U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVE116/HWP/jd
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DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

4 JAN 1953

[redacted]

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group NINETY-FIVE POINT ONE
(2) Commander Task Force NINETY-FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

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Subj: Action Report 19 November through 29 November 1952; submission of

Ref: (a) Art 0705 Navy Regulations
(b) OPNAV INST 3480.4
(c) CINCPACFLT INST 3480.1A
(d) CTG 95.1 OpOrder 2-52

00651

Encl: (1) Sample Air Schedule
(2) Aircraft Usage and Availability; Chart of
(3) Damage Confirmed by intelligence sources, report of

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c), and (d) the action report of the Task Element 95.11 for the period 19 November through 29 November 1952 is submitted herewith. The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT was Commander Task Element 95.11 from 2100 on 19 November until 2100 on 28 November of this period.

2. This report is divided into six parts, as follows:

Part I General Narrative.

Part II Chronological Order of Events.

Part III Remarks on performance of ordnance, material, and equipment, including ammunition expenditure.

Part IV Summary of own and enemy battle damage.

Part V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

Part VI Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedures.

3. Greater detail with respect to aircraft performance may be obtained by referring to VMA-312 Type "B" Report Command Dairy for November 1952.

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GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. During the period of 19 November to 29 November 1952, Captain H. L. RAY, 062691, USN, Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) was CTE 95.11, Commander Carrier Element, West Coast Blockade and Patrol Group. The U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) operated as a unit of TE 95.11. Ships assigned CTE 95.11 as screen were the U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673), U.S.S. WISEMAN (DE-677), H.M.S. COMUS (D-20), and H.M.C.S. HAIDA (DDE-215). The screen varied from two to four ships as screen ships were detached to CTE 95.12 for night patrols.

B. During the period of this report the U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116) operated off the West coast of Korea in accordance with CTG 95.1 Operation Order 2-52. During daylight hours, the carrier remained in the general vicinity of 37°20'N 124°40'E and retired southward during the night.

C. The general mission of the United Nations Forces operating off the West coast of Korea is blockade of the Korean West Coast. This blockade is performed by patrol ships of CTE 95.12, CTE 95.11 aircraft and screening ships, and by the troops on occupied islands. A group of five islands stretching from the Han River estuary in the South to the Taedong estuary in the North are so occupied and obtain information by radar, friendly agents and guerrilla action. These islands are of great value in warning of enemy air action and in the rescue of United Nations pilots forced down in North Korea.

The assigned tasks of CTE 95.11 are air protection of the blockade forces (TE 95.12 and TE 95.15) against enemy artillery fire and enemy aircraft, airspot for friendly gunfire, close air support of attacks by friendly forces, surveillance of coastal area, armed reconnaissance, and strikes against enemy targets in assigned area. In performing these tasks, CTE 95.11 maintained, during daylight hours two defensive CAPS over carrier, four TARCAPS controlled by CTU 95.12.1 in target area and supplied STRIKE groups to attack targets as requested by CTE 95.12 and CTE 95.15. STRIKES also attacked targets developed from intelligence sources.

D. The full potential of the ship and squadron could not be realized during this patrol because of a shortage of aircraft. With an operating allowance of 24 F4U model aircraft, there were never more than twenty aboard ship. While some additional aircraft were delivered on board during this patrol, these were only adequate to cover attrition.

E. The patrol was a most interesting one, with a considerable number of worthwhile targets developing, and substantial damage is believed to have been inflicted on the enemy. Most targets were selected on the basis of requests for assistance received from friendly troops occupying the small islands which fringe the North Korean territory. The more important incidents of the patrol are listed herein.

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F. On the 21st of November the troops on SUNWI-DO reported having been heavily shelled from the mainland which is only about 1000 yards away and requested an air strike. Because of the aircraft shortage and committments elsewhere it was decided to arm the two plane CAP with Napalm and rockets for strikes in this nearby area. All except DAWN and DUSCAP were so armed for the remainder of the patrol. The Task Element closed the islands to the extent practicable in order to retain voice contact and control of the CAP throughout the strikes. The napalm strikes on the mainland appeared to be highly successful as friendly troops reported fires burning for twelve hours after the initial strike with several secondary explosions. It was reported that morale of friendly troops was improved 100% by the strikes. Needless to say this accomplishment was equally beneficial to the morale of the pilots of VMA-312 and the ships personnel.

G. Another request for air strikes was received on 23 November when friendly forces on the mainland occupying the mountainous terrain of Point CHANGSON-GOT (XC 4522) reported being under attack by 100 enemy troops. The TARCAP assigned to CTU 95.12.1 was released to hit this area and also to airspot for the surface ship assigned. Low level attacks were made on reported enemy installations but identification of targets and damage assesment was difficult because of the rugged terrain and heavy ground cover which exists in that area. A subsequent report from friendly troops, however, reported that the combined attack repelled the enemy who sustained losses of 12 KIA and 9 WIA. There were no friendly casualties.

H. The encounter between six corsairs and two MIGs is noted because the apparent success of the defensive tactics employed. The six corsairs of a strike group had just recovered from their initial attack on a pre-briefed target on 28 November when the 2 MIGs started making a series of three firing runs from overhead and astern. Five corsairs assumed a tight circular tail chase formation at low altitude, in accordance with squadron doctrine, the 6th aircraft being separated and unable to join. This latter aircraft took evasive action from the MIG on his tail by threading through the passes between the hills at an extremely low altitude. Two corsairs of the larger group were able to bring their rockets to bear and fired eight HVARs in the general direction of one MIG which then broke off action. Five corsairs in a tail chase proved to be too large a group and subsequent deep strike sorties have been maintained at four aircraft or multiples of four in order that aircraft can join-up in a tight circle with all planes in a steeply banked turn.

I. The policy of interchanging officers with H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) and screening ships of TE 95.11 for familiarization and training purposes was continued during this patrol.

J. A note worthy feature of this period was the prevailing flyable weather. During the nine consecutive days of the patrol, all scheduled flights were performed without interuption from weather or other causes.

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K. VMA-312 was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. CAMERON, 07027, USMC, during this period. Planes assigned this squadron consisted of F4U-4 and F4U-4B type. The average number of aircraft on board during this patrol was 20 and the average availability per day was 17.0. Total number of sorti flown during the period was 339 for a total of 786.2 hours. A total of 119 hours of this was "over the target time."

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1300I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun positions in CHANGNYON and P'UNGSAN area. This flight destroyed three gun positions, cut one road bridge and destroyed one building.

1345I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack road and railroad bridges in CHINNAMPO area. Planes destroyed two bridges and sank one small boat with an estimated two troops killed.

1516I/ Recovered 1300I launch plus the two aircraft diverted to K-6 from 1145I launch.

1650I/ Two aircraft, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-6.

1713I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1720I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Low broken clouds at 1500 feet in operating area lifting to 3000 feet in the target area, except 2000 feet over the southern sector. Fresh northerly winds. Good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP and four STRIKE for a total of thirty-four Sorties.

21 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack bridges in ONGJIN area. Planes cut three roads, set fires in village, and damaged a bridge bypass.

0900I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop bunkers and warehouses in CHANGNYON area. Planes damaged bunkers and warehouses. STRIKE group attacked road bridges in ONGJIN area. One bridge destroyed. One plane of this flight hit by small caliber AA fire damaging an oil cooler. Plane later landed aboard safely.

0910I/ Recovered 0700I launch plus the two aircraft diverted to K-6 yesterday at 1650.

1019I/ CTU 95.12.4 requested aircraft to attack enemy positions in the area as mortars and artillery had fired continually on SUNWI-DO for the past week.

1023I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

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1100I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack railroad cars in SINWON-NI area, observation point in P'UNGSAN area and power transformer in CHANGYONG area. Planes destroyed two buildings, damaged one transformer and two rail cars, cut two railroads and neutralized an observation post.

1123I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1151I/ H.M.S. COMUS (D-20) advised CTE 95.11 of a casualty to distiller pump which was repairable but fresh water supply would require replenishment from tanker at PAENGYONG-DO island.

1300I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack road bridge in TAEP'YONG area. Planes destroyed two bridges, cut one road and destroyed one building. STRIKE group attacked supply village in CHANGYON area. Twelve buildings were destroyed.

1324I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1434I/ H.M.S. COMUS (D-20) detached to proceed to PAENGYONG-DO for repair of distilling pump and replenishment of fresh water supply. H.M.C.S. HAIDA (DDE-215) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack command post on hill 297 in the P'UNGSAN area and buildings in the ONCH'ON-NI area. Planes damaged command post with estimated fifteen troops killed, destroyed five buildings and left three burning.

1530I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1700I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1710I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

1930I/ CTE 95.12 advised CTE 95.11 that mine-sweepers would be operating close to shore, 23, 24, and 25 November and requested CTE 95.11 to provide air cover against enemy coastal artillery, using smoke screen if necessary.

CTE 95.12 was advised that no smoke making equipment was available but that TARCAP would be assigned additional responsibility of covering mine-sweepers during the operation.

Weather Summary:
Broken low clouds in operating and target areas at 2500 to 3500 feet. Haze and shallow ground fog in central sector of target area until 1000. Average to good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, Nineteen TARCAP, and eight STRIKE for a total of thirty-seven sorties.

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22 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack command post in P'UNGSAN area. Plane damaged two buildings, got direct hits on command post trenches and cut one railroad. Two planes of this flight hit by small caliber AA fire causing minor damage. Planes returned safely.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in CH'INNAMPO area. Planes destroyed one building, damaged radar position and hit gun positions.

0922I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

0935I/ U.S.S. ODMUS (DD-20) rejoined the screen after having repaired distilling pump and replenished fresh water supply.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack road bridges in TALCH'ON-NI area. Planes cut one road and damaged revetments. STRIKE group attacked supply dump in CHANGYON area. Planes destroyed five buildings with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded.

1125I/ U.S.C.G. MANILA (DDE-215) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

1132I/ Recovered 0900I launch. One plane struck LSO screen with port wing during landing, damaging port wing and aileron.

1145I/ U.S.S. WISEMAN (DE-677) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP and two plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in SINCH'ON area. Planes damaged a railroad car and dropped bombs in troop area with unassessable damage.

1315I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1326I/ Two TBM of VR - 23 "CODFISH" line, landed aboard with spare part and personnel.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop area as requested by CTU 95.12.4 with unassessable damage and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack railroad bridge in CHANGYON area. Planes cut one railroad and two roads and destroyed nine buildings with an estimated twenty troops killed.

1514I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

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1654I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1720I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
High overcast with ceiling 8000 feet. Low scattered to broken clouds in target area. Visibility 10 to 15 miles. Good flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TARCAP, and three STRIKE for a total of thirt one sorties.

23 November

The U.S.S. WISEMAN (DE-677) was unable to return to the force having struck a submerged rock while performing patrol duty und the operational control of CTE 95.12. Resulting damage minor but required dry dock facilities for repair. Ship was subsequ tly ordered to Japanese port for repairs.

0700I/ Two CAP, two TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12 released TARCAP to attack supply dump in P'UNGSAN area. Planes destroyed one warehouse and bombed and strafed troops in trench STRIKE group attacked buildings in T'AET'AN area and destroyed four buildings, one railroad car, damaged two rail cars, and go a direct hit on railway tunnel entrance.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack trenches and bunkers in SUNWI-DO area as requested by CTU 95.12.4. Planes bombed area with unassessable damage. Planes returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in P'UNGSAN area. Planes destroyed one building with an estimated ten troops killed. Trenches were bombed in the area with unassessable damage. Two planes of this flight were hit by small caliber AA fire with minor damage to wing and flaps.

0926I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack mortar positions in CH'ONGDAN area. Damage was unassessable. CAP released to atta gun position in CHANGYON area. Gun position was neutralized. At 1120I during his second run on this target Captain Charles A WILLIS, USMCR, was hit in the left arm by small arms fire. Captain WILLIS was able to make a landing on K-53, the emergency strip on PAENGNYONG-DO, and was later evacuated by plane to a Korean hospital. Damage to plane was a small hole in the canop Plane was flown back to the ship later in the day. STRIKE grou attacked ammunition dump in HAMJONG-NI area. Planes damaged tw buildings, knocked out a loading dock and damaged a large amount of supplies.

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1113I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1200I/ H.M.S. CONUS (D-20) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack mortar positions in PONGGANG-NI area and gun positions in P'UNGSAN area. Both areas attacked with unassessable damage.

1318I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1500I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and two plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies and docks in CH'INNAMPO area. Planes destroyed two small boats and damaged supplies with direct hits. STRIKE group attacked supplies in T'AET'AN area. Planes destroyed ten buildings, damaged a radar station and made four road cuts.

1534I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1717I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1756I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Scattered to broken low clouds, ceiling 2000 feet lowering in target area to 1500 feet. Radiation ground fog in central and southern TARCAP areas. Weak trough passing through area during the morning period. Flying conditions mostly average.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twelve TARCAP, and twelve STRIKE for a total of thirty-four sorties.

24 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in CHANGYON area. Planes destroyed three buildings and six sheds. STRIKE group attacked railroad overpass in SINCH'ON area. Plane destroyed overpass and cut one railroad. One plane of this flight was hit by small caliber AA fire, resulting in minor damage. Plane landed aboard safely.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack radio station and buildings in MONGGUNP'O-RI area. Planes destroyed six buildings and damaged five others. At about 0915I, a plane of this flight flown by Captain R. W. KUEHL, USMC, was hit by automatic AA fire of 50 caliber type. Left oil cooler was damaged causing loss of oil, propeller overspeeding, and consequent freezing of engine about two minutes after being hit. A water landing was made one mile from shore about ten miles south of CHODO Island. Pilot was rescued by helicopter from CHODO after having been in the water only 12 minutes. The pilot was uninjured and returned to the ship the following day.

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CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies and troops in SONGHWA area. Planes destroyed eight buildings, a large amount of supplies, killed an estimated thirteen troops and wounded fifteen.

0925I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, three plane STRIKE, and two plane TARCAP launched. CAP released to attack troops in SUNWI-DO area. Planes destroyed seven buildings. At 1140I during this attack, Captain Carleton M. GREEN, USMC, dropped fragmentation bombs from a low altitude instead of a Napalm bomb as intended. The plane was disabled and a water landing was made ten miles South of SUNWI-DO Island. The first helicopter was at the scene in about fifteen minutes but was unable to lift the pilot from the water. A second larger helicopter was sent from K-53 and completed the rescue. Pilot was uninjured. Total time in the water was forty-five minutes. Remaining plane returned as defensive CAP.

CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun position and troops in CHANGNYON area. Planes damaged a gun position and destroyed supplies. STRIKE group attacked supplies in CHANGNYON area. Planes bombed and made two road cuts.

1119I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1126I/ H.M.S. JONAS (D-20) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1156I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP, four plane armed reconnaissance and two TARCAP launched. Armed reconnaissance attacked and destroyed gun positions in CHAIANG-NI area. An estimated fifteen troops killed and one wounded.

1315I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1435I/ Captain GREEN, USMC, returned to ship by helicopter from K-53.

1500I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP and TARCAP released to attack troops in CHANGYON area. Troop area received one hundred percent bomb coverage and fires were left burning. CAP returned to act as defensive CAP.

1541I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1729I/ Two aircraft from 1300I flight, one with hung ordnance, diverted to K-14. Recovered remaining planes of 1500I launch.

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1736I/ Force retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Overcast most of the day at 1500 to 8000 feet. Light rain in the target area. Visibility 8 miles. Marginal flying conditic becoming average by 1100I.

Mission Summary:

Ten CAP, eighteen TARCAP, seven STRIKE, and four armed reconnaissance for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

25 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and troops in UPCH'O-RI area. Planes destroyed nine buildings with an estimated twenty seven troops killed. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in CHANGYON area. Planes bombed two gun positions and troop area with unassessed damage.

0900I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in SANGHYU-DONG area. Planes destroyed nine buildings and damaged four. STRIKE group attacked troops in CHANGHYAN-RI area. Planes destroyed twenty-nine buildings and damaged ten.

0924I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP and two plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troops in SONGCH'ON-NI area, and destroyed six buildings. Plan returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop positions in CHANGWON area. Planes destroyed large amount of supplies and damaged one building with an estimated five troops killed.

1116I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1145I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

1218I/ H.M.C.S. HAIDA (DDE-215) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrc

1300I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and trenches in the SUNWI-DO area. Planes destroyed three buildings and returned to act as defensi CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack gun position in SONGHWA area. Planes destroyed a gun position, destroyed four buildings and damaged five. STRIKE group attacked warehouses i ONJONG-NI area. Planes destroyed one building and damaged six.

1317I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

three plane STRIKE,

1500I/ Two plane CAP/and two plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in P'UNGSAN area. Planes damaged one building and two railroad overpasses. STRIKE group attacked buildings in HAMJONG-NI area. Planes cut three road bridges and one road.

1518I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1720I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1726I/ Task Element retired southward for the night.

Weather Summary:
Scattered low, middle and high clouds. Ceiling and visibility unlimited. Average flying conditions, light winds.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, fifteen TARCAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-six sorties.

26 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack ammunition dump in HAMJONG-NI area. Planes dropped bombs in dump area, destroyed two AA gun positions and damaged one, destroyed one building and damaged one. STRIKE group attacked troops in HAMJU area. Planes started fires in troop area with bombing and strafing.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troops in CHOIANG-NI area. Planes destroyed eighteen buildings and one small boat and returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in ONJONG-NI area. Planes destroyed eight buildings and damaged three gun positions.

0920I/ Recovered two aircraft diverted to K-6 on previous day.

0925I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troops in CHOIANG-NI area. Planes destroyed eight buildings and damaged a gun position. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack supplies on dock in CH'INN-AMPO area. Planes left supplies on dock burning, destroyed three warehouses, damaged three warehouses and one boat. STRI group attacked troops in SONGCH'ON-NI area, destroying seven buildings with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded. A bridge and trenches were damaged.

1117I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1119I/ Two replacement aircraft landed aboard from K-6.

1200I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) detached to CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1205I/ H.M.C.S. HAIDA (DDE-215) rejoined the screen from CTE 95.12, WHITBREAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP and three plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troops in village of CHUKTONG. Planes destroyed ten buildings and left village burning. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in ONCH'ON-NI area. Planes destroyed two buildings and damaged two. A railroad was cut and a rail overpass damaged

1322I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1500I/ Two plane CAP, three plane STRIKE, and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in ONCH'ON-NI area. Planes destroyed two buildings, damaged trench and gun positions, destroyed a road bridge, damaged a road bridg and cut one road. STRIKE group attacked buildings in CHANGYON area destroying four buildings, one bridge, cut two railroads, and damaging two buildings and a radar station.

1520I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1715I/ Recovered 1500I launch.

1721I/ Task Element retired southward for night.

Weather Summary:
Cyclonic flow aloft causing high cloudiness throughout the operating area. Ceiling 7000 feet lowering near end of period to 3000 feet. Average flying conditions.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TARCAP, and eleven STRIKE for a total of thirty-nine sorties.

27 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP damaged buildings in MONGGUMPO-RI area with strafing before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack buildings in the ANAK area. Planes made excellent hits destroying seven buildings and strafed remaining buildings. STRIKE group attacked fuel tanks in CHINNAMPO area. Planes scored direct hits on tanks with rockets, resulting in no apparent damage. One plane developed an oil leak and was escorted to K-53 for landing. Escort knocked out road bridge enroute. Remaining aircraft destroyed one building, one gun position, cut a railroad, and damaged a building. One plane was slightly damaged by AA small arms fire.

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0900I/ Two plane CAP, two plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in SINWI-DO area. Flight destroyed eight buildings and damaged six before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack road bridge in ONCH'ON-NI area. Flight scored a road cut and damaged the bridge. Flight then destroyed six buildings, one warehouse, and damaged a road bridge. STRIKE and spotting mission attacked a gun position in SINWI-DO area. Gun position was damaged. Aircraft of this flight spotted ship's gunfire and made strafing runs which resulted in probable destruction of gun position, an estimated fifteen troops killed and ten wounded. One plane was hit by small caliber AA fire with minor damage.

0911I/ U.S.S. NICHOLAS (DD-673) rejoined screen from CTE 95.12, WHITEHEAD patrol.

0938I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, four plane TARCAP, and four plane STRIKE launched. CAP attacked a village in ONGJIN area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings and damaged five with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack road bridges in HAEJU area. One bridge was damaged, three roads cut, eight buildings destroyed, radar antenna destroyed and one building damaged. STRIKE group attacked tunnels in T'AET'AN area. Planes closed one tunnel, destroyed one building, and attacked troops in caves and buildings with unassessable damage.

1128I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1136I/ U.S.S. WILDS (DDE-215) detached to CTE 95.12 for WHITEHEAD patrol.

1300I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in CHANGNYON area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings, strafed a gun position and a group of trenches before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in ONCH'ON-NI area. A group of building were left burning and a truck was destroyed with two troops killed. Two planes of this flight diverted to K-14 to pick up photographs required for target analysis.

1321I/ Army Guerrilla unit based on PAENGYONG-DO Island reported that one hundred troops with mortars and machine guns were attacking friendly troops occupying point CHANGSAN-GOT (XC 4522) and requested that CTE 95.11 aircraft attack enemy troops as soon as possible.

1332I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

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1351I/ CTE 95.11 advised LEOPARD and JOC that TARCAP had been diverted to attack enemy troops.

1500I/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops menacing friendly troops in MONGGUMP'O-RI area. Troop area attacked with unassessable damage. Major Raymond J. RIGHTMYER JR., USMC, made low strafing pass, reported a rough running engine during pull up, and was escorted to K-53 for emergency landing. A wheels down landing was attempted with six rockets and an external fuel tank aboard. The plane was observed to nose over to an inverted position at the edge of the whallow water. Within a few seconds the plane was burning intensely preventing rescue by nearby personnel. A doctor was dispatched from the ship by helicopter immediately and pronounced the Major dead when he arrived. The aircraft was completely destroyed. STRIKE group diverted to assist TARCAP attacking enemy troops near MONGGUMP'O-RI, but was unable to assist due to low ceiling and limited attack area. STRIKE group attacked village of MANJI-DONG and destroyed twenty-eight houses and damaged a railroad car.

1513I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1649I/ Recovered 1500I launch, plus two aircraft previously diverted to K-14.

1729I/ Force retired southward for the night.

1737I/ A dispatch from CTU 95.12.4 reported the 1500I STRIKE of 21 November silenced mortar positions that were attacking the island of SUNWI-DO, thereby raising morale one hundred percent. Fires were reported still burning in the area twelve hours after STRIKE with secondary explosions.

Weather Summary:
Low overcast at 3500 to 4000 feet with rain until early afternoon. Marginal weather conditions in the target area restricted target visibility. Visibility 5 to 8 miles in rain. Cold front 400 miles northwest of operating area.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, twenty TARCAP, and sixteen STRIKE for a total of forty-six sorties.

28 November

0700I/ Two plane CAP, four plane STRIKE, and four plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in SONGCH'ON-NI area. Direct hits with Napalm destroyed twelve buildings containing troops. Small arms fire was encountered during attack. A coastal gun was neutralized with rockets. STRIKE group attacked groop village in ONGJIN area. Eight buildings were destroyed with Napalm and a truck strafed.

0900I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked buildings and supplies in UPCH'O-RI area. Ten buildings were destroyed and five damaged with an estimated five troops killed and five wounded. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack radio antenna in MONGGUMP'O-RI area. Damage not assessable. Two medium size boats were damaged in the CHODO area by rockets. Meager and inaccurate AA fire was observed in CHODO area.

0915I/ Recovered 0700I launch.

1100I/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and two plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in SONWI-DO area. Nine buildings were destroyed and six others damaged with an estimated fifteen troops killed. Flight returned to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack four junks in the PAENGYONG-DO area. One junk was destroyed and five others damaged. STRIKE group attacked bridges in SINWON-NI area. Flight destroyed one railroad bridge, damaged a road bridge and scored hits on three gun positions. Flight was attacked by MIG type aircraft in CHANGYONG area. MIG Type planes made three firing runs on the formation with no damage resulting. Eight 5" HVAR rockets were fired at the MIG's which seemed to confuse the enemy pilots as the engagement was broken off immediately thereafter. No damage was inflicted on the enemy planes.

1116I/ Recovered 0900I launch.

1202I/ U.S.S. HICKOX (DD-673) chopped to CTE 95.12.

1300I/ Two plane CAP and four plane TARCAP launched. CAP attacked troop village in KANGYONG area. Flight destroyed three buildings and damaged two, plus bombing enemy troop area with unassessable damage before returning to act as defensive CAP. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troop village in CHEIANG-NI area. Flight destroyed twenty-five buildings and damaged ten. One small boat was destroyed, five damaged and a gun position damaged.

1315I/ Recovered 1100I launch.

1325I/ Two marine pilots of VMA-312 transferred to PAENGYONG-DO by helicopter for further transfer to H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19) to observe flight operations.

1425I/ Two plane CAP, six plane STRIKE, and three plane TARCAP launched. CTU 95.12.1 released TARCAP to attack troops in HAEJU area. Flight destroyed twelve buildings and damaged two. Fire from six to eight 20MM AA weapons was observed during the attack. One bridge was destroyed, two roads cut and a gun position was destroyed. STRIKE group attacked troops in YONAN area. An estimated twenty-five troops were killed.

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1500I/ Recovered 1300I launch.

1633I/ Recovered 1425I launch

1640I/ Set course southward for SASEBO.

2100I/ Relieved as CTE 95.11 by H.M.S. GLORY (CVL-19).

Weather Summary:
Cold frontal passage at 0400 cleared operating and target area by 0530 with unlimited ceilings and visibility throughout the period. Fresh northeast to north winds with moderate to rough seas after mid-period.

Mission Summary:
Ten CAP, eighteen TARCAP, and fifteen STRIKE for a total of forty-three sorties.

29 November

1315I/ Detached H.M.C.S. HAIDA (DDE-215) to proceed independently to SASEBO.

1650I/ Moored to Buoy number 18 in SASEBO Harbor.

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PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ship's ordnance expended, 544 rounds 40MM.

B. Performance of ship's ordnance

1. AA firing exercise was conducted 19 November. There were no material casualties, however, three loading casualties did occur.

2. The MK-34 radar of the MK-63 director system sustained the following casualties:

21 November - The radar antenna on Mount 11 was not boresighted. The antenna will be boresighted on arrival in port.

26 November - Radar Range Unit MK-19 Mod-0 casualty: Intermittent jumping of range step and no sweep in precision of the radar indicat (control) MK-2. The cause was a faulty capacitor C-358 in Radar Range Unit Circuit. The capacitor was replaced.

27 November - Radar Indicator MK-2 casualty: Partial loss of range sweep and step. The cause was shorted capacitor C-329 in Radar Indicator Unit.

3. AA firing exercise was not conducted enroute to Sasebo. The 40MM training allowance for use while employed in WesPac is not sufficient to conduct an exercise each time we transit the firing area throughout the period of the ship's scheduled operations in WesPac.

4. General Quarters gunnery and fire control personnel have participated in an active training program to improve the AA defense capability of the ship. The training consisted of the following exercises:

a. 40MM loading drill.
b. Target acquisition and tracking drill using CAP.
c. Training films pertaining to operations of and maintenance of guns and fire control equipment.
d. Instruction to indoctrinate all personnel in safety precautions pertaining to operation of gun and handling of ordnance material.

C. Ammunition replenishment was accomplished in SASEBO, Japan prior to this cruise. Excellent cooperation was experienced in dealing with the issueing activity NavOrd Facility. The following items were NIS:

1. Adapter, F/AN - MK-219 fuze
2. Auxiliary booster, MK-4
3. Anti-personnel bomb fuze extension (daisy cutter - 18 inch)
4. 3.5 Rocket head (WP or PWP)
5. 20MM Ctg. A/C Belted
6. Torpedo boosters MK-9 Mod-0 (F/MK-24 Mine)
7. Fuze MK-142 Mod-0 (F/MK-24 Mine)

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The lack of availability of items (1) and (2) can hamper future operations when present stock is depleted. These are used with anti-personnel bombs. The shortage is not critical at this time, however, the ship began the last operating period with 20 less than our allowance of 350. Item (3) is available only with 36" extension. The 18" is more desirable for catapulted aircraft. Item (4) will cause fire as well as being good smoke markers. The present inventory consists of FS smoke heads only. Item (5) was not available, however, the component rounds and links were substituted.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that belted 20MM A/C ammunition be furnished because this requires considerable effort to belt while in port in addition to normal replenishing. Time, space, and personnel are not available during operations to belt ammunition.

During replenishment, 62 fire bombs (Napalm tanks) were rejected and returned to NavOrdFac. These were promptly replaced by NavOrdFac. The tanks were damaged and not useable probably due to careless handling and poor stowage facilities.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that better stowage facilities be made available and that returnable crates be provided for some degree of protection to the tank during handling and stowage.

D. Summary of Aviation Ordnance Expended

TYPE	AMOUNT
1000# GP Bombs	44
500# GP Bombs	135
500# SAP Bombs	8
350# ADB Bombs	4
260# FRAG Bombs	74
250# GP Bombs	96
100# GP Bombs	358
Napalm Bombs	141
5" HVAR Rockets	974
Rounds 20MM Ammo	42,400
Rounds 50 Cal. Ammo	91,200

[redacted]

PART IV

SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

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A. The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Damage inflicted on the enemy by ships aircraft:

TARGETS	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Buildings	365	103
Gun positions	115	17
Boats	6	1
Road bridges	11	9
Road cuts		16
Railroad bridges	3	1
Troops	177	46
Railroad cuts		5
Radar stations	1	4
Railroad cars	4	10
Fuel storage tanks		2
Tunnels	1	3
Railroad overpass	1	2
Ox carts	9	11
Oxen	4	
Command posts	1	
Observation post	1	
Power transformer		1

Docks with large amount of supplies destroyed.
Troop trenches strafed with no assesment of damage.

C. Damage inflicted on ships aircraft:

1. One aircraft damaged by enemy fire and consequently lost in water landing.
2. One aircraft damaged by own comb blast and consequently lost in water landing.
3. One aircraft nosed over and burned during emergency landing at K-53. Engine malfunction believed caused by enemy small arms fire observed by ships in vicinity of target area.
4. Six other aircraft slightly damaged by enemy flak and small arms fire.

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PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Performance

1. Personnel
The high morale of the crew was reflected in the excellent job performed during the period of this report. Personnel on board during this period including Marines was 119 officers and 1003 enlisted for a total of 1122. There were no transfers or new personnel reporting aboard during this period.

2. Education
Educational advancement received continued emphasis despite a heavy operating schedule. Ships company personnel are currently enrolled in twenty five USAFI Caurses, nineteen officer correspondence course one hundred twenty three enlisted correspondence courses and a total of two hundred eleven course books are checked out for study. Valuable on the job training was utilized during the period.

3. Divine Services
Services conducted aboard during this period included, three protestant services, one catholic mass, daily catholic rosary services, one Latter Day Saints class, two periods of choir practics and one bible class.

4. Welfare and Recreation
Maintenance requirements reduced movie showings to six during this period. A capacity turnout indicated this to be the most popular shipboard recreation.

A daily summary of aircraft missions and damages inflicted plus a roundup of world news and sporting events is given over the ships announcing system by the Chaplain each day at noon. This is a great morale builder and is eagerly awaited by ALL HANDS.

The ships cruise book is progressing on schedule and will be complet when the ship reaches the states.

A large number of officers and enlisted personnel take advantage of rest hotel facilities during in-port periods.

Thanksgiving dinner left little to be desired and was a great contribution to morale.

B. Casualties

1. Captain Charles A. WILLIS, USMCR, was wounded in the left arm by enemy AA fire during a bombing run 1120I, 23 November 1952. Captain WILLIS landed at K-53 and was evacuated to a Korean hospital.

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2. Major Raymond J. NIGHTMYER Jr., USMC, 023222, attempted an emergency landing at K-53 about 1630I, 27 November 1952. During the landing roll out the plane nosed over to the inverted position. Intense fir plus wing rockets prevented nearby personnel from rescuing the pilot. The body of Major NIGHTMYER was returned aboard the following day.

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SPECIAL COMMENTS ON DOCTRINE AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES

A. Air Department

1. Comment: Upon breaking out a box of .01 primer detanators (lot No. A 0P30A), after having been aboard in the ships magazines less than ten days, they were found to be wet and corroded. Check of the ships storage spaces showed no destructive moisture content and the container box show no indication of previous wetness. However, the detanators were in such condition that they were considered unsafe for use.

Recommendation:
That great care be exercised when handling and storing ammunition and when possible damage is assessed that steps be taken to inspect and remove the damaged items. The limited amount of storage space aboard a CVE does not leave allowance for a percentage of "throw-aways."

2. Comment: A napalm mixer manufactured by General Motors Corporation, Harrison Radiator Division, Lockport, N.Y. (serial U4424) was used in order to evaluate its effectiveness. No instruction book accompanied th instrument, but familiarity with mixing napalm by ships personnel throug use of a similar, and by considered opinion, more efficient piece of equipment (USS BADOENG STRAIT(CVE-116) ltr ser 68 of 22 Jan 1952) evaluation was effectively realized. The results obtained from the General Motors Corporation indicate that the mixer is unsuitable for cold weathe operation when gasoline runs below normal temperatures in ships tanks.

Recommendation:
A complete evaluation report is being prepared, by separate correspondence, for BuOrd. However, at this time the basic discrepancy to be noted is that the heat exchanger unit on the mixer should be enlarged for adequate mixing of the powder with the gasoline. A unit similar to that described in the above mentioned BADOENG STRAIT'S letter is believed to answer the immediate needs of napalm preparation.

3. Comment: Numerous bursters for fuze M-157 were discovered to be oversized. Twenty-two (22) out of the 302 bursters handled were found to be oversized. These were taken from lots No. C.P. 15817-23 of June 1951 and No. C.P. 15817-23 of July 1951. (See gunnery, also).

Recommendation:
That more careful inspection of ordnance materials be made at the manufacturing point.

4. Comment: During this operation the ship's starboard whip antennas were required to be lowered for roughly 10 hours out of every 24 hours. The reasons - launching and recovery periods, loading napalm tanks (due to possible high induction fields indicated in ComairPac ltr ser 10/02314 of 29 October) and topping-off periods.

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Recommendation:
That conclusive tests be made on CVE type carrier for induction activity or that the starboard antennas be relocated to eliminate the close proximity to the flight deck.

5. Comment: The MK-4 life-raft located at the LSO platform for emergencies has no designated stowage space. As a result the V-4 Divisi of the BADOENG STRAIT manufactured a quick release rack on the outboard side of the guntub, located just aft of the platform, in order to make it readily available to be jettisoned. Iron straps (1¼" X 3/16") with quick-release pin were used.

Recommendation:
That all carriers use ship's force to manufacture a similar device for emergency release, should an aircraft be ditched near by.

6. Comment: The VMA squadron operating aboard was equipped with AN/ARN-6 direction finders. This was not known until shortly before their arrival. Bench-test components were immediately ordered in order to service the gear. All parts except the harness and control box have arrived at this time. No operating handbook has been received, however, the equipment has been set-up for operation through the efforts of competent personnel.

Recommendation:
That electronic bench-test equipment for the AN/ARN-6 be added to the section "n" allowance of all carriers.

7. Comment: As a result of uncontrolled skidding by aircraft coming out of the arresting gear and the limited parking space ahead of the barriers, several planes have received minor damage through collision. The flight deck was stained with BuShips formula 21.

Recommendation:
Several corrective measures are offered: One, that an abrasive be added to the stain. Two, that flight deck planking be prefrabricated with an abrasive material and to avoid having an aircraft come upon this increased traction suddenly, graduate the degrees of abrasiveness; or perhaps install about every third or fourth crossdeck planking with a uniform prefrabricated abrasive plank in order to avoid the possibility of a nose-up.

8. Comment: Wet weather together with the maneuvering of airplanes on the hard rubber mats at the forward end of the H-4C catapult shuttle track has broken the mats adhesion to the flight deck. The ship's carpenter has used every available adhesive but has not successfully secured the mats to the flight deck. One mat was put in during the ships last yard period, while the second was put in by the ships force recently.

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Recommendation:
That effective materials and procedures for fastening rubber mats to flight deck be developed. The following methods are suggested for consideration: One, that flat-head wood screws secure the mat to a wood deck. Or secondly, using round head bolts with washers to secure the mat through to the steel deck below.

9. Comment: Serious stowage problems for departmental and squadron materials are encountered on the hangar deck and elevator pits. Additional room is required for mixing napalm, wing stowage, CaC's and machine gun cleaning.

Recommendation:
That tank-top conversion (BADONG STRAIT ltr CVE116/AWW/asr L9-2/13 ser 1357 of 23 Nov 1951) be considered for early installation in order to afford additional stowage requirements along with personnel and work space needs.

10. Comment: One hundred-fifty (150) N7 & N8 Napalm tanks were received at Sasebo, Japan when re-arming ship for this operation, of these, seven five (75) were rejected as being damaged to much to be used. On some tanks the seams were split, others had the external igniter bracket brok off and others had so many dents and creases that it was feared they would cause severe buffitting when in flight.

Recommendation:
It is suggested that issuing activities inspect all tanks before issuing and survey tanks not suitable for issue prior to delivery to operating forces.

11. Comment: 18,000 Rounds of aircraft incendary 20MM were received at Sasebo. Of these, the contents of two (2) wooden cases were so badly corroded they were dangerous to handle. Ammunition had gotten wet and was evidently not inspected before issue.

Recommendation:
It is suggested that issuing activities inspect all wooden cases and boxes of ammunition before issuing and survey the unfit rounds.

12. Comment: The V.T. Fuzes T-90 of Log No. P.A. 264-4 of June 1945 had the arming vane protection ring modified by increasing the thickness of the ring one quarter of an inch ($\frac{1}{4}$"). One set of locking pins had been modified to receive an arming wire and one pin had not been modified. The second pin is being modified on board at this time.

Recommendation:
That when modifications are to be made, they be completed prior to being issued to operating activities; in order that the operating forces may not be hindered by a modification program prior to using the ordnanc

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13. Comment: Because of an excessive number of wires broken or burned the following crossdeck pendants were replaced:

#1 After 56 engagements
#2 After 53 engagements
#3 After 64 engagements

Recommendation:
None.

14. Statistics:
a. Launches

H-2-1 Catapult
No - 107
Avg Wt. pounds - 14200
Avg Wind knots - 25
Avg Pressure psi - 2700
No. Bridles expended - 7

H-4C Captapult
No - 226
Avg Wt. pounds - 15000
Avg Wind knots - 26
Avg Pressure psi - 2200
No. Bridles expended - 12

b. Landings

No. - 334
Avg Wind knots - 26
CPV psi - 650
Avg run-out Ft. - 115
No. times wires caught

#1 - 75	#6 - 2
#2 - 131	#7 - 0
#3 - 74	#8 - 0
#4 - 45	#9 - 0
#5 - 7	No. - 0

Barriers Engaged - 0

B. Engineering Department

1. Electronics: During this operation several electronic difficulties were encountered. The most serious was with the four VK repeaters on board. Two of these repeaters are designed for operation with the AN/SRR-6 AEW system. This system has been out of operation for the past six months due to the lack of a transformer which has burned out. Replacements are unavailable in any of the supply activities. VK-No. 2 and VK-No. 3 operate with this system and even though the system is inoperative the VK's can still be used as repeaters for the search radars. The 120 volt line voltage for these two repeaters is obtained from the ships 440 V.A.C. generators. The

440 volts is stepped down to 120 volts though a transformer common to the AN/SMR-6 system only. In addition to this transformer, the line voltage for these repeaters is further controlled by a center tap transformer. A fire occurred in VK-No. 3, burning out both fuze holders and impairing the off-center range switch and its associated wiring. Noighte of the fuzes blew. In trying to determine the cause of the fire it was discovered that the line voltage on Vk- No. 2 was 128 volts instead of the normal 117. The line volta at the AN transformer was 117 volts. Further investigation showed the line passed through the above mentioned center tap transformer and improper positioning of the center-tap had raised the line voltage from 117V to 128V. This center-tap transformer was labeled as an auto-transformer for the SG-1 radar on the name plate, and the fact that it was being used to control the line voltage for VK-No. 2 and VK-No. 3 was not known by any of the electronic personnel. Further, the design of the VK repeaters is such that an under-size fuze holder must be used because of space limitations. The end of the fuze holder comes within a fraction of an inch of the off-centering range switch. It is felt that the over heating of the fuze holder, caused by the high line voltage and current plus the defective fuzes installed caused the fire.without blowing the fuzes. This repeater was placed back in operation after about five man-days work. The night following the fire, VK-NO.2 blew a fuze. It was felt that this was also due to the line overload. It was at this time the center-tap transformer was discovered. The voltage was cut down to 117 volts and VK-No. 2 refuzed and put back on the line. Then VK-No. 1 and VK-No. 4 both blew fuzes with VK-No. 1 also burning out one fuze holder Investigation showed that these two repeaters get their 120 volts supply from a transformer common to much of the ship's lighting circuits in the forward part of the ship. After putting these repeaters back on the line a chart was kept of the line voltages at these two repeaters. These voltages varied from 112 volts to 123 volts. It was learned that the transformers supply ing this voltage operate at full load conditions and that any changes in this load, such as turning on electrical machinery will cause the voltage to fluctuate. These two repeaters continued to blow fuzes periodically dur-ing the operation due to overload. It is recommended that the VK set up be modified to include a separate transformer for obtaining their line voltage rather than have the varying load condition occurring with the use of light-ing circuit transformers.

One of the TCK transmitters was put out of commission to work on a noisy motor generator. It was found that the ball bearing in the motor end was very poorly packed and apparently had a flat ball. This bearing was replaced and the bearing on the generator was repacked. This transmitter was out of commission for about four hours. There were no other failures in communications equipment.

The only other electronic difficulty was several tube failures in the AN/UPX-1. The tubes that failed are the 6D4 and 6AS6. These are the same tubes that have failed several times previously this year. It is felt that none of the above failures seriously effected the ship's operating schedule. There were always at least to VK's on the line, the TCK was put out of commission only during a lull in ship to shore traffic and the AN/UPX-1 was out of commission for a short period of time.

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The continued shortage of electronics rating caused a hand to mouth operation at all times. The AR division has been able to keep enough of the electronics equipment in operation to permit a satisfactory evaluation during this and other combat patrols, but to do this it is often necessary for certain of the higher rated personnel to work 10 to 12 hours a day.

The theory that designated strikers are rated men and that third class petty officers can be counted as second class and on up the line, is not always true. In practice it is found that a designated striker, although very interested in his work, falls short of the practical knowledge found in the third class petty officer. In doing repair work the most dependable men are the first and second class petty officers, the third class petty officer is a good assistant but seldom has sufficient practical knowledge to do the job alone. In the final summary of the first and second class petty officers form the repair crews and unless they are supplied in sufficient number, we will have to work long hours if the equipment is to operate.

C. Operations Department:

1. Combat Information Center: Enlisted personnel in CIC are arranged in three rotating watch sections with one watch officer, one Air Controller and one Air Operations Officer on watch during all air operations.

Air control of defensive CAP, departing TARCAP and STRIKES are the primary functions of CIC during present operations. Defensive CAP is used to intercept all returning STRIKES in addition to unidentified aircraft, thus providing maximum training of Air Controllers.

Defensive Air Control work is seriously limited by proximity of land and limitations of equipment in this type of operation. During air operations the carrier remains within twenty-five to forty miles of enemy territory. The average range of detection of single aircraft over water with SK Air Search Radar has been thirty to forty miles and almost negative results obtained with aircraft over land. CAP stationed between the ship and expected attack origin have a bare twenty miles in which to intercept an aircraft before it enters the ships AA range. This would be inadequate should jet aircraft make an attack on the ship. The ship is equipped with both MK-3 and UPX type IFF, however, the UPX type has a non-directional antenna. This produces an identification ring on the scope at the proper range but no bearing. This system further reduces the IFF detection range to about a thirty mile maximum. An SPS-6 type radar with directional type IFF is recommended for ships conducting this type of operation.

2. Communications:

a. Personnel: The shortage of rated personnel, although serious, did not hamper the rapid transmission or reception of messages. Radio watches were stood on a basis of one in three. Any further loss of rated personnel would necessitate the standing of radio watches on a port and starboard basis. CWO watches were stood on a basis of one in three with two CWO's on watch continously. Due to the heavy encrypted traffic load, the CWO watch was augmented by two additional officers during peak periods.

b. Traffic Analaysis: It has been determined that over one hundred messages a day were handled by the main communication station, at least one half of which were classified. Classified traffic amounted to an average of approximately twelve thousand coded groups a day

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c. Material: A worn bearing on the motor generator of the TCK-1 was the only casualty that occurred to the transmitters. This was repaired in a period of four to six hours. If this repair had not been effected the loss of this transmitter would have seriously affected operational communications due to there being no spare transmitters in this frequency range available. Due to the shortage of transmitters in the medium to high frequency range, all medium to high frequency transmitters must be in operation continously.

Carry-over was experienced on two primary VHF circuits (voice) causing serious difficulty in the control of aircraft during critical periods of air operations. Interference was experienced on several occasions on primary CW Nets. This interference was attributed to the proximity of frequencies and attempted jamming.

One of the most serious difficulties experienced this patrol in regard to communications was the continued failure of coding machines. During the last operation failure was experienced with the two machines this unit is allowed. During the in-port period both machines were turned over to Crypto-Repair facilities in Sasebo. Work on neither machine was satisfactorially complete and prior to departure both machines were turned in to the RPMIO in Sasebo and two other machines were drawn. These had just been returned to RPMIO from a repair facility, and were thought to be in excellent repair. However on the fifth day of operating one of the machines became inoperative due to failure of the clutch mechanism. The other machine has remained operative but has consistently given trouble in that it has failed to print properly. Failure of the one machine has thrown the entire load of eight to twelve thousand code groups a day on this machine and has doubled the work load on crypto personnel due to improper printing.

Before leaving Sasebo it was requested that an additional machine be issued on temporary custody for use as a spare in case of failure. This request was turned down by the RPMIO due to the allowance list. Had both machines become inoperable during this operation it would not have been possible to keep up with the operational traffic that is required to be handled by a Task Element Commander in this area. There are no Crypto-Repair personnel assigned to this unit.

Recommendations:

1. Safeguard the number of trained enlisted and officer personnel so that it will not be necessary to decrease the number of watches from the present one in three. Any increase in the work load would increase the fatigue and decrease efficiency.

2. Provide a spare transmitter in the medium to high frequency range to guard against a serious hampering of primary communications in the event of a one hundred percent casualty to a medium to high frequency transmitter.

3. Continue the effort to decrease the amount of traffic, both classified and unclassified, that is transmitted by radio. Mail should be used as often as possible.

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4. That the allowance list be increased to allow three coding machines to be issued to CVE's on this duty. This increased allowance would only be required during the time the unit is operating in this area and could be transferred to each relieving unit in turn.

5. That present crypto repair facilities be examined with a view toward improving the quality of repair work.

6. That if practicable one crypto repair man be assigned to CVE's operating in this capacity.

3. Photographic Laboratory: The photo laboratory is operated by three rated men and one striker with the senior rate being a second class photographer. In addition to standing flight deck watches and continuing routine shipboard work, the laboratory supported five photographic sorties, expending three rolls of F-56 film and two rolls of K-20 film. Negatives from these sorties were used to produce three mosaics plus 154 prints.

4. Aerology: Ratt circuits provide the main source of aerological data in this area and proved to be unreliable during many hours of the day. Facsimile equipment is very desirable for carriers operating in this area.

D. Medical Department:

1. Captain Charles A. WILLIS 037774, USMCR, was wounded in the left arm by small caliber AA fire on 23 November 1952. Captain WILLIS was flown to a Korean Hospital. A detailed account is contained in Section IV.

2. Major Raymond HIGHTOWER, USMC, was killed attempting an emergency landing at K-53 when his plane nosed over to an inverted position and burned. Remains were returned aboard the following day and transported to Sasebo. A detailed account is contained in Section IV.

3. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group and Ship's Company

a.	Admitted to sick list	24
b.	Total sick days out of 12342 possible working days	80
c.	Officers admitted to sick list	1
d.	Total patient visits to sick call	466
e.	Total medical treatments	539
f.	Patients received from other ships	2
g.	Patients transferred to hospital	0
h.	Number minor injuries treated	26
i.	Number major injuries treated	4
j.	Number shipboard injuries resulting in death	0
k.	Minor surgical procedures	3
l.	Major surgical procedures	0
m.	Venereal disease cases and Non-specific Urethritis total	18
	1. Gonorrhea 4, Chancroid 3	
	2. Non-specific Urethritis following sexual exposure	11
n.	Penicillin tablets issued last in port period	238

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4. Medical Statistical Summary Air Group Pilots and Crewmen

a.	Pilots temporarily grounded for medical reasons	4
b.	Pilots permanently grounded pending medical evaluation	1
c.	Average number days pilots grounded	3.2
d.	Crew grounded for medical reasons	0
e.	No. of pilots KIA	1
f.	No. of pilots WIA	1

H. L. RAY

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP
COMNAVFE (1) Advance
COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP
COM7thFLT (1) Advance
CTF-77 (1) Advance
COMAIRPAC (5)
COMSERVPAC
COMFAIRJAPAN
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
COMCARDIV 15
COMCARDIV 17
CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
CG, AIRFMFPAC (1) Advance
CG, FMFPAC (1) Advance
CG, 1st MARAIRWING
CO, MAG-12
CO, VMA-312
CO, U.S.S. BATAAN (CVL-29)
CO, U.S.S. KENDOVA (CVE-114)
CO, U.S.S. BAIROKO (CVE-115)
CO, U.S.S. POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)
CO, U.S.S. SICILY (CVE-118)

AUTHENTICATED

R. R. STANGER, SCLK. USN
for S. O. COLE
CDR, USN
Operations Officer

U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

DECLASSIFIED

[redacted]

27 November 1952

FLIGHT SCHEDULE FOR 28 November 1952

SUNRISE 0735 SUNSET 1724

EVENT	NO. A/C	MISSION	LAUNCH	LAND	AMMO	NOTES
A-1	2	CAP	0700	0915	A	1 A/C SAR
A-2	4	TARCAP	0700	0915	A,B	
A-3	4	STRIKE	0700	0915	A,B	
B-4	2	CAP	0900	1115	A,B	1 A/C SAR
B-5	4	TARCAP	0900	1115	A,B	
C-6	2	CAP	1100	1315	A,B	1 A/C SAR
C-7	2	TARCAP	1100	1315	A,B	
C-8	6	STRIKE	1100	1315	A,B	1000#/.025 as alternate load.
D-9	2	CAP	1300	1515	A,B	1 A/C SAR
D-10	4	TARCAP	1300	1515	A,B	
E-11	2	CAP	1500	1715	A	1 A/C SAR
E-12	3	TARCAP	1500	1715	A,B	
E-13	6	STRIKE	1500	1715	A,B	500#/.025 as alternate load.

HELICOPTER

GUARD MAIL — All ships.
GUARD MAIL — Designated ships.

Note: 1. Events A, B, and C without belly tanks.
2. Events D and E with belly tanks.

Ammo Load

A - All A/C full gun loads.
B - All A/C Napalm and 6-HVAR.

B. E. COLKITT JR.
LCDR, USN
Air Operations Officer

Copty to
CO
XO
AMMO
AIR PLOT (2)
BRIDGE (4)
PHOTO LAB
AIR DEPT (8)
MEDICAL (2)
READY I (2)
SQUADRON OFFICE (6)
AIR INTELLIGENCE (2)
CPO QUARTERS BB
ALL OFFICERS STATEROOMS
EACH SCREEN SHIP (3)

ENCLOSURE (1)

USS BADOENG STRAIT - CVE - 116

OPERATING PERIOD 20 NOV. TO 28 NOV. 1952



Report of Damage Confirmed By Intellgince Sources

[redacted]

DECLASSIFIED

(A) The following is a list of damage inflicted by planes from this carrier and verified by intelligence sources in North Korea. This is not a complete report covering all strikes made.

DATE	LOCATION	RESULTS
21 November 1952	RONGGANG-NI Area	Seven North Koreans Killed, twenty-eight wounded.
25 November 1952	SUNWI-DO Area	Seven North Koreans Killed.
28 November 1952	SUNWI-DO Area	Twenty North Koreans Killed.
28 November 1952	MONGGUMP'O-RI Area	Twelve North Koreans Killed, One light machine gun destroyed.
25 November 1952	CHEIANG-NI Area	Fifty-one North Koreans Killed.
26 November 1952	CHANGHYAN-NI Area	Twenty-nine North Koreans Kille
26 November 1952	CHEIANG-NI Area	One North Korean Killed, large ammo dump destroyed.
26 November 1952	CHEIANG-NI Area	Three North Koreans Killed, twenty-one houses destroyed.
26 November 1952	CH'INNAMPO Area	One warehouse containing 3000 bags rice destroyed. Two small junks and three cement houses destroyed.
25 November 1952	SINCH'ON Area	Eighty-three North Koreans Kille twenty wounded. One warehouse containing 300 bags rice and four pillboxes destroyed.
1 November 1952	RONGGANG-NI Area	Nineteen North Koreans Killed, two bunkers, two guard posts, and one 80MM mortar destroyed.
25 November 1952	UPCH'O-RI Area	Six North Koreans Killed, six wounded and one truck destroyed
25 November 1952	UPCH'O-RI Area	Nine North Koreans Killed, eigh wounded and one civilian wounde Two bomb shelters destroyed.

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE (3)

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25 November 1952	SUNWI-DO Area	Seven North Koreans Killed and six houses destroyed.
25 November 1952	UPCH'O-RI Area	Fifty North Koreans Killed.
26 November 1952	CH'INNAMPO Area	One warehouse containing 3000 bags grain, two junks and cement jetties destroyed.
26 November 1952	CHANGHYAN-NI Area	Thirty North Koreans Killed and four houses destroyed.
26 November 1952	CHEIANG-NI Area	One Norht Korean Killed, one wounded. One large ammo dump and fifteen houses destroyed.
26 November 1952	CHEIANG-NI Area	Three North Koreans Killed, three wounded. Twenty-one houses destroyed.
28 November 1952	SUNWI-DO Area	Twenty laborers killed and one - hundred-twenty houses destroyed.
28 November 1952	MONGGUMP'O-RI Area	One-hundred North Koreans attack D-4 safe village. Partisans plus Navy and Air repelled attack, killing twelve North Koreans, and wounding nine. One heavy machine gun and ten rifles were destroyed with no friendly casualties.