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4. ACCIDENT SUMMARY

10/15/51 AD4L - Landing gear collapsed upon hard landing with pitching deck. Pilot uninjured.

10/16/51 AD4L - Upon return to ship while on cross wind leg engine lost complete power. Ditched - pilot recovered - no injuries.

10/22/51 AD4W - Upon taking wave-off aircraft lost power and was ditched. All personnel recovered - no injuries.

10/25/51 F4U4 - Ditched after engine failure due to AA/Pilot rescued by helicopter - no injuries.

10/30/51 F4U5NL - After night waveoff pilot collided with catwalk and plane went over the side. No injuries to pilot.

11/4/51 F9F2 - After unarrested landing plane went through barriers unarrested and crashed into aircraft spotted forward. 2 F9F jettisoned. 1 damaged beyond repair aboard ship. Three AD4 aircraft damaged beyond repair aboard ship. Pilot decapitated, other casualties (see casualty section)

11/4/51 AD4NL - Upon catapulting, bridle broke - All personnel recovered - No injuries.

11/8/51 F4U4- Engine failure due to AA damage. Pilot ditched in Wonsan Harbor and was recovered by helicopter - minor injuries.

11/12/51 F4U5NL- Water landing after cat shot. It is believed flaps retracted due to hydraulic valve failure when wheels were retracted. Pilot uninjured and recovered by destroyer.

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B - DAMAGE TO ENEMY

TARGETS	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
TANK	1	
TRUCKS	26	47
CARS	1	
LOCOS	5	3
OX CART	16	24
HIWAY BRIDGES	4	
SUPPLY DUMPS	12	14
AMMO DUMPS	1	1
FACTORIES	3	5
WAREHOUSES	32	28
BARRACKS & BUILDINGS	81	78
GUN REPLACEMENTS	33	26
LUMBER PILES	6	
OXEN		25
VILLAGES	7	2
BOATS	2	5
BUNKERS	4	3
RAILROAD TRACKS	350 cuts	
RAILROAD TUNNELS	3	
RAILROAD CARS	92	61
RAILROAD BRIDGES	13	7
TROOPS KILLED		246
RAILROAD BY-PASS	5	
HIWAY BY-PASS	3	
FUEL DUMP		1
HIWAY	3	
OBS-POST	2	
AIRFIELDS	3	
GRADER		1
BULLDOZER		1
HANGARS	3	

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V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND C[redacted]UALTIES

A. Personnel performance.

1. In general, personnel performance both officer and enlisted, has been highly satisfactory indicating excellent morale and satisfactory training. Competetion amongst the pilots for missions of any type has been keen. The enlisted personnel have borne the brunt of operations with surprising reserves of energy and spirit.

2. During this operating period, one aviator was temporarily grounded awaiting BUMED-BUPERS action because of the development of psychosomatic symptons from strain of combat flying and a past history of sensitivity to motion. One aviator was admitted to the U. S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan for observation of back difficulties and possibly a poor motivation for flying; it is questionable if he will return to flying status.

3. Three aviators have been hospitalized because of serious injuries resulting from accidents. One will return to duty during the next operating period. One will be transferred to the U. S. Naval Hospital Yokosuka, Japan for further hospitalization and treatment; he will not be able to return to flying status with this Air Group. One was hospitalized on board another ship in the Task Force and will return to flying status during the next operating period.

4. During this operating period, three aviators from VF 713 and one officer attached to the CAG Staff have been suspended from flying from the ship by the Commanding Officer of the ship for deficient aeronautic proficiency in landing aboard the Carrier. Final disposition of these aviators is pending at present.

5. One aviator was killed in an F9F-2 accident when he passed thru the barriers unarrested and crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck. Three enlisted personnel from the Air Group also died in this accident. Three other squadron personnel were hospitalized for injuries received in this accident.

6. During this operating period, 28 different aviators were grounded for short periods of time for upper respiratory diseases, and observation following accidents. Only three aviators were grounded on more than one occasion. Three of twenty-two combat air crewmen have been grounded for short periods of time for similar reasons.

7. Since leaving Japan for this operating period, the Air Group has had only two cases of veneral disease, one gonococcal urethritis, and one chancroid. This is an excellent record, and is a result of an extensive educational program instituted before departing the States, and of a rigid prophylaxis program instituted by the Ship during that stay in Japan.

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B. CASUALTIES

1. LT G. A. GEHO, 363962/1315, USNR

On 16 October 1951, LT GEHO ditched his AD-4L aircraft off the stern of the carrier because of engine failure following a combat strike. He was picked up by the destroyer guard and returned to the ship sustaining only minor muscle strains of the neck and back.

2. LT A. S. KALAS, JR. 414544/1310, USN

On 21 October 1951, LT KALAS received a thru and thru wound of the left inner thigh from flak material when his F9F-2P aircraft was hit by anti-aircraft fire while flying a combat photographic mission. He landed his aircraft at K-18, Korea, received first aid treatment, and was subsequently flown back to this ship. He will return to flying status during the next operating period.

3. LTJG F. E. MASEK, 477082/1315, USNR

AL-1 W. T. MOREAU, 632 69 71 USN
AT-2 G. L. HARBOUR, 327 10 24, USN

On 22 October 1951, LTJG MASEK and his crewmen crashed into the sea when their AD-4W aircraft developed engine trouble following a wave-off during a night heckler recovery. The pilot sustained only minor contusions of the back and legs, and crewmen Moreau sustained a moderate laceration of the left wrist. All have been returned to duty.

4. LTJG L. W. DORSEY, 478509/1315, USNR

On 25 October 1951, LT DORSEY sustained minor contusions of the neck, back, and legs when his F4U-4 was hit by anti-aircraft fire over Hungnam and crashed at sea. The pilot was recovered by a CTF helicopter and was subsequently returned to the ship. He was returned to duty on 1 Nov 1951

5. LT R. E. KRAMER, 428480/1315 USNR

On 30 October 1951, LT KRAMER sustained minor contusions of the neck and back when his F4U-5NL aircraft crashed into the side elevator of the ship and into the sea after a wave off during a night heckler recovery. The pilot was recovered by a guard destroyer and returned to the ship. He was returned to duty on 1 November 1951

6. LTJG N. K. DONAHOE, 496794/1315, USNR
AT3 J. A. BEECHER 799 43 87, USN
AM3 R. A. NOBLES, 798 82 11, USN
On 4 November 1951, LTJG DONAHOE and his crewmen crashed into the sea off the bow when the catapult failed on a early morning heckler launch of their AD-4NL aircraft. No injuries were sustained by any of the personnel and they were rescued by a guard destroyer and returned to the ship on the following day. He returned to duty on 5 November 1951

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7. LT G. S. BRAINARD, 320881/1315, USNR

On 4 November 1951, LT BRAINARD was killed when his F9F-2 aircraft went thru the barriers and crashed into parked aircraft forward in the flight deck.

LT G. J. DE POLO, 418485/1315 USNR

On 4 November 1951, LT DE POLO sustained a fractured pelvis and a perforated urinary bladder when a F9F-2 aircraft went thru the barriers and crashed into his parked aircraft. LT DEPOLO will be transferred to the U. S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan for further treatment and hospitalization.

9. AN T. R. RUSSELL, 425 83 42, USN

On 4 November 1951, RUSSELL died of injuries received when an F9F-2 aircraft crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck.

10. AN E. L. CLARK, 423 76 81, USN

On 4 November 1951, CLARK died of injuries received when an F9F-2 aircraft crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck.

11. AN E. A. PFIEFER, 366 27 48 , USN

On 4 November 1951, PFIEFER died of injuries received when an F9F-2 aircraft crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck.

12. ADE-2 T. A. CARR, 711 22 84, USNR

On 4 November 1951, CARR sustained multiple lacerations and contusions, and a fracture of the left hand when an F9F-2 aircraft crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck. Returned to duty 14 Nov. 1951.

13. ADE 1 R. F. CANNIZZARO 710 56 01, USNR

On 4 November 1951, CANNIZZARO sustained a fracture of the left wrist when an F9F-2 aircraft crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck. Returned to duty 13 November 1951

14. AOUAN J. C. NIPITELLA, 232 47 50, USNR

On 4 November 1951, NIPITELLA sustained a moderate contusion of the back when an F9F-2 aircraft crashed into parked aircraft forward on the flight deck. Returned to duty 9 November 1951

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15. LTJG H. G. GOODELL, 481085/1315, USNR

LTJG GOODELL received moderate to severe lacerations of the face and left leg when he crashed into the sea after his F4U-4 aircraft was hit by flak over Wonsan. He was rescued by the helicopter from the crusier Toledo and returned to that ship. LTJG GOODELL was hospitalized aboard the Toledo. Returned to duty

16. LTJG R. C. CLINITE, 521337/1310, USN

On 10 November 1951, LTJG CLINITE sustained a minor abrasion of the right forehead when his F9F-2 aircraft was hit by flak over Yangch'on-dong. He returned to the ship and landed safely. Not grounded

17. LTJG L. O. WARFIELD, 496399/1315, USNR

On 12 November 1951, LTJG WARFIELD crashed into the sea after a catapult launch for a pre-dawn heckler mission, when his wing flaps came up as he raised his gear. He sustained only minor muscle strains of the neck and back. LTJG WARFIELD was rescued by a destroyer guard and returned to this ship the following day. Returned to duty 16 November 1951.

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VI COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. OPERATIONS

1. The Air Group has completed its first combat period since recommissioning in a satisfactory manner. No major difficulties were experienced in assuming the burden of operations on station. It is believed that the carrier based training period in the Hawaiian Area 14 September Taru 21 Septemner 1951, helped in large measure to bring the group up to the required training level.

2. The practice of sending Air Group representatives to the Task Force prior to reporting on station was of great assistance in "starting off on the right foot".

3. The launching interval, both deck and catapult, rapidly decreased to a satisfactory operating level. Much greater difficulty has been encountered in shortening the landing interval. Steady improvement, however has been noted throughout the operating period, in the landing interval and the incidence rate of wave offs, with the exception of the F4U Squadron where the wave off rate is still considered high.

4. Due to unsatisfactory airmanship displayed in coming aboard the carrier three pilots from VF 713 have been recommended for disposition board action. Four additional pilots have been scheduled for FCLP during the in port period. The performance of this squadron over the target area has been highly satisfactory. It is believed that the deficiency mentioned can be corrected without further action. One CAG staff pilot is also before a Disposition Board.

5. Due to the fact that no enemy air opposition has been encountered, this group has had no opportunity to conduct air to air gunnery. It is recommended that air to air above firing be conducted by the CAP when tow planes are in the vicinity of the Task Force for surface to air firing.

6. Strike elements normally have been composed of four to six AD aircraft and four to six corsairs. Strike efforts have primarily been directed at RR track cuts and at bridges. The F4U's normally fly above the attack element in two plane units to and from the target and concentrate on flak supression ahead of the attacking AD's. Track targets assigned average in length from ten to fifteen miles. Isolated, hard to repair areas are concentrated upon, and runs are spread out along the stretch of track assigned. An average of approximately ten runs are made on each strike and the number of cuts have varied from five to twenty depending on the number of planes in flight, amount and accuracy of anti-aircraft fire encountered, and wind condition. At the conclusion of and during each strike, an AD is sent low with F4U's strafing to assess damage and photograph cuts with a K-25 camera mounted on the starboard wing.

7. The close air support missions were conducted in teams of two F4U's and two AD's. Though only six missions were assigned the support was reported by TACP's as being highly successful. Due to the excellent training provided at Air Support School, the Anglico group at Pearl Harbor, and the pre Air support briefing, no difficulty was encountered in conducting these missions. Additional work of this type would be welcomed.

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8. NGF missions were performed using two Corsair aircraft. Results on these missions were highly satisfactory even tho many of the pilots had little previous experience. It is suggested that representatives from squadrons expected to perform NGF duties be sent to ships conducting this type of mission in order to observe the operations from the ship. It is believed that better spotting would result.

9. Jet Operations

a. Jet Operations have bondisted of Combat Air Patrol, Interdiction, Reconnaissance flights, and Fighter Sweeps over enemy air fields in northeast Korea. An average of 30 sorties were scheduled each operating day.

b. Of the Combat Air Patrols flown all were of a routine nature with no unfriendly interceptions. The interdiction and reconnaissance flights were flown over prescribed routes in Northeast Korea with the object of nanpering and destroying supply routes and supplies of the enemy.

c. These flights were conducted with three aircraft using the following tactical deployment. The first plane maintained an altitude between 1500 and 2000 feet over the terrain being searched unless actually engaged in an attack. The second plane maintained a position astern of the first plane at an altitude of 3000 to 4000 feet from which position the pilot was able to maintain constant visual contact with the first plane. The third plane maintained a position astern and level with or higher than the second plane. From this position the third pilot was able to navigate and warn the first pilot of turns or deviations in the route.

d. It has been found frequently, that flying at an altitude of 2500 to 3000 feet rather than a lower altitude enables the searching pilot to search accurately due to the decreased angular movement of objects on the ground. It also relieves some of the strain of avoiding the ever present hills and mountains, thus increasing the amount of time observing the ground. While this altitude is still subject to automatic anti-aircraft weapons fire, small arms fire is much less effective. Due to his ability to see further forward at this altitude, he is thus able to initiate an immediate attact on a vehicle before it can be hidden.

e. Because contacts with worthwhile targets have been limited on such flights, external ordnance of 5" HVAR and 100 lb. bombs have often been expended on rail cuts and upon buildings.

f. The fighter sweeps over enemy held air fields were composed of four aircraft. All were of routine nature with no contacts being made with enemy aircraft. After a preliminary inspection from altitude, an attack was made with rockets, strafing and bombing on worthwhile targets. Care was taken to note the condition of the fields and any indications of their use or repairs by the enemy.

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g. It has been doctrine to test fire the 20MM cannon, place the hydraulic system selector to combat manifold, and air empty tip tanks prior to reaching land. With the approaching cold weather, test firing of the guns has been stopped in order to keep the barrels taped as long as possible. Upon leaving land on the return trip the pilots, at the signal of the leader, drop their hook, safety the guns, close tip tank dump, return hydraulic selector to "system" and insure that the hook circuit breaker is in. In this manner a pilot with a hook that will not extend properly has an opportunity to land at a friendly field while there is enough fuel remaining.

10. VF(N) OPERATIONS

a. Each Night Heckler section is assigned a separate recco route. It has been found through experience that too much time is lost in rendezvousing two darkened planes following an attack, so each pilot operates independently, but stays within 10 miles of the other plane. Sightings and position are reported frequently over the radio. A prearranged altitude separation of at least 1000 feet is maintained between aircraft. Each pilot calls out when he begins a run and when he recovers. Lucrative targets may be attacked by both planes, the second pilot beginning his run after the first pilot announces his recovery. When flares are used an attempt is made to have the second plane in position to begin a run immediately after the flare ignites; the plane dropping the flare pulls up and covers the attacking plane, then follows with his attack. Each plane usually gets in two runs before its flare goes out.

b. The loading preferred by the VFN on evening heckler hops when moving vehicles are the most likely targets is one 500 lb. GP, six 260 frags, all fused nose VT and tail .01 delay. 20MM ammo is belted two HEI and two I, and is considered to be the most effective weapon of the night heckler.

c. A pair of light weight binoculars would be most useful to the heckler pilot during those periods of dusk and dawn when vehicular traffic moves without the use of headlights. The standard 7 X 50 Navy binoculars have been used but are considered to be too heavy and bulky.

11. VA(N) OPERATIONS

a. The VA(N) night attack team, composed of 4 AD-4NLs and 6 pilots, flew predawn heckler and ASP escort missions.

b. Night tactics consist of two AD-4NLs flying in section formation to and from the beach. When over the area, lights are turned off and pilots search for vehicles and trains moving along the roads and railroads. After making the first attack or if separated before, planes fly alone at different altitudes. Frequent use of radio is essential to maintain separation. The pilot finding a lucrative target calls the other plane to assist in the attack. Both call commencing and breaking off runs. The heckler load generally carried is two 500 lb. GPs and VT nose and .01 delay tail, 6 260 lb. frags with same fuzing and 2 100 lb. GP with instantaneous nose and .01 delay tail fuzing. Four flares are carried on the evening hecklers. It would be desirable to carry a larger load but with the high basic weight of the AD-4NL aircraft this is not possible without exceeding the loaded weight limitation.

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12 Photo Operations

Photo flights were assigned and conducted between 500 and 10,000 feet. Coverage was made on railroads for damage assessment at 5000, 7500, and 10,000 feet, with the vertical installation. Low level oblique photo's were taken of harbors, installations and bridges. Difficulty was encountered when missions were assigned which require more film to cover the area assigned than the film magazines were capable of carrying. It is understood that F2H-2P equipment will correct this difficulty.

It is recommended that Photo Aircraft be modified to include cockpit deck armor plate due to the necessity for these aircraft to fly straight and level thru highly defended flak areas.

13. Awards - It is recommended that some means be provided to recognize the performance of the ASP ADW aircraft pilots and crew members. These personnel are entrusted with a highly important flight mission and one which precludes their participation in any other type of combat operation which would be recognized under the strike flight award system.

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B. INTELLIGENCE

1. Four of the five members of the Air Group Intelligence team were sent to the forward area approximately six weeks before the Air Group was deployed to WestPac. This training with the experienced air groups proved highly instructive as the system of briefs debriefs and reports were planned before the air group was in actual combat.

2. The ComCarDiv ONE Staff Intelligence Officer presented the team with excellent background of Staff Intelligence which was highly valuable to the lower echelon intelligence officers. The ComNavFE Air Intelligence Officer also provided assistance and was responsible for bringing an Escape and Evasion team from the Far East Air Force aboard the USS ANTIETAM (CV-36) for a lecture concerning escape and evasion in the Korean theater of war. This information proved very valuable to all personnel concerned.

3. The Air Group Intelligence team is composed of five officers:one Air Group and four squadron AIO's.

The Air Group AIO has the following duties:

(a) Makes certain squadron AIOs secure daily briefs from Ship's Intelligence Office.
(b) Makes up and passesout authenication and recoginition code sheets to squadron AIOs.
(c) Briefs and debriefs all specialized detachment team flights.
(d) Give de-briefing information to Ship's AIO for flash report.
(e) Collects air attack report form stencils, aircraft and crew survival and aircraft vulnerability reports. His yeoman keeps number of report in consecutive order, mimeographs each form and sends out all reports to designated distribution list.
(f) Reads all intelligence publications for briefs.
(g) Keeps photo file of all K-25 camera blow-up prints of damage of enemy.

Each squadron AIO performs the following duties:

(a) Briefs and de-briefs pilots on their assigned missions
(b) Gives de-briefing information to Ship's AIO for flash report of each event.
(c) Maintains ready-rooms charts and displays specifically bomb-lines, flak area, restricted areas and recco routes.
(d) Reads all intelligence publications and briefs his Commanding Officer
(e) Makes out air attack report form stencil, original aircraft and crew survival and aircraft vulnerability reports. These reports are then turned over to the Air Group AIO.
(f) Complies and edits the Squadron War Diary and assists Air Group AIO in compiling the Action Report.

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As the two jet squadrons are located in the same ready-room and conduct the same type operations the two AIOs assigned to these squadrons merely alternate briefs and de-briefs.

The two prop-squadrons AIOs also alternate each brief but each AIO de-briefs his own respective squadron.

The Air Group AIO briefs and de-briefs the special unit teams.

Each squadron AIO has an assistant AIO or recognition officer which is always an aviator.

4. RECOMMENDATIONS

a. Air Group and Ship Air Intelligence Officers should be sent to the forward area at least six weeks before the Air Group is deployed to WestPac. Prior to present deployment Air Group personnel were ordered by ComAirPac to the forward area early, but the Ship's Intelligence Officer was not. One group AIO and one ship AIO is sufficient.

b. One yeoman from each squadron should be sent to Air Intelligence school for indoctrination, to get an overall picture of the Air Intelligence function and to secure the necessary information as to making out proper reports and distribution lists.

c. Escape and Evasion equipment should be aboard and available prior to leaving the West Coast. This Air Group received E & E kits from the USS BOXER (CV-21) but the number given was not adequate and the contents of the kits were not intact.

d. All carriers should have built-in panels in the rear of each ready room for maps and charts to be used in the briefing and de-briefing of the pilots.

e. It is recommended that a standard teletype machine be installed in the AIO office on the Air Plot-Ready Room circuit so that the Intelligence Office would be informed of late information and could present target changes to the ready rooms on the same circuit.

f. Each ready-room should be equipped with the following:
   1. One safe with combination lock for intelligence material.
   2. One sixteen millimeter movie projector.
   3. One Belloptician--small type.
   4. One glass-beaded screen.
   5. One recognition projector and kit with slides.
   6. One microphone to be used for briefs and lectures.

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5. RECOGNITION CODE:

Recognition code sheets for each pilotare made up and passed to eac pilot before each flight and collected by the Squadron Duty Officer at the completion of that flight. This code sheet is cut on a stencil and mimeographed on sheets five (5) inches by seven (7) inches in order that it may fit each pilots' knee pad. It is composed of the following information:

1. Date
2. Enciphering and deciphering of days' shackle code
3. Code name for jig-points of reference.
4. Recognition turn for that particular day.
5. Aircraft signals
   (a) Identification letter and challenge
   (b) Tracer Color
   (c) Star Color
6. Surface craft reply--flashing light letter.
7. Ground signals
   (a) Tracer Color
   (b) Star color--pyrotechnics
   (c) Panel displays
8. Submarine emergency identification-pyrotechnic color.
9. Position of rescue heliocopters and code voice calls.

This system of passing out recognition code sheets to each pilot has saved much time in briefings and in this aspect it does not compel the pilot to spend all his time before flights copying all the necessary information from the blackboard on his knee pad.

6. REPORTS

a. Air Attack Reports

This report is not suited for this type operation. It does not present a true picture of the success of events. It is devised to record attacks on one target rather than many targets. Evaluation groups should study and modify this type of report.

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C. MAINTENANCE

1. Aircraft maintenance during this period was mainly of a routine nature; two engine and five wing changes were accomplished. The early part of the period was marked by a large number of hangar deck and flight deck accidents which in conjunction with combat damage, placed a heavy work load on the squadron structural mechanics. The incidence of these accidents has decreased as plane captains and handling crews have gained experience. The parts damaged were mainly control surfaces, wing tips and tail cones. It is suggested that a small heat treating oven be included as part of the V-2 division equipment; this would permit repair of many damaged sections which are at present turned back into supply, for return to overhaul activities.

2. During the latter part of this period the F9F aircraft experienced a seige of low pressure warning lights due to fuel contemination. An investigation into the cause of the fuel impurities is underway by the Ship.

3. Most of the jet aircraft maintenance is performed in Bay one Area. At the present time there is only one chain fall in this section. Because of the close overhead clearances and necessity of a strong supporting point there are very few places where additional chain falls can be installed. It is suggested in place of additional chain falls that some type of portable hoist be provided to be used in conjunction with an engine stand to facilitate work on jet engines.

4. Because of the limited spots with extended over-head space on the hangar deck the following procedure was devised to facilitate landing strut changes and strut seal changes on AD aircraft. The wing and tail jacks are positioned and securely tied down. The struts are then lashed to prevent their extension when the plane is raised. As soon as the wheels are off the deck the landing gear is retracted until the strut extends at a 45° angle. The strut is then unlashed and necessary repairs or replacements accomplished.

5. During this period sixteen men from the engine build up section V-2 division were integrated into the squadron maintenance organizations on a loan basis. The transfer was advantageous to all concerned. It allowed the V-2 division men to gain added aircraft experience in their rates while it helped to alleviate the maintenance work load on the squadrons. Squadron and ship personnel then conduct all maintenance within the capacity of either the squadron or ship.

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D - ELECTRONICS

1. Well organized shops and test bench equipments had been set up under the supervision of the Ships Aviation Electronics Officer, in spite of space limitations and other problems. The Air Group Electronics Officer and the Ships Aviation Electronics Officer work in close harmony and cooperation. V-2 personnel have been available to alleviate heavy work loads of squadron electronics personnel.

2. Communications equipment, AN/ARC-1, homing radio, AN/ARR-2, IFF equipment, espicially the AN/APX-6, and radio altimeter, AN/APN-1 have created our greatest maintenance problems. It is suggested that an AN/APN-1 test bench be set up in the A.E.W. Shop in addition to the existing installation in the electronics shop due to the location of the A.E.W. Shop and the fact that the major portion of the Compron electronics work is done in the A.E.W. shop.

3. Servicing and maintaining the AN/APS-31 creates problems. There is a lack of parts for the antenna test bench assembly, and there are no Servo Amplifiers in this area. To check and maintain this equipment, the complete component must be removed from an aircraft and than be raised by hoist from the hangar deck through a hatch in the O-2 deck. Lack of the shop space makes it very difficult to move it and set it up to work on. In spite of these handicaps the AN/APS-31B is performing in an outstanding manner, consistently picking up targets at 100 miles or better. No flight has expericenced equipment failure.

4. For checking AN/APX-6 the combination of UPM-1, TS-419/U and the "Paired pulse Generator" was used. As test equipment this arrangement performed satisfactorily within its limitations as a substiture for UPM-4. Lack of bench space prohibits checking AN/APX-1 and AN/APX-6 simultaniously.

5. With the probability of using MK-3 MOD-3 toss bombing gear temporary test bench equipment was set up. Test equipment proved its worth in locating discrepancies. However it is impossible to calibrate MK3 MOD3 aboard ship. Pitch and roll, plus changes in atmospheric pressure caused by opening and closing shop doors, negates any probability of calibration accuracy under present conditions.

6. Maintenance problems in the ships have been solved as expeditionily as possible, and electronic equipment operation has been held at a high level.

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E- SURVIVAL

I. Deficiencies in Survival Equipment on reaching the Action Area are detailed below

1. Inadequate facilities for weighing and charging PK2 life raft CO2 oxygen bottles.

2. Inadequate storage space for survival gear bombs and equipment.

3. Shortage of replaceable supplies for parachute loft such as sewing machine needles, thread, and Zipper fasteners.

4. No facilities for drying parachutes.

5. Shortage of beater kits, C-1 survival vest (army types) and evasion and escape reading files.

II. WINTER FLIGHT CLOTHING

1. Sufficient winter flight clothing was procured by squadron supply Officers.

III. Droppable Survival Bomb

CAG-15 designed and manufactured fifteen (15) droppable survival bombs equipped with Knapsack packed with necessary survival clothing, emergency rations and signaling equipment. One survival bomb is carried on every strike, normally by AD aircraft. One survival bomb was lost during this action period. The survival bomb with knapsack complete weighs approximately 100 pounds. The knapsack with survival contents weighs 45 pounds. A special report of this development has been submitted to ComAirPac.

IV Ditching in Water

Planes were ditched with a total of four (4) aircrewmen and eight (8) pilots being rescued from the water. No personnel were lost. No planes were ditched on land.

V. Oxygen Replenishment

A special portable system has been developed to greatly facilitate aircraft oxygen resupply. A special report of this development is being forwarded to ComAirPac.

VI Helicopter and Guppies

These aircraft have been equipped with life rafts, emergency clothing and rations for survival purposes.

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VII Recommendations

1. That a standard droppable survival kit be developed and issued to Carrier Air Group prior to deployment.

2. That Barter Kits, Survival Vest, blood chits, pointee talkies, maps and the necessary evasion and escape information for carriers operating in Korean waters be provided prior to deployment.

3. All squadrons should hold frequent, supervised, timed ditching drill. Pilots must react automatically to get out their life raft, plane first aid kit, charts, parachute and all survival equipment. Of eight ditchings including 12 persons only one pilot got his life raft out.

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