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12 JUN 1951

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL 29)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force 95
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report; period 8 April 1951 - 11 May 1951; submission of

Ref: (a) Navy Regulations, 1948
(b) CNO ltr Op345/aa, Ser 1197P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950, NDB 15 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) Action Report period 8 April 1951 - 11 May 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b), enclosure (1), with parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI, is submitted herewith.

2. During the period covered by this report U.S.S. BATAAN operated with TG 95.1.

W. MILLER

Copy to:
ComAirPac
ComCarDiv 15

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PART I

GENERAL NARRATIVE

On 8 April 1951, Task Element 95.11, of truly United Nations aspect, comprised of USS BATAAN, with VMF 312 embarked, HMS THESEUS, and screening destroyers; USS ENGLISH (DD 696), USS SPERRY (DD 704), HMS CONSORT, HMAS BATAAN, HMCS ATHABASKAN and HMCS HURON sortied Sasebo at 0700, 8 April 1951 in compliance with CTF 95 Operation Order 1-51, to conduct operations on East Coast of Korea in accordance Annex Baker, CTF 95 secret Operation Order 2-51 and CTE 95.11 confidential Operation Order 2-51 Revised. OTC and CTE 95.11 Captain E. T. NEALE, USN in USS BATAAN (CVL 29).

The Task Element arrived in the operating area night of 8 April and reported to CTG 95.2 for operational control at 2309 Item. Air operations were initiated early morning 9 April and continued through 15 April consisting of interdiction strikes, armed reconnaissance, air spot for naval gun-fire and combat air patrol. The primary physical objective was stoppage of enemy traffic, especially trucks, on the enemy's main supply route along the east coast of Korea in the vicinity of Wonsan, Hamhung, and Songjin. Surface operations conducted were those required for air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. Formation 4 Roger was used throughout except during replenishment.

During this period five aircraft and one pilot were lost to enemy action. On 9 April 1st Lt. J. S. Sumner of VMF 312 ditched his plane in Wonsan Bay after it sustained damage from enemy AA during an airspot mission in support of naval gun-fire against Wonsan by TE 95.21. Rescue units were immediately alerted and a timely rescue was made by a helicopter dispatched from USS MANCHESTER at Wonsan. 1st Lt. Sumner was uninjured and was returned to USS BATAAN the following day. Analysis of the pilot's report of this incident indicated that his immersion suit performed satisfactorily for a brief period but that thereafter a considerable quantity of water seeped through at the wrists and neck. In addition to increasing the discomfort of the pilot, the weight of the water within the suit made recovery by the helicopter difficult.

On 10 April a Sea Fury, operating from HMS THESEUS, piloted by Pilot III R. H. Johnson, was shot down by AA about 35 miles southwest of Wonsan in enemy territory. An extensive and thorough search failed to reveal any sign of the pilot and rescue efforts were abandoned. He was reported lost in action and presumed killed.

An unfortunate incident involving THESEUS aircraft took place the same morning when one land-based U.S. Marine Corsair, in a case of mistaken identity, attacked two Sea Furies south of Wonsan. Both Sea Furies were hit; one was extensively damaged. Fortunately, the pilots were not hurt and were able to complete a successful landing aboard the THESEUS. This incident was reported to Commanding General, First Marine Air Wing for appropriate action.

Two days later, on 12 April, a Firefly operating from HMS THESEUS was forced to ditch at sea 10 miles southeast of Hungnam after being hit by AA. Pilot and crewman were recovered uninjured by helicopters from BATAAN and THESEUS. The following day, 13 April, a Sea Fury piloted by Lt. J. S. Humphreys was damaged by AA and forced down on land 6 miles southwest of Hamhung. Rescue was effected by a helicopter from USS MANCHESTER. The pilot suffered a fractured right ankle, concussion, shock, exposure, and lacerations.

On 14 April, Capt. H. G. Hennenburger of VMF 312 was forced to land at Pohang when a gun blast tube in the port wing blew up during a strafing attack on enemy positions. The pilot was uninjured. The same day, a Sea Fury, piloted by Lt. I. L. Bowman, was hit by AA fire and forced to crash land 6 miles southwest of Hungnam. RESCAP was formed by other members of his flight and nearby BATAAN aircraft until rescue was effected by helicopter from USS MANCHESTER. In performing the rescue, the helicopter was subject to considerable small arms fire. The pilot was uninjured, and was returned to THESEUS. The downed Sea Fury was destroyed by wingman's gun-fire.

During this operating period USS BATAAN launched 224 sorties, of which 218 were offensive and 26 were Combat Air Patrol. Of the 218 offensive missions 20 were for airspot in support of naval gun-fire conducted against Wonsan and Sonjin by TE 95.21 and TE 95.22 respectively. The other 198 missions comprised armed reconnaissance and air strikes against enemy installations and equipment found in the area.

USS BORIE (DD 702) joined the screen at 1515 Item, 10 April, and was detached at 1517 Item, 11 April with orders to proceed to Wonsan and report to CTG 95.2 for operational control.

Replenishment of the Task Element was conducted in three phases: Commonwealth destroyers were refueled in Wonsan area by PLATTE (AO 24) on 11 April; HMS THESEUS was replenished by WAVE CHIEF on 13 April, on completion of which she resumed flight operations; USS BATAAN (CVL 29), plus destroyers ENGLISH and SPERRY

were replenished by NAVASOTA (AO 106) and LEO (AKA 60) on 14 April, on completion of which at 1330 Item, normal flight operations were resumed. Air operations were curtailed on 15 April due to fog.

Upon completion of air operations 15 April, 1630 Item, HMS THESEUS was designated CTE 95.11 at which time USS BATAAN, USS SPERRY and HMAS BATAAN (DD) were detached and departed operating area for Sasebo, reporting for operational control to CTG 95.1 at 1900 Item. HMS THESEUS and screen as CTE 95.11 proceeded West Coast of Korea, replenishing enroute as necessary.

USS BATAAN and screen arrived Sasebo at 1116 Item, 16 April for period of replenishment and upkeep.

At 0930 Item, 17 April, Captain W. Miller relieved Captain Edgar T. Neale as Commanding Officer, USS BATAAN (CVL 29) during ceremonies held aboard USS BATAAN at Sasebo, Japan.

USS AGERHOLM (DD 826), USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD 786) and USS ROGERS (DDR 876) reported to USS BATAAN (CVL 29) for duty at 1633 Item, 17 April.

At 0700 Item, 19 April, USS BATAAN, with VMF 312 embarked, and screen composed of above destroyers sortied Sasebo in accordance CTE 95.10 confidential dispatch 170251Z to relieve HMS THESEUS and screen on west coast of Korea. USS BATAAN, upon arrival in the operating area, at 2000 Item, 19 April, assumed duties as CTE 95.11, OTC and CTE 95.11 Captain W. Miller, USN in USS BATAAN.

Operations were based on ComNavFE OpOrd 20-50, CTG 95 OpOrd 1-51 and CTG 95.1 OpOrd 1-51. Mission of CTE 95.11 derived from above orders and set forth in USS BATAAN OpOrd 3-51 consisted of enforcing the United Nations' blockade of the west coast of Korea, protecting sea communications in the Yellow Sea, and rendering air support to ground forces. An air plan providing for fifty sorties per day was promulgated. Surface operations consisted of those required for air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. Formation 4 Roger was used throughout except during replenishment.

During the seven days of air operations from early morning 20 April to evening 26 April, planes of VMF 312 operating from USS BATAAN flew 318 sorties of which 136 were for close air support of front line troops, 96 were reconnaissance missions, 18 strike, and 68 combat air patrol. Armed reconnaissance covered the Haeju-Chinnampo region and the area near Hanchon.

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On 20 April Major Frank Presley, Commanding Officer of VMF312, was hit in the right leg while on an armed reconnaissance mission over enemy territory. Despite the injury, Major Presley managed to return safely aboard. Of exceptional note in this period was the destruction of three Yak planes, and the probable destruction of a fourth by Capt. Phillip C. DeLong and 1st Lt. Harold D. Daigh of VMF 312, about 0715 in the Chinnampo area 21 April. This action is described in detail in Appendix (1).

On the same morning 1st Lt. Godbey was forced to bail out on the mainland opposite Sokto-ri Island southwest of Chinnampo when his engine failed. He was covered by aircraft of his flight until rescued by ROK Marines' boat; later picked up by helicopter and returned to the ship. Lt. Godbey suffered injury to his left ankle. The following day, 22 April, Capt. John Rainalter was killed during a strike against Sariwon airstrip. Hit by AA, his plane burst into flames, dived into the ground, and exploded on impact. There was no possible chance of survival.

Rendezvous for scheduled replenishment was effected with USS KASKASKIA (AO 27) at 0619 Item, 23 April at latitude 36-30N, longitude 124-30E. Replenishment was completed at 0629 Item and air operations were immediately resumed. North Korean and Chinese forces had initiated a new drive on the west flank of UN forces a few hours earlier and troops ashore were in desperate need of close air support. During the ensuing four-day period maximum effort was devoted to close air support and a total of 136 such sorties were flown by pilots of VMF 312. A two-plane CAP was maintained over the task element and armed reconnaissance was reduced to the minimum requirement of one flight per day for coastal reconnaissance.

On 24 April Point Option was changed to 36-45N, latitude and 125-20E longitude for the express purpose of covering TE 95.12 during its replenishment, at the completion of which Point Option was moved to 37-00N latitude and 125-30E longitude.

Close air support, reconnaissance and combat air patrol missions continued until dusk of 26 April. At 2000 Item, 26 April HMS GLORY assumed duty as CTE 95.11, relieving USS BATAAN and screen on station. BATAAN and screen departed operations area and proceeded to Sasebo. At 0500 Item, 27 April USS ROGERS (DD) was detached to proceed Pusan reporting for operational control to CTG 95.2 in accordance with instructions from CTF 95 received enroute. BATAAN and remaining destroyers, USS AGERHOLM and USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON, continued to Sasebo, arriving at 1345 Item, 27 April. Upon arrival, USS AGERHOLM and

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USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON were directed to report for operational control to CTF 95. USS BATAAN proceeded with scheduled replenishment and upkeep.

In order to provide maximum close air support for hard pressed United Nations' forces, the replenishment and upkeep period for USS BATAAN was abruptly terminated. At 0700 Item, morning of 1 May USS BATAAN with VMF 312 embarked, escorted by HMCS SIOUX (DD) and HMS COMUS (DD), sortied Sasebo to join HMS GLORY and screen off west coast of Korea to conduct joint air operations against the enemy. Routine anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were conducted enroute.

USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD 786) joined the formation at 1336 Item, 1 May and the formation arrived in operating area Mike at 012230 Item, where rendezvous was effected with HMS GLORY and Commonwealth destroyers. Capt. W. Miller, USN, in BATAAN (CVL 29) assumed duties as OTC and CTE 95.11 at 0001 Item, 2 May.

The formation was augmented by the arrival of USS PERKINS at 0520 Item, 2 May. TE 95.11 composed of carriers USS BATAAN and HMS GLORY with screen composed of Commonwealth destroyers, HMCS SIOUX, HMS COMUS, HMAS WARRAMUNGA, HMCS NOOTKA, HMCS HURON, HMAS BATAAN and US destroyers ANDERSON and PERKINS, commenced air operations at dawn 2 May. At 0645 Commonwealth destroyers SIOUX and COMUS were detached to report for operational control to CTE 95.12.

Operations were conducted in accordance with current operation orders of ComNavFE, CTF 95, CTG 95.1, and CO, USS BATAAN Operation Order 3-51. Surface operations consisted of those necessary to support air operations, replenishment, and night steaming. Formation 4 Roger was used throughout except during replenishment.

Air operations during this period consisted of combat air patrol, armed reconnaissance, and close air support, with special emphasis placed on close air support for front line troops. Adverse weather seriously hampered flight operations during this period. Low ceilings, poor visibility and intermittent fog patches were encountered on the morning of 4 May. Launching was delayed until 1045 Item; however, the planes were unable to reach the target area and were forced to return. Poor visibility and low ceilings made recovery difficult and hazardous; nevertheless, all planes were landed safely.

Poor weather prevailed the following day and flight operations were delayed until late afternoon, the first launch taking place

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at 1635 King. On 7 May normal operations were conducted except for a delay of one half hour in launching the first flight. Poor weather again delayed launchings until 1400 King 8 May.

From early morning 2 May to afternoon of 10 May planes of VMF 312 flying off the USS BATAAN flew a total of 293 sorties; 244 offensive and 49 defensive. Bulk of the effort was directed against enemy troops in close air support of United Nations' front line forces.

One Sea Fury and one Corsair were lost during this period. Afternoon of 2 May, the pilot of a damaged Sea Fury crash landed in the mouth of the Han River 30 miles northwest of Seoul behind enemy lines. RESCAP was formed immediately and a timely rescue was made by helicopter. The pilot was flown to Seoul where he was placed in a field hospital and treated for exposure. A Corsair was lost when 2nd Lt. Smith, while on combat air patrol, experienced engine trouble and decided to bail out. Rescue attempts by helicopter failed when the pilot was unable to extricate himself from his parachute harness. Recovery was made by boat dispatched by the destroyer AGERHOLM. The pilot was later returned to USS BATAAN where he was treated for exposure and shock.

Afternoon of 4 May destroyers VAN GALEN and SIOUX joined the screen, reporting for operational control to CTE 95.11 at 040400Z and 040700Z respectively, at which time WARRAMUNGA and NOOTKA were detached to proceed as ordered making own movement reports.

USS AGERHOLM (DD 826) joined TE 95.11 at 1230 King, 6 May as a replacement for the VAN GALEN. The VAN GALEN was directed to refuel, upon completion of which at 1730 King she was detached to report for operational control to CTE 95.12.

TE 95.11 was now composed of USS BATAAN with VMF 312 embarked, HMS GLORY, Commonwealth destroyers SIOUX, HURON, and BATAAN: U.S. destroyers PERKINS, ANDERSON and AGERHOLM.

On completion of flight operations 2000 King 6 May, HMS GLORY with destroyers SIOUX, HURON and BATAAN, was detached to proceed Sasebo for period of replenishment and upkeep.

Replenishment during this period was conducted on 4 and 6 May. Commonwealth destroyers were refueled by the WAVE CHIEF on 4 May in vicinity of latitude 36-20N and longitude 125-30E. USS BATAAN and US destroyers plus the VAN GALEN were replenished on 6 May by NAVASOTA (AO 106) and DIPHDA (AKA 59) in latitude 36-30N, longitude 124-30E. USS AGERHOLM refueled prior to joining the screen. VAN GALEN was detached on completion of refueling.

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Flight operations were resumed at 1450 King when refueling was completed.

A radar patrol to provide early warning of enemy surface or air movement between the Shantung peninsula and Korea at night was established during this period in accordance with instructions promulgated by ComNavFE. When a destroyer could not be provided by CTE 95.12 for this patrol a destroyer of TE 95.11 was detached at the end of the day's flight operations to proceed to a point approximately midway between Paengnyong Do island and the Shantung promontory to conduct a radar search as prescribed and rejoin the formation prior to the resumption of flight operations the next morning. Patrols were conducted by USS PERKINS during the nights of 2, 3, and 4 May; by the USS ANDERSON on the nights of 5, 6, 7, and 9 May; by the USS AGERHOLM on 8 May.

On the night of 5 May, USS ANDERSON intercepted a north bound vessel identified as the Greek freighter THENONI enroute from Kobe, Japan to Dairen. After establishing its identity, the vessel was allowed to proceed unmolested. On several occasions friendly native fishing vessels were found operating in restricted areas. These were warned to confine their activities to authorized fishing sanctuaries.

At the completion of Air Operations 10 May USS PERKINS and USS AGERHOLM were detached for Radar Patrol with orders to rendezvous the following morning with HMS GLORY. HMCS SIOUX joined TE 95.11 and in company with USS ANDERSON escorted USS BATAAN to Sasebo, arriving at 1500 King, 11 May. Anti-aircraft gunnery exercises were conducted enroute to port.

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AIRCRAFT ACTION REPORT OF CAPT PHILLIP C. DeLONG, 016434/7302/USMC and 1ST LT HAROLD D. DAIGH, 038633/7302/ USMCR.

CAPT DeLONG was launched from the USS BATAAN at 0540 leading a four (4) plane flight of F4U-4's consisting of 1ST LT's Harold D. DAIGH, 038633/7302, USMCR and Shelby M. FORREST, 028042/7302, USMCR and 2ND LT Robert E. HOWARD, Jr., 051397, USMCR. The mission of this flight was to conduct a reconnaissance from Choppeki Point to Onjong-ji along the west coast of Korea.

At about 0645 while flying over position XC 6535 a distress call was heard from 1ST LT William H. GODBEY, 026472/7302, USMCR who reported that he was bailing out due to engine trouble.

CAPT DeLONG made radio contact with the Combat Air Patrol flying over the USS BATAAN to relay a call for the helicopter to be dispatched to pick up LT GODBEY.

CAPT REILLY, the leader of LT GODBEY's flight was orbiting at 10,000 feet above the spot where the latter had bailed out. He established contact with the CAP also and relayed the position while the remainder of the flight, 1ST LT's Archibald W. MacLACHLAN 026773/7302, USMCR and Harry W. COLMERY, 039393/7302 USMCR, orbited over the downed pilot at 500 feet. At the request of the USS BATAAN, LT's FORREST and HOWARD were detached from CAPT DeLONG's Division and sent to the Island of Paengnyong-do to escort a rescue helicopter based there.

CAPT DeLONG and LT DAIGH were flying northeast towards a prebriefed target at XC 9992 where they were to jettison their load. This flight climbed for altitude over Hojang-do XC 8983 in an open formation with LT DAIGH about 500 yards at 7 o'clock from CAPT DeLONG. Upon reaching an altitude of approximately 2000 feet, LT DAIGH observed four (4) aircraft approaching from the northwest and above his flight. These aircraft proceeded to make a run on CAPT DeLONG from the northwest and from approximately 5000 feet.

Flying in a loose right echelon the four (4) aircraft made a right then a left turn (at about 10 o'clock) toward CAPT DeLONG. This flight apparently did not see LT DAIGH. CAPT DeLONG's attention was first directed to this flight when the first two aircraft opened fire on him and a bullet hit his plane aft of the cockpit.

LT DAIGH pulled in behind the attacking aircraft and was able to follow their number three man, leaving their number four plane at 7 o'clock to LT DAIGH. LT DAIGH broke away from his position behind the number three man and dove to the left and below the number four man who was firing at him. LT DAIGH made a climbing 360 degree turn and opened fire on two (2) enemy aircraft with unobserved results. He then tailed in at 4 o'clock on another enemy plane; opened fire, hitting the tail, fuselage and wing. His hits caused the starboard wing of the enemy aircraft to break off and the plane crashed and burned.

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Meanwhile, CAPT DeLONG, upon being hit, did a "Split S" to pick up speed and made a climbing turn to the left. Two (2) enemy aircraft made firing runs from astern, but overshot and turned wide while he pulled in behind and returned fire on the two (2) aircraft with unobserved results. While CAPT DeLONG was in a climbing left turn one (1) enemy aircraft crossed in front of CAPT DeLONG's plane crossing from right to left. At that instant an aircraft was seen by CAPT DeLONG to crash into the ground and burn. This was LT DAIGH's kill. The plane crossing CAPT DeLONG's nose was fired on by CAPT DeLONG sending the enemy plane spinning into the ground smoking. This second enemy aircraft crashed and burned about one-half mile west of the spot where the first plane was burning. 1ST LT DAIGH also observed this aircraft burning on the ground.

CAPT DeLONG turned to the left and headed eastward when he observed three (3) planes flying ahead of him also heading east. LT DAIGH was pursuing one (1) enemy aircraft, with the second enemy aircraft following to the left and turning right on to LT DAIGH's tail. CAPT DeLONG called LT DAIGH and told him to pull up as the enemy was on his tail.

LT DAIGH turned hard to the left and dropped under and astern opening fire on the enemy plane as it overran him. His fire started the enemy plane smoking out of both sides of the cockpit from around the wing roots.

CAPT DeLONG continued tailing the enemy lead plane and his opening fire started this aircraft smoking. The enemy attempted to evade the fire by turning to the south, and then to the west; CAPT DeLONG's pursuing fire caused the enemy plane to puff smoke. The enemy plane did a "Split S" and headed west. CAPT DeLONG followed through and continued to tail in on him firing. The enemy plane was observed to be smoking from both wings and the fuselage while fragments of the aircraft kept falling off. Papers were seen coming from the cockpit. Following this the pilot jettisoned his hood and then bailed out. The enemy aircraft went into the water. The pilot's parachute opened and he descended into the water apparently unhurt.

CAPT DeLONG and LT DAIGH then joined up and climbed to 6000 feet, orbiting over the downed enemy pilot's location. CAPT DeLONG called CAPT REILLY and requested that the helicopter which had been requested previously to pick up LT GODBEY also attempt to pick up the enemy pilot. The section orbited this area for about 10 minutes and then headed south toward Changyon.

The fourth enemy aircraft which LT DAIGH had started smoking was last seen climbing east into the sun smoking from both wing and roots. Further search for this aircraft produced negative results.

A rough engine in LT DAIGH's plane and smoke in the cockpit of CAPT DeLONG's aircraft compelled the flight to return to the BATAAN. The flight landed without mishap at 0820.

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RESUME:

The enemy aircraft were first sighted about 0715. The dog-fight was over by about 0725. All the aerial action took place between 2000 and 3000 feet. This unexpected attack found both CAPT DeLONG and LT DAIGH's aircraft carrying a belly tank and a 500 pound bomb, or a napalm tank, which were not jettisoned until the combat was nearly over. Each plane, likewise, was carrying a wing load of six (6) HVAR rockets and two (2) 100 pound bombs which were not jettisoned until the flight headed for the ship.

The enemy aircraft were identified as either YAK 3's or YAK 9's

The markings on the aircraft were white circles outlined in red and a red star in the center.

These markings were located on the fuselage aft and below the cockpit, and on underside of left wing.

The aircraft was painted in camouflage that ran from silver to light green.

OPINIONS

It is the opinion of CAPT DeLONG and 1ST LT DAIGH that:

1. The attack by the enemy aircraft was very poorly executed, as they had numerical superiority and altitude advantage. They also had an opportunity to make the attack out of the sun, but didn't, instead made it 90° to the sun. Also the fact that they used all four aircraft to make an initial attack on only two aircraft.

2. The air discipline of the enemy was good as the effectively kept all aircraft together in the same area to be mutually supporting.

3. They pressed home their attack with determination and did not attempt to leave the area until they were smoking from hits.

4. Their marksmanship was poor on deflection shooting.

5. The F4U-4, even while loaded with droptank, 500 pound bomb or Napalm and full wing load of 6 HVARS and 2 100 pound bombs and 2400 rounds of 50 cal ammo is more maneuverable than the YAK-3 or 9, at speeds between 140 and 160 knots.

6. The YAK pilot were considerably inferior in flying ability to the Japanese in World War II.

7. The YAK is inferior in speed and rate to climb to the F4U-4. Maximum speed used by the YAK's was about 200 to 250 knots. Most maneuvering after the first pass was below 200 knots.

8. Since no effective evasive action was taken by the YAK pilot it is believed they either lacked training or experience or both.

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PART II

CHRONOLOGY

7 April 1951 — At Sasebo, Japan, for logistics.

8 April 1951 — At 0700 Item departed Sasebo, Japan, enroute operating area off east coast of Korea in company with HMS THESEUS and screening ships consisting of HMS CONSORT, HMAS BATAAN, HMCS HURON, HMCS ATHABASKAN, USS ENGLISH and USS SPERRY. CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN.

9 April 1951 — Operating as TE 95.11 off east coast of Korea in Wonsan area. Launched 10 CAP and 34 of offensive sorties; 24 armed recco, 4 strike Songjin-Wonsan area, 6 naval gun-fire air spot for TE 95.21 at Wonsan and TE 95.22 at Songjin. An F4U 4, piloted by 1st Lt. J. S. Sumner, USMCR, was hit by small arms fire and ditched in Wonsan harbor. Pilot rescued by helicopter from USS MANCHESTER. No serious injury to pilot.

10 April 1951 — Operating as before. At 1515 the USS BORIE (DD 702) joined screen. Launched CAP and ASP provided by the THESEUS, 45 offensive sorties; 37 armed recco, 4 strike Wonsan area, 4 air spot for TE 95.22 in Songjin area. Two Sea Furys from the THESEUS damaged when attacked by two shore-based Marine Corsairs south of Wonsan. Both pilots were able to return and land aboard THESEUS uninjured. Sea Fury from THESEUS, pilot Lt. R. H. Johnson, RN, shot down by enemy AA 35 miles southwest of Wonsan. Area searched thoroughly, no sign of pilot; search abandoned the following day.

11 April 1951 — Operating as before. At 1517 USS BORIE detached for duty with TE 95.21 at Wonsan. Commonwealth destroyers refueled at Wonsan. Launched CAP and ASP provided by THESEUS, 7 offensive sorties; all armed recco. Weather conditions unfavorable for flight operations due to fog.

12 April 1951 — Operating as before. Launched CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 48 offensive sorties; 44 armed recco, and 4 to strike railroad bridges in the Yonghung area. One Firefly from THESEUS ditched at sea 10 miles southwest of Hungnam. The pilot and observer were rescued by helicopter from USS ST PAUL, no injury to personnel.

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13 April 1951 Operating as before. THESEUS replenished from HMS WAVE CHIEF. Launched 2 CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 35 offensive sorties; 27 armed recco, 8 airspot for TE 95.21 at Wonsan and TE 95.22 at Songjin. Sea Fury from THESEUS, pilot Lt. J. S. Humphreys, RN, was shot down by enemy AA fire six miles southwest of Hamhung. The pilot, seriously injured, was rescued by helicopter from USS MANCHESTER.

14 April 1951 Operating as before. BATAAN, ATHABASKAN, SPERRY, and ENGLISH replenished at sea from USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) and USS LEO (AKA 14). Launched 2 CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 20 offensive sorties, all armed recco. An F4U 4, pilot Capt. H. G. Henneberger, USMC, was forced to land at Pohang when a gun blast tube in the port wing blew up during a strafing run. The pilot was uninjured. A Sea Fury from THESEUS, pilot Lt. I. L. Bowman, RN, was hit by enemy AA fire 10 miles southwest of Hamhung and crash landed in the same area with no injury to pilot. Rescue was effected by helicopter from the USS MANCHESTER.

15 April 1951 Operating as before. Launched 6 CAP, 1 ASP provided by THESEUS, 25 offensive sorties; 21 armed recco, 4 airspot for TE 95.22 at Songjin and TE 95.21 at Wonsan. Flight operations were curtailed due to fog in the operating area. 1630 Item the THESEUS and screen assumed duties of TE 95.11 and departed for west coast operating area; the BATAAN accompanied by HMAS BATAAN and USS SPERRY departed for Sasebo, Japan.

16 April 1951 Arrived Sasebo, Japan 1116 Item for logistic support.

17 April 1951 At Sasebo, Japan, for logistic support.

18 April 1951 At Sasebo, Japan, for logistic support.

19 April 1951 At 0700 Item underway Sasebo, Japan, enroute operating area West Coast Korea accompanied by USS RICHARD B. ANDERSON (DD 786), USS ROGERS (DD 876), and USS AGERHOLM (DD 826). At 2000 Item relieved HMS THESEUS and screen as TE 95.11. CTE 95.11 in USS BATAAN.

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20 April 1951 Operating as TE 95.11 off West Coast of Korea. Launched 31 offensive sorties, all Armed Recco, and 8 CAP.

21 April 1951 Operating as before. Launched 33 offensive sorties; all Armed Recco, and 10 CAP. 1st Lt. W. H. Godbey, USMCR, was forced to bail out southwest of Chinnampo, when the engine of his F4U 4 aircraft cut out. He landed near the coast opposite Sokto-ri Island where he was picked up by friendly Korean Marines who withdrew him in a small boat. He was subsequently transferred from the boat by helicopter to the island of Cho-do and later taken 50 miles south to island of Paengngong-do by an Air Force helicopter. There he was picked up by ship's helicopter. The only injury to the pilot was a sprained ankle.

After leaving two planes of his section to cover Lt. Godbey, Capt. Phillip DeLong and 1st Lt. Harold Daigh proceeded north of Chinnampo where they were surprised by four enemy aircraft which attacked from the northwest. In the ensuing encounter Capt. DeLong shot down two of the enemy planes and Lt. Daigh shot down one while the other fled the scene in flames, and is believed to have crashed 20 miles farther north, where parts of a YAK and the body of an enemy pilot were recovered several days later.

22 April 1951 Operating as before. Launched 8 CAP and 26 offensive sorties; 8 Armed Recco, 18 Strikes in the Chinnampo - Sariwon area. F4U 4, pilot Capt. Jack Rainalter, USMCR, was hit by enemy AA fire near Sariwon, crashed, and exploded, with no chance of survival by the pilot.

23 April 1951 Operating as before. Replenished from USS NAVASOTA (AO 27). Launched 12 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 36 CAS, and 4 Armed Recco.

24 April 1951 Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 36 CAS, and 4 Armed Recco.

25 April 1951 Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 32 CAS, and 8 Armed Recco.

26 April 1951 Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 40 offensive sorties; 32 CAS, and 8 Armed Recco. 2000 Item, BATAAN and escorts relieved as TE 95.11 by HMS GLORY and escorts.

27 April 1951 Enroute Sasebo, Japan for upkeep and logistic support. 0500 USS ROGERS (DDR 876) detached for duty in Wonsan area in accordance with instructions received enroute Sasebo. 1520 Item BATAAN, ANDERSON and AGERHOLM moored Sasebo harbor.

28-30 Apr 1951 At Sasebo, Japan for logistic support.

1 May 1951 At 0650 Item departed Sasebo, Japan, enroute operating area off west coast of Korea in company with HMS COMUS and HMCS SIOUX to join HMS GLORY and screen.

2 May 1951 Captain W. Miller in USS BATAAN assumed duties as CTE 95.11 at 0001 Item. Operating as TE 95.11 off west coast of Korea, the USS BATAAN and HMS GLORY were screened by HMCS SIOUX, HMS COMUS, HMAS WARRAMUNGA, HMCS NOOTKA, HMCS HURON, HMAS BATAAN, USS ANDERSON with the USS PERKINS joining at 0520 Item. CAP and ASP provided by the GLORY. BATAAN launched 43 offensive sorties, all Armed Recco. During afternoon air operations a pilot from the GLORY was hit by enemy AA fire north of Seoul and was forced to ditch in the Han River with no injury to pilot. Rescue was effected by an Air Force helicopter. 2000 Item PERKINS detached for duty as radar picket north of force returning at 0530 Item the next morning.

3 May 1951 Operating as before. Launched 11 CAP and 34 offensive sorties; 16 CAS and 18 Armed Recco. 0530 Item PERKINS rejoined screen. 2000 Item PERKINS again detached for duty as radar picket returning at 0530 Item the next morning.

4 May 1951 Operating as before. CAP and ASP provided by GLORY. BATAAN launched 10 offensive sorties; all Armed Recco. Flight operations were restricted due to fog. Refueled Commonwealth destroyers from HMS WAVE CHIEF. 1300 Item the

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VAN GALEN of the Royal Dutch Navy joined the screen. At 1600 Item HMCS SIOUX rejoined the screen. At 1700 Item HMAS WARRAMUNGA and HMCS NOOTKA were detached to proceed on mission assigned. 2000 Item the ANDERSON detached for duty as radar picket returning at 0530 Item the next morning.

5 May 1951 — Operating as before. Launched 2 CAP and 8 offensive sorties; all CAS. Flight operations again restricted due to fog. 2000 Item ANDERSON detached on duty as radar picket returning at 0530 Item the next morning. 0030 Item ANDERSON reported investigation of Greek freighter THENONI enroute from Kobe, Japan to Dairen.

6 May 1951 — Operating as before. BATAAN, ANDERSON, PERKINS, VAN GALEN, and AGERHOLM who joined screen at 1230 Item, replenished at sea from USS NAVASOTA (AO 106) and USS DIPHDA (AKA 59). CAP and ASP provided by the GLORY. BATAAN launched 22 offensive sorties; 14 Armed Recco and 8 CAS. 1730 King the VAN GALEN detached to proceed on mission assigned. 2000 King the GLORY and screen detached to proceed to Sasebo, Japan for logistic support. BATAAN's screen consisted of the U.S. destroyers PERKINS, ANDERSON and AGERHOLM. 2100 King the ANDERSON was detached for duty as radar picket returning at 0530 King the next morning.

7 May 1951 — Operating as before. Launched 11 CAP and 44 offensive sorties; 20 Armed Recco and 24 CAS.

8 May 1951 — Operating as before. Launched 4 CAP and 19 offensive sorties; 4 Armed Recco and 15 CAS. 1738 King F4U 4, pilot D. N. Smith, USMCR, crashed near force as the pilot bailed out when his engine quit while flying CAP. Rescue of the pilot was effected by a boat from the AGERHOLM. The pilot was not seriously injured. 2100 King the ANDERSON was detached as radar picket returning at 0530 King the next morning.

9 May 1951 — Operating as before. 0530 King to 1230 King furnished CAP for HMS ALACRITY and USS ALGOL (AKA 54). Launched 12 CAP and 38 offensive sorties; 4 Armed Recco and 34 CAS.

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10 May 1951 Operating as before. Launched 10 CAP and 30 offensive sorties; 3 Armed Recco and 27 CAS. In the early evening HMCS SIOUX joined screen. 2000 King the AGERHOLM and PERKINS were detached to proceed on mission assigned; the BATAAN accompanied by ANDERSON and SIOUX departed for Sasebo, Japan. At about 2000 King HMS GLORY and screen assumed duties of TE 95.11.

11 May 1951 Arrived Sasebo, Japan 1500 King for logistic support.

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PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE

1. Material and Equipment

Performance of ordnance material and equipment was satisfactory for this period.

2. Ammunition Expended

(a) 9 April to 16 April

Caliber .50 AMG	161,000 rds
100# G.P. Bombs	354
500# G.P. Bombs	7
5.0" HVAR Rockets	1,067
F51 Napalm tanks	77
Napalm thickener	3,465 lbs

(b) 19 April to 27 April

Caliber .50 AMG	150,000 rds
100# G.P. Bombs	482
500# G.P. Bombs	119
1000# G.P. Bombs	4
5.0" HVAR Rockets	1,512
Napalm tanks	127
Napalm thickener	5,715 lbs
40 MM	78 rds

(c) 1 May to 11 May

Caliber .50 AMG	171,800 rds
100# G.P. Bombs	491
500# G.P. Bombs	107
1000# G.P. Bombs	20
5.0" HVAR Rockets	1,477
Napalm tanks	122
Napalm thickener	5,550 lbs
40 MM	1,651 rds
20 MM	240 rds

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(A) Own - F4U 4 BuNo's as shown

9 April 1951

1. 97380 Hit in leading edge left wing; second hit port fuselage; no vital parts hit; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

2. 96964 Hit in leading edge of right wing; bullet out top; bottom of right wing, out top; Caliber .30 and Caliber.50 machine gun fire.

3. 81770 Hit in lower cowling, air scoop, engine, leading edge right wing; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

4. 97207 Hit starboard wheel well door; hydraulic line; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

5. 96916 Hit left wing; Caliber .30 machine gun fire; second hit fuselage; minor damage; small arms fire.

6. 97225 Hit two feet aft of cockpit and into armor plate; minor damage fuselage; estimated Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

7. 96979 Hit entered under side of elevator and came out through top side of elevator; minor damage; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.

8. 96916 Hit left wing; second hit fuselage or tail; engine failed. Ditched.

9. 80869 Hit below right wheel well, right of skid board; second hit lower center cowling near #8 cylinder; third hit below center section wing outboard, wheel well door; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

10. 97225 Hit right side fuselage; entered corner stowage box right console and then hit radio cord; second hit right wing outboard ammunition box, intercooler door, through water tank stopping at engine mount; Caliber .30 and Caliber .50 machine gun fire.

[redacted]

10 April 1951

	BuNo.	
1.	80967	Hit right horizontal stabilizer; minor damage; estimated Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2.	81879	Hit oil cooler; fairing wing spar; second hit left horizontal stabilizer; third hit battery compartment; all Caliber .30 or Caliber .50 machine gun fire.

12 April 1951

1.	97191	Hit left wing center of wing; out through top of wing; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2.	97207	Hit through belly tank; into wing and stopped; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.
3.	96964	Hit fuselage; exploded in electrical system, damaging radio; second hit entered left wing and went out top side of wing; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.
4.	96989	Hit through wing and top side of wing; second and third hits penetrated fuselage; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
5.	97380	Hit through wing and went out top side; two holes in fuselage; no vital parts hit; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

13 April 1951

1.	82174	Hit fuselage aft of engine into primary air-duct; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2.	96804	Hit through left aileron; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
3.	97084	Hit through fuselage; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
4.	97225	Hit entered fuselage, minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
5.	81789	Hit leading edge of right wing; minor damage; shrapnel.

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[redacted]

14 April 1951

	BuNo.	
1.	96964	Hit in starboard wing; penetrated fabric; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

20 April 1951

1.	97380	Hit penetrated lower cowling; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2.	96949	Hit left flap rear; entered bottom of flap and came out top of flap; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
3.	82098	Hit right wheel-well door-brake assembly; Caliber .30 machine gun fire; brake assembly replaced; hit right wing; minor damage; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.
4.	97380	Hit went through fabric in elevator; minor damage; small arms fire.
5.	96949	Hit left side of fuselage; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
6.	96779	Hit left inboard flap 3 inches from trailing edge; hole in flap; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

21 April 1951

1.	97380	Hit through left cowling, minor damage; second hit entered behind forward radio antenna APX 1 destroyed; Caliber .50 machine gun fire.
2.	96949	Hit entered right cowling; seared spark-plug lead; passed on through; minor damage; small arms fire.

22 April 1951

1.	97225	Hit amidship; plane exploded, no sign of life noted; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.
2.	97207	Hit entered left wing, out through top of wing; minor damage; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.

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23 April 1951

	BuNo.	
1.	82165	Hit in elevator. Entered bottom, out through top; minor damage; small arms fire.

24 April 1951

1.	97121	Hit left side of engine, severed hydraulic line; minor damage; small arms fire.
2.	96949	Hit penetrated wing; minor damage; small arms fire.

25 April 1951

1.	97321	Hit through forward portion of port wing and out top of wing; minor damage; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.

2 May 1951

1.	96818	Hit entered cowling; hit speed ring; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

3 May 1951

1.	81879	Hit leading edge of port wing 2 feet out, hit rib, came through top of wing; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.
2.	82018	Hit entered bottom side of right wing, came out through top of wing; minor damage; small arms fire.

7 May 1951

1.	96779	Hit penetrated vertical fin; minor damage; small arms fire.

8 May 1951

1.	97121	Hit top aft fuselage to bottom mid-fuselage; minor damage; small arms fire.

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9 May 1951

	BuNo.	
1.	81879	Hit entered bottom of right aileron, came out through top; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

10 May 1951

1.	80869	Hit entered oil cooler in the port wing butt and came out through top of wing along the fuselage; minor damage; 40 MM automatic weapon fire.
2.	81181	Hit entered cowling, hit rear of prop hub and glanced off; minor damage; Caliber .30 machine gun fire.

(B) Enemy

Destroyed		Disabled		Damaged	
Aircraft	3	Junks	12	Aircraft	1
Junks	2	Motor vehicles	195	Junks	2
Motor Vehicles	5	Railcars	5	Armored vehicles	71
Railcars	9	Oxcarts	5	Motor vehicle	1
Oxcarts	16	Sampans	117	Railcars	18
Pack animals	42	Locomotives	7	Oxcarts	2
Bridges	12	Tanks	5	Locomotives	3
Field pieces	22	Gun positions	6	Rail tunnels	5
Gun emplacements	2	Floating crane	1	Sampans	123
Fuel & supply dumps	49			Bridges	26
Warehouses	41				
Buildings	771				

Casualties inflicted on enemy troops, estimated - 1920

23

[redacted]

PART V

PERSONNEL; PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

The performance of all personnel was excellent. However, under more strenuous operating conditions it would be difficult to train recalled reserve personnel "on-the-job" to use equipment and techniques which have been introduced in the fleet since the World War II demobilization. Some reduction in operating efficiency could be expected. To preclude this expectation it is recommended that mobilized reserve personnel be indoctrinated in new techniques and equipment and given the opportunity to "brush up" in their rates before being detailed to duty aboard a ship in the combat zone.

Personnel casualties were as follows:

9 April — 1st Lt. John S. Sumner, 028090, USMC, crash landed in sea. He was picked up by rescue helicopter after about eleven minutes. The only injury suffered was a mild abrasion on right arm.

21 April — 1st Lt. William H. Godbey, 026472, USMC, bailed out over land and was rescued by guerillas who put him aboard small harbor craft from which he was picked up by helicopter. He suffered only mild contusions to left foot.

22 April — The plane piloted by Capt. William J. Rainalter, 020896, USMCR, was hit by anti-aircraft fire over his target. Aircraft burst into flames immediately and crashed into ground. There was no possible chance of pilot survival; pilot not recovered.

8 May — 1st Lt. Darrell N. Smith, 028280, USMCR, bailed out over water after the engine of the plane he was piloting failed. He was rescued by helicopter and destroyer after being in the water about 13 minutes. He was unconscious for a very short while, but suffered only mild contusions and abrasions to trunk and extremities.

PART VI

COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Comment: The operations of 8-15 April and 1-6 May were notable for their international aspect and provided valuable experience for the units of the nations participating. Considering that the United States and British carriers and their mixed United States, British Commonwealth, and Netherlands destroyer screen were operating together for the first time the operations went off remarkably well. The ability of these forces to join and operate effectively in company using the doctrines contained in the USF publications, particularly USF 4, emphasized the benefits to be derived from the standardization of doctrine and operating techniques throughout the naval services of the United Nations.

Recommendation: It is recommended that standardization of operating doctrines and techniques of United Nations naval forces be continued and that every opportunity be taken to train and operate these forces in company.

Comment: In plotting and reporting positions of surface and air contacts the CICs of British Commonwealth vessels normally use a rectangular grid coordinate system. The principal advantage of this system appears to be the elimination of conversion plotting between CICs. However, to facilitate operations during this period the British Commonwealth vessels in company used the U.S. polar coordinate system of plotting and reporting.. They made this change without difficulty as they had formerly used the polar coordinate system and were equipped to use either method. If the need arose, however, it is believed U.S. vessels would have considerable difficulty converting to the British system with present CIC equipment which is designed exclusively for the polar coordinate method.

Another feature of the British reporting system is their method of designating contacts. All air contacts, including known friendlies, such as outgoing strikes, CAP, and ASP, are given track designations such as "Friendly twenty". In addition, blocks of numbers are reserved for certain type raids, such as numbers from one to ten for interforce raids. This system is designed to eliminate confusion between their air and surface control centers which are physically separated from each other, but it is somewhat confusing to their allies. In the final analysis, however, the CICs of the British and Commonwealth vessels were alert and reliable. In some respects, such as their use of the deck condition code contained in USF 15, and in the conscientious manner in which they reported contacts, they outshone the CICs of U.S. vessels in company.

Recommendation: It is recommended that a standardized system of radar plotting reporting be developed and utilized by naval forces

of the United Nations, in order that all units may have a clear picture of the tactical situation at all times. Such a system should approximate, where feasible, the systems employed by the land based forces of the United Nations. In this connection the rectangular grid system of reporting contacts should be carefully considered as it appears more adaptable to joint use than the polar coordinate system. It is further recommended that until a standardized CIC doctrine is effective in United Nations forces all United States CIC personnel be familiarized with the methods utilized by the British and Commonwealth forces, and they with ours.

Comment: BATAAN has operated with a representative cross section of destroyers in the Korean area due to the policy of rotating destroyers between east and west coast duties. All destroyers with which she has operated have been given equal opportunity to control BATAAN's CAP. This policy has been highly beneficial from a training standpoint and has paid dividends on the occasions the carrier has suffered electronic casualties. However, in implementing this policy it has been noted that air controllers in destroyers are generally in need of more practice. The reasons for this deficiency are not definitely known, but it is understood that destroyers are not often enough afforded opportunities to control CAP.

Recommendation: It is recommended that destroyer CIC personnel be thoroughly indoctrinated and exercised in CAP control before their ships are ordered to the combat zone and that while in company with carriers destroyers be given every reasonable opportunity to control the CAP."

Comment: Radio Guam (George Fox) gave uniformly excellent results throughout the period. Radio Tokyo (Ratt Fox) continued to present a major communication problem. There were nightly periods when reception ranged from fair to impossible. Because this vessel was not generally in direct communication with others guarding this broadcast, a considerable amount of servicing resulted, usually conducted on the ship-shore nets direct to Radio Tokyo. It was also apparent from the number of service messages appearing on the Radio Tokyo (Ratt Fox) that other major commands in the Korean theater are experiencing the same reception difficulties.

Recommendations: It is recommended that:

1. Commanders in each operating area inform Radio Tokyo at three-hourly intervals of the readability of Radio Tokyo Ratt signals and request re-runs for ships in the area. Radio Tokyo should re-run missing numbers immediately after receiving a report of reliable reception.

37-30N 125-30E. The sky condition over ship at 0500 was overcast at 2000 feet and visibility 8 miles with light rain. At 1100 the ceiling was 2500 feet with visibility 3 miles. The visibility had decreased slowly throughout the morning.

The first two flights were cancelled but a third flight was launched about 1100. Planes airborne reported 1700-2000 foot ceilings with fair to poor visibility but proceeded on their mission. Around 1200 conditions worsened rapidly and the planes were recalled. When they landed aboard the ceiling was 300-400 feet and visibility 1/2 to 1 mile. Conditions remained bad with the rain ending shortly after mid-night, but followed by a heavy fog with visibility 0 to 1/2 mile which lasted until 1610 the next day.

The center of the Yellow Sea had proved to be a virtual mixing pot for the warm maritime tropical air mass from east of the Philippines, the continental polar air mass from eastern Siberia, and the warm air mass moving across southern China, from the Indian Ocean. Once again a cyclonic wave had formed on a slow moving front and a new storm was born. This wave slowly intensified and later, when located near Tokyo on the afternoon of 8 May, had a central pressure of 999 MB. deepening. This created a deep trough aloft extending southwest to the Formosa area which proved to be an excellent track for typhoon Iris between 8 and 10 May. The increase in the intensity of the high over Manchuria and the Yellow Sea behind this low also aided in preventing Iris from coming closer to Japan.

A further problem of an aerologist in this area is the general deterioration of visibility in the Spring. Heavy sea fog with visibility less than one mile sometimes will last well into the afternoon. Damp haze, which is characteristic of the warm air, is a prevalent restriction to visibility, but it does not reduce visibilities as much as does the fog. This haze has been observed to be heaviest two or three days after dust storms were observed southwest of Lake Baikal. It is surmised that with high winds aloft (about 50 knots) dust particles from the Gobi Desert may be carried eastward to the area of Korea causing frequent observations of haze aloft. Quite often, when the sea and sky blend due to a high scattering of light from suspended particles, pilots have reported visibilities of one mile when visibilities between ships have been as high as seven miles. Smoke or dust, especially in areas of heavy ground action, further increase the concentration of the suspended particles. Heavy smoke from fires set by the enemy for screening purposes has restricted visibilities to 0-2 miles and, very frequently hampered flight operations.

2. Radio Tokyo give immediate priority to requests for reruns from ships or commands in the operating areas when a check shows that messages requested are addressed for action to those ships or commands.

Comment: Due to their nature Ratt broadcast files accumulate rapidly and require a large portion of the space available for the stowage of radio traffic files. At present it is required that broadcast files be retained on board for six months after receipt. In this period Ratt files alone fill all available space reserved for stowage of broadcast files in this vessel. While additional filing cabinets can always be installed it is felt that this is not the most desirable solution.

Recommendation: It is recommended that the period required for retention of Ratt broadcast files on board be reduced from six to three months, and that current filing instructions be amended accordingly.

Comment: It was particularly gratifying to note how successfully the CIC and aircraft VHF Nets were employed by the ships of five allied nations during the combined operations. Using standard crystallizations and frequency employments, combined channels were used for controlling U.S. and British aircraft. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining sufficient crystals for the C.I. primary and task element gunnery coordination and administrative nets because of the different types of equipment used. British and other allied ships used crystals operating on different fundamental frequencies than those utilized in U.S. Navy equipment. These ships do not have UHF equipment installed and it was not used during the operation. On the recommendation of the British CVL, the task element gunnery coordination and administrative net was very successfully used during hours of darkness to "patch" or service Fox broadcast messages between ships of the element, providing an efficient substitute for "Nancy" which was not available in British Commonwealth ships.

Comment: The primary tactical circuit (TBS) is deserving of special comment. On far too numerous occasions tactical communications were interfered with by the transmission of administrative traffic on the primary tactical circuit. Most of these transmissions emanated from destroyers and frigates operating independently in the area adjacent to the carrier operating areas, frequently at maximum voice range. The telephone, be it radio or landline, is a familiar, handy, and usually reliable device which to many represents the most natural and convenient way to communicate with persons not in the immediate vicinity, without regard for its "party line" properties.

Comment: Flight operations in the Wonsan-Hungnam-Songjin area were chiefly armed reconnaissance missions for the purpose of locating enemy vehicle concentrations and obtaining information on suitable interdiction targets such as bridges. Initially these missions were conducted at low altitudes, with the planes making several consecutive passes over likely targets for identification and attack. This method had been used successfully earlier during similar operations on the west coast of Korea. However, the first day's operation on the east coast resulted in the surprising total of ten planes hit by small arms and automatic weapons fire. Fortunately, none were seriously damaged, but it was apparent from the number hit that a change in tactics was necessary. Consequently the following tactics for armed reconnaissance missions were employed:

1. Armed reconnaissance patrols consisted of no less than four aircraft. This assured a strong RESCAP in event any member of the flight was forced down by anti-aircraft, and deterred minor and isolated enemy anti-aircraft positions from taking flights under fire, in anticipation of strong retaliation.

2. Known centers of enemy activity such as Hungnam, Hamhung, and Wonsan were detoured in order to avoid known and probable concentrations of anti-aircraft artillery. It was estimated that there were numerous suitable, undefended, and untouched vehicles and interdiction targets in the surrounding areas and that until these were destroyed there would be little profit in attacking in the more heavily defended locations. This estimate was verified by the destruction of an estimated 120 vehicles in 6 days in undefended vehicle parks between Hungnam and Wonsan without a single plane being hit while in these target areas. Likewise, undefended bridges, the destruction of which would be equally as serious to the enemy as the destruction of bridges in heavily defended areas, were plentiful and four were destroyed. Targets such as these bridges were designated primary targets of the reconnaissance missions when practicable in order that heavy ordnance might be expended on them early in the flight, thus enabling the aircraft to proceed at higher speeds during subsequent reconnaissance of dangerous areas than would have been possible had full ordnance load been retained.

3. When an area on which there was no previous flak intelligence was to be reconnoitered, a preliminary sweep of the area at 2-3000 feet altitude was made in order to observe critical terrain features, the overall pattern of enemy activity, and to draw enemy fire so that anti-aircraft artillery locations could be spotted. If the area swept was deemed to be only lightly defended, low altitude sweeps to spot camouflaged vehicles, supply dumps, and other profitable targets followed. In more familiar areas surprise was guarded against in another manner, by half the patrol flying a low level reconnaissance while the other half flew

high and in position to observe and warn the low flight of any apparent dangers ahead, or immediately to take under fire any anti-aircraft positions which opened up on the low flight.

4. The previous practice of making consecutive passes or orbiting likely targets during attacks was discontinued. Instead of pulling up in an immediate turn to get in position for attack when a target was spotted it became the practice for the flight to continue ahead maintaining speed until clear, then to effect rendezvous and return to make a "straight through" type of coordinated attack.

As a result of the foregoing modifications in armed reconnaissance tactics the number of planes damaged by small caliber anti-aircraft fire while engaged in reconnaissance was reduced.