UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

CVG-11/A16-13
(EFV:jge)
Ser: 028

6 JUN 1952

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SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN
To: Commanding Officer, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

Subj: Action Report, Carrier Air Group ELEVEN from 12 May 1952 to 6 June 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4
(b) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1

1. In accordance with reference (a) and (b) this report is submitted for inclusion with the action report of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) for the same period.

PART I - MISSION AND COMPOSITION

The mission of Carrier Air Group ELEVEN is derived from CTF-77 Secret Operation Order No. 22-51 (2nd revision). It consists primarily of rail interdiction against the North Korean railroad network. It consists also of interdiction against the enemy's transportation, communications, industrial, and supply facilities. Night and early morning hecklers, armed reconnaissance, photo reconnaissance, and naval gunfire spot missions were conducted in support of the overall interdiction program. Defense missions consisted of ASP and CAP

COMPOSITION OF CARRIER AIR GROUP ELEVEN

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL AIRCRAFT 5/12	5/31	6/6	PILOTS 5/12	5/31	6/6
CVG-11 CDR J. W. ONSTOTT	None	-	-	-	5	5	5
VF-112 CDR J. V. ROWNEY	F9F-2	17	17	17	23	23	23
VC-61 (Det. "C") LCDR R. L. NALL	F9F-2P	3	3	3	4	4	4
VF-113 LCDR J. R. STRANE	F4U-4	17	16	14	25	24	23
VF-114 LCDR G. B. BJORNSON	F4U-4	16	16	16	26	26	26
VC-3 (Det. "C") LCDR A. G. RUSSELL	F4U-5N	2	3	3	5	5	5
VA-115 CDR C. H. CARR	AD-4 AD-4L	12 4	11 2	11 2	26	26	26
VC-11 (Det. "C") LCDR R. D. BOTTEN	AD-4W	3	3	3	5 (Crews) 4	5 4	5 4
VC-35 (Det. "C")	AD-4NL AD-2Q AD-4Q	3 1 1	3 1 1	3 1 1	6 (Crews) 6	6 6	6 6

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II - CHRONOLOGY

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA with Carrier Air Group ELEVEN embarked remained at Yokosuka during the period 18 April through 28 April 1952 for upkeep and rest and recreation. The ship and air group conducted training and refresher exercises to the South of Honshu during the periods 29 April - 1 May and 7 - 8 May 1952. The remainder of the time up to 12 May was spent in Yokosuka as ready carrier. A total of 280 sorties consisting of group tactics were flown during these two periods.

12 May - Departed Yokosuka to join Task Force 77 off the East coast of Korea. No air operations conducted.

13 May - Enroute to Task Force 77. Conducted refresher group tactics during the afternoon. Total sorties flown was 66.

14 May - Joined Task Force 77. Force replenished this date. No air operations conducted.

15 May - Conducted air operations over Northeast Korea. Missions consisted of ASP, CAP, Hecklers, Photo, NGF, 1 jet strike and 3 prop strikes. Total sorties 99, total ammunition expended 11,700 (20 MM)/ 7,600 (50 Cal.), total rockets fired 12, total bombs dropped 73.4 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 53 railcuts, 3 railroad cars damaged, 1 railroad bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad bypass damaged, 2 highway bridges damaged, 3 trucks damaged, 3 buildings destroyed and 7 damaged, 2 fuel dumps damaged and 2 troops killed or wounded.

16 May - Air operations continued as before. Total sorties 99, total ammunition expended 10,800 (20 MM)/ 43,700 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 81.8 tons, total napalm dropped 2.3 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 51 railcuts, 8 railroad cars damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed, 5 railroad bypasses damaged, 15 trucks destroyed and 14 damaged, 19 buildings destroyed, 3 supply dumps damaged, 1 fuel dump damaged, 3 gun positions destroyed and 2 damaged, 4 small boats damaged, and 21 troops killed or wounded.

ENS G. C. MC ALLISTER, VA-115, lost control of his AD upon take off due to slip stream ahead. His left wing dropped as he left the deck and the plane fell off to the port side of the ship's bow and crashed in the water. ENS MC ALLISTER was rescued by helicopter uninjured.

17 May - Air operations as before except that the afternoon and evening flights were cancelled due to inclement weather. Total sorties 63, total ammunition expended 3,500 (20 MM)/ 24,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 43.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 11 railcuts, 17 trucks destroyed and 13 damaged, 12 buildings damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed, 1 supply dump damaged, 1 fuel dump destroyed, 2 gun positions destroyed and 4 damaged, 4 shore batteries damaged, 1 hangar, 1 round house, 12 small boats, 1 locomotive repair ship, 1 railroad tunnel, 1 construction machine, and 1 pier damaged.

18 May - Force replenished.

19 May - Air operations conducted between 0330 - 0800(I) then cancelled due to inclement weather. The force then headed north to launch a group strikes against enemy installations in Chongjin. This was also cancelled due to weather. Total sorties flown during the morning 25, total ammunition expended 1,700 (20 MM)/ 1,900 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 19.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2 tons.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Damage to the enemy consisted of 16 railcuts, 1 railroad car damaged, 2 railroad bridges damaged, 4 trucks destroyed, and 9 buildings destroyed.

LTJG S. C. BALMFORTH, VA-115 ditched his AD-4L within the Task Force upon returning from a rail strike. Engine failure was caused by AA hit. He was rescued by helicopter uninjured.

20 May - No air operations conducted due to fog. Intended to carry out group strikes on Chongjin.

21 May - No air operations due to fog. Still standing by to conduct strike on Chongjin.

22 May - The Task Force proceeded south because of inclement weather and conducted a group strike on Wonsan during the afternoon. Total sorties 73, total ammunition expended 1,500 (20 MM)/ 1,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 54.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 1 railcut, 14 large buildings completely destroyed, 3 gun positions damaged, and 2 troops known to be killed or wounded.

23 May - Continued rail interdection. Total sorties 110, total ammunition expended 10,800 (20 MM)/ 2,400 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 84.8 tons, total napalm dropped 2.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 61 railcuts, 5 railroad cars destroyed and 21 damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed and 4 damaged, 2 railroad bypasses damaged, 2 highway bridges destroyed and 2 damaged, 17 trucks destroyed and 10 damaged, 10 buildings destroyed and 12 damaged, 2 warehouses destroyed and 4 damaged, 4 gun positions destroyed and 2 damaged, 2 shore batteries damaged, 7 small boats damaged, 1 ammo dump, 2 tanks, 2 high tension towers, 3 troop shelters, and 1 jeep were damaged.

24 May - Force replenished.

25 May - Conducted two group strikes on Chongjin. Total sorties 128, total ammunition expended 4,600 (20 MM)/ 9,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 98.5 tons, total napalm dropped 4.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 11 buildings destroyed and 19 damaged, 3 railroad cars destroyed and 8 damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed, 2 gun positions damaged, 3 transformer stations destroyed and 1 damaged, dock area damaged and 1 oxygen plant destroyed.

26 May - Continued routine rail interdiction against the enemy in Northeast Korea. Total sorties 101, total ammunition expended 3,800 (20 MM)/ 44,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 62.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 54 railcuts, 8 railroad cars destroyed and 17 damaged, 1 railroad bridge damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 31 trucks destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 building destroyed and 8 damaged, 1 supply dump damaged, 11 fuel dumps destroyed, 2 gun positions damaged, 110 troops killed or wounded, 1 small boat destroyed and 6 damaged, and 1 locomotive repair shop damaged.

27 May - Air operations continued as before. Total sorties 96, total ammunition expended 11,400 (20 MM)/ 33,800 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 68 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 68 railcuts, 8 railroad cars destroyed and 10 damaged, 2 railroad bridges destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad bypass damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 6 trucks destroyed and 4 damaged, 2 buildings destroyed, 1 warehouse damaged, 3 supply dumps damaged, 3 truck shelters destroyed, and 4 troops killed or wounded.

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28 May - Force replenished.

29 May - Rail interdiction in Northeastern Korea continued. There were limited air operations due to inclement weather. Total sorties 71, total ammunition expended 9,900 (20 MM)/ 36,300 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 48.5 tons, total napalm dropped 2.8 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 52 railcuts, 4 railroad cars damaged, 2 railroad bridges damaged, 2 railroad bypasses destroyed, 15 trucks destroyed and 4 damaged, 1 building damaged, 1 warehouse destroyed and 5 damaged, 2 gun positions damaged and 3 small boats damaged.

ENS M. G. WICKER, VF-113 ditched his F4U between Wonsan Harbor and Hungnam, five miles off the coast when his aircraft was hit by AA, covering an oil line. He was rescued uninjured by the helicopter from the LST 799.

LTJG P. S. SWANSON, VA-115, ditched his AD in Wonsan Harbor when his aircraft was hit by AA causing engine failure. He was rescued uninjured by the minesweeper, USS SYMBOL (AMS-123).

30 May - The force replenished in the morning because of unfavorable flying weather. During the afternoon very limited air operations were conducted due to continued bad weather. Total sorties flown 31, total ammunition expended 3,300 (20 MM)/ 8,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 18 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 8 railcuts, 6 railroad cars destroyed and 12 damaged 3 trucks destroyed, 3 shore batteries damaged, 1 locomotive damaged, and 3 small boats damaged.

31 May - Continued air operations as before. Total sorties 96, total ammunition expended 8,300 (20 MM)/ 12,500 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 57.5 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 42, railcuts, 1 railroad car damaged, 2 railroad bypasses destroyed and 1 damaged 1 highway bridge damaged, 4 trucks damaged, 4 buildings destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 warehouse damaged, 1 supply dump destroyed and 2 damaged, 3 gun positions destroyed and 1 damaged.

1 June - Rail interdiction continues, one strike was made on the town of Kojo where enemy troops were reported to be barracked. Total sorties 92, total ammunition expended 10,000 (20 MM)/ 23,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 47.8 tons, total napalm dropped 8.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 55 railcuts, 2 railroad cars destroyed, 7 trucks damaged, 18 buildings destroyed, 3 warehouses damaged, 1 supply dump damaged, 3 gun positions destroyed, 1 fuel dump destroyed, and 100 troops killed or wounded.

LTJG G. C. CHICK, VF-113, was forced to ditch his F4U in Wonsan Harbor when his aircraft lost all fuel pressure as a result of an AA hit. He was picked up by the minesweeper USS CURLEW (AMS-8) uninjured.

2 June - Air operations over Northeast Korea continued with 94 total sorties, total ammunition expended 6,100 (20 MM)/ 21,000 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 56 tons, total napalm dropped 1.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 34 railcuts, 2 railroad cars destroyed and 2 damaged, 1 railroad bridge destroyed and 1 damaged, 1 railroad bypass damaged, 1 highway bridge damaged, 5 trucks damaged, 5 buildings destroyed, 2 supply dumps damaged, 1 gun position destroyed and 1 damaged, 34 troops killed or wounded, 1 radar station damaged and 14 small boats damaged.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ENS G. R. BROWN, VF-113, ran into a violent slip stream upon take off and his F4U dived into the water off the bow. The belly tank blew up on contact and the plane sank immediately. The pilot did not escape.

3 June - Force replenished.

4 June - Limited air operations conducted in the morning. The USS PHILIPPINE SEA was relieved on the line by the USS PRINCETON, and departed for Yokosuka for upkeep and recreation. Total sorties 36, total ammunition expended 5,100 (20 MM)/ 10,600 (50 Cal.), total bombs dropped 24.5 tons.

Damage to the enemy consisted of 24 railcuts, 1 railroad car destroyed, 1 truck destroyed, 1 gun position damaged, 1 supply dump damaged, and 10 small boats damaged.

5 June - Enroute to Yokosuka. No air operations conducted.

6 June - Arrived at Yokosuka.

PART III - ORDNANCE

1. Comments on Ordnance Equipment.

F9F

a. During the ships last stay at Yokosuka, VF-112 made the change in the F9F-2 gun charging system that was recommended by Commander Fleet Air Japan, S/L FF7-6/713 ser 890 of 7 April 1952 and approved by ComAirPac. This change was to help eliminate some of the light struck primer troubles encountered by F9F-2 squadrons by holding the four way slector valve exhaust port open at all times when the slector switch was placed in the "Ready" position. At the same time sufficient personnel were received for temporary additional duty from ComFairJap to enable the squadron gunnery department to initiate a night check crew to insure perfect maintenance of the ordnance equipment. Only (25,000) rounds of 20 MM ammunition were fired during this operating period but 107 stoppages were encountered, with the charging system accounting for 96 of them. Chargers were observed to back up in the "Ready" position during test firing on deck, 2 charger lugs were broken off and four chargers were knocked off the gun after the safety wires were broken, causing one accidental firing on the hangar deck. Loss of main hydraulic pressure was reported many times when the switches were placed in the "Safe" position indicating the exhaust valves were sticking open. Although pilots were thoroughly briefed to allow sufficient time on both the "Safe" and "Ready" cycle before attempting to fire, there were many cases of light struck primers and rounds half way into the chanber. The change will be removed from most of the planes, but further comparison and testing will continue and the results reported.

b. Because most trouble is encountered in the charging system, VF-112 never changes a gun without removing and completely overhauling the charger. There were eight spare guns allowed, but no spare chargers. A quick gun and charger change in the short time between flights was impossible. The lack of spare chargers also seriously hampered the operation of the night check system. With the help of ComFairJap personnel, the squadron was able to obtain four spare chargers during the latter part of the operating period, and the maintenance problem was greatly simplified. It is urgently recommended that squadron allowance be changed to include one spare charger for each spare gun.

c. The substitution of braided driving springs for the non available charger springs proved successful. Hydrolube seems to cause the back up rings to swell, but soaking them in oil for 24 hours before use helps this condition.

d. No E-51 gun oil is available and the substitute turbine oil does not have proper preservation qualities. Evidence of rust formation shows in a very short period of operation at sea. The squadron is now trying preservation oil W14-O-2833-65 to attempt to gain some improvement.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

F4U-4

a. Ordnance equipment has performed satisfactorily during this period.

F4U-5N

a. The MK AN-M-26 flares did not perform satisfactory. Of the 88 flares dropped, only 48 functioned. They were dropped from altitudes of 2,500 to 7,000 feet, at airspeeds of 120 to 200 knots. The average air temperature was plus 10° C. and M146 fuses were used. Compron Three (Unit "C") is submitting a RUDAOE by separate letter. It is recommended that these flares be replaced by the MK6.

AD

a. In general, all ordnance equipment performed satisfactorily. Pertaining to the 20MM guns, it was discovered that when the initial round was fired, an average of 1,512 rounds per stoppage was obtained. Consideration of the failure to fire initial round because of faulty ammunition, slow travel of breech forward because of substitute lubricants, or malfunction of the hydraulic charging system for the same reason changes the computation to an average of only 550 rounds per stoppage.

2. Ordnance Expenditures.

Ordnance	Month	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
2000 # GP	May	0	0	68	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	68	68
1000 # GP	May	0	94	267	361
	June	0	0	30	30
	Total	0	94	297	391
500 # GP	May	0	257	96	353
	June	0	59	72	131
	Total	0	316	168	484
250 # GP	May	248	958	1,218	2,424
	June	40	229	372	641
	Total	288	1,187	1,590	3,065
100 # GP	May	16	362	0	378
	June	0	36	50	86
	Total	16	398	50	464
260 # Frag	May	0	106	36	142
	June	0	72	16	88
	Total	0	178	52	230
Napalm	May	0	18	19	37
	June	0	16	6	22
	Total	0	34	25	59
Flares MK-6	May	0	36	32	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	36	32	68
Flares MK-8	May	0	0	32	32
	June	0	0	4	4
	Total	0	0	36	36

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Ordnance Expenditures Cont'd.

Ordnance	Month	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
Flares AN-M-26	May	0	68	28	96
	June	0	20	8	28
	Total	0	88	36	124
20 MM	May	25,000	9,075	46,067	80,142
	June	5,500	3,740	12,425	21,665
	Total	30,500	12,815	58,492	101,807
50 Cal.	May	0	253,660	0	253,660
	June	0	62,554	0	62,554
	Total	0	316,214	0	316,214

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE

1. Battle Damage to Enemy.

	Destroyed			Damaged		
	May	June	Total	May	June	Total
Rail Cuts				417	113	530
Locomotive				1		1
Railroad Bridges	7	3	10	11	1	12
Railroad Bypasses	4		4	10	1	11
Railroad Cars	30	1	31	85		85
Highway Bridges	2		2	7	1	8
Trucks	108	1	109	64	12	76
Buildings	73	23	96	48		48
Warehouses	5		5	10	3	13
Fuel Dumps	12	1	13	31		31
Supply Dumps	1		1	10	4	14
Ammo Dumps				1		1
Gun Emplacements	12	4	16	18	2	20
Shore Batteries				6		6
Tanks				2		2
Jeeps				1		1
Radar Station					1	1
Oxygen Plant	1		1			
Transformer Stations	3		3	1		1
Troop Shelters				3		3
Troops				139	134	273
Roundhouse				1		1
Locomotive Repair Shop				2		2
High Tension Towers				2		2
Hangar				1		1
Truck Shelters	3		3			
Construction Machine				1		1
Railroad Tunnel				1		1
Piers				2		2
Small Boats	1		1	35	24	59

2. Battle Damage to own Aircraft.

	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
VF-112	16 May	F9F-2	127201	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	16 May	F9F-2	127194	Small Arms Fire	Port Wheel Well Fairing
	16 May	F9F-2	127179	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Side of Fuselage
	22 May	F9F-2	127215	Small Arms Fire	Port Flap
	22 May	F9F-2	127204	Flack	Port Wing
	23 May	F9F-2	127215	Small Arms Fire	Nose Section
	23 May	F9F-2	127207	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Droop Snoot & Dive Brake
	23 May	F9F-2	127163	Flack	Port Horizonal Stabilizer & Elevator

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Battle Damage to own Aircraft Cont'd.

	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
VF-112	25 May	F9F-2	127205	Flack	Port Tip Tank
(Cont'd)	26 May	F9F-2	127190	Small Arms Fire	Tail Pipe
	31 May	F9F-2	127176	Small Arms Fire	Nose Section
	1 June	F9F-2	127202	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Stabilizer
	4 June	F9F-2	127205	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
VF-113	15 May	F4U-4	82163	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	16 May	F4U-4	81037	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage, Canopy & Stbd Wing
	16 May	F4U-4	81301	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	17 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	17 May	F4U-4	81152	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing & Horizonal Stabilizer
	17 May	F4U-4	81308	Small Arms Fire	Port Flap
	17 May	F4U-4	81301	Small Arms Fire	Engine Cowling
	23 May	F4U-4	81317	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Horizonal Stabilizer & Elevator
	23 May	F4U-4	81251	Bomb Blast	Stbd Wheel Well
	23 May	F4U-4	81037	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	23 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Elevator
	23 May	F4U-4	80837	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	25 May	F4U-4	82163	Flack	Stbd Wing
	26 May	F4U-4	82163	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	27 May	F4U-4	81176	Flack	Port Wing
	27 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	29 May	F4U-4	81037	Flack	Engine (Plane Ditched at Sea)
	29 May	F4U-4	80801	20MM Fire	Accessory Cowling, engine Mount, Fuselage & Port Wing Stub
	29 May	F4U-4	97179	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron
	30 May	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Both Wings & Fuselage
	1 June	F4U-4	80801	Small Arms Fire	Accessory Cowling & Oil Tank
	1 June	F4U-4	81301	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank
	1 June	F4U-4	81385	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Flap & Vertical Stabilizer
	1 June	F4U-4	82163	Flack	Engine (Plane Ditched at Sea)
VF-114	16 May	F4U-4	97046	Flack	Port Side of Fuselage
	16 May	F4U-4	81188	Flack	Stbd Aileron
	19 May	F4U-4	97046	Small Arms Fire	Port Oil Cooler
	23 May	F4U-4	81219	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing Stub
	26 May	F4U-4	80848	Small Arms Fire	Belly Tank
	31 May	F4U-4	81839	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron
	31 May	F4U-4	97046	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
VA-115	16 May	AD-4	123995	Bomb Blast	Stbd Wing Stub
	16 May	AD-4	123999	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	16 May	AD-4	123951	Flack	Stbd Wing & Aileron
	16 May	AD-4	123865	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	16 May	AD-4	128922	Flack	Stbd Wing
	16 May	AD-4	123843	Small Arms Fire	Horizonal & Vertical Stabilizer
	16 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Fuselage
	16 May	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	19 May	AD-4	123995	Small Arms Fire	Oil Cooler (Plane Ditched at Sea)
	19 May	AD-4	127875	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Stub, Engine Cowling & Port Wheel Well

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

Battle Damage to own Aircraft Cont'd.

	Date	Type	BuNo	Cause	Location
VA-115 (Cont'd)	19 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Propeller, Engine Cowling, horizonal & Vertical Stabilizer
	22 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Port Wheel Well Door
	23 May	AD-4	128922	Small Arms Fire	Both Wings & Port Wing Stub
	23 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron
	23 May	AD-4	127874	Flack	Fuselage
	26 May	AD-4	123843	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	26 May	AD-4	127878	Small Arms Fire	Rudder & Vertical Stabilizer
	26 May	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Empennage & Fuselage
	26 May	AD-4	123937	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	27 May	AD-4	127875	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Tip
	27 May	AD-4	123937	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing
	27 May	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Tip & Port Wing Stub
	27 May	AD-4	127874	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron
	27 May	AD-4	123951	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Wing Stub
	29 May	AD-4	123951	Flack	Engine (Plane Ditched at Sea)
	30 May	AD-4	123865	Flack	Stbd Wing Stub & Flap
	2 June	AD-4	123966	Flack	Stbd Wing
	2 June	AD-4	123929	Small Arms Fire	Port Wing
	2 June	AD-4	127876	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron & Oil Cooler
	4 June	AD-4	123966	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron
VC-3	19 May	F4U-5N	124519	Small Arms Fire	Port Aileron
VC-35	29 May	AD-4NL	124748	20MM Fire	Port Wing & Fuselage
	30 May	AD-2Q	122379	Small Arms Fire	Stbd Aileron & Wing

3. Loss of own aircrafe due to operational causes.

Date	Squadron	Type	BuNo	Cause
16 May 1952	VA-115	AD-4	123996	Dived in Water on take off. Cause: slip stream.
2 June 1952	VF-113	F4U-4	81152	Dived in Water on take off. Cause: slip stream.

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

1. Personnel Performance:

a. VF-113 - Satisfactory.

b. VF-114 - Satisfactory.

c. VA-115 - Satisfactory.

d. VC-3, VC-11, VC-35, and VC-61, (Detachments "C") - Satisfactory.

e. VF-112 - Morale remained very high and the performance of the men was excellent in spite of the heavy work load imposed by the loss of many of the senior rated men. It has become necessary for this command to acquire sixteen additional men on temporary duty to fill key vacancies. Nine men were received from FASRON 11, four from FASRON 120, and three from ships company. The majority of these men had no previous training for the sort of work they are required to do in this unit, and present a severe training problem.

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It is recommended that orders issued by the Bureau of Naval Personnel be routed via the administrative command for information. Bureau of Naval Personnel orders to shore duty have accounted for the majority of personnel losses, and in no case does COMAIRPAC receive any advance notice of such a transfer in order to effect a replacement. Each transfer to shore duty is a man with two years or more of continuous sea duty and, in most cases, one of the more senior rated men of the unit. Provision is made for the command to retain these man at it's discretion, but in the light of the morale problem involved, such a practice is not desirable. It is believed that the practice of this command to transfer all men who so desire, in the event they receive shore duty orders, has contributed materially to the high morale and working efficiency of the unit. However, not one replacement has been received to date.

It is further recommended that any relief ordered to the unit be transferred at least 60 days prior to the intended date of relieving, in order to arrive prior to the departure date of the man relieved. This would be particularly true in the case of the higher pay grades. Every effort should be made to provide a relief of the same job code designation in the case of aviation mechanics of pay grades E-6 and E-7, due to the wide difference in training for jet and reciprocating engineering maintenance.

2. Casualties

a. ENS Gerald R. BROWN, 505733/1310, USN, VF-113 killed as a result of a crash when his plane encountered slip stream upon takeoff on a combat mission and dived in the sea. The plane sank immediately. Body was not recovered. Position of the ship was Lat. 39-01N, Longitude 129-19 E.

PART VI - OPERATIONS

1. F9F During this tour on the line, several variations of tactics and procedures have been used by VF-112 and have proved to be satisfactory. They are as follows:

a. It has been found that no advantage is obtained by climbing to any altitude in excess of 10,000 feet on a strike or a photo hop. Time and fuel savings are neglegible with increase in altitudes, especially when external stores are carried.

b. When anti-aircraft defenses are known to be slight and when terrain permits it has been found that excellent results with rail bonbing can be obtained by using high speed (300 Kts or more) "Low Level" bombing runs. By "Low Level" its meant using a minimum of 2 feet of altitude for each pound of bomb, i.e. 250# use 500 feet etc., compensating for deflection error by taking into account the bomb stations and their distance outboard on the wing. Sighting is automatically done by flying along the track, using the nose as a reference. Results have been very satisfactory using this method.

c. VF-112 recommends using section tactics in preference to whole divisions when conducting "Armed Recco" assignments. Sections have many advantages over entire divisions in recco assignments. They are more versatile, and are able to cover the same assignment more effectively. By dividing the route into two parts and giving each section half, the effectiveness of the division is doubled. Radio contact can be maintained and rendezvous can be effected by proper pre-flight briefing.

d. The F9F is an extremely effective flak-suppression weapon. The four 20MM cannon make the F9F valuable for any coordinated strike. The F9F

should be made available for a flak-suppression run after the bombing run of the propellers. It is possible for the jet to make it's bombing run before the prop planes, pull up and come around for strafing on flak positions while the AD's and F4U's are initiating a recovery. Proper pre-flight briefing is mandatory when using jets and prop planes in this type of attack.

e. The optimum ordnance loading for the F9F is four 250# bombs. This is true because:

(1) Outboard racks can be removed and speed can be gained.

(2) It is felt that the 250# bomb is about the smallest bomb that is effective on our present targets.

(3) The aircraft is not seriously handicapped in range or endurance by using this load during an hour and a half flight.

f. It is recommended that the portable radio (AN-CRC-7) be carried in the PK2 liferaft by all jets in the operating area. The radio would replace the radar reflector now carried in the raft. This radio would provide a downed pilot with an additional survival aid, and would also serve as a means to locate the man by other planes in the area. Due to the F9F's extreme range, high speed, and the short time available to effect any rescue or to remain on station as a rescue CAP, the radio would save valuable time in effecting the rescue and provide a positive means to keep in contact with the downed pilot in the event that the accompanying plane had to leave before the rescue was accomplished or before a permanent rescap arrived.

2. AD Air operations during this period have continued the same as previous periods. There were three group strikes conducted against enemy installations and facilities at Chong-jin and Wonsan. During this period, one returning strike was subject to a controlled approach and let down to a carrier landing due to low ceilings and fog. This operation was considered unsatisfactory due to the lack of practice and experience of both the pilots and the ships controllers. It definitely brought out the fact that Carriers and Air Groups should practice this procedure before arriving at WesPac. This type exercise should be scheduled whenever carriers in WesPac have the opportunity to conduct refresher training. The CCA procedure set forth in CTF 77 ltr ser 080 dated 17 May 1951 is considered to be an excellent plan with one exception. Rather than bring sections down at one minute intervals, the aircraft should be fed into the pattern at same rate planes land aboard with no more than four planes in the traffic pattern at one time. This would limit the number of aircraft to be controlled in a restricted area should the landing pattern change from contact to instrument conditions, thus limiting the chances of collision.

3. Survival

It has become increasingly apparent that a set of joint service rescue signals for combat areas should be drawn up and promulgated to all concerned. The signals used by the Navy, Marines and Air Corps vary, and even the different Air Groups within TF 77 do not use the same signals. Unless all services employ the same signal code, the pilot on the ground awaiting rescue may not understand or may misinterpret the signals given by aircraft flying the ResCap, particularily if the aircraft are from another service branch. The signal code now in effect set forth in the Pilot Information File, NavAer 00-80-T-33 is adequate for forced landings not in enemy teritory. However, there should be a modified set of signal for the rescue of pilots and crew members forced down in enemy territory. Signals for the following conditions should be added:

a. Down pilot, pinned down by enemy fire, indicates that fact to the Res-

Cap so they can seek out the enemy and strafe them.

b. ResCap informs down pilot that he is sighted, and that the helicopter is on the way.

c. ResCap wants the down pilot to walk in a certain direction i.e., away from enemy troops or to a clear area where the helicopter can land.

d. ResCap wishes to inform pilot that rescue cannot be effected today due to weather, or coming darkness, or no helicopter available at that time, but will be attempted the next day.

e. ResCap wishes to inform pilot that for some reason rescue can't be effected and that the pilot is on his own to escape and evade.

f. Pilot wishes to inform ResCap that it is necessary for him to walk in a certain direction to avoid capture, or that he is taking off in that direction because rescue can't be effected in the present location.

This command has noted the advent of the (AN-CRC-7) radio in the operating area as of May 1952. It is further noted that this radio was made available to the military in 1945. It seems unfortunate that a period of nearly two years has elapsed from the commencement of hostilities in the Korean theater and the arrival of this vital equipment. In a one week period, pilots of this Air Group have listened to the proceedings attendent to three rescue efforts. It was evident that, in each case, the ground-air radio played a major part in the rescue.

PART VII - MAINTENANCE/MATERIAL

F9F

1. During the present tour in the forward area VF-112 was scheduled for 410 flyable missions, and of these, 400 were completed for a percentage of 97.5%. The total flyable missions assigned to the squadron during the three tours in the forward area was 1479 of which 1440 were completed for a percentage of 96.7%.

2. The efforts of the maintenance department of VF-112 have been seriously hampered due to apparent lack of high usage items in the normal supply channels. Although all AOG parts have been obtained from various ships and sources, the hours lost in awaiting the arrival of parts and the time they are generally received has caused a serious deficiency in the distribution of continually increasing work load. The inability of the ship to obtain parts which they have requested as priority "A", even though the same part is available when ordered under an "AOG" catagory, is felt to be a contributing factor to this situation. A survey of maintenance records shows that 318 aircraft hours have been lost due to this deficiency during this tour.

3. Prior to the close of the last tour in the forward area, fuel was taken aboard which had a high water content, and immediately serious trouble was experienced with the pressurizing valve freezing in the closed position. Prior to this time the squadron had not found it necessary to use oil dilution in fuel supply, but with the presence of water, oil had to be added to the fuel. This partially eliminated the difficulty. During the last period in Yokosuka, proportioners were received and installed, and the amount of oil utilized was gradually increased to over 2%. This tour a supply of water-contaminated fuel was received, and the use of oil in the fuel system had little or no effect in preventing freezing of the pressurizing valves. If efficient operation and maintenance is to be continued, positive measures will have to be taken to ensure that uncontaminated fuel is delivered to the operating units.

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SECURITY INFORMATION

4. The following shortages for immediate issue by aviation supply of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) resulted in the serious hampering of maintenance for F9F aircraft:

a. Grease - General Purpose: R14-G-860
Approximately 8 to 10 hours delay 25 May 1952 while procured from another ship on a priority "A" requisition.

b. Transmitter - Oil Pressure: R88-I-2651-200-000
One order priority "AOG" 26 May 1952 for F9F BuNo. 126207. The part was not received until the morning of 31 May 1952. The aircraft was grounded during that time.

c. Liner - Combustion Chamber: R85-PW-169553
Between 18 May 1952 and 31 May 1952, a total of 8 F9F aircraft were grounded approximately 6 to 8 hours each while liners of this type were procured from other ships on priority "AOG" requisition.

d. Duct - Weldment, Turbine Exhaust: R85-PW-153026
Approximately 8 to 10 hour delay 24 May 1952 while procurement of one from another ship on a priority "AOG" requisition. As a necessity, another duct was taken off the Quick Engine Change unit and used on a grounded plane in order to meet the flight schedule. A replacement was ordered for the Quick Engine Change unit on a priority "A" requisition 29 May 1952. As of 31 May 1952 it has not been received.

e. Valve Assembly - Fuel Pressurization and shut-off: R85-BPD-116417-5
Approximately 8 to 10 hour delay 31 May 1952 while procurement of two from another ship on a priority "AOG" requisition.

f. Fairing Assembly - Main Landing Gear Right: R82-GR-132255R
Approximately 8 to 10 hour delay, 31 May, while procurement of one from another ship on a priority "AOG" requisition.

g. It is believed that other shortages on such items as R86-VI-AA-20334L Hydraulic Pump Assemblies and R82-GR-132255L Main Wheel Fairing Assemblies, Left, exist in ship's supply. However no "AOG" requisitions have resulted from the shortage.

5. Some of the above shortages exist due high usage, others are due to unavailability of parts in the supply system. It is believed that appropriate action has not been taken in supply channels upon the various follow-up dispatches sent out by the supply department of the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). Therefore, problems encountered in maintenance are increasing, and the results are being reflected in the availability of aircraft for combat missions.

AD

1. One aircraft remained "AOG" for practically the whole period of this report. The yoke on the horizontal stabilizer was damaged by a .30 Cal. bullet and no replacement part was available on the ship. Other than this one aircraft, maintenance was satisfactory.

The F4U, F4U(N), AD(N) and AD(W)'s had no unusual maintenance problems during the period of this report.

Electronics

1. The APS-19A equipment installed in the F4U-5N's has performed in an outstanding manner during this period. This can be attributed to the results of the extensive training program established within the unit. As an example, shore line targets are regularly presented at ranges of about 100 miles at

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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SECURITY INFORMATION

3000' altitude, and the task group has been intercepted on occasions at ranges of 80 miles. The few airborne failures experienced were caused by catapult launches. Other airborne electronics equipment functioned satisfactory.

Aircraft Availability (12 May - 5 June 1952)

Squadron	Average A/C on Board	Average A/C Available	Percent
VF-112	17	14.3	84.1
VF-113	16.4	15.1	92.1
VF-114	16	14.7	91.9
VA-115	14.1	11.9	84.4
VC-3	3	2.7	90.0
VC-11	3	2.8	93.3
VC-35	5	4.1	82.0
VC-61	3	2.6	86.6

1. This availability was computed at 0800 daily during the period 12 May through 5 June 1952.

2. The Air Group was able to meet its assigned missions by 97.99% during this period.

PART VIII - FLIGHT SUMMARY BY COMBAT SORTIES

1. Numbers and Types of Sorties (12 May - 6 June 1952).

	F9F	F4U	F4U(N)	AD	AD(N)	AD(W)	Total
ASP						39	39
CAP	235	4					239
Strike	15	391		211			617
Recco	84						84
Heckler			26		22		48
Photo	39						39
Photo Escort	37						37
Gator		3		8	25		36
NGF		28					28
TarCap		4					4
ECM					4		4
Special					5		5

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SECURITY INFORMATION

F4U-4

a. Ordnance equipment has performed satisfactorily during this period.

F4U-5N

a. The MK AN-M-26 flares did not perform satisfactory. Of the 88 flares dropped, only 48 functioned. They were dropped from altitudes of 2,500 to 7,000 feet, at airspeeds of 120 to 200 knots. The average air temperature was plus 10° C. and M146 fuses were used. Compron Three (Unit "C") is submitting a RUDMOE by separate letter. It is recommended that these flares be replaced by the MK6.

AD

a. In general, all ordnance equipment performed satisfactorily. Pertaining to the 20MM guns, it was discovered that when the initial round was fired, an average of 1,512 rounds per stoppage was obtained. Consideration of the failure to fire initial round because of faulty ammunition, slow travel of breech forward because of substitute lubricants, or malfunction of the hydraulic charging system for the same reason changes the computation to an average of only 550 rounds per stoppage.

2. Ordnance Expenditures.

Ordnance	Month	F9F	F4U	AD	Total
2000 # GP	May	0	0	68	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	0	68	68
1000 # GP	May	0	94	267	361
	June	0	0	30	30
	Total	0	94	297	391
500 # GP	May	0	257	96	353
	June	0	59	72	131
	Total	0	316	168	484
250 # GP	May	248	958	1,218	2,424
	June	40	229	372	641
	Total	288	1,187	1,590	3,065
100 # GP	May	16	362	0	378
	June	0	36	50	86
	Total	16	398	50	464
260 # Frag	May	0	106	36	142
	June	0	72	16	88
	Total	0	178	52	230
Napalm	May	0	18	19	37
	June	0	16	6	22
	Total	0	34	25	59
Flares MK-6	May	0	36	32	68
	June	0	0	0	0
	Total	0	36	32	68
Flares MK-8	May	0	0	32	32
	June	0	0	4	4
	Total	0	0	36	36

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