operations

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CARRIER AIR GROUP TWO
C/O FLEET POST OFFICE
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.

CVG-2/A16
Serial: 014
10 October 1950

[redacted]

From: Commander Carrier Air Group TWO
To: Commanding Officer, USS BOXER (CV-21)

Subj: Action Report of Carrier Air Group TWO (15 September 1950 - 2 October 1950)

Ref: (a) CNO Restricted ltr OP 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

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1. The following action report of Carrier Air Group TWO for the period 15 September - 2 October 1950 required by reference (a) is forwarded for inclusion in the report of USS BOXER (CV-21).

2. Operations against North Korean invasion forces were conducted by Air Group TWO on 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 28, 29 September and October 1 and 2 as directed by Commander Task Force 77 in compliance with Commander Task Force 77 Op Order 1-50, and Commander Joint Task Force 7 Op Plan 9-50 for every day except 27 September; on 27 September the above plus Commander Carrier Division 1 Op Order 2-50.

3. Comment and Recommendation:

(a) Air Operations.

1. For controlled close support, or Deep Support, four separate three (3) hour flights of eight to fourteen aircraft were scheduled. Caps, Tarcaps, Naval Gun Fire and ASP patrols gave an additional launch of sixteen aircraft to the close or Deep Support launch.

2. Since two carriers were operating together, close or deep support flights were maintained over the target area continously.

3. Special flights such as photo and strikes were launched as called for by Commander Task Force 77.

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(b) Tactics.

1. Since no air opposition was encountered and anti-aircraft fire was, in general, light or non existent, individual and trial runs could be made to insure better identification and therefore better target destruction.

2. Moderate success was obtained against tunnels and bridge obutments by skip bombing or mast head attacks with bombs having a 4 to 5 second dalay fuse.

3. Armed reconnaissance patrols and ground support work are best controlled by using a flight or four (4) VF and four (4) VA to a solected target. It is then possible for each division (VA or VF) to give protection to the other if anti-aircraft fire is encountered.

4. It is strongly recommended that unless a definite target is available before each close support or deep support launch, the VA aircraft should not be heavily loaded with napalm, 1000 lb or 500 lb bombs plus full HVAR and ammo. By cutting down on the above load especially the napalm bomb there would be no need for the futile dropping of napalm and bombs on non-deserving targets which happened rather frequently. It also would allow for greater safety and greater manueverability on targets which call for rackets or ammo instead of napalm or heavy bombs.

(c) Anti Submarine Patrol.

1. The lack of sonobouys for the VA aircraft greatly reduced the potential effectiveness of the hunter killer unit.

2. VA(S) configured airdraft are considered necessar for night operations. The range and sensitivity of the APS-20A make it impracticable for surface craft to leave screening stations and investigate the numerous contacts.

3. To further increase the effectivness of ASW operations it is recommended that hunter killer teams train as a unit prior to arrival in combat area.

4. Since efficiency of the radar operator is greatly reduced after two hours of operation, flights should be limited to three hours when practicable

(d) Aircraft Ordnance.

1. The following ordnance and fusing is considered desirablo for targets indicated.

TARGET	WEAPON	FUSE
(a) A/C on ground	20mm,50cal,&Frag Bombs	VT
(b) A/C revetted or personnel	Frag Bombs,Rockets & Napalm	VT
(c) Locomotives	20mm,50cal,Rockets	
(d) Oil Cars	20mm " "	
(e) Power Stations	20mm,50cal,rockets small bombs	
(f) Bridges	2000 lb (dive bomb) 1000 or 500 lb skip bomb	.025 / VT 4-5 sec delay
(g) Factories	Bombs,20mm,50cal	Instant or .025
(h) RR Yards	Bombs, Rockets	
(i) Tunnels	Bombs, Rockets	4-5 sec delay
(j) Vehicles, trucks	20mm,50cal,Rockets	
(k) Tanks	Napalm, rockets(SAP)	Instant or 4-5 sec delay
(l) Boats	All ordnance	

(e) Communications.

1. To date only a few planes in the air group have been called upon to use authentication or recognition signals although much time and effort has been spent on the dissemination to all pilots of the proper daily codes. For the current type operations it does not seem necessary that pilots of single sea aircraft should be encumbered with this extra data.

(f) Air Intelligence.

1. Non-flying Air Intelligence Officers are still urgently needed by the squadrons of the air group. The aviators of the group, now acting in the AIO capacity, have to date done an excellent job in addition to their primary duty of flying plus other collateral squadron duties. However, this overload situation has, in a few instances, resulted in inadequate briefing and de-briefing.

2. Photo coverage and intelligance information, collected by other sources, should be expeditiously disseminated to the lower echelons, namely the squadron

that will be participating in the mission. At times in the past it has been noted that such target information has not reached the participating elements until the mission has been completed.

3. The best charts available in any quantity for close support work have been the mercator charts with a scale of 1:250,000. However it was found that the transverse mercator projection charts with a scale of 1:50,000 were actually the best although there were only enough charts to supply the flight leaders.

(g) Personnel.

1. The transition from peace to wartime operations has indicated an immediate need in the air group for non-flying Air Intelligence and Maintenance Officers. It is of interest to note that in the last war streamlined carrier squadrons had a complement of only about ten enlisted men. However, it was found necessary for them to have three or four non-flying officers who usually served in the billets of aircraft intelligence maintenance, administrative and material officers. In the present instance, squadrons are responsible for the complete administration of over one hundred enlisted men; they perform all their own maintenance, ordnance and material functions and yet are not considered to need any non-flying officers. An increase in ordnance personnel, especially that of VA squadrons, is needed. With the continous use and heavy loading required of VA aircraft an increase in AOAN, A03, A02 is urgently required to carry on sustained operations.

(h) Material discrepancies.

1. Aircraft.

(a) Wartime operating conditions revealed the following facts regarding the F4U-4 aircraft:

1. F4U-4

(a) RB-19 spark plugs have given the best performance in the R 2800 - 42W engine.

(b) Oil cooler shut off valves should be instal led on an urgent basis.

(c) Armor plate protection is desirable if planes are to be used for extensive close support work.

2. F4U-5P

(a) While most photography requested was for vertical coverage, it was sometimes necessary to employ two (2) photo aircraft on one flight to achieve vertical and oblique photographs due to inoperative condition of rotating mount in F4U-5P.
NOTE: A service change and Standard Stock items would be necessary to keep mount operative

(b) A view finder would eliminate much duplication and undue use of material, by giving better coverage on target assigned and less flying time over target.

(c) The equipment now being used has not progressed with the speed of the present photo aircraft, as cycling speeds of presently used cameras dictate airspeeds so low as to make use of flaps necessary in order to keep the camera axis level. By decreasing cycling time better runs could be made over dangerous targets with greater safety for pilots and aircraft.

3. F4U-5N

(a) The VFN pilots of this group feel that the APS-19A Radar is wholly inadequate as airborne intercept radar. This is due in main to the inability of the APS-19A to follow targets more than a few degrees from the 12 o'clock position also the double dot presentation showing relative position of target as to altitude will generally fade completely before any change in altitude is indicated. It would be next to impossible to intercept an aircraft if the pilot was aware of your presence and used evasive action. The APS-6 radar gear was much superior to the APS-19A for intercept work. A well trained pilot could follow a target in all but the most violent maneuvers.
NOTE: The APS-19A is considered excellent on "Search" and "Beacon" positions.

2. Ordnance.

(a) On the Corsairs the Mark 8 MOD 2 shackle has been found to work very well. It is strongly recommended that adapters be made available to use on the rocket launchers (Mark 5 MOD 4) of the F4U so

that 100 and 220 lb frag bombs may be carried when needed.

(b) It is strongly recommended that future VA aircraft have four forward firing 20 mm guns. The AD(W) aircraft should be equipped with two forward firing 20mm guns. Also the AD spare parts list should be enlarged to include 100 Mark 9, Mod 3 rocket launchers, 2 20mm gun kits, four spare guns and forty ammunition cans.

(c) In the F4U-5N and 5P the mark 7 link are not satisfactory because of their continual breakage. This breakage caused by the rounds falling towards loading slot when wings are folded; as wings are spread kinks develope resulting in breakage. It is recommended a much stronger link be supplied which will keep the rounds from developing a kink when wings are folded and spread. It is believed that use of Mark 8 links would eliminate this trouble.

3. Summary of recommendations.

It is recommended that:

(a) Skip and mast head bombing be included in the training syllabus of the dive bomber and fighter bomber propeller squadrons.

(b) Close support included in the training syllabus of the VA and VF squadrons.

(c) Strafing be included in the training syllabus of all VA squadrons.

(d) The ASW attack team of VA(s) and VA(W) aircraft and pilots train and operate in the same squadron or unit.

(e) The carrying of authentication codes and recognition signals should not be required of single seat aircraft pilots when conducting strike missions. If necessary a simplified code should be used.

(f) Non-flying Intelligence Officers be assigned the squadrons of the air group and that the squadron ordnance personnel, especially for VA squadrons, complement be doubled in the following rates: AOAN, AO3, and AO2.

(g) Complete target information be given the strike pilots as early as possible prior to the mission and

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that appropriate grid charts (transverse mercator projection scale of 1:50,000) be provided in sufficient quantity for all pilots engaged in close support work.

(h) The following corrective action be taken in regards aircraft and ordnance discrepancies of the F4U-4.

(1) Install armor plate protection.

(2) Install oil cooler shut off valves.

(3) Use only RB-19 spark plugs.

(4) Adapters be made available to use on the Mark 5 Mod 4 rocket launchers.

(i) Corrective action for F4U-5P and F4U-5N.

(1) Install armor plate protection.

(2) Install oil cooler shut off valves.

(3) Substitute Mark 8 links for 20mm for Mk 7 links that are now being used.

(j) Corrective action necessary for the AD are:

(1) Install four forward firing 20mm on the future VA aircraft.

D. M. WHITE

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CAG-2	Commander D. M. WHITE	
14 Aircraft 23 Pilots		1 AD4Q 3 AD4N 3 AD4W 3 F4U-5N 3 F4U-5P 1 HO3S
VF-64	Commander R. W. RYND	
		16 F4U-4 23 Pilots
VF-63	LCDR T. U. BALL	
		16 F4U-4 23 Pilots
VF-23	LCDR C. E. RUSSELL	
		16 F4U-4 23 Pilots
VF-24	LCDR E. R. COFFMAN	
		16 F4U-4 23 Pilots
VA-65	Commander R. W. PHILLIPS	
		18 AD-4 24 Pilots

NOTE: Figures reflect number of flyable aircraft and qualified pilots available at commencement of operations.

ENCLOSURE (1)

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[redacted] DECLASSIFIED VG-2/A16
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NARRATIVE OF OPERATIONS 15 SEPT THRU 2 OCT 1950

Offensive operations against North Korean Forces were conducted during the following period September 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, October 1 and 2.

On the afternoon of the 15th September strike groups and precautionary cover was supplied for the amphibious loading of the 7th Marine Corps and 10th Army Corps at Inchon, South Korea. A number of fires were started in the area assigned the strike groups although no a ccurate amount of damage could be determined.

From the 16th September thru 2 October the flights in general were close and deep support, strikes and sweeps as called for and covered an area on the west coast from Suwon to Pyongyang. Targets attacked and damaged were airfield installations, railroad facilities, locomotive and and rolling stock, bridges, power stations, oil, tanks, factories, troops and vehicles.

From the 23. September until 30 September road sweeps were assigned strike groups. There were five road sweeps made up of the following.

Road sweep #1 - Seoul southwest to Chungju, north to Wongu, along RR back to Seoul.

Road sweep #2 - Seoul south through Suwon to Chowan, to Chonju north through Chuksan-nu, back to Seoul.

Road sweep #3 - Seoul northwest to Kaesng, west to Hayu, north to Saiwan, southwest to Kaesng.

Road sweep #4 - Seoul NE to Chunchon, north to Numhwa, northwest to Inchon, Sibyan-nu, southwest to Youchan, south to Seoul.

Road sweep #5 - Seoul on railroad east to Wonju, north ta Chunchon, southwest to Seoul.

On morning of 27th September a strike was made against North Korean forces dug in at Fankochi Pt. Lat and Long. 37-40N, 125-21E to repel a mock amphibious landing feint by Naval Forces at that point. Targets were mainly dug in troops and gun emplacements.

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA, VALLEY FORGE and BOXER operated together with each carrier leaving for replenishment area every third day.

ENCLOSURE (2) [redacted]

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CARRIER AIR GROUP TWO
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INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY FOR PERIOD 15 SEPTEMBER THROUGH 2 OCTOBER 1950

ACTION REPORT 15 SEPTEMBER

Flight operations commenced at 1432I with the launching of 2 AD's to act as target coordinators and a strike group consisting of 12 F4U's and five AD's. This group attacked Inchon beach and the surrounding area hitting targets with 500 lb. GP bombs, 1000 lb GP bombs, 5 " HVAR's, and 3.25 target spotting rockets and strafed the general area. A factory located on grid 8950, N.E. corner, was left burning and gave indications of a probable oil fire. The Inchon beach area, north of the causeway, was strafed but the results were unknown. Hits were registered on a small island, 9046D and 9146N, where a machine gun emplacement and a 122MM emplacement were noted. Smoke obscured these targets but both were believed destroyed prior to departure. Four hits were made upon a large shed type building at 9345B Damaged. A small amount of inaccurate flak was noted at 9245R -two bursts at 8000 feet. Communications difficulties due to heavy traffic and also confusion as to correct channels assigned. Two of our own planes were damaged with one hole in each tail which were believed to have been caused by rocket pig tail. The flight was recovered at 1805I.

The second flight commenced at 1432I with the launching of 2 F4U's to act as Air coordinators and a strike group consisting of 7 AD's and 10 F4U's. Bombing and strafing runs were made on Inchon between Grace and Joan areas (approximate) -damaging buildings. Three large fires were noted in the area, plus a number of small ones. One of the major fires came from what appeared to be butane or oil tanks in the Red area. Another near Joan area was a fierce white flame with little smoke. Still another in the Irma area appeared to be of a pyrotechnic nature. A few (3-4) small boats about the size of LCN's (40-50 feet) were noted at the docks in the Grace and Fanny areas. All appeared undamaged. Upon retirement from area and orbit over Yongjongdo Island three pilots reported flak bursts of one to five black puffs at about 9000 feet near Palmi-do Island. One plane was circling near the bursts, and one stated that the anti-aircraft fire apparently came from a U. S. destroyer in the area. No damage assessment is possible since the bombing was an area assignment and all the bombs except one fell within the assigned area. Some difficulty was experienced in communications with TADC apparently due to inability to answer all calls in heavy traffic. All planes were recovered at 1820I. No enemy aircraft encountered this date.

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(ENCLOSURE 2)

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ACTION REPORT 16 SEPTEMBER

The first flight, designated event 16, commenced at 0400I with the launching of one AD-4N and one AD-4W on anti-submarine patrol. Situation routine. The flight was recovered at 0900I.

The second flight, designated event 1, commenced at 0600I with the launching of 6 AD's for deep support, 2 F4U's for NGF spot 1, 7 F4U's for TARCAP, and 8 F4U's for deep support for a total of 17 offensive sorties and 8 defensive sorties. The planes carried 500lb. GP bombs, HVAR's, and NAPALM's. The six AD's on deep support hit a railroad yard adjacent to Yongduri with rockets and left railway cars and a warehouse burning fiercely. No hits were recorded as they dive bombed a railway at Suishoki-ri. Moderate flak was observed over Seoul at 6-8000 feet and it was apparently 3 or 5 inch; though inaccurate the altitude was correct. One 40mm mount on top of the peak at Pyonchang was inaccurate but the altitude was correct. The two F4U's scheduled for NGF spotting were not used by the controller. The 8 F4U's scheduled for deep support were released to search for targets of opportunity. All together, nine railroad cars were destroyed (988-1632) by direct bomb hits; one bomb hit a railroad junction 2 miles west of Suwon; eight railroad cars were left burning at Uijongbu (977-1662) after being hit with Napalms and rockets. One railroad car, located at Jo-To 996-1646, was ignited by a napalm hit. An unidentified 5000 ton freighter on Cus 050 degrees was observed 75 miles bearing 240 Pt. Nancy at 0855I. All the planes were recovered at 0900I.

The third flight, designated event 2, commenced at 0739I with the launching of two F4U-5P's and two F4U-4's on a photo mission. All the planes were recovered at 1030I.

The fourth flight, designated event 4, commenced at 0900I with the launching of 6 AD's and 8 F4U's for deep support, 8 F4U's for CAP, 8 F4U's for TARCAP, 2 F4U's for NGF spot 2, and two AD's for ASP-C. The planes were loaded with 500 lb. GP bombs, HVAR's and Napalms. The AD's and F4U's assigned to deep support attacked an ammunition dump between the highway and railroad just S.W. of a 3 track railroad bridge one half mile S. W. of Seoul. They used Napalms and bombs. They also hit a railroad yard 5-10 miles S.W. of Seoul (town of Eitoho). Three buildings were left burning and four railroad cars were believed to have been destroyed. Attitional Railroad cars appeared to have been previously attacked and damaged. Flak at this point was inaccurate and light to moderate and believed to be of small calibre. No AA emplacements were sighted. Four F4U's struck an ammunition dump, railroad yards, and an oil storage depot in the vicinity of Seoul but the damage was not known. Communications were reported as excellent. Event 4 consisted of 18 F4U's and 8 AD's on offensive sorties, and 8 F4U's on defensive sorties. All the planes were recovered at 1200I.

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The fifth flight, designated event 7, commenced at 1200I with the launching of 8 F4U's for CAP, 2 F4U's for NGF spot 3, 8 F4U's for TARCAP, 5 AD's and 8 F4U's for deep support, and two AD's for ASP-D. The planes carried the same ordnance as the previous flights of the day. The two F4U's who were assigned to NGF spot 3 attempted to work with controller but were unsuccessful due to communications difficulties. The five AD's assigned to deep support dropped 3 Napalms on ten coal cars at Kuri-Myon leaving three burning. Five Napalms were dropped at each end of a train tunnel two miles east of Kuri-Myon. It is believed that a train was inside the tunnel. Two weapon carrier type trucks on the road east of Sugin-Myon were strafed with 20 MM and left burning. Ten 5 inch HVAR's were fired on a bridge, over a railroad, five miles east of Kuri-Myron and at least two hits were noted. Two 500lb GP bombs were dropped upon a RR bridge 5 miles east of Yangpyong but no hits were observed. Five locomotives, parked together 3 miles east of Yangpyong and just west of Chunpson, were strafed with 20 MM. However, the damage could not be assessed. Event 7 consisted of 13 F4U's and 7 AD's on offensive sorties and 8 F4U's on defensive sorties. All the planes were recovered at 1500I.

The sixth flight, designated event 10, commenced at 1500I with the launching of two F4U's assigned to NGF spot 4, 7 F4U's TARCAP, 2 AD's for ASP-E, 8 F4U's for CAP, 4 F4U's and 5 AD's for deep support, 2 F4U's for photo 2 and 2 F4U's as escort for photo two. The planes carried 500 lb. GP bombs, HVAR's and Napalms. Two F4U's assigned to deep support swept Yon Ha river for the purpose of investigating and attacking camouflaged gunboats expending 15 HVAR's, two 500 GP bombs, and 90% of the full load of ammunition. One gunboat was left burning and all were damaged. Five AD's, assigned to deep support, attacked with 16 HVAR's, seven 500 lb GP bombs and strafed with 20 mm approximately 20 boxcars in RR yard near Chonwon but were unable to assess the damage. A roundhouse, in center of Seoul, was left smoking from bombs, rocket hits, and strafing runs. Inaccurate flak was observed 300 yards NNW of rail yard at Chonwon coming from approximately 10 light calibre guns. People in white were noted moving in areas east of Seoul and were moving in both directions. Seven F4U's assigned to TARCAP were assigned reconnaissance between BARCAP 2 and 3. They located 500-1000 troops on road between Munsan-ni and Kwansan-ni with handcarts, horsecarts, trucks, and three light tanks at CS 0684. Strafing was conducted damaging carts, trucks, and killing or wounding approximately 50 troops. The troops were white jackets and dark trousers and were walking toward Seoul. Some of the carts carried mounted machine guns, others ammunition. Light inaccurate AA (20mm & 40 mm) was observed at CS 0395, 1576, 1075. Two F4U's assigned to deep support reported striking an ammunition and oil storage depot leaving it burning, and evaluation destroyed. Four small craft aground were strafed and hit by at least one rocket resulting in undetermined damage. One F4U, flown by LT CDR D. C. TAYLOR, 99311, USN, was ditched one quarter of a mile west of Point Bolo. The damage was inflicted by damaged rockets which had probably been damaged by flying debris from the first run. During the second run the rocket motors exploded after firing and flying fragments struck the aircraft engine causing failure. LT CDR TAYLOR was picked up by a shore based helicopter about ten minutes after he effected a forced landing. A second F4U of the group making the second run was damaged by flying debris when the explosion occured. Another F4U, flown by Ensign James Brogan, 506739, USN VF-23, lost power on takeoff and settled into the water. The auxiliary fuel tank exploded and burned

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