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U.S.S. RENDOVA (CVE-114)
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San Francisco, California

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A16-13
Serial: 003-51

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From: Commanding Officer and Commander Task Element 95.11
To: Chief, Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Group 95.1
(2) Commander Task Force 95
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report - 23 September 1951 through 9 December

005973

[redacted]

Ref: (a) Article 0705, Navy Regulations
(b) OpNav Instruction 3480.4
(c) CinCPacFlt Instruction 3480.1
(d) CTG 95.1 Op-Order 2-51 (Revised)

Encl: (1) "RENditions" [REMOVED TO OPNAV OPPLAN FILES 24 SEP 57 [illegible]]
(2) Chart showing Area of Operations [SEE ABOVE]
(3) Statement of CAPT G. C. ARMSTRONG, USMC p.36

1. In accordance with references (a), (b), (c) and (d), the Action Report of Task Element 95.11 for the period 23 September 1951 through 9 December 1951, covering the periods the Commanding Officer U.S.S. RENDOVA acted as Commander Task Element 95.11, is submitted herewith.

2. This is not a complete report of the action of Task Element 95.11 because the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RENDOVA was CTE 95.11 only on the dates indicated in Part I of this report. It does constitute a complete action report for said dates.

3. The report, divided into 6 PARTS as listed below, is appended.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE
PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS
PART III- PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES
PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE
PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES
PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4. The classification of this report may be downgraded to Confidential when enclosures (1), (2) and (3) are detached.

E. E. FICKLING

[redacted]

~~CVE-11/lo:d~~
A16/13
Serial: 003-51

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SECURITY INFORMATION

ADVANCE COPIES TO:

CNO	(2)
CMC	(2)
CINCPACFLT	(10)
COMNAVFE	(10)
COMSEVENTH FLT	(2)
CTF 95	(2)
CTG 95.1	(4)
COMAIRPAC	(20)
COMCARDIV 17	(2)
CG AIRFMPAC	(2)
CG FMF PAC	(2)
CG 1ST MAW	(2)
CO MAG 12	(2)
VMF 212	(2)

Authenticated:

A. WASILEWSKI, ENS, USN
Ship's Secretary

PART I GENERAL NARRATIVE

A. During the period from 23 September 1951 through 9 December 1951, the U.S.S. RENDOVA (CVE-114) under the command of Captain E. E. FICKLING, USN, and with the Marine Aircraft Squadron VMF-212 embarked, operated off the West coast of Korea as a part of the U. S. SEVENTH Fleet in Task Force 95, under the operational control of Commander Task Group 95.1.

(1) The Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RENDOVA alternated with the Commanding Officer of the Commonwealth Aircraft Carrier HMAS SIDNEY as Commander Task Element 95.11. Task Element 95.11 consisted of one escort carrier and a maximum of four destroyers, or destroyer escorts, acting as screening vessels. The screen was reduced to less than four ships when required by operational demands. The alternate schedule required one of the two carriers to be on station at all times, with the remaining carrier receiving replenishment at Sasebo, or Kure, Japan. The average time on station for the operating periods was nine (9) days. This report covers the operations of Task Element 95.11, only when the Commanding Officer, U.S.S. RENDOVA was Commander of Task Element 95.11 on the following dates:

2100, 25 September 1951 - 2100, 4 October 1951
2100, 8 October 1951 - 2100, 17 October 1951
2100, 26 October 1951 - 2100, 4 November 1951
2100, 13 November 1951 - 2100, 22 November 1951
2100, 28 November 1951 - 2100, 6 December 1951

The mission of this Task Element was to conduct Air Operations in support of the United Nations Blockade, West coast of Korea, United States Eighth Army, Korea (Eusak), and to render SAR Assistance as required. In addition to that contained in applicable operation orders, the doctrine followed is defined in enclosure (1).

(2) The enemy forces were the North Korean Army and Chinese Communist forces in enemy-held North Korea. No enemy naval forces were encountered by this Task Element and, therefore, no surface action ensued. Enemy small craft including sampans, junks, sailboats, small barges and power boats, operating in the rivers, estuaries and along the West coast of Korea were attacked and destroyed by own aircraft whenever possible.

(3) Typical missions of aircraft were Armed Reconsiaissance, Combat Air Patrol, Close Air Support, Pre-briefed Strikes, Target Combat Air Patrol, Naval Gun Fire Spotting, and Photo Reconnaissance. Based on forty-four (44) days in the action area, during 3687.1 combat hours of flying, VMF-212 flew 1743 combat sorties of which only fifteen (15) were abortive, for a total average of 39.6 missions per day. The squadron aircraft allowance was 24, the total average aircraft on board was 22.5 and the total average aircraft available was 21.0. Only one entire day of air operations was lost because of inclement weather, giving a total of forty-three (43) days of air operations out of forty-four (44) days in the action area. On three days, flight operations were reduced because of weather but the Task Element was successful in manouvering through frontal weather to areas where air operations could be conducted. On 17 November, VMF-212 flew sixty-four (64) sorties to establish a new sortie record for CVE's.

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4. The operating area for Task Element 95.11 was in area "Nan", South of 39°-15' N and East of 123°-30' E during daylight hours, withdrawing to the South during darkness. The Task Element and aircraft operating area is indicated in enclosure (2). During the period of this report the U.S.S. RENDOVA operated at various times with the following ships:

(a) HMS BELFAST
(b) HMS CHARITY
(c) HMS BLACKSWAN
(d) HMS COMUS
(e) HMS COCKADE
(f) HMS WHITESANDS BAY
(g) HMS MOUNTS BAY
(h) RFA GREEN RANGER
(i) RFA BROWN RANGER
(j) RFA WAVE PREMIER
(k) RFA WAVE CHIEF
(l) HMAS TOBRUK
(m) HMCS ATHABASKAN
(n) HMCS SIOUX
(o) HMCS CAYUGA
(p) HMAS MURCHISON
(q) HMNZS TAUPO
(r) HMNZS HAWEA
(s) USS SMALL
(t) USS TINGEY
(u) USS TOLEDO
(v) USS TAUSSIG
(w) USS NICHOLAS
(x) USS PHILIP
(y) USS NAIFEH
(z) USS HANNA
(aa) USS COLLETT
(bb) USS TONDIGBEE
(cc) USS BRISTOL
(dd) USS NEW JERSEY
(ee) USS SHIELDS
(ff) USS EDMONDS
(gg) USS MUNRO

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[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

201200/Sept Arrived Kobe, Japan, for embarkation VMF-212 personnel and material, and turnover from U.S.S. SICILY (CVE-118).

21/Sept Conducted administrative inspection of U.S.S. SICILY for ComCarDiv-17.

220900/Sept Departed Kobe, Japan, for Sasebo, Japan, having completed VMF-212 embarkation, and officially relieved U.S.S. SICILY as United States aircraft carrier unit under CTG 95.1 and Blockading and Escort Group, West Coast, Korea.

Landed VMF-212 aircraft this date, experiencing one barrier crash in which pilot was uninjured. Aircraft required propeller change.

HMS CHARITY (D-29) reported for duty and took screening station.

23/Sept Carrier-qualified VMF-212 pilots. A total of 47 flights were made, resulting in one barrier crash. Pilot was uninjured; aircraft required engine and propeller change. All squadron pilots now adjudged "Carrier-qualified".

240717/Sept Arrived Sasebo, Japan, for loading of ammunition and other material, and off-loading of ship's boats and rolling stock.

250701/Sept Underway for Yellow Sea OpAreas (areas "M" and "N") in accordance with CTG 95.1 orders. HMCS ATHABASKAN (D-219) and HMCS SIOUX (D-225) forming screen.

250950/Sept Launched 20 aircraft in simulated strike on Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with orders.

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to OpArea.

252100/Sept Relieved HMS GLORY and assumed CTE 95.11

26/Sept U.S.S. SMALL (DD-838) and U.S.S. TINGEY (DD-539) reported for duty and joined screen before first light this date.

Commenced combat air operations, launching a total of 42 flights (2 of which were non-combat). Weather generally good.

CDR G. B. CARVER, DSC, RN, Aviation Officer, CTG 95.1 came aboard via helicopter.

Detached HMCS ATHABASKAN on conclusion of flight operations to perform Bugatti Patrol and return before first light the following morning.

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270220/Sept U.S.S. SMALL reported possible submarine contact, range 3,000 yards. Sounded General Quarters, turned away from contact, increased speed to maximum (20 Knots); two screen ships detached to investigate. 0243 contact evaluated "non-submarine"; formation secured from General Quarters and returned to base course.

A total of 43 flights (4 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

RADM CREERY, RCN, came aboard from HMCS ATHABASKAN via helicopter, for an unofficial visit, and departed via helicopter this same day with CDR CARVER.

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached on conclusion flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

28 Sept A total of 43 flights (8 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

281120/Sept Set Condition 1AA for the Gunnery Department because of an unidentified air contact closing the formation. 1141 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

Captain J. L. KANE, COMCARDIV-17, left the ship via TBM for Atsugi, Japan.

281430/Sept HMCS SIOUX detached from screen to investigate and destroy large floating object. Object identified as section of wooden railroad trestle. HMCS SIOUX unable to destroy the trestle by gunfire, so planted demolition charge and effectively destroyed it as a navigational hazard.

Detached HMCS SIOUX on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

281855/Sept Sonar contact made by screen. Turned away from contact, went maximum speed, and detached screen ship to investigate. 1905 sonar contact evaluated "non-submarine"; returned to base course, and came to standard speed.

282049/Sept Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact closing the formation. 2056 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

282305/Sept Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 2318 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

29 Sept A cold front approaching from the northwest at the time of the first launch brought rain by 0800 and necessitated the recalling of all aircraft then airborne, though not before they had expended their ordnance on the primary target. Synoptic indications together with radar determinations prompted the decision to steam directly into the path of the approaching front with the intention of launching aircraft in the clear weather beyond. This was done with maximum effort being put forth in the late afternoon launch. A total of 30 flights (2 of which were non-combat) were flown this date.

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290734/Sept Unidentified air contact closing formation; Condition 1AA already in effect in accordance with routine dawn and dusk alert procedure. 0748 air contact identified as friendly P2V; secured from routine dawn alert.

290901/Sept Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 0905 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

Detached HMCS ATHABASKAN on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

292000/Sept Changed course by emergency turn, went to maximum speed, and detached U.S.S. SMALL to investigate unidentified surface contact. Contact identified as friendly.

292042/Sept Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. Maneuvered evasively. 2102 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

30/Sept A total of 44 flights (4 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. 1st Lt. W. E. BOYLES, USMC, crashed into the Yellow Sea after being catapulted. The aircraft sank immediately. The pilot was not seen to leave the cockpit nor sighted at any time subsequent to the crash, though the helicopter and plane guard destroyer searched the area thoroughly. Lt. BOYLES is now carried on the squadron records as "dead by drowning."

Transferred sailing man from HMCS ATHABASKAN to U.S.S. BENDOVA sickbay for ulcer treatment.

British tanker, RFA WAVE PREMIER, escorted by HMS BLACKSWAN, refueled screen ships while underway.

The U.S.S. TOLEDO (CA-133) with RADM DYER, CTF 95, embarked, and the U.S.S. TAUSSIG (DD-734) joined the formation.

RADM DYER made an official visit via helicopter, returning to the U.S.S. TOLEDO this same day.

301110/Sept Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 1125 contact identified as USAF B-26; secured from Condition 1AA.

U.S.S. SMALL detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

U.S.S. TOLEDO and U.S.S. TAUSSIG departed from the formation to proceed on mission assigned.

01/Oct A total of 43 flights (4 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One aircraft required engine change as result of damage from enemy ground fire.

U.S.S. TINGEY detached on conclusion flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

02/Oct U.S.S. SMALL was detached from the formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

A total of 34 flights (3 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

U.S.S. FINGEY was detached from the formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

03/Oct Unfavorable weather conditions over the target area impeded air operations this date. A total of 30 flights were flown.

HMAS TOBRUK (D-37) joined formation and took screen station.

031650/Oct Detached HMCS SIOUX to investigate two small craft displaying South Korean and white flags. Contacts identified as friendly fishing craft outside designated fishing areas; these were directed to return to proper area without delay.

HMS BROWN RANGER escorted by HMAS TOBRUK refueled screen ships while underway.

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached on conclusion flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

032340/Oct HMCS SIOUX detached to investigate surface contact. 2352 contact identified as U.S.S. MARINE LYNX (C-4).

040139/Oct Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. Increased speed to maximum. 0200 secured from Condition 1AA, contact having passed beyond radar range.

04/Oct A total of 52 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. A cold front approaching from the northwest resulted in a steadily lowering ceiling during the morning, making it necessary to recall all aircraft shortly before noon. Again the decision was made to steam directly through the front, and by 1415, air operations were once again in progress with only broken clouds encountered over the target area.

041329/Oct Set Condition 1AA because of two unidentified air contacts. 1357 secured from Condition 1AA, contacts having passed beyond radar range.

042100/Oct Relieved as CTE 95.11 by HMAS SYDNEY.

Sailed for Sasebo, Japan.

Detached HMCS ATHABASKAN to report to HMAS SYDNEY for operational control.

05/Oct — Launched 8 aircraft in simulated strike on Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with orders.

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to Sasebo, Japan.

051530/Oct — Arrived Sasebo, Japan, for rest and replenishment.

06-08/Oct — Moored at buoy 19, Sasebo, Japan, for rest and replenishment.

080701/Oct — Underway for Yellow Sea OpArea in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch orders.

U.S.S. PHILIP (DDE-498) and U.S.S. NICHOLAS (DDE-449) reported for duty and took screening stations.

Conducted AA gunnery firing exercises (towed sleeve) enroute to OpArea.

082100/Oct — Relieved HMAS SYDNEY and assumed CTE 95.11

090213/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 0217 contact identified as friendly weather patrol plane; secured from Condition 1AA.

090352/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 0415 secured from Condition 1AA, contact having passed beyond radar range.

09/Oct — A total of 52 flights were flown this date. Weather generally good, except for low ceiling over target area.

HMAS TOBRUK reported for duty and took screening station.

091513/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 1524 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

091718/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contacts. 1734 contacts identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

091745/Oct — U.S.S. PHILIP detached to investigate surface contact. 2016 contact identified as ROK intelligence boat "SEA WOLF" Number 5555.

U.S.S. NICHOLAS detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

100300/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 0310 contact plotted to pass directly overhead at very low altitude. Changed course by emergency turn and increased speed to maximum. 0312 taking high speed evasive action. 0315 contact at 2000 feet, 15 miles, closing rapidly; now showing IFF Code #2. 0317 U.S.S. PHILIP ordered to fire warning shots. 0323 contact directly overhead; formation again changing course by emergency

turn. U.S.S. PHILIP still "locked on". 0330 contact now at 12 miles identifies himself as friendly weather patrol plane. Secured from Condition 1AA.

10/Oct — A total of 44 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. Capt. G. C. ARMSTRONG, USMC, received intense .50 caliber and 20MM ground fire and his aircraft was hit in the fuselage and engine, setting fire to the engine. The pilot was able to get to the coast and made a controlled water landing. He was recovered, uninjured, by a small boat from the HMS ST. BRIDES BAY and returned to the U.S.S. PENDOVA. The aircraft was lost. One barrier crash; pilot unijured; aircraft required propeller and engine change.

101249/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 1251 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

HMAS TOBRUK detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

Two men transferred from U.S.S. NICHOLAS to U.S.S. PENDOVA sickbay for treatment.

11/Oct — A total of 50 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One barrier crash; pilot uninjured, aircraft slightly damaged.

MFA WAVE PREMIER escorted by HMS BLACKSWAN refueled screen ships while underway.

U.S.S. PHILIP detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

12/Oct — A total of 50 flights (4 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good except for low ceiling over target area.

121016/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contacts. 1036 contacts identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

U.S.S. NICHOLAS detached on conclusion flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

13/Oct — A total of 52 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

U.S.S. MAIKEH (DE-352) and U.S.S. HANNA (DE-449) reported for duty and took screen stations.

U.S.S. PHILIP and U.S.S. NICHOLAS detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

HMCS CAYUGA (DDE-218) reported for duty and took screen station.

HMAS TOBRUK detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

14/ Oct — A total of 48 flights (1 of which was non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

FFA WAVE CHIEF escorted by HMS ST. BRIDES BAY refueled the screen ships while underway.

HMCS CAYUGA detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

142050/Oct — Detached U.S.S. HANNA to investigate surface contact. 2434 contacts identified as friendly vessels S.S. LOYOLA VICTORY and USNS PASCICAGUA.

15/Oct — A total of 47 flights (9 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. The aircraft piloted by Lt. Col. M. BRILLIANT was hit in the wing and engine by .50 caliber ground fire. The pilot was able to get to the coast and bailed out. He was recovered, slightly injured, by HMS COMUS.

150758/Oct — Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contacts. 0800 contacts identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

Transferred acute appendicitis patient from U.S.S. NAIFEH to U.S.S. PENDOVA sickbay for treatment.

Detached HMAS TOBRUK before conclusion flight operations to retrieve Lt. Col. BRILLIANT from HMS COMUS and patrol Bugatti.

16/Oct — A total of 51 flights (2 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One barrier crash; pilot uninjured; aircraft required propeller and engine change.

U.S.S. HANNA detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

U.S.S. NAIFEH detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

17/Oct — A total of 54 flights (5 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

FFA WAVE CHIEF escorted by HMCS ATHABASKAN refueled screen ships while underway.

U.S.S. NAIFEH detached from formation and task element to report to HMAS SYDNEY for duty.

172100/Oct — Relieved of CTE 95.11 by HMAS SYDNEY.

Sailed for Sasebo, Japan.

[redacted]

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18/Oct — Conducted AA gunnery firing practice (towed sleeve) enroute to Sasebo, Japan.

Detached HMCS CAYUGA and HMAS TOBRUK to proceed into port independently.

19-25/Oct — Moored buoy 18, Sasebo, Japan, for rest and replenishment.

260713/Oct — Underway for Yellow Sea OpArea in accordance with CTG 95.1 orders.

HMS COCKADE (D-34) and HMAS TOBRUK reported for duty and took screening stations.

261010/Oct — Launched eight-aircraft simulated strike on Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with orders.

Conducted AA gunnery firing exercises (towed sleeve) enroute to OpArea.

262100/Oct — Relieved HMAS SYDNEY and assumed CTE 95.11

27 Oct — A total of 52 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

Lt. Col. W. W. EHRGOTT, USA, and 1st Lt. W. J. KURTZ, USA, came aboard via helicopter for special liaison conferences concerning friendly guerrilla operations on the West Coast of Korea.

U.S.S. HANNA reported for duty and took screen station.

HMAS TOBRUK detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

28/Oct — A total of 51 flights (5 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One barrier crash; pilot uninjured; aircraft seriously damaged.

Lt. Col. EHRGOTT and 1st Lt. KURTZ, accompanied by CDR J. J. MAECHTLEN and Lt. Col. M. BRILLIANT, left the ship via helicopter for HMS COCKADE for further transportation to guerrilla base.

U.S.S. COLLETT (DD-730) reported for duty and took screen station.

HMS COCKADE detached in mid-morning to deliver passengers to island base and then patrol Bugatti.

29/Oct — A total of 47 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

RFA WAVE CHIEF escorted by HMNZS HAWEA refueled screen ships while underway.

HMAS TOBRUK detached on completion flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

[redacted]

[redacted] SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

201200/Sept Arrived Kobe, Japan, for embarkation VMF-212 personnel and material, and turnover from U.S.S. SICILY (CVE-118).

21/Sept Conducted administrative inspection of U.S.S. SICILY for ComCarDiv-17.

220900/Sept Departed Kobe, Japan, for Sasebo, Japan, having completed VMF-212 embarkation, and officially relieved U.S.S. SICILY as United States aircraft carrier unit under CTG 95.1 and Blockading and Escort Group, West Coast, Korea.

Landed VMF-212 aircraft this date, experiencing one barrier crash in which pilot was uninjured. Aircraft required propeller change.

HMS CHARITY (D-29) reported for duty and took screening station.

23/Sept Carrier-qualified VMF-212 pilots. A total of 47 flights were made, resulting in one barrier crash. Pilot was uninjured; aircraft required engine and propeller change. All squadron pilots now adjudged "Carrier-qualified".

240717/Sept Arrived Sasebo, Japan, for loading of ammunition and other material, and off-loading of ship's boats and rolling stock.

250701/Sept Underway for Yellow Sea OpArea (areas "M" and "N") in accordance with CTG 95.1 orders. HMCS ATHABASKAN (D-219) and HMCS SIOUX (D-225) forming screen.

250950/Sept Launched 20 aircraft in simulated strike on Sasebo, Japan, in accordance with orders.

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to OpArea.

252100/Sept Relieved HMS GLORY and assumed CTE 95.11

26/Sept U.S.S. SMALL (DD-838) and U.S.S. TINGEY (DD-539) reported for duty and joined screen before first light this date.

Commenced combat air operations, launching a total of 42 flights (2 of which were non-combat). Weather generally good.

CDR G. B. CARVER, DSC, RN, Aviation Officer, CTG 95.1 came aboard via helicopter.

Detached HMCS ATHABASKAN on conclusion of flight operations to perform Bugatti Patrol and return before first light the following morning.

[redacted]

5

30/Oct A total of 49 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

Col. M. A. SEIVERSON, USMC, Inspector General for First Marine Air Wing, came aboard via TBM for an official visit.

31/Oct A total of 42 flights (8 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Poor weather conditions over the target area throughout the day and the carrier during the late morning and early afternoon impeded air operations against the enemy. The aircraft piloted by 1st. Lt. A. L. NORDBOM, USMCR, was hit by ground fire causing the engine to fail. The pilot was able to reach the coast, and made a water landing. He was recovered by a ROK fishing boat and was shortly taken by helicopter to a friendly island; thence by seaplane to Kimpo Airfield. He was returned aboard the U.S.S. WENDOVA by TMB the following day. Another aircraft suffered extensive damage to one wing when one of its machine guns overheated and exploded inside the wing. The pilot was able to return to the carrier and land without further incident. Both pilots were uninjured. An aircraft piloted by Capt. A. E. HUTCHENS, USMCR, suffered an engine failure while on a CAP mission over the carrier. The pilot was forced to make a water landing, but was recovered immediately by the carrier's helicopter. He suffered a small cut on one hand.

Conducted gunnery firing exercise. Expended eight rounds 5"/38 caliber ammunition at floating smoke pot laved by helicopter.

U.S.S. FANNA detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

01/Nov A total of 28 flights (2 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Low ceiling and rain over the target area precluded the launching of all late afternoon strikes. One aircraft suffered extensive damage to horizontal stabilizer, elevator, rudder and after fuselage when hit by 37MM ground fire. The pilot was uninjured and was able to land safely at Suwon Airfield without further incident. He was able to return to the carrier with his aircraft after three days delay for repairs.

HMS GREEN RANGER escorted by HMAS MURCHISON refueled screen ships while underway. Heavy weather forced the cancellation of this operation before completion.

Col. M. A. SEIVERSON, USMC, Inspector General, 1st Marine Air Wing, departed via TBM.

HMS COCKADE detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

020548/Nov Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 0552 contact identified as a USAF B-26; secured from Condition 1AA.

A total of 25 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Adverse weather conditions at the carrier and over the target area precluded all morning flights. Low clouds over the target area in the afternoon further impeded air operations.

HMAS TOBRUK detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

022025/Nov Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact, 2035 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

03/Nov A total of 36 flights (8 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Heavy ground fog and low clouds over the target area impeded air operations.

U.S.S. HANNA detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

032350/Nov HMAS TOBRUK detached to investigate unidentified surface contact. Contact identified as USNS MISSION (?) proceeding to Inchon, Korea.

04/Nov A total of 67 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

HMS GLEN RANGER escorted by HMCS SIOUX refueled screen ships while underway.

HMS BELFAST with RADM SCOTT-MONCRIEFF embarked joined formation. RADM SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, DSO and Bar, RN, CTG 95.1; CDR G. W. CARVER, DSC, RN, and Lt. A. P. KEATE, RN, came aboard via highline for an official visit, and departed via highline this same day.

HMS BELFAST departed to proceed on mission assigned.

U.S.S. COLLETT and U.S.S. HANNA detached from formation and task element to report to HMAS SYDNEY for duty.

042100/Nov Relieved as CTE 95.11 by HMAS SYDNEY.

Sailed for Sasebo, Japan.

05/Nov HMS COCKADE and HMAS TOBRUK detached to proceed into port independently.

051734/Nov Arrived Sasebo, Japan, for rest and replenishment.

06-12/Nov Moored at buoy 18, Sasebo, Japan, for rest and replenishment.

130708/Nov Underway for Yellow Sea OpArea in accordance with CTG 95.1 dispatch orders.

HMS COMUS (D-20) and U.S.S. BRISTOL (DD-857) reported for duty and formed screen.

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (KD type drone) enroute to OpArea.

131743/Nov Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. Contact in visual range; apparently transport type, showing port and starboard running lights. Contact showed no IFF and could not be contacted on any frequency. 1758 secured from condition 1AA, contact having passed beyond radar range.

132100/Nov Relieved HMAS SYDNEY and assumed CTE 95.11.

14/Nov A total of 49 flights (10 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62), VADM H. M. MARTIN, USN, COM7TH FLT, embarked, and U.S.S. SHIELDS (DD-596) joined formation. VADM MARTIN, accompanied by RADM SCOTT-MONCRIEFF, came aboard via helicopter for an official visit. They returned to the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY via helicopter this same day.

U.S.S. NEW JERSEY and U.S.S. SHIELDS departed the formation to proceed on mission assigned.

HMCS ATHABASKAN reported for duty and took screen station.

HMS COMUS detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned. HMS COCKADE detached to patrol Bugatti.

HMS COCKADE and U.S.S. EDMONDS (DE-406) reported for duty and took screen stations.

U.S.S. BRISTOL detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

142315/Nov Detached HMS COCKADE to investigate unidentified surface contact. Contact identified as S.S. AIKEN VICTORY.

15/Nov A total of 20 flights were flown this date. Inclement weather caused the cancellation of all flight operations during the morning and impeded operations throughout the day.

U.S.S. COLLETT detached from formation and task element to proceed

16/Nov A total of 54 flights (5 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

USA WAVE CHIEF escorted by HMNZS TAUPO refueled screen ships while underway.

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U.S.S. BRISTOL detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

161944/Nov Sounded General Quarters because of rapidly closing unidentified air contacts. Ceased zig-zag, came to maximum speed, and changed course by emergency turn. Contacts very low. 1959 secured from General Quarters, contacts having passed beyond radar range.

170350/Nov Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. Came to maximum speed; manouvered evasively. 0406 secured from Condition 1AA, contact having passed beyond radar range.

A total of 69 flights (5 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

18/Nov A total of 52 flights (5 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One aircraft was hit by .50 caliber ground fire, necessitating the change of the right horizontal stabilizer and elevator. Another aircraft required a wing change when an explosion of unknown origin caused a large hole in the leading edge of the wing. Both pilots were uninjured.

U.S.S. EDMONDS detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

19/Nov A total of 61 flights (13 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. 1st. Lt. A. T. WOOD, USMC, was slightly wounded when a .30 caliber bullet entered the left side of the canopy, creased his left hand, and passed out through the right side of the canopy. The aircraft required a canopy change.

HMS GREEN RANGER escorted by HMS MOUNTS BAY refueled screen ships while underway.

HMS COCKADE detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

20/Nov A total of 51 flights (7 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

U.S.S. EDMONDS detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

210319/Nov Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. Ceased zig-zag, changed course by emergency turn, and came to maximum speed. 0339 came to standard speed, returned to base course, and secured from Condition 1AA, contact having passed beyond radar range.

A total of 58 flights (13 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One aircraft was hit by one .50 caliber bullet in each of two blades of the propeller. Each bullet penetrated the blade completely, but the pilot was able to return to the carrier without further incident. Aircraft required propeller change.

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached on conclusion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

U.S.S. BRISTOL detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

22/Nov No flight operations this date due to inclement weather. A cold front moving south out of Manchuria provided the first real winter weather of the season, and made Thanksgiving Day more or less a day of rest for the ship and squadron. However, winds of 45 knots and very rough seas, took some of the enjoyment out of the traditional feast.

HMCS ATHABASKAN and U.S.S. EDMONDS detached to refuel from HMS GREEN RANGER escorted by HMNZS HAWEA at, or near, "FOX" anchorage, Inchon, Korea.

U.S.S. EDMONDS detached from formation and task element to report to HMAS SYDNEY for duty.

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached from formation to proceed into port independently.

222100/Nov Relieved as CTE 95.11 by HMAS SYDNEY.

Sailed for Sasebo, Japan.

231135/Nov Arrived Sasebo, Japan for rest and replenishment.

24-27/Nov Moored at buoy 18, Sasebo, Japan, for rest and replenishment.

280701/Nov Underway for Yellow Sea OpArea in accordance with CTE 95.10 dispatch orders.

HMS COCKADE and HMAS TORRUK reported for duty and formed screen.

Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to OpArea.

282100/Nov Relieved HMAS SYDNEY and assumed CTE 95.11

29/Nov A total of 46 flights (2 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

U.S.S. MUNRO (DD-422) reported for duty and took screen station.

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HMS COCKADE detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

HMCS ATHABASKAN reported for duty and took screen station.

U.S.S. MUNDO detached on completion of flight operations to patrol Bugatti.

300344/Nov Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. Maneuvered evasively. 0405 secured from Condition 1AA, contact having passed beyond radar range.

A total of 41 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. One aircraft was hit by a .30 caliber bullet which entered the right wheel-well door, penetrating the tire, hydraulic line and wing. The pilot was uninjured and was able to land his aircraft aboard the carrier without further incident. The tire and hydraulic line had to be replaced.

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

HMCS CAYUGA reported for duty and took screen station.

Bugatti not patrolled this night, because operational demands required all available ships for other missions.

010055/Dec Ceased zig-zag; came to maximum speed. 0105 sounded General Quarters because of two unidentified air contacts. Maneuvered evasively. 0115 came to standard speed. 0120 secured from General Quarters, contacts having been evaluated as false.

A total of 41 flights were flown this date. Weather generally good. The aircraft piloted by Maj. W. H. RANKIN, USMC, was hit by a 37MM AA projectile in the right wing flap. The projectile exploded on contact, resulting in the complete penetration by numerous shrapnel fragments of the fuselage from the canopy aft. The pilot was painfully but not seriously wounded when a piece of shrapnel 1CM x 2CM penetrated his upper right thigh. The pilot was able to return to the carrier and land without further incident. The aircraft required a new canopy, right wing flap, and rudder, plus extensive patching to the fuselage, where 134 separate holes were counted.

FFA WAVE CHIEF escorted by U.S.S. EDMONDS refueled screen ships while underway.

HMCS CAYUGA detached from formation and task element to proceed on mission assigned.

Bugatti not patrolled this night because tactical commitments required all available screen ships in other locations.

02/Dec A total of 41 flights (8 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

U.S.S. EDMONDS reported for duty and took screen station.

HMCS ATHABASKAN reported for duty and took screen station.

Transferred man from U.S.S. MUNRO to U.S.S. BENDOVA sickbay for emergency dental treatment.

021710/Dec HMAS TOBRUK, with U.S.S. BENDOVA Medical Officer embarked, detached to intercept small craft reported to have friendly wounded aboard.

U.S.S. EDMONDS detached on completion of flight operations to assist in island patrols. Through misunderstanding, she patrolled Bucatti.

HMAS TOBRUK rejoined formation having been unable to make contact with specified small craft.

030055/Dec HMAS TOBRUK detached to keep small craft in area under surveillance.

A total of 45 flights (4 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good.

031308/Dec HMAS TOBRUK rejoined formation and transferred Medical Officer back to U.S.S. BENDOVA. The friendly wounded were never located, though numerous small craft in the area were investigated.

U.S.S. EDMONDS detached on completion of flight operations to land night support to U.N. naval forces in the defense of friendly islands.

04/Dec A total of 45 flights (3 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. Almost half of this day's flights were Advanced Combat Air Patrol missions for U.N. naval forces defending friendly islands.

USS WAVE CHIEF escorted by HMAS MURCHISON refueled screen ships while underway.

HMAS MURCHISON detached from escort duty to deliver BAR ammuntion and magazines to friendly islands.

USS WAVE CHIEF detached to return, unescorted, to Sasebo, Japan.

U.S.S. EDMONDS detached on completion of flight operations to assist in island patrols.

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05/Dec A total of 52 flights (6 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. Almost half of this day's flights were Advanced Combat Air Patrol missions for U.N. naval forces defending friendly islands. One aircraft required the replacement of its vertical stabilizer because of damage from .30 caliber ground fire. Pilot was uninjured.

051110/Dec Set Condition 1AA because of unidentified air contact. 1116 contact identified as friendly; secured from Condition 1AA.

U.S.S. MUNDO detached on completion of flight operations to assist in island patrols.

06/Dec A total of 36 flights (2 of which were non-combat) were flown this date. Weather generally good. Capt. W. S. McCARSON, USMC, crashed in enemy held North Korea when he failed to recover from a strafing run. Aircraft disintegrated and burned completely. No chance of pilot survival. Another aircraft required replacement of right wing tip when hit by .30 caliber ground fire. Pilot was uninjured.

Refueled entire screen because of prior commitments of tanker (Note: on frequent occasions the U.S.S. WENDOVA refueled and/or replenished one or more ships of the screen, but every effort was made to maintain a regular refueling schedule with the various British tankers.)

HMCS ATHABASKAN detached from formation and task element to report to HMAS SYDNEY for duty.

HMCS CAYUGA reported for duty and took screen station.

HMAS TOBRUK detached from formation and task element to report to HMAS SYDNEY for duty.

062100/Dec Relieved as CTE 95.11 by HMAS SYDNEY.

Chopped to CTF 95.

Sailed for Yokosuka, Japan, for turnover to U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116).

07/Dec Conducted AA gunnery firing drills (towed sleeve) enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

Detached U.S.S. MUNDO from formation to proceed on duty assigned.

08/Dec Launched 22 VMF-212 aircraft (F4U-4) to land aboard U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT for duty.

Landed 15 TBM aircraft of VS-892 from U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT.

HMCS CAYUGA detached from formation to proceed on duty assigned.

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090616/Dec Arrived Yokosuka, Japan for turnover to U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT, disembarkation of VMF-212 non-flying personnel and materiel, and embarkation of VS-892 non-flying personnel and material and ComCarDiv-17 and Staff.

10/Dec Moored at Pier 10, Truman Bay, Yokosuka, Japan, completing turnover and transfer of personnel and materiel.

Chopped to ComNavFE.

110616/Dec Underway for San Diego, California, having been officially relieved by U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT INCLUDING AMMUNITION EXPENDITURES

A. MARK 77 - MOD-0 Fire Bomb.

1. Directive: Commander Task Force 95 dispatch 210618Z of October 1951 requested RENDOVA conduct evaluation of the MARK-77-MOD-0 Fire Bomb. On 23 October 1951 eight (8) fire bombs were delivered and evaluation commenced on 28 October 1951 continuing through 30 October 1951.

2. Evaluation: The F-51 type napalm tank, the type in use on RENDOVA, was used in conjunction with the MK-77 Fire Bomb. The results were as follows:

(a) Stowage: The F-51 presented no stowage problems. The full allowance was stowed under the elevator platforms and in the elevator pits. While only eight (8) MK-77 Fire Bombs were on hand, it was readily ascertained that stowage of a full allowance would present a difficult problem due to weight, and size of bomb and crate. Further the MK-77 crate must be retained for return to CONUS and therefore must be restowed, presenting double the effort in handling. The above does not include tailfins, which were not delivered.

(b) Weight: Without tail fins the MK-77 Fire Bomb weighs 2.3 times the F-51 tank.

(c) Assembly: The uncrating, assembly, fitting, loading and fusing averaged 1.17 man hours per MK-77 Fire Bomb without tail fins, while the F-51 averaged 0.25 hours per tank.

(d) Handling: The MK-77 Fire Bomb requires handling by the MK-5 bomb and torpedo skid, while the F-51 tank may be handled with the MK-1, MK-5 or MK-8 skid.

(e) Fusing: Difficulty was encountered while fusing the MK-77 with a M146 W/P or M145 W/P fuse, as the apertures in the bombs were not true, requiring machining or shimming of the fuses. The M145 W/P was used by RENDOVA on all drops.

(f) Arming: Arming was difficult with the M145 or M146 igniters as the arming wires were not permitted a straight lead, causing sharp bends, which resulted in a tendency of the arming wires to pull the solenoid from the MK-8 shackle.

(g) Flight Characteristics: Using normal power setting, the MK-77 allowed a ten (10) knot increase in speed over the F-51 tank. However, when loaded on the F4U-4, the flap setting of 50 degrees, the flap touched the plastic tail cone. The dimensions of the tail fin being unknown, complete evaluation cannot be given as to amount of flap the F4U-4 could use with safety.

(h) Dropping and Coverage Characteristics: Both the MK-77 and F-51 were dropped at the same altitude, the coverage of the two types was identical. Of the eight (8) MK-77 dropped, four (4) were duds, three were set off by straffing, and one remained a complete dud. The planes returned with nose arming wires retained. The tail arming wires pulled the solenoid from the MK-8 shackle.

(i) Cost: It is estimated that the MK-77 MOD-0 Fire Bomb, less tail fin, costs approximately ten (10) times that of the F-51 tank. To this initial cost, is added also, the cost of space and money in shipment from CONLUS to WestPac, plus the same amount of space involved in reshipping the empty crate to CONLUS.

3. Conclusions

(a) The stowage, time involved in assembly, handling disadvantage of being forced to use one type bomb skid, and the cost of the MK-77 Fire Bomb, outweighs its one good characteristic, i.e., streamlined design.

(b) If the streamlined effect is the fundamental desire, it is felt that the 1,000 pound water filled training bomb, complete with tail fins and possessing the aerodynamic characteristics of a TNT bomb could fill the need much cheaper than the MK-77.

(c) That if the use of the MK-77 is to be continued a better means must be devised to give the arming wires a straight lead, thus preventing the arming wires from pulling the solenoid from the MK-8 shackle.

B. Use of the 3.5" Rocket with W/P head.

1. The use of 3.5" rocket with W/P heads was found to be excellent for the type target encountered on the West coast of Korea. The type targets encountered are, in general:

(a) Wooden warehouses
(b) Wooden houses in villages
(c) Troop bunkers and shelters
(d) Concentrations of sampans, junks and small power boats

2. In most cases, ordnance loadings were a combination of napalm and 3" W/P Rockets, especially when pre-briefed targets were attacked.

C. Ammunition Expenditures (less Training)

1. 26 September 1951 through 30 September 1951

(a)	500# G.P. Bombs	75
(b)	3.5" Smoke Rockets	16
(c)	5.0" HVAR	475
(d)	50 Cal. Belted	97,600
(e)	Napalm Thickner (lbs)	2,520
(f)	F-51 Type Tanks	42

2. 1 October 1951 through 31 October 1951

(a)	1000# G.P.	0
(b)	1000# SAP	8
(c)	500# G.P.	121
(d)	375# D.B.	1

(e)	3.5" Smoke Rockets	216
(f)	5.0" HVAR	928
(g)	6.5" ATAR	0
(h)	50 Cal. Belted	209,600
(i)	Napalm Thickner (lbs)	2,010
(j)	F-51 Type Tanks	39
(k)	Mk-77 MOD-0 Fire Bomb	8

3. 1 November 1951 through 30 November 1951

(a)	1000# G.P.	0
(b)	1000# SAP	13
(c)	500# G.P.	316
(d)	375# D.B.	0
(e)	3.5" Smoke Rockets	286
(f)	5.0" HVAR	1,540
(g)	6.5" ATAR	96
(h)	50 Cal. Belted	373,600
(i)	Napalm Thickner (lbs)	2,220
(j)	F-51 Type Tanks	51

4. 1 December 1951 through 9 December 1951

(a)	1000# G.P.	9
(b)	1000# SAP	0
(c)	500# G.P.	106
(d)	375# D.B.	0
(e)	3.5" Smoke Rockets	239
(f)	5.0" HVAR	668
(g)	6.5" ATAR	104
(h)	50 Cal. Belted	197,600
(i)	Napalm Thickner (lbs)	2,070
(j)	F-51 Type Tanks	48

D. Training Ammunition Expended

1. 26 September 1951 through 30 September 1951

(a)	40MM	2,598
(b)	20MM	240

2. 1 October 1951 through 31 October 1951

(a)	40MM	2,885
(b)	20MM	800

3. 1 November 1951 through 30 November 1951

(a)	40MM	1,392
(b)	20MM	2,551

4. 1 December 1951 through 9 December 1951

(a)	40MM	2,353
(b)	20MM	0

[redacted]

PART IV - SUMMARY OF OWN AND ENEMY BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Own battle damage

1. No battle damage was sustained by the ships of this task element.

2. Damage to aircraft - see Naval Air Warfare Reports submitted for the period 23 September 1951 through 6 December 1951.

B. Battle damage inflicted on the enemy.

1. No damage was inflicted on the enemy by the ships of this task element while operating therein.

2. Enemy battle damage inflicted by own aircraft - see Naval Air Warfare reports submitted for the period 23 September 1951 through 6 December 1951.

[redacted]

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIES

A. Personnel performance was excellent and in many cases outstanding.

B. Casualties

1. On 30 September 1951 at 1526 ITEM, the plane piloted by Captain W. E. BOYLES, USMCR, crashed into the sea following a catapult launch. The plane sank immediately. The pilot was not recovered. The helicopter and plane guard searched the area thoroughly with negative results.

2. On 15 October 1951 at 1510 ITEM the aircraft piloted by Lieutenant Colonel H. BRILLIANT was damaged by enemy gun fire over enemy held North Korea. Lieutenant Colonel BRILLIANT flew out to sea and was forced to abandon the aircraft. He was picked up by the HMS COMUS. He suffered lacerations and friction burns while abandoning the aircraft.

3. On 31 October at 1315 ITEM, Lieutenant A. L. NORRBOM, USMC, was forced to make a crash landing at sea after his aircraft had been damaged by enemy gun fire. He was recovered by a friendly power boat. He suffered lacerations of the right lower leg.

4. On 31 October 1951 at 1450 ITEM, Captain A. R. HUTCHENS, USMC, made a water landing near the RENDOVA following aircraft engine failure. He was recovered by the ship's helicopter and returned aboard for treatment of minor injuries.

5. On 19 November 1951 at 1100 ITEM while on aerial flight against the enemy, the aircraft piloted by First Lieutenant A. T. WOOD, USMCR, was hit by a .30 caliber bullet which entered the left side of the canopy, wounded the pilot in the left hand and passed out the right side of the canopy. The wound was not serious and the pilot experienced no difficulty in returning to the ship.

6. On 1 December 1951 at 1200 ITEM, Major W. H. RANKIN, USMC, was injured in action while on an aerial flight against the enemy. An exploding shell from enemy gunfire damaged the aircraft and a shell fragment became lodged in Major RANKIN's upper right thigh.

7. On 6 December 1951 at 1230 ITEM, the aircraft piloted by Captain William MC CARSON, USMC, was seen to crash in enemy held North Korea with no possibility of pilot survival.

8. VMF-212 completed 981 consecutive carrier landings without a barrier crash before departing for U.S.S. BADOENG STRAIT on 8 December 1951.

PART VI - COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Doctrine

1. Commander Task Group 95.1 Operation Order 2-51 (Revised) required rotation of screen commander duties among the various screening vessels for training purposes. In view of the rapid rotation of screening vessels and in the interest of reducing the demands upon the Senior Officer of the screen, it is recommended that the rotation of screen commander duties be discontinued in the action area for Task Element 95.11, the reason being that the actual screen commander is still responsible for the screen's movements which requires him to check all actions of the acting screen commander, thereby doubling his work load and giving him no rest.

2. It is recommended that an Air Controller be assigned surface vessels for periods when those vessels are working with Naval Gunfire Spotting Flights, since such a controller speaks the language of the pilots. In connection with this recommendation the following dispatches are quoted:

(a) CTE 95.13 (ST. BRIDES BAY), Confidential Dispatch 121442Z of 12 October 1951 to CTG 95.1 - (Paraphrase not required) "Close cooperation between strike aircraft and this command in the last two days has been almost entirely due to the chance provision of a Liaison Officer. Most strongly recommend that an experienced officer from the carrier operating in the area be lent to the ship of CTE 95.13."

(b) CTG 95.1 Confidential Dispatch 130633Z of 13 October 1951 to U.S.S. RENDOVA (Paraphrase not required). "Strongly concur with CTE 95.13's 121442Z. Would be grateful if you would consider lending one experienced officer for this duty. Propose rotation about every other operating period to enable officer to become sufficiently "in the picture", to further enchance his value. Regret SYDNEY has insufficient pilots to permit loan of one for this duty."

(c) CTE 95.11 (U.S.S. RENDOVA) Confidential Dispatch of 14 October 1951 to Commander Task Group 95.1 - (Paraphrase not required). "CTG 95.1 130633Z and CTE 95.13 121442Z.Concur heartily and had our pilots not been operating since 20 September without adequate rest would designate one for succeeding operation X Can definitely provide one for our next but believe Marine Air Ground Control Officer more appropriate since pilot would be grounded too long X If you authorize shall attempt obtain one forthwith from First Marine Air Wing."

3. In connection with paragraph 2 above, the statement of Captain G. C. ARMSTRONG, USMC, VMF-212, who was shot down on 10 October 1951 as a result of enemy ground fire and recovered by HMS ST. BRIDES BAY is included as enclosure (3).

B. Aircraft

1. The usual trouble with broken or pulled out pigtails in rockets due to ejected shell casings was encountered. Most of this trouble was eliminated by firing the two inboard rockets before firing the machine guns.

2. When long delay fuses were used in general purpose bombs, skip bombing, not dive bombing was employed. This prevented the bomb casing from rupturing and causing either a dud or a low order detonation.

C. Equipment

1. In several instances, high winds caused malfunction of SPS antenna. Winds of 40 knots or more caused blowing of fusetrons. A redesigned antenna unit appears to be the only solution to this problem.

2. H4C Catapult

(a) The H4C catapult type bridle catcher has been breaking due to the use of the new 7/8" type bridles. The lugs attaching the bridle catcher to the deck have sheared, causing loss of unit. A "Y" fitting was constructed and fitted to the deck. This fitting gave added support to the securing lugs, thus preventing the bridle catcher from going over the bow.

(b) The spider was broken and bent due to the greater force required to arrest the heavier 7/8" type bridle. It is recommended that a ½" metal plate be welded to the legs of the spider to help hold its shape, strengthen it, and give it more inert mass.

(c) During operations the main pumps on the H4C catapult required excessive time to build up pressure. An expert was requested and upon arrival conducted tests and inspection. As a result of these tests, it was found that improper venting of the gravity tank was also contributing to the slower operation of the equipment. The performance of the pumps was found to be satisfactory but not up to desired standards.

3. Storage space for flight deck crash and rescue gear, "high-line" gear and tow bars forward of the island is not adequate. It is recommended that a crew shelter and storage space be constructed forward of the island between the island and number three gun director station, in order to provide more stowage space for crash and rescue equipment and additional crew shelter for cold weather operations.

4. In several instances equipment on the allowance list was not received, or, after continued follow-up and re-ordering, was duplicated upon receipt. To insure efficient operation and to eliminate use of the ship's operating allotment to fulfill allowances, it is recommended that full allowances be provided when ships are recommissioned.

5. This Command had no photo aircraft. In order to obtain vertical and oblique photographs, an F-56 camera was mounted in a belly tank of an F4U on a special mount built in the ship's metal shop. This mount was constructed in such a manner that it permitted the camera to be tilted fore and aft and from side to side to obtain the proper angle for the photographs desired. The setting was made prior to take-off. During cold weather, a 50 Caliber Machine Gun heater was strapped to the camera housing on the side of the camera motor, and the camera was wrapped with asbestos to insure proper functioning of moving parts which were subject to sticking when cold weather caused lubricants to stiffen.

D. Intelligence

1. It is recommended that the ships intelligence officer visit Joint Operational Command, Korea, prior to the ships arrival in the action area, in order to familiarize himself with operational procedures, intelligence data available from that source, and methods necessary to obtain that data.

2. The practice of the relieving carrier sending key personnel to observe the last period of operations of the carrier being relieved is considered by this Command to be a sound and essential procedure.

[redacted]

SECURITY INFORMATION

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN G. C. ARMSTRONG 035997/7302 USMC

I was just pulling out from a strafing attack on Chinese Communist or North Korean troops located in a valley north of the Han Estuary, when my aircraft was hit by ground fire. As far as I could estimate, it was either .50 caliber or 20mm shells that struck the plane, possibly both. My engine started to miss and oil began to spurt from around the cowling. Finally, the engine caught on fire and flames began shooting from the cowling area.

Continuing my pull-out, I intended to reach about 1,000 feet and then bail out, but just before reaching that altitude, a bullet went through the cockpit. Figuring that if I jumped, I would be shot on the way down, I then decided to try and make a water-landing at the mouth of the Yesong River.

Since the flames were the big danger at the present time, I turned off the gas and started to glide. The flames extinguished themselves but the black smoke from the burning oil continued.

Upon looking over the side of the cockpit I realized that I would fall far short of the river mouth so I turned the gas back on. The engine caught but kept missing and the flames broke out again. Realizing however, that this was the only means I had to keep the plane in the air, I continued to shut off the gas until the fire stopped - then turned the gas on until the flames would get too bad.

At last I reached the mouth of the river but was only 200 feet in the air. Having had insufficient time to unbuckle my parachute, I prepared for a water landing anyway.

At an altitude of 100 feet over the water, I tried to lower my landing flaps but they refused to work and I noticed that my hydraulic pressure was at zero.

I landed in the water about one-half mile from the west bank and one-half mile from the north bank in a tail first altitude at about 90 knots. The nose of the aircraft immediately dug into the water and began sliding sideways. The aircraft came to rest in a vertical position with the nose buried in the mud and water coming halfway up between the cockpit and the tail.

While under the water, I undid my safety belt and swam to the surface. As soon as I reached it, the parachute forced the lower part of my anatomy out of the water and tended to force my head and shoulders back under again. I then undid my leg straps and the chute floated to the surface allowing me to lie flat in the water. At that time I noticed that the tail wheel and tail hook on the aircraft were down, indicating hydraulic failure.

Using the floating parachute for a rest, I inflated my Mae West. I waited in this position for a few minutes to see if any enemy troops on the beach fired at me. When no enemy fire was received, I inflated the raft located in the seat of my parachute.

ENCLOSURE (3)

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After the raft was floating, I took off my Mae West, the Air Force survival jacket, shoes and pistol belt and put them in the raft. This enabled me to be able to dive under the water in case someone fired at me from the beach.

Procuring my signal mirror from the Air Force jacket, I signaled the British Frigate St. Brides Bay, which was at the other end of the Han Estuary. The frigate had already been contacted by one of the wingmen and had a boat lowered and on the way.

I then got into the raft and started paddling towards the approaching boat. Before I was picked up however, I noticed two sampans start out from the shore but retreated when the planes drew near.

While aboard the Frigate, I noticed that they had quite a bit of trouble with the radio communication between the ship and the aircraft used for air spotting. Since these were aircraft from my own squadron, I became interested and found that most of the trouble came from voice accent and the inability of the air controller to determine exactly what a Corsair aircraft could do on a mission of that type.

After talking with the commanding officer of the Frigate, I took over as air controller and directed five or six air spotting missions; all with good results.

It was then I heard that the guerillas were about to make a landing. Wondering if the Marines would be able to lend close air support in a deal of this sort, I requested and received, permission to accompany a British Officer on the landing.

That night I embarked on a JML (Japanese Mine Layer) with the British Officer who was acting as navigator, and some guerillas. Another JML carried other guerillas while the main attacking force was to come from another area. The JML that I was in was supposed to run close to the shore-line and draw fire from the enemy troops so that the main force could land undetected at another point. This ruse worked very well and the South Korean guerillas seemed to enjoy the return fire they were receiving from the beach.

During daylight hours, both JML's were supposed to return prior to the ebbing of the tide, but the South Korean guerillas did not wish to do this and by the time the British officer and I could convince them, the tide had started out and both JML's were mired in the mud about 1,000 feet from the enemy held shore-line.

I immediately radioed the St. Brides Bay and notified them about what had happened. I requested that they send a dispatch to the escort carrier, USS RENDOVA, asking for planes to act as a Target Combat Air Patrol. Immediately upon receiving an urgent dispatch the RENDOVA relayed an order via her CAP (Combat Air Patrol) to a flight of aircraft operating in the area and directed them to the scene. Within a few minutes, this flight of Marine Corsairs was covering the JML's to prevent enemy troops on the beach from firing at the marooned boats.

It was during this time that I noticed that whenever the guerillas fired at the beach, troops on the beach fired back at the boats. When the guerillas did not fire however, the troops did not fire either. I and the British officer then ordered the guerillas to cease firing.

The planes covering the boats still had their ordnance aboard so I acted as air controller and directed them to targets on the beach where they could unload their rockets and bombs. Later another flight of aircraft was directed to the scene by the RENDOVA and continued to cover the stranded JML's. This flight was also directed to enemy targets for attack.

After two hours, the tide began to rise and when the water was high enough for the JML's to manouver, the planes strafed and rocketed the beach so the boats could depart the area. As the JML's departed, the order was given the guerillas to open fire again.

During the time that the boat was firing at the beach, a gun emplacement returned fire. When the guerillas returned the fire about 15 or 20 troops ran from the emplacement. Those enemy troops, dressed in white, then heard planes coming and dispersed into nearby fields and pretended to be working. When the planes left, the troops formed again and left the area.

It is my opinion that had it not been for the covering aircraft both JML's would probably have been lost to the enemy.

On the 14th of October I was transferred from the St. Bridos Bay to a U.S. Destroyer and returned to the USS RENDOVA.