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PART IV DAMAGE (CON'D)

DATE	SQD	TYPE	BUNO.	CAUSE	POSITION F DAMAGE
1/27/52	VF 713	F4U-4	97162	50 Cal.	Port wing.
1/27/52	VA 728	AD-3	122815	Small Arms	Underside of fuselage and wing joint.
1/27/52	VF 837	F9F-2	125095	BombBlast	Port Wing
1/29/52	VA 728	AD-3	122829	BombBlast	Stbd. wing.
1/29/52	VF 837	F9F-2	127156	Small Arms	Port Wing.
1/29/52	VF 837	F9F-2	127158	AA	STbd. Tip Tank.
1/29/52	VC 3	F4U5NL	124553	37MM	Engine
1/29/52	VF 713	F4U-4	97317	UNKNOWN	Wing sheared off
1/31/52	VA 728	AD-2	122324	Bomb Blast	Fuselage port side aft.
1/31/52	VA 728	AD-2	122310	Small Arms	Port wing.
1/31/52	VA 728	AD-2	122304	Small Arms	Bottom of port aileron
2/3/52	VF 713	F4U-4	81269	20MM	Lower side stbd stabilizer
2/3/52	VA 728	AD-4	123951	Bomb Blast	Port wing tip lost.
2/3/52	VF 837	F9F-2	127152	Small Arms	Center nose section, lodged in APG-30 gear.
2/3/52	VF 837	F9F-2	127189	UNKNOWN	Port tip tank.
2/4/52	VA 728	AD4L	123999	20MM	Leading edge of stbd wing.
2/4/52	VA 728	AD-2	122248	Small Arms	Port aileron
2/4/52	VF 713	F4U-4	81888	UNKNOWN	Presume accessory section
2/6/52	VF 837	F9F-2	127200	Small Arms	Stbd. wing flap.
2/6/52	VA 728	AD-4	123999	Bomb Blast	UNKNOWN
2/6/52	VF 713	F4U-4	81558	Bomb Frag.	Aft. cockpit port side.

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2. AIRCRAFT DAMAGED BEYOND REPAIR ABOARD SHIP

DATE	SQD	TYPE	BUNO.	CAUSE
1/18/52	VC3 DET "D"	F4U5NL	124551	Aircraft struck the after 5 in. gun mount after diving for the deck. Strike damage.
2/1/52	VC61 DET"D"	F9F-2P	123495	No. 3 elevator lowered on folded right wing incurring major damage to wing, wing stub, and landing gear.

3. AIRCRAFT LOST

DATE	SQD	TYPE	BUNO	CAUSE
1/17/52	VF 837	F9F-2	125094	Unable to maintain aileron control after catapult launch - ditched.
1/21/52	VA 728	AD-2	122315	AA Damage - Ditched.
1/29/52	VF 713	F4U-4	97317	AA Damage - Plane landed in water.
1/29/52	VC-61	F9F-2P	123705	Plane struck ramp coming aboard. Went into water.
1/29/52	VC-3	F4U5NL	124553	AA - Landed in enemy territory-Fire.
2/4/52	VF 713	F4U-4	81888	Engine froze - ditched.
2/4/52	VF 837	F9F-2	125096	Flame out after shift to emergency fuel control position - Ditched.

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B. DAMAGE INFLICTED TO ENEMY THIRD OPERATING PERIOD 16 JAN. - 9 FEB. 1952

	DAMAGED	DESTROYED	GRAND TOTAL DAMAGE DAMAGED	GRAND TOTAL DAMAGE DESTROYED
TANKS	1		7	6
LOCOMOTIVES	4	1	17	18
TRUCKS	48	32	134	128
OXCARTS	3	41	53	254
BOATS	8	1	44	66
TROOPS KILLED		59		608
RR TRACKS		672 Cuts		2186 Cuts
RR BRIDGES	8	20	31	42
RR CARS	129	88	329	219
OXEN		3		148
SUPPLY DUMPS		2	12	20
GUNS	3	18	3	18
BUILDINGS	12	9	93	189
WAREHOUSES	7		71	63
BUNKERS		1	6	4
FACTORY	1		5	7
ROUND HOUSE	2	1	2	1
REPAIR SHOPS		3		3
RELAY STATIONS	1		1	
RADAR EMPLACEMENT		1		1
AMMO DUMP	1	1	1	1
JEEP	1		1	
GUN EMPLACEMENT	5		40	46
CARS	1		1	
HIWAY BRIDGE	4		4	
LUMBER PILES	6		6	
VILLAGES			7	2
RR TUNNELS			3	
RR BYPASS			8	5
HIWAY BYPASS			9	2
FUEL DUMP				1
HIGHWAY			3	
OBSERVATION POST			2	1
AIRFIELDS				1
GRADER				1
HANGARS			3	
TELEPHONE EXCHANGE				1
BOAT HOUSES				1

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PART V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

A. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

1. In spite of continuous cold weather during this operating period personnel performance was uniformly excellent, and morale was outstanding. Pilots still continued to compete for flights.

2. During this operating period, one aviator was found to be not physically qualified and temporarily not aeronautically adapted because he did not wish to continue flying with a chornic skin condition of his hands. He is at present awaiting BuPers - BuMed disposition. Two aviators are still hospitalized at the U. S. Naval Hospital, Japan and were on TAD to that hospital during this entire operating period.

3. During this operating period, one F4U pilot was lost to enemy action, and one airman (VF 837 Plane Captain) was lost at sea when he fell overboard while working on the flight deck before dawn.

4. Five night fighter pilots reported on board as a replacement team, and one night attack pilot reported as a replacement pilot.

5. During this operating period, 25 different pilots were grounded for short period of time primarily for upper respiratory diseases and for observation following accidents. The total number of pilots temporarily grounded at any one time was twelve (12) for the entire Air Group. A maximum number of eight (8) in the Attack Squadron and four (4) in one jet squadron were grounded at one time. Only five (5) pilots were grounded on more than one occasion. Only one (1) combat air crewman was grounded. Four (4) pilots were hospitalized on board for short periods of time because of upper respiratory diseases and treatment following accidents.

6. Since leaving Japan for this operating period, the Air Group has had twelve (12) cases of venereal disease, all gonococcus urethritis. This is compared with two (2) cases and ten (10) cases from the previous two operating periods.

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B. CASUALTIES

1. LT A. MODANSKY, 379014/1315, USNR

On 17 January 1952, LT MODANSKY crashed into the sea in his F9F-2 aircraft shortly after being catapulted. He sustained a puncture wound of the left leg and a moderate contusion of the left knee. After being hospitalized six (6) days, he was discharged to DNIF. LT MODANSKY is expected to return to flying status during the next operating period.

2. LT W. H. SELLS, 461042/1310, USN

On 18 January 1952, LT SELLS was involved in a landing accident when his F4U-5NL aircraft bounced over the barriers and hit the island demolishing the aircraft. LT SELLS was uninjured and returned to flying status on 20 January 1952.

3. LT J. E. WALLEY, 351278/1315, USNR

On 21 January 1952, LT WALLEY was hit by anti-aircraft fire while flying ona strike and was forced to ditch his AD-2 aircraft at sea. He sustained no injuries, was returned to this ship on 22 January 1952, and was returned to flying status on 23 January 1952.

4. AN E. J. C. FARRELL, 211 90 56, USNR

On 21 January 1952, Airman FARRELL was working on the flight deck before dawn under conditions of snow, and rain, and was observed to fall overboard from the forward port side of the flight deck. A thorough search by two destroyers failed to recover the body.

5. LT S. B. MURPHEY, 428338/1310, USN

On 29 January 1952, LT MURPHEY was hit by anti-aircraft fire while flying on a predawn heckler mission, and he crash-landed his F4U-5NL aircraft in enemy territory. While evading an enemy soldier, he sustained a superficial gunshot wound of the neck. A successful helicopter rescue was accomplished, and he was returned to this ship on the same day as his accident. LT MURPHEY was treated as an outpatient and was returned to flying status on 3 February 1952.

6. LT A. S. KALAS, Jr. 414544/1310, USN

On 29 January 1952, LT KALAS hit the ramp of the carrier in his F9F-2P aircraft when landing, and crashed into the sea off the port

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side of the ship in an inverted position. The helicopter's frogman assisted LT KALAS in the rescue, and he was returned to this ship immediately in a semiconscious state suffering from a mild degree of shock and moderate generalized contusions. He was hospitalized for four (4) days and was discharged to DNIF. LT KALAS is expected to return to flying status during the next operating period.

7. ENS W. W. MARWOOD, 538141/1325, USNR

On 29 January 1952, ENS MARWOOD's F4U-4 aircraft received a direct anti-aircraft fire hit in the starboard wing, severing it from the aircraft. The aircraft crashed into the sea and ENS MARWOOD was not observed to have parachuted, nor was he seen after the crash. A search by eight aircraft and a helicopter failed to recover the pilot.

8. LTJG R. E. WILSON, 473048/1310, USN

On 4 February 1952, LTJG WILSON had a flame-out of his F9F-2 aircraft while returning from a CAP mission and was forced to ditch near the carrier. He was rescued by a helicopter, sustaining only a mild degree of shock from exposure. LTJG WILSON will return to flying status during the next operating period.

9. LTJG C. E. GILLETTE, 466148/1315, USNR

On 4 February 1952, LTJG GILLETTE had an engine failure in his F4U-4 aircraft while flying on a naval gunfire spotting mission and was forced to ditch at sea without sustaining any injuries. He was rescued by a helicopter, and was returned to this ship on 5 February 1952. LTJG GILLETTE will return to flying status during the next operating period.

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A. OPERATIONS

1. Operations during the third combat tour were characterized by maturity and efficiency of operations. The ship and Air Group worked together in harmony. Maximum effort was directed against the enemy.

2. Operations, once again, were almost completely of an interdiction nature. During the entire period the target area was covered with snow and the weather was uniformly cold.

3. Tactics during this period changed considerably. Instead of spreading track breaking effort over the entire assigned rail network with resultant scattered breaks, strategic sections of tracks were designated and the mission was modified to provide for complete destruction of the tracks and roadbed in these areas. Track sections were selected which were difficult to reach for repair and were in low flak density areas. Areas selected were photographed and all anti-aircraft positions noted. The results of this policy were quickly apparent. Damage was great and the enemy showed that he was hurt by moving in additional anti-aircraft facilities.

4. When targets were assigned in heavily defended areas, coordinated strikes were used composed of 8 jets, 6 VF props and 6 VA. All VF were used for flak suppression, using VT bombs, while the VA aircraft were assigned to destroy the target. Props were launched 15 minutes ahead of the jets and made a running redezvous. After takeoff the jets would rapidly climb to altitude and conserve fuel. Pilots were prebriefed and assigned individual gun positions to suppress. The jets would make their run 60 seconds before the VA. The VF prop immediately followed the jets. Results proved highly satisfactory and bridges defended with over 38 guns have been destroyed with no damage to aircraft.

5. The above procedure, while satisfactory, requires a large number of aircraft for flak suppression. Strikes were successfully made in heavy flak areas using eight jets alone, relying upon their speed and deception to overcome the flak danger.

6. Jets normally were scheduled in flights of four aircraft. Each flight was assigned a section of railroad to bomb and then a route to recce.

7. A major reduction in flak damage was effected this operating period. This was accomplished by a change in tactics (previously described) and by a continuous program of pilot briefing.

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8. Damage assessment was accomplished primarily using the K-25 camera. This is considered a dangerous procedure due to the fact that the aircraft must go extremely low to get satisfactory pictures. In the last report a recommendation was made that a longer focal length camera be provided to enable satisfactory pictures from higher altitude. Pending receipt of such equipment, it is recommended that the F9F2P aircraft be scheduled to take the strike damage assessment photos in addition to their presently assigned photo duties. It is believed that the concentration of strike effort presently being followed makes this feasible. Excellent coverage is provided by these aircraft af four to five thousand feet (out of flak density ares)

9. With present fusing, it is very difficult to knock locomotives and cars off the tracks even though they are seriously damaged. It is recommended that daisy cutter fusing be evaluated for this type of work.

10. Recommendations are being submitted by separate correspondence regarding changes to existing awards policy.

11. The policy of Air Group representatives from each ship attending the daily CTF 77 Staff Operations Planning and Scheduling Conference Has been very advantageous.

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B. INTELLIGENCE

1. This Air Group has used a new system in producing copies of Air-Craft Vulnerability and Aircraft Crew amd Survival Reports. One yeoman receives rough copies from units concerned and keeps a log of the consecutive number of reports. These reports are then typed on a mimeograph stencil and mimeographed according to the number of reports desired for proper distribution. This system has saved many hours of typing and also is desirable due to the fact that all reports are more centrally located which means that a closer supervision of all reports can be maintained.

2. Flak information has shown a steady improvment during the three operating periods. This has been due primarily to better photographic coverage of target areas. It is believed, however that much progress can still be made. Flak information is received from the following:

SOURCE	POSITION
Photo Interepretation	Gun Position
Information from other Agencies Including Air Force	Gun Position or Air Burst (not normally specified)
Pilot Reports	Generally Air Burst Position

Due to the wide variance between air burst position and gun positions, it is believed that a single flak overlay has limited value, particularly in selecting track target areas. This group has developed a 1 to 50,000 chart of target areas showing all known gun positions with range radius curves for each gun. This chart shows great promise. Indications are that two flak overlays may be desirable. One presenting known gun position information. The other presenting air burst positions. Evaluation of the problem will be continued during the next action period.

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C. MAINTENANCE

1. During this operating period the overall aircraft availabilty was very good. One squadron VF 713, flew better than a hundred per cent of its scheduled sorties for the entire period. This was achieved in spite of the fact that the weather was the coldest we have encountered to date.

2. With no satisfactory fuel proportioning system, in operation on the flight deck, oil was added to the fuel for jets by hand at each gassing (6 gallons added to the after cell giving approximately a 1% mixture). This addition of oil has materially reduced high pressure pump and T.J.C. troubles. Some difficulty has been experienced with sticking of the high pressure cocks and the secondary fuel nozzles. This is thought to be a carry-over from the previous period when no oil was used. Occurrences lessened at the end of the period. The expected starting difficulties due to oil did not materialize because of (1) increased attention to ignition cleanliness by cleaning all of them every replenishment day. (2) The low concentration of oil is not great enough to cause trouble, particularly since the forward cell contains little oil initially. It is planned to increase the oil additive during the next cruise.

3. VF 837 had three planes returned to the ship with low pressure fuel lights. In all cases the filters were changed and no further difficulty was encountered. In each case the engine had 20-25 hours since check. A policy of changing all low pressure fuel filters at 15 hours has been initiated.

4. The maintenance difficulties encountered during this period on F4U aircraft were of a minor nature. Two wing changes were required as a result of the failure of the wing fold cylinder bracket caused by a combination of strong winds, bomb loading, and high speed turns. In spite of the possible delay in the launch and the added danger to flight deck personnel, jury struts are now being left on until the ship is into the wind.

5. The Mark 14A bomb racks were finally installed on all Corsairs by using the San Diego wing adapters and the Chance Vought wiring procedure for the cockpit. No circuit breakers were available to incorporate wiring necessary to utilize rocket provision, but bombs were released without difficulties.

6. The main AD maintenance difficulties were caused by the large amount of damage due to enemy flak and cold operating weather. A total of 21 planes were damaged by flak, which required anywhere from one

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to one hundred and ten man hours to repair. In addition, planes were AOG due to the damage of parts not normally available in Aviation Supply. An accumulation of useage parts by Aviation Supply should improve this situation.

7. The cold weather was the cause of considerable starting trouble in spite of the use of oil dilution every day on the line. The weather was also responsible for a siege of carburetor and instrument troubles.

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D. ELECTRONICS

1. During this action period, as in previous periods, close cooperation existed between Ship's Electronics, Aviation Electronics and Air Group Electronics. This is of particular importance in solving problems and correcting discrepancies in such equipments as "Mother", "Hayrake" and Trout" and the respective equipments in the planes: AN/APS-19 and AN/APS-31, AN/ARR-2 and AN/ARN-6.

2. On receipt of a report or several reports, especially, of faulty performance of an equipment in a plane, Ship's Electronics is notified. When ships gear has a discrepancy or one is suspected Ship's Electronics notifies Air Group Electronics. In this manner performance in both phases is maintained at a very high standard.

3. The Electronics Shop developed a combination head set-lip mike for the use of the Landing Signal Officers. This consists of a headband with one earphone attached. The other end of the headband is modified so that it has no protruding metal or rough ends. A lip mike frame is attached to the earphone.

   Both earphone and microphone are plugged to a disconnect attached by a clip to the LSO's shoulder. Mike leads runs from the disconnect to a keying switch. The keying switch, a momentary three - contact push button type, is attached to a small metal frame constructed to slip on a paddle handle in such a manner that it can be operated by the LSO. Leads run from the keying switch to the ships junction box via the LSO's shoulder. Phone leads run from the junction box to the earphone side of the disconnect.

   This arrangement is patched to Radio I through Radio III in parellel with Primary Fly and Air Plot. Radio II which has the TDQ and RCK is patched to Radio I. The TDQ and RCK are the transmitter and receiver on the ship's land-launch frequency. The acting LSO may talk and listen to the pilots of night landing planes. This arrangement has proven very successful. A complete report including photographs is being submitted to ComAirPac. Radio talk-down control by the controlling LSO is considered highly desireable and recommended for standard installation on all carriers.

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E. SURVIVAL

1. Deficiencies of survival equipment at conclusion of operating period:

(a) Insufficient number of MKIII Anti-Exposure suits for all pilots.
(b) Shortage of needles, thread and Carr Fasteners.
(c) Inadequate facilities for weighing and charging PK2 life raft CO2 oxygen bottles. This problem is being detailed in separate correspondence.

2. Droppable Survival Bombs - Aviation Supply received 15 Survival Bombs from ComAirPac which are being utilized in the Survival Program. Survival Bombs made up by CAG-15 are being disassembled and the equipment being used for other Survival emergency purposes.

3. DITCHINGS:

(a) Four (4) pilots ditched their aircraft in water. All four pilots were rescued.
(b) One pilot and plane went over the starboard side after the tail hook broke on a deck landing. Pilot was rescued.
(c) One pilot ditched his plane on land in enemy territory after his aircraft has been struck by enemy AA. After evading two enemy soldiers the pilot was rescued by helicopter.

4. LECTURE AND MOVIES - Squadron's Survival Officers conducted Survival, Evasion and Escape lectures, and provided movies on various phases of survival for their pilots.

5. SURVIVAL, EVASION & ESCAPE HINTS: - were incorporated in the daily brief notes. This proved to be an excellent medium for disseminating this type of information.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) That oversize parachute harnesses be provided for pilots wearing winter flight clothing and exposure suits.

(b) The majority of pilots who ditched their aircraft recommended that more emphasis be placed on physical conditioning activities for pilots.

(c) That spare wrist and neck seals be provided for MKIII Survival suits.

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