrawn into a Phase II type insurgency in which the guerilla seeks to avoid direct contact with the enemy, while strengthening his base of support with the local populace. There were also some indications that the VC had regrouped into smaller units, thereby lessening supply problems, lessening probability of detection, and resulting in increased morale.[1]

This increased morale could be the reason for the lack of Hoi Chanhs in the U Minh area in recent months. This area earlier accounted for over 1000 Hoi Chanhs since the first of the year. Recent reports have been received that the enemy forces in the U Minh were being resupplied from the sea by small coastal craft.[2] This would certainly increase morale among enemy troops. To counter the infiltration threat, COMNAVFORV urged the intensification of search efforts, and the employment of imaginative tactics to include coordinated operations by inner barrier units and coastal group forces as well as operations across established

1. CNFV INTSUM 109-71
2. COMNAVFORV msg 070649Z May 71

boundary lines.[3] Furthermore, to combat the infiltration along the coast of An Xuyen Province, CTF 213 designated a new task unit, CTU 213.4.3 to patrol from the Bo De River mouth (WQ 465 955) to the Song Ong Doc River mouth (WQ 78 97). The task unit will be composed of one PCE, WHEC, or DER, which is assigned to the unit for a period of five or six days each and is to be relieved on station. In case of necessity, three PCFs from TRAN HUNG DAO IV will be sent out to intensify patrol or surveillance.

Another move to counter infiltration was made by the assignment of surveillance flights to the OV-10s, the Black Ponies. These flights will be of two types: random and pre-planned. The random flights will be made during routine patrols, and the information gathered will be radioed back to either CSC Vung Tau, An Thoi, or NOC, Solid Anchor. The pre-planned flights will be scheduled when foul weather precludes surface unit operations; when SA CTF 213/CTF 115 is in receipt of intelligence indicating possible infiltration attempts, and during periods of extremely high tide when the possibility of trawler infiltration is greatest.[4]

The worth of the Black Pony patrols was proved on 6 May, when a flight of OV-10s spotted a large cargo sampan approximately 40 feet

3. Ibid.
4. CTF 116/CTF 115 msg 110723Z May 71

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long heading inland from the sea at the mouth of the Rach Muoi Du (VR 817 327). After obtaining proper clearances, the Black Ponies scored a direct hit on the craft, resulting in a large secondary explosion. Also, on 27 May, Black Ponies placed strikes on a target in the Long Toan Secret Zone (XR 673 633). Upon reaching the target area, the aircraft observed a camouflaged 40 foot junk, several camouflaged sampans, and several structures. The strike resulted in five VC killed; the junk, four bunkers, and seven structures were destroyed. Two 20 foot sampans were heavily damaged, and one secondary explosion was observed.

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PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS AND CIVIC ACTION SUMMARY

Navy Psyops loudspeaker broadcasts and leaflet drops were at a low level this month due to the rainy weather and reductions and relocation of Beach Jumper Unit One personnel and equipment at the various detachments. The SOLID ANCHOR (BJU-1) Detachment moved out during the month leaving one man at the recently turned over base. BJU detachments now consist of only one or two men working with operational and police units on broadcasts and leaflet drops in conjunction with ground troop operations. Requests for Psyops gear came to BJU-1 from Phu Quoc, Tan An, and USAF Psyops aircraft which have missing components not readily available through the supply system. Throughout the month BJU-1 attempted to supply these detachments as equipment became available.

Intelligence reports indicated during the month that the enemy has launched new terrorist attacks against civilians in South Vietnam and Laos in affirmation of his strength. However, Hoi Chanhs continued to rally during the month and attributed their decision to "chieu hoi" to allied Psyops broadcasts and leaflets in many cases. Ben Tre reported 26 ralliers during the first two weeks of the month, 30% due to Psyops, 30% tired of fighting, and 40% because too many GVN troops were in the area to freely operate,

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according to the Chieu Hoi Center in Ben Tre. The My Tho Chieu Hoi Center reported a record 80 ralliers for the period 17-29 May. Fifty of them mentioned inducement by leaflets and broadcasts.

There were many Hoi Chanhs this month all over the country in areas where there are usually no ralliers reported. On 20 May a man who claimed he was secretary for the Dong Hoa Village guerrilla unit rallied there to PF Platoon -12 and RF Company 361 troops. On 30 May another Hoi Chanh who stated she was a nurse for the Dong Hoa unit rallied at the village which is in the Can Gio District (YS 065 478), part of the Rung Sat Special Zone, where Psyops activities have been going on on a regular basis for several months and where the enemy has been active in recent road mining attempts (See April's Summary). Later that same afternoon the RSSZ Psyops team and one of the Hoi Chanhs conducted a 50 minute live loudspeaker broadcast from an Army Slick helo in the area around Dong Hoa, 30 kilometers southeast of LSB Nha Be, to encourage more enemy who wished to rally. On 22 May in An Xuyen Province near ISB Nam Can an enemy soldier rallied to the ARVN camp. Preliminary interrogation by VNN intelligence and U.S. Psyops/Polwar personnel indicated he was a low level worker from Rach Goc Hamlet (WQ 052 519). The Chieu Hoi Center in Ca Mau has reported

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81 Hoi Chanhs since 18 April 1971.

In Kien Giang Province at VS 847 221, 29 kilometers northwest of Rach Gia on 27 May, three VC males chieu hoi'ed to RPD 58 PBRs, approaching in a sampan and surrendering a Mark 26 grenade. A debrief by RPD 58 sailors indicated that the Hoi Chanhs were members of the Hon Me Village Defense Force. The Hoi Chanhs were turned over to the Ninth ARVN Element as they appeared to have knowledge useful to the operation presently occuring in the Three Sisters AO.

USCGC MORGENTHAU (WHEC 722) continued to provide medical care for the people of the Gulf of Thailand Vietnamese Islands, treating over 200 people. MEDCAPS, with a Vietnamese corpsman supplied by the VNN liaison officer of the Coast Guard cutter and its medical staff participating, were conducted on 3 and 26 May at Poulo Dama, on 24 May at Hon Tre, and on 25 May at Hon Rai Islands. The smallpox vaccination program was continued at Poulo Dama where 30 people were immunized.

Seabee teams throughout the Delta at work on USAID pacification projects reported treating 826 medical patients and training 101 Vietnamese nationals during the month. Seabee civic action projects are discussed in the Naval Construction Forces section of the Summary.

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Psyops personnel in Tan An reported 15 broadcast hours from helos, boats, and Jeeps, on Chieu Hoi and VCI blacklist themes during the month. In the My Tho AO, 39 hours of loudspeaker broadcasts were conducted by Jeep and 435,000 leaflets and booklets were distributed by hand. On 10 May, Psyops personnel worked with an ARVN Ranger Battalion in Cai Lai District attempting to persuade villagers to move from the fields to the canals, accompanied by the District Chief and the District Senior Advisor. During the last week of the month, the My Tho Psyops Team conducted five missions, including one quick reaction to an overrun PSDF outpost. At Ben Tre, a Psyops broadcast was made in a Vietnamese Marine Police boat targeting villagers and boaters along the river with a National Police tape.

At Binh Thuy a special leaflet was initiated to be used on Black Pony strikes, to be dropped through the message hole of the helo asking survivors to reconsider the Chieu Hoi Program. Moc Hoa reported no operations and the intention to relocate the Psyops BJU-1 detachment there, however, there were five Hoi Chanhs who rallied and all of them stated that they had heard Psyops broadcasts and seen leaflets.

Psychological operations continued to be conducted in the Fourth Coastal Zone areas north of the U Minh Forest and south along the

Gulf of Thailand coast to the Ca Mau Peninsula. At Chau Doc in the Tri Ton area (WS 520 006) two missions were conducted with Marine Police boats, one with a Chieu Hoi broadcast theme and the other exposing the ten most wanted VCI in the area and asking the populace to turn them in if their location was known. 26,000 leaflets asking information of VCI movement were dropped from helos and the Chieu Hoi Center reported 11 Hoi Chanhs. Rach Gia reported conducting broadcasts aboard Marine Police boats on the Can Gac (in the vicinity of recent boat minings), offering rewards for mine location and promulgating the success of GVN U Minh Campaign operations. The Chieu Hoi Center reported 25 Hoi Chanhs in one week of May, three of them attributable to Psyops. 200,000 leaflets (Chieu Hoi, personal testimony) were dropped from Seawolves on preplanned strike target areas. The Ca Mau BJU-1 detachment conducted field operations on Phu Quoc Island and in the U Minh Forest during the month. Psyops personnel participated in an ambush with the National Police Field Force on a U Minh convoy broadcasting the theme of watermine rewards. A USA advisor made a tape using the reputation of his counterpart at the 32nd Regiment to induce VC to Chieu Hoi. This operation took fire. In addition there was a quick reaction broadcast exploiting a recent Hoi Chanh who denounced his former ways and exposed VCI in his village.

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The dependent shelter construction program continued at a reduced pace during May due to the departure of the Seabee units, NMCB 3 and 74, tasked with construction of dependent shelters. CBMU 302 continued to work on dependent shelter units throughout the Delta (See Construction Forces Section of this Summary), reporting that the rate of construction in the future will depend largely upon the amount of VNN manpower participation in the project. Since 1 January, 1968, the combined efforts of the Vietnamese government and the U.S. Navy have added 3,199 new shelters to the then existing 2,699 shelters for a total inventory of 5,898 units (approximately 25% of the total VNN/VNMC requirement of 22, 989 shelters). It is the current goal to add another 819 units by the end of June 1971. Twelve of the 36 sites programmed for the FY 71 funded dependent shelter program were reported as completed by 7 May, with an additional 13 sites currently under construction.

A total of 117 livestock projects of the VNN Food Supplement Program were in operation during the month. 20,000 broiler chickens were imported in April and another 20,000 in May, bringing the total of imported chicks to over 130,000. Eighty-four swine have been distributed from the Cam Ranh Bay distribution center. The Cuu Long center has farrowed five litters in the last two months, the largest litter being 12 living piglets. An incubator

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was purchased by the Helping Hand Foundation and assembled at the Cuu Long center; the hatchery, with 1,250 parent stock chickens, is estimated to be in full operation by July 1971. A feed mill is now in operation at Cam Ranh Bay processing feed for the swine breeding herd and for distribution centers at DaNang and An Thoi which has been delayed due to lack of available land and CB construction teams.

VNN managed and operated fishing projects of the Food Supplement Program are now in operation at 15 VNN bases. For March and April, nearly 200 tons of fish were caught and sold to VNN dependents and messes at about 1/10th the commercial price resulting in a net savings to the VNN sailors of over 25,000,000 piasters.

The 1971 Government of Vietnam Community Defense and Local Development Plan listed five priority information tasks. These tasks represent the core of the Psyops effort for the VNN and are as follows:

1. Phung Hoang - This entails a Viet Cong infrastructure campaign to assist in the neutralization of all properly identified communist political cadre in order to prevent them from undermining the pacification effort.

2. People's Self-Defense Force - The role of the PSDF is important to the achievement of security and must be understood by

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all citizens.

3. Land-to-the-Tiller Program - The Land-to-the-Tiller Law was promulgated on March 26, 1970. It allows for the direct ownership of land cultivated by the farmer, and is one of the GVN's most powerful Psyops advantages.

4. Chieu Hoi - Strong emphasis continues in the efforts to induce VC to rally to the side of the GVN in an effort to bring peace to all parts of the country.

5. Veterns and War Widows - In this category are included those programs designed to alleviate the condition of disabled veterans and the dependents of all killed, wounded, or missing military personnel. Information concerning the rights to government benefits must reach this needy audience.

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ACCELERATED TURNOVER PROGRAM AND TRAINING SUMMARY

The Accelerated Turnover Program continued its emphasis on ACTOVLOG in the month of May, but on a lower scale than in the preceding month. A second logistics support base was turned over at An Thoi, highlighting the month. Also, seven LCMs were turned over on the last day of the month. Explosive ordnance disposal responsibilities were shifted to the VNN on the first of the month , and Navy Seals and Harbor Clearance Units also were phasing out, with their corresponding VNN units taking on an increased load.

Logistics assets were turned over exclusively during the month. On 15 May the USN turned over the first refrigerated storage craft, the YFR-889, to the VNN Fleet Command at Nha Be. The craft was commanded by USN Chief Boatswains Mate A. Z. Goforth prior to turnover, while the new commanding officer of the craft was VNN Dai-Uy (LT) Tong Phuoc Hai who had graduated from the VNN OTC at Nha Trang in 1965. The YRF-889 was built in October 1945 and was recommissioned for duty in Vietnam in October 1966. Throughout its five-year tour of duty the ship had on numerous occasions engaged in combat action with the enemy, and was a recipient of the Navy Unit Commendation.

On the 31st of May seven LCMs were turned over to the

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VNN Logistics Support Command. Two LCM-8s and two pickets were turned over at the DaNang Logistics Support Base. An LCM-3, an LCM-6, and an LCM-8 were turned over at Nha Be. Finally, two LCM-3s were turned over at the Logistics Support Base at Dong Tam.

The achievement of another major milestone in the building of a self-sufficient, viable Vietnamese Navy occurred on 25 May when the Logistics Support Base at An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island was turned over. The base supports coastal surveillance forces assigned to the VNN Coastal Flotilla 4. For the past five years, An Thoi had been a key base for allied coastal patrol forces operating along the Gulf of Thailand coastline of Vietnam. Logistic support bases are the largest and most advanced naval installations in South Vietnam. They provide major overhaul services for river and coastal combat craft and are major supply stock points for supporting less sophisticated bases in their areas. The USN had already turned over 16 smaller bases in addition to the logistic support bases and had transferred 846 combat and logistic support vessels to the VNN by the end of May.

On 28 May the OP base at Chu Lai was turned over to the VNN. At the time of turnover, base equipment and real property (if not previously signed over) is transferred, and a bilingual turnover

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

Rear Admiral McManus proceeding to the ceremony for the turnover of the Logistic Support Base at An Thoi, where he signed the turnover document.

agreement is executed. Following the event, the USN functions in only an advisory role.

On 21 May, the VNN OCS Class number 9 graduated at Newport, Rhode Island. The class was 70 strong, and underwent the same program that American officer candidates went through.

On the first of May the VNN assumed all EOD responsibilities from the USN in a ceremony at Cam Ranh Bay, completing the transfer of individual EOD team responsibilities to the VNN. The USN continued to maintain one mobile two-man EOD advisory element within each Military Region. In May, the VNN EOD teams were operating at full capacity. They deployed 11 EOD teams of five men each, plus one fast reaction team of seven men in Saigon. All personnel had completed training by 30 April, and were EOD qualified. On 8 May a new EOD class graduated at Cam Ranh Bay, putting enough new men in the program that a new evaluation system could begin, with poor performers weeded out of the program. The VNN EOD personnel have been all volunteers, and were screened through a 16 week period of strenuous training. It is not surprising, then, that the VNN EOD teams were reported as being excellent. Their living and working with their American advisors had produced superb results. In each case of removing mines - one

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in Qui Nhon, two in Nha Trang, and one in Vung Tau - the VNN EOD teams performed their duties in a most professional manner. The VNN EOD teams report administratively to CTF 214, and operationally to the VNN commander of the tactical area of operational responsibility in which they are assigned.

The ACTOVRAD program proceeded on schedule during the month with some delays while material shipments were awaited. On 10 May ACTOVRAD site 10, on "Monkey Mountain" northwest of DaNang, received sniper fire, wounding one man in the leg. The fire was apparently harassment by dissident local woodcutters and hunters, and not by the VC.

# ACTOVLOG

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


* Base already turned over

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NAVAL SUPPORT ACTIVITY, SAIGON

During May Logistics Assistance Teams were created to supplement advisory personnel at Navy bases throughout the Delta as they are rapidly turned over to the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese supply system has been a problem that has irked the support efforts for months. Necessary supplies and repair parts have been unavailable through Vietnamese Navy supply channels which are sometimes unknown. The problem is becoming more serious as the responsibilities for more support bases are assumed by the Vietnamese Navy and as the Americans go home.

On 1 May COMNAVFORV addressed a message to ISB COs: "CHNAVADVGRP is now in the process of reassigning a large proportion of our operational advisors to new duties in the Vietnamese logistics system. This drastic reorganization of the Naval Advisory Group was not a decision taken lightly or in haste. . . . It is increasingly evident that serious deficiencies in every aspect of logistics pose a grave threat to the continuation of VNN operations. It is for this reason that operational advisors individually and in teams have been assigned to supplement your efforts."[1]

Teams of up to 40 men were formed at ten LSB's and six other bases. Seven five-man inventory teams were set up to keep a check of

1. COMNAVFORV msg 010051Z MAY 71

wall to wall inventories of material and equipment at these bases. SA ISB Cat Lai was enthusiastic about the additional personnel to assist with the many CTF 214 units supported by his base: MIDs 93 and 91, LDNN Seals, EOD, and Salvage teams, and RPD 51 with 149 boats in need of repair. SA ISB Dong Tam also welcomed the idea as a way to prepare the base's repair facility for turnover to the Vietnamese Navy and help with the backlog of repair work. SA ISB Qui Nhon however reported that the logistics assistance team concept was a step in the wrong direction which would lead to more dependence upon U.S. supply assets. He went on to point out that former boat riders would make the worst kind of logistics advisors. Because of previous rapport with the crews they would be under constant pressure to take short cuts and get supplies for the boats.

The highlight of the month for NSA and associated support commands was the visit of Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, who arrived on 27 May to make his first trip here since his tenure as COMNAVFORV which ended just over a year ago. Meeting the Admiral at the airport and accompanying him on tour was Rear Admiral Chon, Vietnamese Navy Chief of Operations and Zumwalt's friend and former counterpart. Also greeting "Big Z" like an old friend at each base he visited were hundreds of young

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


Admiral Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. and Rear Admiral Robert S. Salzer, past and present commanders of U.S. naval forces in Vietnam, take advantage of the solitude of their airplane to discuss their recent stop at Nam Can naval base.

Navymen who had never met him but feel they know him through the rapport he had established with them and their hair in the renown "Z-gram" messages concerning "chicken" Navy regulations. In Saigon Zumwalt met with Defense Minister Nguyen Van Vy, General Abrams, and Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Samuel D. Berger.

During his tour of Vietnam, Admiral Zumwalt inspected projects which had been started during his time as COMNAVFORV and CHNAVADVGRP from September 30, 1968 to May 15, 1970. It was during this period that initial phases of the Navy's Vietnamization and Operation Helping Hand Programs began. At one stop he was given a chicken and at another, two bottles of Nuoc Mam (fish sauce, Vietnam's national condiment). The "pigs and chickens" animal husbandry projects, which are now underway at 49 Naval bases in the Republic of Vietnam, are part of Operation Helping Hand. The operation was started by Admiral Zumwalt in late 1969 and is designed to raise the standard of living and to improve the diet of Vietnamese navymen and their families through raising small livestock and building adequate housing for them on their bases. At An Thoi Naval Base, a sign reading "Z-houses, pigs, fishes, chickens---a better life for the Vietnamese Navy" greeted Admiral Zumwalt.

At each stop the Admiral talked with USN advisors and held

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During his stop at An Thoi naval base on Phu Quoc Island in the Gulf of Thailand, Admiral Zumwalt received a 15-pound chicken as a gift from Vietnamese Navy dependents there. Zumwalt originated the Navy's "pigs and chickens" program.

informal question and answer periods, promising to write later when he couldn't directly answer a question at once. At all his stops, Admiral Zumwalt reminded U.S. Navymen that many of their fellow sailors had served and died in Vietnam to help the Vietnamese people. He told them that we are now witnessing the successful results of those sacrifices as the Vietnamese become more able to defend themselves and more Americans leave. Admiral Zumwalt's tour lasted two weeks and included stops in Hawaii, Australia, Japan, and aboard ships of the 7th Fleet. He spent four days in Vietnam.

The drug amnesty program, which gives drug users 30 days (ending June 30) to turn themselves in for treatment without fear of prejudice or descrimination, was announced by Admiral Zumwalt at a press conference in Saigon on 30 May at Tan Son Nhut Air Base. The program officially started on 1 June but one man already had turned himself in under the pilot program in Binh Thuy when Admiral Zumwalt announced it there. The drug amnesty people will be rehabilitated aboard the APL s 21 and 30 moored at LSB Nha Be. The Navy has two other pilot amnesty programs underway - one at Naval Air Station Miramar, near San Diego, California, and the other at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. A declaration of intent to cooperate fully in efforts to rehabilitate himself (user) constitutes sufficient evidence of sincerity and is the theme for admittance to the program.

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

Admiral Zumwalt, while sampling cake baked in his honor, talks with members of U.S. Navy Seal Team One during his stop at Nam Can naval base. The team members are, from left, Chief Petty Officer J.S. Harris, Lieutenant Junior Grade N.E. Walsh and Lieutenant C.H. Ward.

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During the month three NSA detachments were disestablished and an LSB turned over to the Vietnamese Navy. LSB An Thoi on Phu Quoc Island was turned over on 25 May. For the past five years it has been a key base for allied coastal patrol forces operating along the Gulf of Thailand coastline of Vietnam ( now Vietnamese Navy Coastal Flotilla Four) and the second one turned over under the Vietnamization Program. During the ceremony, five American Navymen were presented medals by the VNN. LCDR Michael B. Andrasko, Deputy Commander of the base, was also awarded the Bronze Star by Admiral McManus, COMNAVSUPPACT, Saigon.

NSA detachments at Sa Dec, Ben Luc, and Cat Lo were disestablished on 10, 15, and 30 May, respectively. NSA personnel were reassigned to other detachments such as the newly commissioned ISB Nam Can. Some residual personnel such as HAL-3 Detachment Four at Ben Luc remained at the bases. The Cat Lo disestablishment meant that CO NSAD Cat Lo became the Senior Advisor to the LSB there as the Vietnamese assumed entire operational control.

NSA Saigon and NSF DaNang also lost the services of several support ships and craft during May as U.S. Navy assets continued to be turned over or redeployed from Vietnam. At the first of the month DaNang's floating drydock, the AFDL 23, was taken under tow

by the fleet tug USS MOLALA (ATF 106) for delivery to Subic Bay, after having served in DaNang for over five years. Also on the first of May USS SANCTUARY (AH 17) ended a four year tour as the hospital ship for the First Coastal Zone, leaving DaNang for decommissioning in Alameda, California. The hospital ship had treated more than 23,000 American armed forces, allied troops, and civilians since 1967.

Three NSAS support ships, USS SPHINX (ARL-24), USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (AGP 838), and USS HOLMES COUNTY (LST 836), departed Vietnam for the last time as USN assets during May. HOLMES COUNTY was relieved by USS WHITFIELD COUNTY (LST 1169) as the SOLID ANCHOR (THD IV) Support LST on 9 May. HAL-3 Detachment Six helicopters moved from HUNTERDON COUNTY to Phu Loi before the ship's departure for Hong Kong. Admiral McManus congratulated HUNTERDON COUNTY and SPHINX navymen on their competence and dedication during the past years. SPHINX has served for three years as a repair ship in Vietnam and has been awarded the Presidential and Navy Unit Citations. In addition, YFR 889 was turned over to become HQ 490 at Nha Be on 15 May and assigned to Fleet Command. YFR 889 was built in 1945 and recommissioned for Vietnam duty in October 1966.

NSA detachments suffered only a few hostile accidents during May but several craft were sunk at LSB piers. On 1 May Alfa Boat, HQ 5129, was sunk while alongside the LSB Dong Tam pier, just after having completed overhaul; sea valves had been left open. A PBR of RPD 57, HQ 7620, sunk at the LSB Nha Be pier on 13 May; the pier watch was working on rigging the eductor to another boat which was taking water when he noticed the 7620 going down. Radios and guns were removed and the boat was pumped, floated, and removed by the next morning. At LSB Dong Tam on 13 May, repairs on HQ 7540 were completed; the craft was placed in the water and was found the next day resting vertically on the bottom. A VNN Alfa Boat HQ 5154 was sunk while alongside USS ASKARI (ARL-30) near Dong Tam in 24 feet of water while awaiting repairs on 17 May. The Senior Advisor to the VNN Logistics Support Command pointed to the causes of such sinkings: "During the period from 16 August 1969 to 9 March 1971, 40% of the VNN craft lost were sunk as a result of improper damage control procedures."[2]

OP Base My Tho reported the mortaring of the area at XR 496 444 in Dinh Tuong Province adjacent to the Province Chief's Headquarters and 1000 meters north of the OP Base on 4 May. There

2. SA VNN LOGSUPPCOM msg 180654Z May 1971

were two 82mm mortar rounds received and no damage or casualties resulted. An NSF Security man, BM1 Owen A. Monk, was wounded by sniper fire at ACTOVRAD Site #2 (BT 092 837) on DaNang's Monkey Mountain on 10 May. The fire was believed to be from individual woodcutters or hunters rather than from the enemy. On 19 May the subject man was returned to duty.

The only major offensive incident occurred on 28 May at 0320H when the YRBM 21, command post for Cambodian convoy operations moored five kilometers north of Tan Chau at WS 229 991, received six 75 mm recoiless rockets, two of which scored hits which resulted in the total destruction of one Seawolf UH-1B helo and shrapnel wounds to five U.S. sailors, one serious. The fire came from an estimated VC company located on the east bank at WS 239 992. PBRs on patrol immediately commenced suppressive fire, valiantly drawing fire from the YRBM. (SA CTF 218 later recommended the patrol officer of one PBR, Aspirant Le Thanh Tuyen, for the Bronze Star Medal). The enemy then attacked a PF outpost located at WS 240 990 at 0330H. Seawolves from Detachment Five arrived at 0338H and commenced putting in strikes at the request of the PF outpost and with clearance from Hung Nhu District. Black Ponies arrived at 0405H, illuminated the area, and put in strikes. At 0413H

three 2.75mm rockets impacted about 50 meters south of the Tan Chau OP Base perimeter, resulting in three VN civilians wounded, one seriously; the sourse of this fire was thought to be from the Black Ponies. By 0415H the enemy broke the attack on the outpost and retreated northeast.

On 29 May an incident of theft of Navy base supplies occurred which illustrates another problem which constantly threatens the success of the Vietnamization effort. A Coastal Group 36 gate sentry observed an LDNN truck departing the base with 25 bags of cement, part of the material for dependent housing construction which had been turned over to the Senior Advisor of ISB Long Phu for safe keeping until other units continued the job begun by recently redeployed Seabees. The sentry reported the matter to the commanding officer of the ISB, and the CO discussed the matter with the LDNN Petty Officer in Charge, who said that the guilty member was indebted to a villager for 10,000 to 20,000 piasters and had sold cement to pay the debt. The Senior Advisor requested an investigation and appropriate disciplinary action, neither of which was reported by month's end.

The drug problem in Vietnam received additional attention this month in the form of an investigation of marijuana usage among crewmen of USS SATYR (ARL 23). Several months ago a Navyman from

the ship on liberty in Long Xuyen passed out presumably from use of the drug. An investigation led to the apprehension of 15 other crewmembers of SATYR almost all of whom were in possession of marijuana, which is readily available in the Long Xuyen bars. The subject men were transferred to Naval Station, San Francisco on 17 May.

Administrative highlights during the month included the commencement of separate messing of Vietnamese and U.S. Naval personnel at the various LSBs and ISBs throughout the country and the beginning of the gradual replacement of MPC paper change (5¢, 25¢, etc.) with hard U.S. coins. Throughout the month several departments of NSF DaNang vacated Camp Tien Sha and moved to the annex across the road, making ready more buildings at Camp Tien Sha to be remodeled for dependent housing.

On 1 May, CAPT E.P. Travers relieved CAPT R. L. Dise as Deputy SA to the VNN LSC and Chief of Staff to NSAS. On 18 May CDR Daniel J. Moss was relieved by CDR Allen L. Bader as the commanding officer of LSB Nha Be. CDR Moss was presented with the Vietnamese Medal of Honor First Class from Captain Nguyen Van Lich, the commanding officer of VNN LSC, for his assistance during the initial phases of the co-manning of the base and his promotion of civic action programs for the civilian populace of Nha Be. On 4 May LCDR C. W. Albaugh relieved LT

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G. C. Meiers, Jr., as SA ISB Ben Luc. LT Thomas B. Huffman relieved LT Eldon J. Fry as OIC YRBM 21 on 14 May.

Distinguished visitors to NSA and detachments included a party of two Assistant Secretaries of Defense who visited Saigon, Cam Ranh Bay, and DaNang from 1 to 7 May. Secretary Barry Shillito was briefed on ACTOV status by RADM Salzer and RADM McManus. Secretary Edward J. Sheridan, Deputy for installations and housing, concerned himself during the visit with installations turned over to ARVN units. Congressional delegates Frank M. Clark (D-Pa.) and Philip E. Ruppe (R-Mich.) visited Vietnam at the end of the month for the purpose of observing operations and obtaining briefings, with special interest in Coast Guard operations. They visited Cam Ranh Bay and Cat Lai. On 12 May Captain John F. Riley, USN, Head of the Assignment Section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, visited DaNang and other detachments with several assistants to discuss with Navymen new assignments of duty after the Vietnam tour.

The following is a list of support ships serving during May on resupply and afloat repair operations for NSA :

| | |
|---|---|
| USS ASKARI (ARL 30) | Dong Tam |
| USS SPHINX (ARL 24) | Song Ong Doc - Vung Tau-depart RVN |
| USS SATYR (ARL 23) | Long Xuyen |
| USS PARK COUNTY (LST 1077) | Vung Tau |
| USS TUTUILA (ARG 4) | Nha Be |

| | |
|---|---|
| USS HUNTERDON COUNTY (AGP 838) | Song Ong Doc, Vung Tau, Hong Kong |
| USS TOM GREEN COUNTY (LST 1159) | Square Bay (VQ 67 70) |
| USS HOLMES COUNTY (LST 836) | Sa Dec-Long Xuyen-depart RVN |
| USS WHITFIELD COUNTY (LST 1169) | Sa Dec |
| USS BRULE (AKL 28) | WQ 10 20 - Nha Be |
| APL-21 | Nha Be |
| APL 30 | Dong Tam (towed to Nha Be 23 May) |
| YR 9 | Nha Be (towed to Subic 23 May) |
| YR 71 | Tan Chau (turnover 1 July) |
| YRBM 21 | Tan Chau |
| YFR 889 | Nha Be (turnover 15 May) |
| USS KRISHNA (ARL 38) | Vung Tau |
| YF 866 | Nha Be |
| YD 174 | Subic Bay (overhaul, to beinactivated) |
| YRBM 16 | Guam (preturnover overhaul) |
| YR 70 | Subic Bay (preturnover overhaul) |

USS COHOES (ANL 78) spent the first part of the month repairing POL lines off Chu Lai and later departed for overhaul in Subic Bay. A leak in the JP-4 fuel line off Tan May was discovered on 12 May and USS CURRENT (ARS 22) rushed to the scene to begin repairs. During the month ASKARI reported completing work requests on 28 boats, making 76 dives for underwater inspections, and lifting 17 boats. On 25 May, 18 OV-10 aircraft were offloaded from USS OKINAWA (LPH 3) and towed ten miles to the U.S. Naval Air Facility at Cam Ranh Bay in a combined operation with Army MP and VNN harbor security units providing traffic control and protection.

## NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCES

During May NMCB Five, a force of 362 men, continued work on projects begun by the two NMCBs which departed last month at Ta Kou (ACTOVRAD site #9), Mui Dinh (ACTOVRAD site #8), and ISB Ca Mau. By 26 May, only one man from the Third Naval Construction Brigade was left in the Republic of Vietnam. CBMU 302 continued to render technical assistance for VNN self-help dependent shelter construction at various locations throughout the country and worked on several new projects during the month. NMCB Ten, the main body of which is deployed to Okinawa, has two teams working in Vietnam on USAID pacification community projects. Team 1019 at My Tho (XS 497 455) and Team 1020 at Go Cong City (XS 842 462). On 31 May at the Bien Hoa Seabee Center, CDR Robert J. McHugh, Jr., CEC, USN, relieved CDR R. A. Schrade, Jr., CEC, USN, as Commanding Officer of NMCB Five.

By the end of the month NMCB Five, Detail Bronco, 71 men, at the Ta Kou radar installation, had completed 96% of the temporary camp there and 75% of the upgrading of Rt. 341 leading to the site. There were only two mining incidents reported this month on this road which resulted in some damage but no casualties. On the

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afternoon of 24 May a road crew, returning on Rt. 341 during a rain storm, detonated a freshly planted mine (20 pounds) at ZS 138 950 with a lowboy trailer. When the explosion occurred, automatic weapons fire was heard, but, a later survey of the area showed no indication of any enemy and it was supposed that the fire came from RF flank security troops. Repairs to the wheels of the trailer were made on site. Two days later, on Rt 341, at ZS 16 94, the third truck in a line of trucks hauling rock detonated a mine which damaged the truck's rear axle and wheels and left a crater six feet in diameter. No casualties were sustained in the incident.

NMCB Five, Detail Maverick, at the Mui Dinh ACTOVRAD site, completed 57% of the roadwork there during the month. No hostile incidents were reported, however, there was concern during the month as to the logistics support of the remote site, located 15 kilometers south of Phan Rang. The unit is supplied with repair parts, mail, and food, by means of Phan Rang Sector helos on an available basis. Bulk cargo arrives by LST or YFU which takes five days from Saigon. At landlocked Ta Kou, 15 miles southwest of Phan Thiet, all supplies come by truck convoy, slow but adequate support except during the monsoon season rains when the roads are sometimes impassable. The assistance of USN helos that

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operate from Tan Son Nhut to resupply USN and VNN units in MRs Three and Four was considered.

NMCB Five, Detail Mustang, 86 men, at ISB Ca Mau, completed 92% of the temporary camp during the month and 23% of the ACTOV base facility. The RMK well-drilling crew arrived on site and construction of the well was reported as proceeding on schedule. Another detail, Colt, began ACTOV work in Quang Xuyen District (RSSZ), arriving at the site on 23 May with a pile driving barge from Nha Be to construct a pier for the Marine advisors.

During May, COMNAVFORV tasked Seabees with additional projects at ACTOV facilities where shortfalls were discovered after acceptance by the Vietnamese Navy. NMCB Five, Detail Stallion, was instructed to rework the POL pumping system, construct a POL rocket screen, install a pier water system and hot water heaters in the advisor's mess, correct pier access ramp structural deficiencies, lower perimeter lights, and miscellaneous electrical work at OP Base Tan Chau. The projects were begun on 20 May. Detail Stallion was also tasked with installing pier lighting at ISB Cho Moi. At the recently turned over ISB Nam Can an official inspection team discovered several shortfalls existing in the pier and ammi drydock construction, dependent shelters, and the POL system. Seabees of Detail Stallion were tasked to work

with private contractors on this project. NSA Public Works was assisting in the completion of base electrical distribution and generation systems. Vietnamese navymen were to stabilize the runway, install a sewage lift pump, and complete a waster catchment system. COMNAVFORV also recommended self-help work by the VNN officer-in-charge at Chau Doc such as grating ports for stoves, stanchions on piers, cement splash blocks, and hose racks. The Senior Advisor to OP Base Chau Doc responded that Seabee assistance in material and planning was necessary as the project was beyond VNN capabilities.

During May CBMU 302 continued dependent shelter projects at Rach Soi (17 under construction, 50% complete), Quang Ngai ( ten under construction, 90% complete), An Thoi (26 under construction, 170 completed), Thuan An (37 under construction, 42% complete), DaNang (176 units of the 600 under construction were turned over to NSF DaNang on 26 May). At the DaNang and Cam Ranh Bay sites the VNN are heading the projects with 169 and 110 sailors, respectively, with the assistance of 25 Seabees in DaNang and four at Cam Ranh Bay. At the Cam Ranh Bay site, 575 dependent shelter units are slated to be built, and 187 stood at the end of the month almost completed. CBMU 302 Seabees were also called upon to render technical assistance for VNN self help

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construction of 16 dependent shelters at Chu Lai as well as repairing 14 already built by filling in rear porch areas and building a retaining wall. Work began on 24 May on dependent shelters at ISB Cat Lai for disabled veterans by VNN sailors with Seabee assistance. 25,000 square meters of land was procured months ago and a small section has been filled in to a suitable elevation for the shelters to be constructed.

CBMU 302 NavCat (Community Action Team) #7, eight men, completed the assigned seahuts at Dong Tam on 14 May, and NavCat #17, 27 men, completed a berthing facility on 17 May at Rach Soi. CBMU 302 Seabees were also at work during May on the administration building and perimeter lighting and flag mess hall at Binh Thuy, the Cam Ranh Bay mess hall, and a VNN warehouse at the Saigon shipyard.

Seabee team 4006 relieved Seabee Team 0107 in Tan An City (XS 535 655) on 7 May; Seabee Team 6206 relieved Seabee Team 0106 at Ham Tam City (ZS 019 823) on 11 May. On 8 May Seabee Team 1020 closed the team compound at Phu Vinh City (XR 463 973) and reopened the compound at Go Cong City, Go Cong Province. During May, detached Seabee teams completed 15 projects. Team 0318 completed a 4 x 10 meter warehouse addition in Kien Hoa Province, 0319 completed two ten ton bridges in Long Khanh Province and a 6 x 6 meter dispensary, and 7409 completed a 10 x 10 meter

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school addition in Kien Phong Province. In civic actions, Seabee Teams 0318 and 0518 installed playground equipment at local hospitals and orphanages in Kien Hoa and Ba Xuyen Provinces. Seabee Teams 0319 and 1020 graded roads and cleared land in Long Khanh and Go Cong Provinces. Seabee Team 0518 performed water system repairs, and Seabee Team 0319 installed four culverts.

SW3 Kenneth Marvin Hatcher, a Seabee who died last month in a light airplane crash, was posthumously recommended for the Navy Achievement Medal with Combat Distinguishing Device. His work was representative of the total Seabee effort in Vietnam. The proposed citation for the award read in part: "During the period November 1970 to April 1971 Petty Officer Hatcher was assigned to Seabee Team 0319 located at Xuan Loc City, Long Khanh Province, Republic of Vietnam. While serving as the team steel worker, Hatcher assisted in the productive and effective team construction program in support of the pacification and rural development programs of the government of Vietnam. In Long Khanh Province he made significant contributions to the construction of an extensive road culvert project and a shower facility at a local orphanage. Also, he performed welding and steelwork construction on two 10 meter heavy duty steel truss bridges,

and a dam sluicegate. Hatcher provided all steelworking and welding support to 12 completed projects and five in progress. In conjunction with his steelworker tasks, Hatcher supervised the training of one Vietnamese steelworker trainee. Through his sincere interest Hatcher achieved an unusual rapport with his trainee and consequently was able to instruct at an accelerated pace."[1]

Additional kudos also went to LTJG Robert L. Harman who received a Navy Commendation Medal as OIC of NavCat #8 in Cuu Long from March 1970 to March 1971. He was responsible for the construction of 192 dependent shelters for the VNN, and organizing and deploying a team of 45 men and construction equipment to accomplish the mission. He also supported the Navy's Project Protein by providing animal shelters vital to upgrading the Vietnamese diet. BU2 Ernest Ramey received the Navy Achievement Medal while serving as crew leader with CBMU 302's NavCat #6 in An Thoi from February to December 1970. Using an inexperienced crew, he directed the construction of two housing projects and two schools with maximum efficiency.

1. CBPACDET RVN msg 082344Z May 1971

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# OPERATIONAL ORGANIZATION
# TF 21/22




APPENDIX I




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## NAVAL ADVISORY GROUP ORGANIZATION

| | |
|---|---|
| CHNAVADVGRP U.S. MACV | RADM R. S. SALZER, USN |
| SENAVADV | CAPT B. G. STONE, USN |
| SA FLEET COMMAND, SAIGON | CAPT J. F. DRAKE, USN |
| SA CMD NAVAL COMMAND (SA CTF 227) | LCDR J. H. GAUL, USN |

TRAN HUNG DAO Campaign Advisory organization/Area Operation Coordinators (AOC)

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| AOC, COSTAL | SA CTF 213 | CAPT C. R. QUANSTROM, USN |
| SA DEPCOMTHD Binh Thuy | | CAPT W. J. CROWE, USN |
| AOC, NORTHERN | SA 3rd Riverine Area | CDR L. E. PELLOCK, USN |
| SA THD II, Ben Luc | VNN TG 214.1 | LCDR P. S. GESSWEIN, USN |
| SA THD V, Phu Cuong | VNN TG 216.1 | LCDR W. W. WERNDLI, USN |
| SA THD IX, Tan Chau | VNN TG 212.3 | LCDR B. COUSINS, USN |
| AOC, EASTERN | SA, 4th Riverine Area | CDR W. WARDELL, USN |
| SA THD VIII, Can Tho | VNN TG 217.1 | LT K. J. PLIS, USN |
| SA THD XIX, Can Tho | VNN TF 217.2 | LT R. E. BROWN, USN |
| AOC, SOUTHERN | SA ATF 211 | CAPT P. C. GIBBONS, USN |
| SA THD IV, Nam Can | VNN TG 214.2 | CDR H. V. SHORES, USN |
| SA THD VI, Rach Soi | VNN TG 212.5 | CDR W. S. BROWN, USN |
| SA THD XVII, Ca Mau | VNN TF 210 | CAPT W. J. GIBBONS |
| AOC , WESTERN | SA COMTHD 18 | CDR A. WRIGHT, USN |

SA THD XVIII, Chau Doc VNN TF 218 CDR A. WRIGHT

SA THD XX, An Thoi VNN TG 212.4 LT D. C. SNYDER, USN

Amphibious Type Command Advisory Organization (ATF 211)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA PHIBCMD Dong Tam | CAPT P. C. GIBBONS, USN |
| SA RAID 70 Kien An | LT R. J. LENDSTEDT, II, USN |
| SA RAID 71 Kien An | LT S. L. HOLMES, USN |
| SA RAID 72 Kien An | LT J. H. DUNCAN, USN |
| SA RAID 73 Neak Luong | LT R. L. TAYLOR, USN |
| SA RAID 74 Ca Mau | LCDR R. B. RYLAND, USN |
| SA RAID 75 Ca Mau | LT J. GLUTTING, USN |

River Patrol Type Command Advisory Organization (TF 212)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA RIVPATCMD Binh Thuy | CAPT R. E. SPRUIT, USN |
| SA RPD 51 Cat Lai | LT J. M. LAWLESS, USN |
| SA RPD 52 Phu Cuong/ Nha Be | LT J. R. RECKNER, USN |
| SA RPD 53 My Tho | LT A. HILDEBRAND, USN |
| SA RPD 54 Ben Keo, Tan An, Ben Luc | / LT R. ARMITAGE, USN |
| SA RPD 55 Chau Doc | LT D. URSPRUNG, USN |
| SA RPD 56 Vinh Long | LT J. B. GIBNEY, USN |
| SA RPD 57 Nha Be | LT J. B. BURNESKIS, USN |
| SA RPD 58 Sa Dec | LT H. M. HIGHLAND, USN |
| SA RPD 59 Tan Chau | LT J. E. PEPPER, USN |
| SA RPD 60 Hoi An | LT B. WATERMAN, USN |

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|---|---|
| SA RPD 61 Rach Soi | LT G. M. ZEMANSKY, USN |
| SA RPD 62 Phouc Xuyen | LT T. C. VOIGHT, USN |
| SA RPD 63 Rach Soi | LT R. B. FIORE, USNR |
| SA RPD 64 Tuyen Nhon, Moc Hoa | LT T. J. FLYNN, USN |

Coastal Surveillance Type Command Advisory Organization (TF 213)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA CSCMD Cam Ranh Bay | CAPT C. R. QUANSTROM, USN |
| SA COSFLOT 1 DaNang | LCDR D. C. WILSON, USN |
| SA COSFLOT 2 Qui Nhon | LCDR J. D. SARVERY, USN |
| SA COSFLOT 3 Vung Tau | LCDR J. J. DOOLEY, USN |
| SA COSFLOT 4 An Thoi | LCDR J. G. TONTI, USN |
| SA COSFLOT 5 My Tho | LCDR J. McCORMICK, USN |
| SA HDU Cam Ranh Bay | LT J. L. JANSEN, USNR |

General Reserve Type Command Advisory Organization (TF 214)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA GENRESCMD Cat Lai | CAPT L. A. DWYER, USN |
| SA RTE DIV 81 Cat Lai | LT J. P. DEATON, USN |
| SA MID 91 Cuu Long | LT J. W. HAMILTON, USN |
| SA MID 92 Cua Viet | LT T. A. COMER, USN |
| SA MID 93 Nha Be, Tan Chau, Ca Mau | LT R. F. ELLIOTT, USN |
| SA SEAL and UDT Unit Saigon | LT F. W. DORAN, USN |
| SA Salvage Unit Cat Lo | LCDR E. H. SHIPP, USN |
| SA RID 40 Go Dau Ha | LT R. O. MILHAM, USN |

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|---|---|
| SA RID 41 Chau Doc | LTJG T. E. SPEERS, USN |
| SA RID 42 Ben Tre, Dong Tam | LT C. VOTAVA, USN |
| SA RID 43 Tra Cu | LTJG T. B. WAGENSEIL, USN |
| SA RID 44 Ben Luc | LT G. C. COOLEY, USN |
| SA RID 45 Dong Tam | LT F. MAUNEY, USN |
| SA RID 46 Nam Can | LT W. C. SMITH, USN |
| SA RID 47 Nam Can | LT W. TAYLOR, USN |
| SA RID 48 Tan Chau | LT W. R. RUSLING, USN |
| SA RAG 27 Nha Be | LT W. GOTTSCHALK, USN |

First Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

| | |
|---|---|
| SA First CZ DaNang | CDR P. McLAIRD, JR., USN |
| SA CG 11 Cua Viet | LT R. DUMINIAK, USNR |
| SA CG 12 Thuan An | LT R. N. MEYERS, USN |
| SA CG 13 Cu Tu Hien | LT J. SCOTT, USN |
| SA CG 14 Hoi An | LT D. M. PENCE, USN |
| SA CG 15 An Hoa | LT D. ROBINSON, USN |
| SA CG 16 Co Luy | LT W. R. OWENS, USNR |
| SA RAG 32 Hue | LT G. L. MAGER, USN |
| SA HCU DaNang | LT D. W. WIRICK, USNR |
| SA CSC DaNang | LTJG R. M. SCOTT, USN |

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Second Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

| | |
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| SA Second CZ Nha Trang | CDR A. S. JEFFERIS, USN |
| SA CG 21 De Gi | LT J. K. ENGELKEN, USN |
| SA CG 23 Song Cau | LT E. L. SIWINSKI, USNR |
| SA CG 25 Dong Hai | LT E. F. GIER, USN |
| SA CG 26 Binh Ba Island | LT J. P. McGRATH, USN |
| SA CG 27 Ninh Chu | LTJG P. MILLER, USN |
| SA CG 28, Phan Thiet | LT G. NORDLAND, USN |
| SA HDU Nha Trang | LT J. E. BINGHAM, USN |
| SA HDU Qui Nhon | LT D. C. OGDEN, USN |
| SA CSC Qui Nhon | LCDR R. SAGEHORN, USN |
| SA CSC Nha Trang | LT S. C. AREY, USN |

Third Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

| | |
|---|---|
| SA Third CZ Vung Tau | CDR J. G. SULLIVAN, USN |
| SA CG 33 Rach Dua | LT F. M. LEMON, USN |
| SA CG 34 Tiem Tom | LT B. R. MOFFETT, USN |
| SA CG 35 Hung My | LTJG T. E. ARNOLD, USN |
| SA CG 36 Long Phu | LT C. L. DOBSON, USN |
| SA HDU Vung Tau | LT N. BARBOUR, USN |
| SA CSC Vung Tau | LT D. F. ROGUS, USN |

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Fourth Coastal Zone Advisory Organization

| | |
|---|---|
| SA Fourth CZ An Thoi | CDR M. J. SHINE, USN |
| SA CG 41 Ha Tien | LTJG S. T. O'NEAL, USNR |
| SA CG 42 Ha Tien | LT O. R. COLE, III, USN |
| SA CG 43 Hon Tre Island | LT M. A. SOBYNA, USN |
| SA CG 44 Ha Tien | LTJG D. C. SNYDER, USN |
| SA CSC An Thoi | LT P. D. McCURDY, USN |

Third Riverine Zone Advisory Organization (TF 216)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA Third Riverine Zone Long Binh | CDR L. E. PELLOCK, USN |
| SA RAG 22 Phu Cuong | LT J. CALABOUGH, USN |
| SA RAG 24 Phu Cuong | LTJG R. L. CANON, USNR |
| SA RAG 28 Long Binh | LT R. M. ANDREWS, USN |
| SA RAG 30 Long Binh | LT. R. M. ANDREWS |
| SA REG for RPG Cuu Long | LT C. E. ROBE, USN |

Fourth Riverine Zone Advisory Organization (TF 217)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA Fourth Riverine Zone Can Tho | CDR W. WARDELL, USN |
| SA RAG 21/33 Dong Tam | LT K. J. PLIS, USN |
| SA RAG 23/31 Vinh Long | LTJG R. E. BROWN, USN |
| SA RAG 25/29 Ca Mau | LT R. J. GILLESKIE, USN |
| SA RAG 26 Long Xuyen | LTJG R. W. BASS, USNR |

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Rung Sat Special Zone Advisory Organization (TF 228)

| | |
|---|---|
| SA RSSZ Nha Be | CDR D. A. STEWART, USN |

Naval Training Center Advisory Organization

| | |
|---|---|
| SA NTC Nha Trang | CDR R. TARBUCK, USN |
| SA NTC Cam Ranh Bay | CDR R. R. WARD, USN |
| SA NTC Saigon | CDR R. R. GROVE, USN |

Logistic Support Command Advisory Organization

| | |
|---|---|
| SA VNN LSC and SA VNN DCOS LOG | RADM P. S. McMANUS, USN |
| DEP SA VNN LSC | CAPT E. P. TRAVERS, USN |
| SA VNNSY | CAPT F. T. SHAVER, USN |
| SA VNNSC | CDR C. H. BARSTAD, USN |
| SA LSB An Thoi | LCDR M. ANDRASKO, USN |
| SA ISB Rach Soi | LT D. E. WARD, USN |
| SA ISB Qui Nhon | LCDR M. AUSTIN, USN |
| SA ISB Ben Luc | LCDR C. W. ALBAUGH, USN |
| SA LSB Cat Lo | LCDR S. UNGEMACH, USN |
| SA LSB Dong Tam | CDR W. M. COLE, USN |
| SA LSB Cam Ranh Bay | CDR C. McINTOSH, USN |
| SA LSB DaNang | CAPT R. PADDOCK, USN |
| SA LSB Nha Be | CDR A. L. BADER, USN |
| SA ISB Thuan An | LCDR J. STEVENS, USN |
| SA LSB Binh Thuy | CDR R. J. COEN, USNR |

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|---|---|
| SA ISB Long Xuyen | LCDR A. THIEL, USN |
| SA ISB Long Phu | LT J. R. MURRAY, USN |
| SA ISB Vinh Long | LT W. McALISTER, USNR |
| SA ISB Cat Lai | LT J. F. MAYER, USN |
| SA ISB Nam Can | LCDR R. BLEDSOE, USN |
| SA ISB Cho Moi | LCDR B. BURGETT, USNR |
| SA ISB Ca Mau | LT D. CHALFANT, USN |
| SA YRBM ALFA | LT R. A. MELODY, USN |

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# APPENDIX IV

## Glossary of Abbreviations

The following abbreviations and terms are commonly used in the combat zone by all agencies and are listed here in amplification of those used in the text:

| | |
|---|---|
| ABF | Attack by fire |
| AMMI PONTOON | A multi-purpose barge, standard size 28'x90' |
| AO | Area of operations |
| ARVN | Army of the Republic of Vietnam |
| A/S | Air strike |
| ASPB | Assault Support Patrol Boat |
| ART | Artillery |
| ATC | Armored Troop Carrier |
| ATSB | Advance Tactical Support Base |
| A/W | Automatic Weapons |
| BLACK PONY | OV-10 Aircraft, twin engine turboprop counterinsurgency |
| CCB | Command and Communications Boat |
| CG | Coastal Group |
| CHICOM | Chinese Communist |
| CIDG | Civilian Irregular Defense Group - mercenaries of Vietnamese, Laotian, Cambodian descent who fight primarily around their own villages. |

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|---|---|
| CMD | Capital Military District |
| CONUS | Continental United States |
| CRIP | Civilian Reconnaissance Intelligence Platoon |
| CZ | Coastal Zone |
| DIW | Dead in the water |
| DUSTOFF | Medical evacuation by helo |
| ENIFF | Enemy Initiated Firefight |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| FOM | French Patrol Boat |
| FSB | Fire Support Base |
| FWMAF | Free World Military Assistance Forces |
| GDA | Gun damage assessment |
| GVN | Government of Vietnam |
| HAFT | Helicopter Attack Fire Team |
| H&I | Harassment and Interdiction Fire support |
| ISB | Intermediate Support Base |
| JGS | Joint General Staff (Vietnamese) |
| KIA | Killed In Action |
| KIT CARSON SCOUTS | Former Viet Cong who have come over to the side of the Saigon government and serve with allied military units. |
| LAFT | Light Attack Fire Team |
| LAW | Light Anti-tank Weapon |

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|---|---|
| LCPL | Landing Craft, Personnel, Large |
| LDNN | Vietnamese equivalent of USN Underwater Demolition Team |
| LHFT | Light Helo Fire Team |
| LOH | OH-6 Light Observation Helicopter |
| LP | Lookout Post |
| LRRP | Long range reconnaissance patrol |
| LSSC | Light Seal Support Craft |
| MACV | Military Assistance Command, Vietnam |
| MATSB | Mobile Advance Tactical Support Base |
| MEDCAP | Medical Civic Action Program |
| MID | Mining Interdiction Division |
| MONITOR | Heavily armored LCM-6 (40mm cannon or 105mm Howitzer) |
| MR | Military Region |
| MSB | Minesweeper, boat |
| MSD | Minesweeper, drone |
| MSF | Mobile Strike Force - mercenaries who deploy and go anywhere |
| MSSC | Medium Seal Support Craft |
| NGF | Naval gunfire |
| NGFS | Naval Gunfire Support |
| NILO | Naval Intelligence Liaison Officer |
| NIOTC | Naval Inshore Operations Training Center |

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| | |
|---|---|
| NMCB | Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (Seabees) |
| NOD | Night Observation Device |
| NSA | Naval Support Activity |
| NSAD | Naval Support Activity Detachment |
| NVA | North Vietnamese Army |
| OJT | On-the-job training |
| PBR | Patrol boat, river |
| PCF | Patrol craft, fast (Swift boat) |
| PF | Popular Forces |
| POL | Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants |
| PRU | Provincial Reconnaissance Unit |
| PSA | Province Sector Advisor |
| PSDF | Popular Self-Defense Forces |
| PSYOPS | Psychological Operations |
| RAC | River Assault Craft |
| RAD | River Assault Division |
| RAG | River Assault Group (VNN) |
| RAID | River Assault and Interdiction Division (VNN) |
| RAP | Rocket Assisted Projectile |
| RAS | River Assault Squadron |
| REF | Reefer (ship) |
| RF/PF | Regional Forces/Popular Forces |
| RMK/BRJ | Civilian construction company in Vietnam |

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| | |
|---|---|
| RPD | River Patrol Division |
| RPG | Rocket propelled grenade (or) River Patrol Group |
| RSSZ | Rung Sat Special Zone |
| RVNAF | Republic of Vietnam Air Force (orArmed Forces) |
| SA | Senior Advisor |
| SAR | Search And Rescue |
| SEAL | Navy commandos (Sea, Air, Land) |
| SEAWOLF | UH-1B Helo, heavily armored, USN operated |
| SHADOW | C-119 aircraft |
| SKIMMER | 20-foot fiberglass motorboat |
| SLICK | UH-1B , USA operated |
| SPOOKY | C-47 aircraft |
| SSB | Swimmer Support Boat (Skimmer) |
| STAB | Strike Assault Boat |
| TAOR | Tactical area of responsibility |
| TP/PT | Convoy designation for ships travelling up the Mekong River from Tan Chau to Phnom Penh and vice versa |
| USARV | United States Army, Vietnam |
| USASUPCOM | United States Army Supply Command |
| VNMC | Vietnamese Marine Corps |
| VNN | Vietnamese Navy |
| WIA | Wounded In Action |
| ZIPPO | Flame thrower-equipped ATC or Monitor |