ORIGINAL 4-5

DECLASSIFIED

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE

FF12/CVG-101/A9
DMD:jhp
Ser 011
20 October 1952

[redacted]

From: Commander Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE
To: Commanding Officer, USS KEARSARGE (CV-33)

Subj: Action report of Carrier Air Group 101 for period 14 September through 20 October 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Subject action report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the Action Report of the USS KEARSARGE (CV-33) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comments and recommendations are presented under the headings indicated below:

I MISSION AND COMPOSITION
II CHRONOLOGY
III ORDNANCE
IV DAMAGE:
Inflicted on the enemy.
Damage to our aircraft.
V PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
VI COMMENTS:
Operations and procedures.
Summary of combat sorties by type and missions.
Summary of average combat flight hours, average number of sorties by squadron.
Maintenance and Material.
Air Intelligence.
Survival.
Electronics.

H. P. ADY, Jr.

ENCLOSURE (1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION REPORT
OF
CARRIER AIR GROUP ONE HUNDRED ONE
FOR PERIOD
14 SEPTEMBER - 20 OCTOBER

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PART I

MISSION AND COMPOSITIONS

Departed Yokosuka, Japan 14 September 1952, Carrier Air Group 101, embarked in the USS KEARSARGE (CV-33), proceeded to the area off the east coast of Korea and reported to Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN. Operating under CTF-77 Operation Order Number 22-51 (second revision) and in accordance with the daily air plan promulgated by Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN, the mission of the Air Group was to perform interdiction flights consisting of strikes, armed reconnaissance flights, close air support and heckler flights directed primarily against North Korean Supply routes including railroad tracks and equipment, bridges, highways and Supply Areas. Defensive missions included CAP and ASP.

Composition of forces:

UNIT	TYPE A/C	14 through 30 September OPERATIONAL A/C 9/14	9/30	PILOTS 9/14	9/30
VF-11 CDR D.P. PHILLIPS	F2H-2	15	15	27	27
VF-721 LCDR F.A. ROBERTS	F9F-2	14	14	*24	24
VF-884 LCDR F.W. BOWEN	F4U-4	13	10	24	23
VA-702 CDR B.T. SIMONDS	AD-4, AD-4L	16	16	**29	29
VC-3 (DET) LCDR R.F. KANZE	F4U-5N	4	4	5	5
VC-61 (DET) LCDR H.M. GARVEY	F2H-2P	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (DET) LCDR M.G. BRAMBILLA	AD-4N	4	4	5	5
VC-11 (DET) LT T.M. RIGGAN	AD-4W	3	3	5	5

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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1 through 17 October

UNIT	TYPE A/C	OPERATIONAL A/C 10/1	10/17	PILOTS 10/1	10/17
VF-11 CDR D.P. PHILLIPS	F2H-2	15	13	27	27
VF-721 LCDR F.R. ROBERTS	F9F-2	14	13	*24	24
VF-884 LCDR F.W. BOWEN	F4U-4	10	9	23	22
VA-702 CDR D.T. SIMONDS	AD-4, AD-4L	16	15	**29	28
VC-3 (DET LCDR R.F. KANEE	F4U-5N	4	3	5	5
VC-61 (DET) LCDR H.M. GARVEY	F2H-2P	3	3	5	5
VC-35 (DET) LCDR M.G. BRAMBILLA	AD-4N	4	4	5	5
VC-11 (DET) LT T.H. RIGGAN	AD-4W	3	3	5	5

* Includes Operations Officer CVG-101
** Includes Commander Carrier Air Group 101 and Administrative Officer CVG-101

PART II

CHRONOLOGY

9/14/52: Departed NOB Yokosuka, Japan.

9/15/52: Enroute to Korean Theater.

9/16/52: Refresher Operations were conducted by the Air Group. A total of 108 sorties were flown and bombing and strafing was done on somke lights. This was the first flight operations conducted by the Air Group since the ORI was held in Pearl Harbor on 27 August 1952.

9/17/52: Air Group 101 pilots had their first day of combat operations. A total of 94 sorties were flown. These Combined Strikes were flown with Carrier Air Group SEVEN pilots acting as strike leaders. The combined results were excellent and this method of target indoctrination is highly recommended for new air groups reporting to the Korean Area.

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Theater of operations:

9/18/52: The Air Group flew a total of 94 sorties this date. Jet recco flights were flown in the Northern sectors and prop strikes were conducted against mining areas, factory sites and rail lines.

9/19/52: No flight operation - replenishment.

9/20/52: 107 total sorties. AD and F4U aircraft flew strike missions against supply build up areas near WONSAN. Jet aircraft flew cover and provided flak suppression.

9/21/52: Weather over the target area restricted air operations. A total of 19 sorties were flown with jet aircraft covering recco routes along the East Korean Coast.

9/22/52: A total of 92 sorties were flown this date. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in the Northern and Central Areas while AD and F4U aircraft attacked rail and high way bridges. AD-4N aircraft conducted ECM exercises.

9/23/52: No flight operation - replenishment.

9/24/52: Air operations were discontinued due to weather, after a total of 49 sorties were flown. All flights hit weather alternates in the CHONGJIN Area.

9/25/52: No air operations due to weather.

9/26/52: 96 total sorties. AD and F4U aircraft flew close air support at the bomb line. Excellent results were reported. Recco routes were covered by jet aircraft and ECM exercises were conducted by the AD-4N type aircraft with excellent results obtained.

9/27/52: AD and F4U aircraft flew close air support and attacked supply areas in vicinity of the front lines. Recco routes were covered by jet aircraft. A total of 92 sorties were flown.

9/28/52: No flight operations - replenishment.

9/29/52: A total of 93 sorties. Jet aircraft covered the assigned recco routes while AD and F4U aircraft flew close air support missions and hit supply areas in the HONGNAM Area.

9/30/52: Close air support was flown by AD and F4U aircraft. A special strike of AD and F4U aircraft was launched to strike troops and supply areas south of WONSAN. Jet aircraft coordinated with the props and the flak suppression was completely effective. LT(jg) SHOCK was killed when his F4U rolled over and crashed into the water, while making a strafing run in the vicinity of SONGJIN. A total of 104 sorties were flown this date.

30

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10/1/52: A total of 88 sorties were flown with AD and F4U aircraft striking supply areas and flying close air support for the front lines. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in the Central and Southern Area.

10/2/52: No flight operations - replenishment.

10/3/52: 103 sorties were flown. Close air support and strikes against troops and supply concentrations were conducted. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in all section. Night hecklers destroyed trucks and gun emplacements along the coastal routes.

10/4/52: Close air support and strike against supply areas were conducted by the AD and F4U aircraft. One strike group hit supply areas in the YONGPO area. An F4U piloted by LT E.F. JOHNSON was diving on a target in this area when 4 MIG-15's made an attack. LT JOHNSON crashed in the water close to the beach and was not recovered. This is the first attack on CVG-101 aircraft by enemy fighters. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in all sectors and night hecklers hit supply lines in the WONSAN area. A total of 100 sorties were flown this date.

10/5/52: 98 sorties were flown. Close air support, NGF spot and strikes in the HONGNG supply areas were conducted by the AD and F4U aircraft. Jet aircraft covered recco routes in all sectors. One AD-4N was lost in the water on a catapult shot. Pilot and crewman were rescued by helicopter. Night heckler pilots hit trucks and gun emplacements along the MSR.

10/6/52: No flight operations - replenishment.

10/7/52: Close air support was flown at the front lines and NGF spot was conducted by the F4U aircraft. Jet aircraft attacked MSR and covered all sectors of recco routes. AD and F4U aircraft conducted an attack south of HUNGNAM in the supply areas and were attacked once again by MIG-15 aircraft. No CVG-101 planes were lost due to the attack. LT(jg) C.G. MURPHY ditched an AD-4L in the water after losing power over enemy territory. The pilot was picked up by a helicopter after being in the water about 45 minutes. A total of 102 sorties were flown this date.

10/8/52: Heckler aircraft began the day of operations by covering recco routes in all sectors. One train and many trucks were damaged. AD and F4U flew close air support missions in support of front line troops. A coordinated attack with Air Force B-29's was conducted on KOWON. Jet aircraft flew TARCAP and escort. The raid was highly successful and all aircraft returned safely. A total of 92 sorties were flown this date.

10/9/52: A total of 91 sorties were flown this date. Morning hecklers damaged one locomotive and many box cars. A flight of prop aircraft attacked the train until completely destroyed. Jet aircraft hit supply and billeting areas west of WONSAN. Close air support was flown by AD and F4U aircraft.

10/10/52: No flight operations - replenishment.

31

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10/11/52: Weathered out. A total of 8 jet sorties were flown.

10/12/52: A total of 90 sorties. Jet aircraft flew recco flights in all sectors. Damaged bridges and small boats along coast line. AD and F4U aircraft flew close air support and NGF spot at the bomb line. Night hecklers covered recco routes between WONSAN and the bomb line destroying trucks.

10/13/52: Prop aircraft flew close air support and NGF spot missions. Jet aircraft destroyed two bridges and a number of OX carts while covering recco routes south and west of WONSAN. Night heckler hit troops and destroyed a number of trucks. A total of 104 sorties were flown.

10/14/52: 41 sorties flown. Jet aircraft hit a possible radar site south west of HUNGNAM. 21 hits were obtained in the target area with 250 lb. bombs. AD and F4U aircraft bombed supply areas and a possible radar site in the YONGHUNG area. Excellent coverage of the area was obtained.

10/15/52: Jet aircraft flew recco missions in all sectors. Full effectiveness could not be obtained because of the low cloud cover in all of the operation areas. Numerous supply areas were hit by the AD and F4U aircraft and two bridges in the HAMHUNG areas were damaged. Jet aircraft flew TARCAP in the area of WONSAN. However, no unfriendly contacts were made. A total of 57 sorties were flown this date.

10/16/52: Jet aircraft flew TARCAP missions in support of the AD and F4U aircraft. Eight bandits were sighted and made a run on prop aircraft. When the AD and F4U turned into the attacking planes the bandits withdrew and headed north. No aircraft were lost. No contacts were made by the TARCAP in the vicinity of WONSAN. One AD, pilot CDR B.T. SIMONDS, Skipper of VA-702, was lost when his aircraft plunged into the water on take off. He was seen clear of his aircraft but the pilot was not recovered. A total of 69 sorties were flown this date.

10/17/52: A total of 100 sorties. AD and F4U aircraft hit supply areas, and bridges south of Wonsan. One flight hit a power sub-station at TANCHON. Excellent results were obtained and 100% coverage knocked out the station. Jet aircraft covered supply routes in all sectors and flew 8 RESCAP missions for down pilots from the task force. This day completed the first tour on the line for Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE.

PART III

ORDNANCE

PERFORMANCE

a. Guns.

All aircraft of the Air Group are armed with 20MM cannon with the exception of the F4U-4 aircraft which carry .50 caliber guns.

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The performance of the 20MM cannon has been satisfactory. However, in the guns mounted in the F2H-2 aircraft eleven sears have been bent in the guns. It is believed that it is caused by weak buffer springs. These were replaced at the same time as the sear.

The AERO 13A gun chargers have been a problem to the attack squadron. Nine failures have occurred due to bending of the piston where the driving lug is brazed to the piston. This could only occur when the breech slides home upon firing the gun allowing the breechblock slide to hit the charging lug before it returns to normal position. Proceedure recommended in NARPAC General Technical Bulletin NR 75 just received is being used to remedy this situation. Driving spring guide plungers are being replaced in accordance with CNL GV5-51.

The .50 caliber machine gun performance has been excellent. Very few stoppages have occured and the guns are maintained by the replacement of a normal amount of parts.

With winter approaching more trouble is anticipated until cold weather lube oil and re-lube change kits for the feed mechanisms are made available.

b. Bomb Racks.

AERO 14A Combination rack and Launcher

F2H, F4U-4 and AD type aircraft are equipped with this rack. Very few hung bombs have been returned because of failure of this rack mechanically or electrically. However, an adapter, bomb rack, and 260 pound frag bomb wrenched loose from a Corsair while taxiing for take-off. It is felt that the adapter used is inadequate for carrying a bomb when the wings of the aircraft are folded. To prevent any further occurances of this type accident, ordnancemen have been instructed to inspect the racks to insure that they are not loose before hanging bombs. No bombs are to be hung on racks not firmly secured to the aircraft.

MK 55 Mod 1 Bomb Racks

The F9F-2 and F4U-5N have these racks installed. The trouble encountered with this rack is that the sway braces are not strong enough to support the weight of a bomb in the wings folded position on an F9F-2. A modification to make the brace stronger is being tried by the squadron concerned.

c. Rockets.

Hung rockets have been the major ordnance difficulty of the Air Group. The hung rockets are of two principle causes. First, approximately twenty-five per cent of those returned have been duds. Second, many rockets have been brought back with broken pigtails. The pigtails were broken by three different means. First, flying brass from Corsair .50 caliber guns cut pigtails. The deflectors installed on the after end of the 14A adapters were not sufficient to deflect all brass, and were soon battered beyond usefulness. This was corrected by adding a higher deflector. No rockets have come back hung from this cause since. Second, whipping of pigtails by the wind on jet

aircraft at high speeds breaks them. Installation of metal strips on the wings of the aircraft to hold down pigtail slack has lessened, but not eliminated hung rockets from this cause. Third, pigtail plug-ins have broken and the rocket has come back unplugged. Procurement and use of a ring to strengthen the plug-in has reduced the number of hung rockets from this cause.

EXPENDITURES

a. 17 through 30 September.

TYPE ORDNANCE	AD4	AD4N	F9F2	F2H2	F4U4	F4U5N	Total
1000 lb. GP	280	-	-	-	14	-	294
500 lb. GP	245	18	-	3	88	25	384
260 lb. Frag	224	-	49	152	133	-	558
250 lb. GP	496	62	152	163	139	68	1080
100 lb. GP	-	60	32	189	46	38	365
ASAR 3"25	15	13	-	-	-	-	28
ATAR 6"5	55	-	69	93	39	-	256
MK 25 5"	103	-	159	175	80	12	529
20MM	*18300	*5050	*39780	*39780	-	*3875	*84229
50 Cal.	-	-	-	-	*65845	-	*65845
350 Depth Bomb	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MK 6 Flares	-	*54	-	-	-	-	*54
Incendiary	-	-	-	-	-	-	16
M29 B/F Cluster	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Napalm Tanks	-	-	-	-	*14	-	14
Napalm Mix	-	-	-	-	*600	-	600
Total Pounds	607,530	31,176	85,722	141,754	151,062	34,980	925224
Tons	303.76	15.58	42.86	70.83	75.53	17.49	526.05

* Not included in total pounds

b. 1 through 17 October.

TYPE ORDNANCE	AD4	AD4N	F9F-2	F2H-2	F4U-4	F4U-4N	Total
1000 lb. GP	299	-	-	-	14	-	313
500 lb. GP	343	12	-	40	102	32	532
250 lb. GP	799	96	362	342	52	191	1851
100 lb. GP	373	91	219	299	200	18	1218
260 lb. Frag	556	-	135	195	154	-	1596
350 lb. ADB	-	-	-	-	-	1	1
ATAR Mk 25	479	-	187	231	250	12	1159
ASAR 3"25	18	20	-	22	-	6	66
20MM	30165	9200	35483	42824	-	9000	126672
50 Cal.	-	-	-	-	83850	-	83850
Napalm Tank	-	-	-	-	4	-	4
Napalm Mix	-	-	-	-	200 lb.	-	200 lb.
Flares Mk6	-	82	-	-	-	68	150
Total Pounds	870520	40600	175680	218440	173040	67680	1746070
Tons	435.26	20.3	87.84	109.22	86.52	33.84	873.04

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34

TARGET	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
RR BY PASSES	0	1
SUPPLY DUMPS	4	3
STORAGE TANKS	1	2
TRUCKS	90	24
TROOPS KILLED	169	
TROOPS WOUNDED	25	
WAREHOUSES	1	1
RR REPAIR SHOP	1	
PIERS	1	1
BOATS	11	32
MORTAR POSITS	58	0
TRENCH IN YDS	850	0
SIGNAL LIGHT	1	0
POWER SUB STATION	1	0

DAMAGE TO OWN AIRCRAFT

a. Aircraft Losses

DATE	SQDN	MODEL	BUNO	CAUSE
30 Sep	VF884	F4U-4	81277	Enemy Action
4 Oct	VF884	F4U-4	80798	Enemy Action
5 Oct	VC35	AD-4N	125712	Defective catapult bridle, crash on take-off.
7 Oct	VA702	AD-4L	123993	Engine failure, lost at sea
16 Oct	VA702	AD-4L	123962	Crashed on take-off, cause unknown.

b. Aircraft Damaged by Enemy Action

DATE	SQDN	MODEL	BUNO	CAUSE	DAMAGE
17 Sep	VC35	AD-4N	125712	SA	Fuselage
17 Sep	VC61	F2H-2P	128866	AA	Port Engine
17 Sep	VF11	F2H-2	125649	AA	Starboard Engine
17 Sep	VF11	F2H-2	125652	AA	Nose Section
20 Sep	VA702	AD-4	123815	AA	Tail Hook
30 Sep	VC35	AD-4N	125714	AA	Engine Cowling
1 Oct	VF884	F4U-4	82027	AA	Fuselage, elevators, wir prop
1 Oct	VF11	F2H-2	125045	SA	Port Engine
3 Oct	VC3	F4U-5N	122183	AA	Port Wing
4 Oct	VF884	F4U-4	96769	AA	Port elevator
5 Oct	VF11	F2H-2	125652	AA	Port Wing
8 Oct	VA702	AD-4	123871	SA	Engine Cowl
9 Oct	VF11	F2H-2	125017	AA	Port Engine
9 Oct	VF721	F9F-2	123078	SA	Port Elevator
9 Oct	VC35	AD-4N	125714	SA	Starboard Wing
12 Oct	VF11	F2H-2	125022	SA	Starboard Wing
13 Oct	VF884	F4U-4	97100	SA	Windshield fuselage
15 Oct	VF884	F4U-4	80848	AA	Canopy
17 Oct	VF721	F9F-2	127134	SA	Nose
17 Oct	VF721	F9F-2	123576	AA	Nose, Wing and Rudder

c. Operational Damage

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DATE	SQDN	MODEL	BUNO	CAUSE	DAMAGE
16 Sep	VF721	F9F-2	122573	Landing	Broken nose wheel strut
17 Sep	VF884	F4U-4	81364	Landing in catwalk	Wrinkled wing & Fuselage. Eng. Chg
22 Sep	VA702	AD-4L	123861	Landing	Propeller
22 Sep	VA702	AD-4	123838	Taxied into by F9F-2	Starboard Aileron
22 Sep	VF721	F9F-2	123574	Taxiing	Tip tank
22 Sep	VF11	F2H-2	125674	Landing	Wrinkled wing
27 Sep	VF721	F9F-2	125145	Landing	Tip Tank
27 Sep	VF884	F4U-4	96769	Landing *	Propeller
27 Sep	VF884	F4U-4	97169	Landing	Wrinkled fuselage
27 Sep	VF11	F2H-2	125501	Landing *	Landing Gear Fairing
29 Sep	VF721	F9F-2	122573	Landing *	Landing Gear
30 Sep	VF11	F2H-2	125671	Catapult	Engine Fairing
3 Oct	VF11	F2H-2	125668	Landing *	Nose landing gear fairing
3 Oct	VA702	AD-4	123845	Landing *	Propeller
5 Oct	VA702	AD-4	123838	Landing *	Prop and engine
7 Oct	VF884	F4U-4	96769	Landing, wheels up	Prop & Engine and Starboard wing
17 Oct	VF721	F9F-2	123574	Landing *	Landing gear faring

* Engaged barriers

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

PERFORMANCE

a. A tremendous work load is imposed on Air Group personnel in the ratings of Ordnancemen, Machinists and Metalsmiths, of which the squadrons are greatly in need of rated and experienced hands. However, the efficiency of such departments has improved a good deal during this period. Their present performance, although satisfactory, leaves little or no margin for:

Casualties
Sickness
Anticipated cold weather operations

Any one of the above mentioned could seriously reduce combat effectiveness.

b. Fighter Squadron SEVEN HUNDRED TWENTY ONE has an authorized complement of 109 men with 110 presently assigned. A standard VF jet squadron has an authorized complement of 119 men. An increase in this squadron's allowance has been requested and submitted to the Chief of Naval Personnel.

c. A current breakdown of Air Group personnel assigned to ship's divisions is as follows:

Stewards	18
Ship's Cooks	5
Mess Cooks	28
Ship's Service	7
M.A.A.	4
Corpsmen	4
Disbursing	2

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CASUALTIES:

9-30-52: LTJG SHOOK was killed in action during strafing run in the vicinity of SONGJIN when his F4U rolled over and crashed into the water.

10-4-52: LT JOHNSON was killed in action while diving on a target in the YONPO area after 4 MIG-15's made an attack on the attacking F4U's.

10-16-52: CDR SIMONDS, skipper of the attack squadron was lost at sea when his aircraft crashed into the water after take-off.

PART VI

COMMENTS

Operations and Procedures

The Operations Officer of Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE works with the ship's air operation Officer in publishing the daily Air Plan. The Air plan from CTF-77 is generally distributed about 1630 to the ship. A copy of this plan is passed to all squadrons concerned. The sorties for the propeller driven aircraft flown as scheduled however jet sorties must be broken down and divided as equal as possible between the two jet squadrons. This has presented no great problem and both the F2H-2 and F9F-2 fly the same type of sorties. The ship has F2H-2P planes aboard and it was found desireable to schedule an F2H-2 as a photo escort.

The sighting of enemy jet type aircraft in the vicinity of WONSAN has demanded more and more TARCAP sorties be flown. Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE lost only one aircraft to enemy fighter planes this tour [illegible] the sightings have been numerous and could in the future require a TARCAP [illegible] all strikes conducted by propeller driven aircraft.

OPERATIONS

During this period jet recoveries have been improved by slightly increasing the landing interval. This step was found to be necessary because of the jet barricade's location and its slow speed of operation. Crowded flight deck conditions forward of the island often limited the speed with which planes could be brought out of the gear. Pilots of this squadron were instructed to try for a 30 second interval in place of the former 25 seconds. The number of foul deck wave-offs immediately decreased, as did overall recovery times.

Banshees were used successfully on flak suppression missions. Various ordnance loadings have been used, the best of which consisted of 4-260# FRAG's and 4-VT fuzed AR's per plane. Mixed loadings were not found to be conducive to optimum accuracy, however, and it is believed that better results could be attained by loading half of the planes with all bombs and half with all rockets. Best results with regard to timing between flak suppression aircraft and dive bombers, were obtained when the jets pushed over about 30 seconds prior to the first conventional plane. Fueled with full tip tanks, F2H's were launched 40 minutes after the conventional strike aircraft.

38

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Rendezvous was affected at a pre-designated point, usually 15-25 miles short of target. By shutting down one engine between attacks while the strike group rendezvoused and climbed back to altitude, the F2H's were able to make two flak suppression attacks coordinating with the strike group; remain in the target area to cover the entry and exit of the strike group; and precede the strike group to base (single engine) for recovery two hours and ten minutes jet launch. However with currently increased MIG activity it is deemed more prudent to keep air speed up over target with both engines operating, resulting in flight of two hours maximum.

F2H's were used as fighter cover for a B-29 bomber formation on one occasion. Bomber element was flown at 21,000 feet. Cover was flown at levels of 25,000, 30,000, and 35,000 feet, with each higher cover level being positioned aft of the one immediately below. A constant weave between two plane section was mintained in order to provide a high escort speed on station. The unexpected appearance of F-86 aircraft several thousand feet above the top cover only added emphasis to the belief that almost no type of escort would be adequate protection for the low speed bombers against the type of attacks which could be expected from MIG attackers. Because of the tremendous speed differantial between the B-29 and the MIG-15, no pursuit curve is necessary when the latter type plane attacks the bomber formation. Consequently the attack would, in effect, be nothing more than high speed strafing runs from any direction a difficult attack to repress with any type jet fighter, even though operating at top speed.

TACTICS

All CAS and STRIKE flights have been flown in coordination with AD aircraft and some with VF (Jet). It is recommended that CAG's now training make every effort to plan and fly coordinated attack flights involving VA, VF, and Jet type aircraft or any two out of three combination. Except for Jet recco and strikes, more than one type will be involved on the same flight and target. Tactics should definitely be devised and rehearsed for different target situations.

FLAK CONSIDERATION

Continuous maneuvers, varying changes in altitude and direction, should be employed when cruising into the target over enemy territory starting two to three miles prior to hitting the beach.

Hi-speed "jinking" should be employed during run in while strafing target and during retirement. Pullouts and retirement should be a compromise between flat high speed and steep pullout using varying turns and fast climb as jinking procedure. Three planes have been hit by small arms; two due to low pullout and maneuvering below a low overcast. In almost all cases pullouts should be accomplished no lower than 3,000 feet in order to be free from effective small arms range. In known or actual heavy flak areas repeated runs from the same altitude and direction should be avoided. Race track patterns and IBP tactics are "TABOO". Pilots employing such tactics have been lulled into a false sense of security, and on their second or third pass have been fired upon with medium and light AA by the waiting enemy. When more than one division of planes is attacking the target, pre-flight planning should include the different directions from which subsequent divisions will attack in order that the AA positions will have more targets than they can handle or see, and prevent them from getting "sighted in" on the last group of planes attacking. Most runs have been made clean. Some dive bombing tactics with dive brakes down have been made, but only when little or no flak was expected or reported, retirement was over water.

59

This squadron has been involved in three encounters with enemy MIG-15 jet fighters, one attack pressed have resulted in the loss of one plane and pilot. In all encounters the MIG's used high altitude and sun to advantage. Recommended defensive tactics are; constant weaving when entering area where MIG's are suspected, employ defensive weave when under attack, and employ a definite lookout doctrine at all times. Critical positions are just when props are entering dive and recovering and retiring from target.

AD AIRCRAFT

It is recommended that on large coordinated strikes against areas, rather than clearly defined targets, a coordinator, separate from the strike group, should be assigned to direct the group in, to handle strike traffic over the target, and to assess damage.

F9F Jet Operations

The four plane recco flight was used successfully by the F9F-2 squadron. In some instances planes became separated but after a few flights pilots became adept at keeping other planes in sight.

Several flights were diverted from strike or recco missions to fly TARCAP when enemy jets appeared in the area. Much difficulty has been experienced in the recognition features of the F-86 and MIG-15. All pilots have been rebriefed in recognition of current friendly and enemy aircraft On all recco flights the doctrine is now for the second section to be utilized as aircraft lookouts.

It is believed that the F9F-2 could be better utilized as a fighter bomber if Mk. 51 bomb racks were installed on all models. It is anticipated that with the recent sightings of enemy jets in the Wonsan and Hamhung areas that more of the navy jets will be employed as TARCAP and escort for the prop flights. When F9F aircraft are employed in this capacity it is recommended that the Mk. 9 launchers be removed from the wings.

F2H-2P PHOTO DET.

As for the primary mission of Photo Unit FOX, all assigned missions were well within the capabilities of both pilots and planes. The F2H-2P is an excellent photo plane and with its range, speed, and endurance can if conditions warrant, adjust to a two hour schedule very easily. Upon returning to the ship after the usual hour and half mission, approximately 2000# of fuel remain. The camera facilities in the Banshee are very satisfactory and although the Beach Reconnaissance and Tri-metrogon mounts have not been called for as yet, it is beleived they will, when used, be as efficient as the general recco mount presently installed. The K-38 camera with the 9 X 18" negative is vastly superior to the K-17 camera, and is considered to be more satisfactory than the K-18 or K-18B.

During the initial part of this cruise there were no K-38 cameras available in AirPac. K-18B's were provided as a substitute before leaving San Diego, however they were delivered with 6 second recycle mechanism and a dispatch request for conversion kits (to convert to three seconds recycle time) was not filled. A camera that will not recycle faster than every sixth second necessitates that the photo plane be slowed to 150 knots., true, in order to obtain the required 60% overlap at 1/5,000 ft. scale. Flying at this slow speed is an abuse of the F2H-2P.

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Two of the four K-38 cameras available in FairJap were received from the BON HOMME RICHARD when she last left the line, and their use increased the capabilities of the plane especially on route survellience and mapping assignments. However the 390 foot capacity of the A8 and A8B magazine has to be reduced to approximately 200 ft. in order to insure efficient film take-up. It is beleived that the gears of the magazine will not pull eighteen inches of film from a 390 foot roll every 1.6 seconds without untimate structural failure.

The lack of image motion compensating magazines also curtails the available speed of the plane, in that with a maximum shutter speed of 1/150 second (using a 24" lens) image motion occurrs above 250 knots true air speed.

In summation, the personnel of this detachment performed satisfactorily during the period of this report, and can be expected to improve with ever increasing experience. The F2H-2P is an excellent carrier type photo plane, and suggestions for minor changes or improvements have been made the subject of separate correspondence to the parent squadron.

The aerial cameras and related equipment are the only in-adequate features of this report. Until K-38 cameras having a 1.6 second recycle time and accomodating a 400 ft. magazine (with the image motion compensating features) are available, the excellent platform afforded by the F2H-2P cannot be employed to its fullest capacity.

Summary of Combat Sorties by Type and Missions

a. 17 through 30 September

	F2H	F9F	F4U	AD	F4U-5N	ADN	ADW	F2H-2P
Strike	27	21	88	145				
Recco	82	87	2					
RR Hecklers					11	13		
ASP (day)							16	
ASP (night)						3	10	
Heckler-(night)					7	8		
NGF-spot			4		2			
Photo								37
Photo-Escort	37							
CAP	66	69						
ECM						12		
CAS			26	29				
Special-Mission			4					
RESCAP								
TARCAP								
Other			5	13		7		
TOTAL	212	177	129	187	20	43	26	37

NOTE: Not included in the above is 108 refresher sorties flown on 16 September 1952.

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b. 1 through 17 October. DECLASSIFIED

	F2H	F9F	F4U	AD	F4U-5N	ADN	ADW	F2H2-P
Strike	44	45	68	144				
Rocco	108	114						
RR Heckler					8	6		
ASP (day)						4	30	
ASP (night)						6	11	
Heckler (night)					19	16		
NGF-spot			26		2			
Photo								43
Photo Escort	42	1						
CAP	75	81						
ECM						5		
CAS			44	91				
Special			1	6	4	6		
RESCAP		8						
TARCAP	17	18						
Other	1	2	8	23	6	16		
TOTAL	287	269	147	264	39	59	41	43

Summary of average Combat flight hours, average number of sorties by squadron.

a. 17 through 30 September.

	F2H	F9F	F4U	AD	F4U-5N	ADN	ADW	F2H-2P
Sorties	9.0	8.2	6.1	7.1	4.2	9.0	7.7	14.0
Flight Hrs	15.4	13.5	18.2	21.3	13.3	28.7	18.1	21.0
CV-landings	9.0	8.2	6.1	7.4	4.2	9.0	7.7	14.0

Group Average

Sorties	8.2
Flight Hrs	18.6
CV-landings	8.2

Aborted Sorties this period

F2H-2	4
F2H-2P	2
F9F-2	2
F4U-4	2
AD-4	2

b. 1 through 17 October:

	F2H	F9F	F4U	AD	F4U-5N	ADN	ADW	F2H-2P
Sorties	10.7	11.4	6.6	8.9	12.6	12.0	8.0	8.6
Flight Hrs	17.1	17.8	20.1	25.4	38.5	36.9	22.1	13.3
CV-landings	10.6	11.4	7.0	8.9	12.4	12.2	8.0	8.6

Group Average

Sorties	9.9
Flight Hrs	23.9
CV-landings	9.8

Aborted Sorties this period

F4U-4	2
AD-4L	1
F9F-2	4
F2H-2	2

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MAINTENANCE AND MATERIAL

a. Spare parts shortages resulting from the incomplete outfitting and inadequate tailoring of the section "B" Allowance Lists prior to departure from the continental limits precluded the attainment of optimum aircraft availability. However, ingenuity of the squadron maintenance crews and controlled cannibilization of dud aircraft were instrumental in preventing low availability and minimizing periods of AOG to 87 plane days. Shortage of certain Section "G" Allowance List items is regretable. For example, only one ignition harness tester is on board, which it was necessary to obtain from another ship on a loan basis after arrival in the operating area.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that

Section "B" Allowance Lists be tailored to reflect the best usage data available. Particular attention must be given to requirements of the VC detachments.

Section "A" and "B" Allowances be completely filled prior deployment. Minor shortages are acceptable only if definite obligations are received from forward area stock points.

Section "G" Allowance List items, particularly testing equipment, be completely outfitted prior to deployment.

b. The delay encountered in the build-up of Quick Engine Change Assemblies due to parts shortages resulted in extended periods of non-availability for those reciprocating engine aircraft requiring engine changes.

RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that Quick Engine Change Lists be made available to the supporting vessel prior to departure from the continental limits so that at least one Quick Engine Change Assembly for each supported model of reciprocating engine is available upon entering combat status.

c. Working spaces available to maintenance, ordnance, line and material personnel are inadequate aboard this type carrier conversion, and present a serious problem.

(1) Maintenance personnel are occupying the following working spaces:
Aviation Tool Issue Room #2; 1 sqd and VC unit.
Aviation Tool Issue Room #3; 1 sqd and 2 VC units.
Aviation Tool Locker, Forward; 1 sqd and 1 VC unit.
Aviation Tool Locker, Aft, 1 Sqd

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RECOMMENDATIONS: It is recommended that maintenance, ordnance, line and material space allocations for an embarked carrier air group be reviewed, with consideration given to allocating adequate spaces and specifically designating these spaces for air group use.

d. AOG AIRCRAFT

MODEL	BUNO	NO DAYS AOG	PART
F4U-5N	122183	13	R82-CV-VS-55013-1; Panel Assy, Outer Wing Left
F4U-4	81277	2	R82-CV-VS34368;Gasket, Main Fuel Cell
F4U-4	80863	2	R86-H-2548;Harness Assy, ignition
AD-4	123993	2	R17-I-7427,R17-I-7463; Inverters
F2H-2	125017	19	R82-MDA-15-15606-3;Fitting,outer wing fold mech.
F2H-2	125655	12	AN-3057-3,UG-58-U, Plug, cannon,Receptacle
F2H-2	125068	2	R82-MDA-15-59395-1;Throttle Quadrant Assy R17-S-35509-100;Stick,control
F9F-2	122573	4	R82BPD-160320;Strut Assy,shock,nose l.g.
F9F-2	123078	19	R83GR-134095,Cylinder Assy.,wing fold.
F9F-2	122573	10	R86-V1-AA 20334-L; Pump, hydraulic R85-GLA-3200-1;Box, ignition,GLA

e. Aircraft availability.

F4U-4	86%	F2H-2P	97%
F4U-5N	78%	AD-4	94%
F9F-2	88%	AD-4W	97%
F2H-2	90%	AD-4N	98%

f. Special mention of F2H-2 maintenance problems is warranted in view of the relative newness of supporting this model airplane in the Pacific.

(1) Duct screens have proven to be very satisfactory. These screens were modified to fit either engine by welding a 1/4" extension on the inboard fixture inserted into the fuselage, which prevents the screens from falling off in high winds, or when behind another aircraft during turn-up. However only nine sets of screens are on board, which are insufficient for sixteen aircraft. As a result, two engine changes were caused by pieces of catapult hold back rings on either metal objects passing through the compressors. One set of duct screens should be provided for each airplane.

(2) The following J34-WE-34 engines were changed during this period

9-16-52 Engine sustained compressor damage from shell fragments.

9-17-52 Unknown object passed through engine on pre-flight turn-up (RUDM #52-52).

10-3-52 Hold-back ring passed through engine (RUDM #53-52)

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10-5-52 Engine damaged by direct 37 mm hit inboard of starboard engine. Plane on beach awaiting repair or disposition.

10-10-52 Second stage compressor vanes hit by 12.7 calibre bullet which damaged remaining stages of compressor.

10-10-52 Engine turned in to overhaul because of excessive turbine outlet temperatures. Engine had been torn down and no defect found, however, the fact that the engine was not properly calibrated following installation of Engine Bulletim #219 may be the cause of the excessive readings. This calibration is ordinarily not done aboard ship, as it requires a calibrating nozzle and two hours turn-up.

(3) Three starters have failed during the period. Two were old type (P/N 22E293-1 and one new type (P/N 62F710-1). Since the installation of Engine Bulletin #205A starter troubles have decreased appreciably.

(4) Several minor fuel control troubles have also occurred. These were caused by clogged fuel filters, which caused a restriction to fuel flow. The filters have become clogged with resin, gum deposits, and other foreign material much more than has been experienced in the past. A thorough check of the filters every 30 hours (instead of 60) has eliminated the fuel control discrepancies.

(5) Thermo-couples have begun to crack and break on engines with more than 200 hours, causing short circuits and resultant faulty tail pipe temperature readings. Most of the cracked thermocouples have been discovered on 60 hour checks before any discrepancies were submitted by pilots. Allowances of thermocouples and harnesses should be tripled to meet these requirements.

(6) The five ten ton jacks aboard are an insufficient quantity. The 7½ton jacks, because of their height are extremely difficult to get under an F2H-2 without inflating the oleos or lifting the aircraft. It is recommended therefore that carriers supporting an F2H-2 squadron be outfitted with nine vice five ten ton jacks.

(7) Although there have been 279 consecutive dudless F2H sorties, two tip tank handing stands have been constructed to provide for dropping and handling full tip tanks and allow folding of the aircrafts wings in the event of a catupult dud with a tight deck spot. These castered stands are constructed of welded steel tubing with a platform of 12" heavy webbing to catch and support the tip tank. They have been used successfully on several occasions.

AIR INTELLIGENCE

During this first period on the line much emphasis was put upon the fundamental problems and procedures present in the Korean Operation, Pilots were instructed intensively upon the vital subjects of CAS, FLAk, E&E, SAR, and Communications. An attempt was made to pass on to them all information available on these and related subjects.

Determining which maps would be most useful and convenient for pilots to carry was at first a problem. Generally, it was decided that a complete

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set of 1:250,000 maps of the operating area, properly assembled and folded so as to be compact and accessible, was best suited to the nature of the operation. In cases where a larger scale is necessary (C.S, PGF, etc.) AMS 1:50,000 maps are utilized.

One of the major problems faced by squadron AIO's has been limited or improperly lighted display space. Various methods have been employed by AIO's to remedy this situation. Perhaps the most successful system is that of bringing two panels together and suspending them from the overhead. Thus when the displays are not in use they may be folded and raised, clearing the space for other uses.

The fact that flights of 10 or more have become the rule rather than the exception has made it necessary to brief from the front of the ready room. In most cases microphones must be used to overcome blower noises and other disturbances. Proper lighting has had to be installed in some cases to make displays clearly visible from all parts of the ready rooms.

Curtains were installed around the debriefing area in ready room 1 for evaluation. This device served to lessen, at least to some degree, the noise and confusion which has been an annoying aspect of most debriefings. The difficulty in getting pilots in a group and keeping them quiet during debriefing should be noted. An attempt to overcome this hazard to proper gathering of information has, and will continue to be, made.

It is urgently recommended that all ready rooms be equipped with special lighting facilities which will properly illuminate briefing displays and maps.

A large reproduction of the target area mosaics carried by pilots is useful in briefing on details of the target area. Pilots are better able to pick out salient features on their own mosaics after such a briefing.

SURVIVAL REPORT

a. The billet of Air Group Survival Officer has been held by the Group AIO as a collateral duty. It is recommended that unless an officer thoroughly trained in survival procedure is available to fill this billet, the Group AIO be properly indoctrinated in survival. Due to the fact that the Group AIO has not received such training prior to deployment, it was found that organization of the survival program was quite difficult.

b. It is highly recommended that all units deploying to the forward area be completely equipped prior to departing CONUS, since much equipment is not available in the Far East. A central issuing depot equipped to supply all necessary survival gear should be set up. This depot might well be modeled along the lines of Air Navigation Offices. In this way all units will be assured of having proper survival gear prior to deployment.

c. PK-2 LIFE RAFT: It has been found that this raft does not fill the needs of survival in the operating area. In view of this fact the Survival Officers of this Air Group made the following changes in the contents of the raft:

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(1) Deleted:
Water making devices

(2) Added:

Socks	First aid supply
Mittens	Emergency radio
Matches	

It is recommended that a study be made of survival conditions in the present combat area and the contents of the raft be revised accordingly.

d. There seems to be an acute shortage of Emergency (CRC-7, PRC-17) Radios in the forward area. Only through the able assistance of ComFairJap Survival Officers was a sufficient supply of these radios obtained. It should be noted; however, that CRC-7 and PRC-17 radios have a very short shelf life with a change of batteries being necessary approximately every two to three weeks.

e. A total of three survival incidents in which rescue of personnel was feasible occurred during the reporting period. Of these, rescue was effected in two cases; in the third, one pilot was lost because rescue facilities were unable to locate him in heavy seas. There was an additional loss of two pilots with no chance of rescue.

AVIATION ELECTRONICS

The Air Group Electronics Maintenance personnel performed their assigned tasks effectively and efficiently during the first tour on the line in Korean waters. As a direct result, there were no AOG due to electronic troubles.

a. SSQ-2B SONOBUOYS:

A program was instigated to perform regularly scheduled checks on the SSQ-2B sonobuoys. At first, difficulty was encountered in finding adequate space to store the sonobuoys after these checks had been pulled. However, this difficulty was overcome by searching for places here and there in the Electronics Shop, Electronics Issue Room and Electronics storeroom. A log is kept on each sonobuoy, in which the results of the checks are recorded. The log is divided into sections according to channels, and all available information as obtained from the TMS-6, is logged.

b. TRAINING PROGRAM:

Each Squadron Electronics Officer has either submitted a training syllabus or is in the process of compiling information for same. Several lectures have been given to the squadron personnel either on basic electronic theory or specific electronic equipment. A record of these lectures is kept in a log, listing the following:

(1) Title of lesson.
(2) Instructor and Organization
(3) Time, date and length of lesson
(4) Names of personnel attending
(5) If appropriate, whether an invitation was extended to personnel of other squadrons or VC detachments.
(6) Visual aids used for lesson.

c. ELECTRONICS DIGEST:

A plan was put into effect to insure that either the current issue or back issues of the Electronic Digest were made available to the air group electronics personnel. A letter was sent to NAESU to obtain back issues in order to complete the existing files for the past 6 years. Issues for two years are bound together in ahard covered folder, mixing both restricted and confidential together and treating the whole thing as confidential. These folders are available to the leading electronic chiefs, who sign a log when they assume custody of same. When all of the men in that particular squadron or VC detachment have read the issues contained in the folder, the chief initials the log to that effect.

d. Four failures were experienced with the throttle microphone switch (Heterington D20733), stock number R17 S25 212-73. All failures occurred within short time intervals of each other. The failures were of an intermittent nature and before they were corrected the maintenance department received several flight discrepancy reports on "Squeals" and other Heterodying noises on "VHF" from pilots in other aircraft on the same flight. Replacing the defective switches proved to be the remedy for both troubles. The switches had been in an operating status for about six months.

e. The line trouble shooting phase of the AN/ARN-6 radio compass and the collins type 340A-4 remote electronics tuning system maintenance, proved to be difficult at first due to the inaccessability of terminal board (circuit symbol E-502), stock number R16 M4764-50 located in the MT-274/ARN-6 mounting rack. Access is needed to this terminal board in order to make the dynamic voltage and current readings while trouble shooting the radio compass. An adapter cable was made up to connect between receiver plug "P-102", and mounting rack jack, "J-501". The length of this cable allow the radio compass receiver proper to be pulled out and placed on top of the 20mm gun barrels while the compass system is energized and operating. The terminal board in the mounting rack is thereby exposed allowing maintenance personnel to take voltage and current readings under operating conditions.

f. The aviation electronics shop on board did not have components and cabling provisions needed in order to make complete bench tests of the ARN-6 radio compass system that includes the collins type 340A-4 electronics remote tuning unit. A cabling harness with attaching fittings was made up with parts drawn from the ship's supply system. This set up provided a means of checking the F2H-2 compass system as a whole, including the AN/ARN-6 radio compass 334A-2 collins control unit, 333A-1 collins servo amplifier and 334A-2 collins tuning motor drive unit.

g. The lack of a complete correct wiring diagram for the F2H-2 radio compass system also hindered efficient maintenance. The wiring diagram in the AN/ARN-6 handbook of maintenance instructions are incorrect for the collins remote electronics turning system. The circuit tracing required in trouble shooting consumed more time than necessary because the technician had to refer to several different manuals in order to obtain the correct

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wiring information. The complete compass wiring was traced out in the aircraft including the mounting rack, MT-274/ARN-6, and terminal board connections. A single wiring diagram was drawn up from this and the results have been very satisfactory in reducing trouble shooting time.

h. An intensive maintenance program for the AN/APG-30, Automatic radar gun ranging system and the "AK6 MOD 0" fire control system was inaugurated and is still carried out. The ship's electronic shop had the major test sets required aboard but lacked a complete radar and fire control bench set up. An installation indentical to the aircrafts radar and fire control system was fabricated from salvaged parts and parts drawn on a custody basis from the ship's stock. With this set up it is possible to give an operational check to each major component; thereby quickly isolating the trouble to one unit. The squadron's pilots have cooperated with the program by making frequent flight checks on the automatic radar ranging while flying "CAP" and "Escort" type missions. A detailed fire control and radar performance sheet, including spaces for entering voltage current, power, sensitivity and wave-form data, was drawn up and this sheet is filled out on each bench check. This performance sheet is filed, along with information concerning all previous troubles and the necessary repair work involved, in a loose leaf type of individual gear maintenance history record. The results obtained from the use of this system has been particularly gratifying.

i. It was found that the AN/APG-30 receiver sensitivity could be increased about ten "DBM" by replacing the "6AK5" electron tubes, in the low and high level intermediate amplifier sections, with the type "5654" tubes.

j. The "6X4" electron tubes used in the power supply (V-801) has a very bad failure record. Replacing the "6X4" with the "6X4" improves the operating time between failures considerably.

k. Plug P-502 in the power supply computer (PP-493/APG-30) was found to come unconnected as a result of the normal stresses applied to the aircraft in arrested landings. A small metal bracket and hold down screw effectively corrected this discrepancy.

l. The maintenance involved on the AN/APX-6, AN/ARR-2 and the AN/ARN-1 is considered to be about normal as compared with past experience on these equipments.

m. The squadron has had trouble with fouled ignition plugs which was probably due to excessive lead in the gas aboard ship. The trouble has been eliminated by cleaning the plugs every 15 engine operating hours.

n. Several cases of inaccurate indications of G-2 compass, fuel flow and fuel quantity indicators were traced to a lacquer applied by the manufacturer for insulation purposes. By removing this lacquer from

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the fuse holders on the amplifier, good electrical contact is established and the trouble is eliminated.

e. Initial shipboard operations were considerably hampered by tail hooks not retracting after landings. It was found that the tail hook solenoid valve was sticking due to corrosion. Very good results have been accomplished by having plane captains drain the air bottle after each flight and cleaning the valve on the 30 hour checks. This procedure also prevents moisture getting to the gun charging valves and rendering them inoperative due to corrosion.