ORIGINAL

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-09B92C

U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
Care of Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CVA45/ A9-4
Ser 0129

19 MAR 1953

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SECURITY INFORMATION

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH FLEET
(3) Commander Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for period 8 February 1953 through 19 March 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.4 of July 1951

Encl: (1) Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 8 February 1953 through 19 March 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Confidential Dispatch Ø2Ø8Ø4Z of February 1953 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), Captain Robert E. DIXON Commanding, Rear Admiral Apollo SOUCEK Commander Carrier Division THREE, and CVG-5 embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan for the Operating Area at 0700I on 8 February 1953.

On 11 February 1953 at 0700I the ship joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN in Area Sugar.

The MISSION of this force is that assigned to the Carrier Group in Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Operation Order No. 2-52.

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PART II

CHRONOLOGY

2-8-53: The Valley Forge departed Yokosuka, Japan, 0900I for the Combat Area in accordance with CTF-77 Confidential [redacted] of ØZØ8Ø4Z of February 1953.

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2-9-53: Enroute to Combat Area. Anti-aircraft firing and general drills were held. Air operations were conducted in the afternoon in the vicinity of southern Kyushu for refresher training of pilots.

2-10-53: Enroute to Combat Area. In the vicinity of the Tsushima Straits a joint air defense excercise was conducted with the 43rd Air Division of the Japanese Air Defense Force. A message received from the 43rd Air Division (1ØØ53ØZ of February) at the conclusion of this exercise is quoted:

APPRECIATE YOUR PARTICIPATION IN JT EXERCISE TODAY WHICH

PROVIDED EXCELLENT TNG IN ALL PHASES AIR DEF.

While attempting to bring aboard his AD with a rough running engine, ENS D.D. POULSON, of VF-54, was forced to ditch when, short in the groove, his engine failed completely. ENS POULSON was recovered uninjured almost immediately by the Valley Forge helicopter. In addition to flight operations general drills were also conducted.

2-11-53: The ship joined Task Force 77 in Area Sugar at 0700I. RADM A. SOUCEK relieved RADM R.F. HICKEY as Commander Task Force 77. Ships present were the carriers U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), the cruiser U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA-135), and various destroyers of the screening force, and the replenishment force. No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished.

2-12-53: The Valley Forge celebrated her return to action by launching 84 sorties, 61 of them offensive missions. Pre-dawn hecklers started the days fire works by destroying 4 trucks and damaging 12, destroying or damaging 6 buildings plus several highway and rail cuts. Meanwhile, Jets from VF-51 on a reconnaissance flight destroyed 7 supply shelters and made 3 highway cuts. The morning propeller flights although scheduled for a Close Air Support mission and a strike, were diverted due to bad weather in their target areas, and hit targets of opportunity destroying 15 buildings and damaging 9 more.

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The afternoon Jet strike was cancelled. Later in the day a Propeller Close Air Support mission and strike were launched reporting destruction on 10 barracks, 9 buildings, a highway bridge and 3 railroad cars. RADM R.F. HICKEY, COMCARDIV FIVE transfered his flag from the U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CVA-33) to the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). The U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) was detached from Task Force 77 and departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

2-13-53: The dawn hecklers, though hampered by bad weather, located a gasoline truck convoy destroying 7 trucks and damaging 3 more. Snow and freezing rain forced the curtailment of all further air operations for the day. General drills were conducted.

2-14-53: Hecklers resumed operations early this morning attacking trucks along the Main Supply Routes, destroying 8 and damaging 5 more. The morning Jets on 2 reconnaissance missions and Cherokee strikes, destroyed 5 buildings, 3 railroad cars, a supply shelter and made 1 rail cut. These were followed by a full scale Propeller strike which destroyed 12 buildings. The afternoon Panter strike along with strike and Close Air Support missions by Corsairs and Skyraiders brought the highest total destruction for the ship during its present tour. The following dispatch from ComCarDiv-3 was received relative to todays operations.

> WEATHER REPORTS FROM MORNING HECKLERS WERE EXCELLENT X
> WELL DONE TO PILOTS AND COMMUNICATIONS
>
> I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN AWARE OF FACT THAT ADMINISTRATIVELY
> MY DIVISION WAS FINE X AFTER RECENT SPLENDID
>
> PERFORMANCE ESPECALLY TODAYS AM SATISFIED THAT I ALSO HAVE AN
> OUTSTANDING TACTICAL DIVISION X AM HIGHLY
>
> PLEASED WITH EACH SHIP AND AIR GROUP

2-15-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

2-16-53: The morning hecklers found truck traffic heavy and their attacks accounted for more than 20 destroyed or damaged. They also destroyed 15 buildings and made several rail cuts. The morning Jet launch hit a Cherokee strip opposite the II ROK Corps with resultant destruction of several barracks and trucks. This event was closely followed by a Propeller Close Air Support mission and a strike in the front line area. In the afternoon, Jets flew a reconnaissance mission against a marshalling yard in the Kowan area making several railcuts and damaging 6 railroad cars and 10 buildings. In the last

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Corsair, Skyraider launch of the day, Corsairs of VF-92 on a Close Air Support mission across from the X Corp area, had 95 per cent coverage of their target area, destroying 6 buildings with 6 secondary explosions and leaving many fires. Skyraiders and Corsairs on a Cherokee strike were equally successful damaging and destroying 15 buildings. A total of 109 sorties were launched from the Valley Forge today including routine CAP and ASP flights.

2-17-53: Dawn Hecklers led off the days attack by destroying 9 buildings and a highway bridge. The early Jet reconnaissance flight destroyed 5 buildings and damaged 5 more. At the same time a Jet strike on a Cherokee strip destroyed 2 small supply dumps, 5 supply shelters and 5 buildings. The morning Propeller strike hit coastal guns in the Wonsan area, silencing all guns. A Close Air Support flight received a score of 95 per cent coverage and a Cherokee strike 85 per cent coverage for a total destruction of 25 buildings, 25 supply shelters with many secondary explosions and fires, all controller confirmed. A total of 93 missions were flown, 81 of them offensive sorties.

2-18-53: Todays strikes were aimed entirely at the North Korean rail system. A total of 50 rail cuts were scored including 2 railroad bridges and one railroad bypass destroyed and 7 railroad bridges damaged. 89 Sorties were flown, 73 combat missions.

2-19-53: Replenished at sea. No air operations were held.

2-20-53: The morning Jet and Propeller strikes were aimed at supply buildings in the areas north of the bombline, destroying 25 buildings and damaging 12. At the same time a Close Air Support mission, by Corsairs of VF-92, in the areas across from the II ROK Corps, knocked out 6 bunkers and destroyed 100 yards of trenches. Corsairs and Skyraiders on a strike destroyed 4 buildings and 5 railroad cars in a raid on a Cherokee strip. The night hecklers found the Main Supply Route crowded with truck traffic and before returning to the Valley Forge had destroyed 14 trucks and damaged 4. In addition they destroyed 4 railroad cars and made 1 rail cut and 4 highway cuts. A total of 99 sorties were launched including routine CAP and ASP flights.

2-21-53: No air operations were held due to bad weather over the target area.

2-22-53: The days air operations were launched with a Jet Cherokee strike and reconnaissance hop which destroyed 3 rail cars and made 3 rail cuts.

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The Cherokee strike had 27 hits in the target area with 27 bombs. In the meantime, Corsairs and Skyraiders were on a Close Air Support mission, strike and Cherokee strike. The combined destruction for the three missions include 8 supply shelters, 4 buildings, 7 bunkers and 2 coastal batteries. The remainder of the afternoon missions were cancelled. The night hecklers were launched, however, destroying 4 trucks and 6 buildings. A total of 59 sorties were flown. VADM J.J. CLARK, Com7thFlt, visited the Valley Forge this day. The U.S.S KEARSARGE (CVA-33) was detached from TF-77 and departed for Yokosuka enroute to CONUS. The U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-36) joined the Task Force.

2-23-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished. Ships present were U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-36), U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47), U.S.S. LOS ANGELES (CA-135), and various ships of the screening force and replenishment force. AA firing at a drone was conducted after replenishment was completed.

2-24-53: Air operations were resumed with the morning hecklers destroying 6 buildings, 1 truck, and a factory. The early morning Jet reconnaissance and Propeller strikes were diverted to their Weather Alternates due to weather over the target area. Later, strikes on a Close Air Support mission and Cherokee strikes destroyed 46 buildings and 2 morter positions. While making a run on a group of buildings in the Wonsan area, LTJG MC ARTHURS' AD was hit by AA. He managed to reach Wonsan Harbor where he ditched his airplane and was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from Yodo Island within 15 minutes. LTJG HAYWARD of VF-51 was forced to ditch his Panter Jet on take off when a power failure occured. He was picked up immediately by the helicopter from the U.S.S. ROCHESTER (CA-124). The Valley launched a total of 87 sorties today including ASP and CAP.

2-25-53: A 0415 heckler launch started the days air operations by attacking trucks along the east coast from Wonsan to Hamhung. Their efforts resulted in destroying or demaging, at least, 19 trucks and 20 buildings. At 0700, two Jet reconnaissance flights, a Cherokee strike and a Close Air Support mission were launched. When the final results of these missions were tabulated the Red forces were short 35 troops, a power sub-station, and 17 supply buildings. The afternoon strikes, both Jet and Propeller were aimed primarily at supply buildings along the Main Supply Routes, of which 26 were destroyed and 23 damaged. Many secondary explosions and large secondary fires were observed at the targets. 85 Sorties were launched, 52 of them offensive missions.

2-26-53: A total of 92 sorties were launched today.

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Starting with pre-dawn heckler flights which destroyed 7 buildings and a truck, the air group experienced a successful day. The morning Jet reconnaissance hops and strikes accounted for 7 more buildings and 8 supply shelters. The first Propeller launch sent Corsairs and Skyraiders on a Close Air Support mission and a Cherokee strike. Both assignments directly across the front lines from the II ROK Corps, resulted in the destruction of 15 vehicle shelters, 3 mortar positions and 25 yards of trenches. An afternoon Close Air Support mission in the same area accounted for 8 personnel shelters and 75 yards of trenches destroyed and 6 bunkers damaged.

2-27-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished.

2-28-53: Though hampered by non-operational weather in the afternoon the Valley launched a total of 86 sorties. All strikes for the day were diverted from their primary targets and Weather Alternates and targets of opportunity were hit. A total of 47 buildings and 1 power plant destroyed were the results of the days activity.

3-1-53: The days air operations were initiated with a Jet reconnaissance and Cherokee strikes which destroyed 5 buildings and 1 truck. This was followed by a Propeller Cherokee strike and Close Air Support missions. On return they were assigned a special mission to silence coastal defense guns in the Wonsan Area. Due to intense smoke and dust the exact results could not be assessed. The afternoon Jet and Propeller hops accounted for many cave entrances being blocked or destroyed and a coastal battery being knocked out. The night hecklers found truck traffic exceptionally light destroying only 4 trucks and 2 buildings.

3-2-53: No air operations were held this date due to non-operational weather.

3-3-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

3-4-53: Morning hecklers commenced air operations with strikes over the coastal Main Supply Routes from Wonsan to the border destroying 8 buildings, 6 railroad cars and 8 trucks. The major part of the days air operations were devoted to leaflet drops on the east coast of Korea from the bombline to the Yalu River. The leaflet drop was the first major drop by carrier based planes during the Korean Conflict.

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3-7-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

3-8-53: A total of 107 sorties were flown this date commencing with a Jet flak suppression mission at 0800. This event was coordinated with Skyraiders and Corsairs from the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34) and was carried out successfully. The morning Propeller strikes were a Close Air Support mission in the X Corps area and a Cherokee strike in the II ROK Corps area. The afternoon missions saw Panthers from VF-51 and VF-53 providing flak suppression for both Air Group Five and One Hundred Two. The Propellers once again were called in on Close Air Support, this time in the X Corps area; there they destroyed 8 bunkers and 8 supply buildings. Skyraiders and Corsairs at the same time were over a Red supply dump in the Wonsan area where they destroyed 35 buildings, started 5 large fires. Two large secondary explosions were also observed.

3-9-53: Morning Propeller strikes centered all their efforts on special strikes on military and personnel shelters in the area just south of Wonsan. Panther Jets at the same time were providing flak suppression for Corsairs and Skyraiders from the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34). Two morning Close Air Support mission were flown; one in the IX Corps area, the other for the II ROK Corps. These same missions were repeated again in the afternoon, in the same Corps area. The Close Air Support missions accounted for a total destruction of 22 personnel shelters, 8 heavy mortar positions, 75 yards of trenches and several large secondary explosions. An arternoon Cherokee strike by Corsairs and Skyraiders destroyed 32 military buildings, all of which resulted in several large secondary explosions. Quote the controller of this mission "Superior Strike" LTJG R.C. GEDNEY, VF-51, while flying his Panther Jet on a strike just south of Wonsan was killed in action when he failed to recover from his bombing run. A total of 114 sorties were flown including regular CAP and ASP flights.

3-10-53: Due to bad weather all air operations were cancelled except CAP and ASP flights. A total of 16 sorties were flown.

3-11-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished at sea.

3-12-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished at sea.

3-13-53: With snow showers and generally bad weather throughout the day air operations were limited to 61 sorties including regular CAP and ASP missions.

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On the morning Propeller launch Corsairs and Skyraiders hit a North Korean rest camp, used for heroes of the Chinese Communist Forces and North Korean Forces who have shot down an allied plane. After the strike a new rest camp was in order and undoubtedly many heroes would shoot no more, the camp was completely destroyed. In the meantime other Skyraiders and Corsairs on a Close Air Support mission in the II ROK Corps area destroyed supplies and personnel shelters.

3-14-53: Morning hecklers on an Electronic Counter Measures mission resumed air operations at 0415. The hecklers found very little truck traffic due to the heavy snow fall of the previous day. Panther Jets flew flak suppression for the morning Propeller strike on a troop billeting area in Hongwon, destroying 10 buildings. In the afternoon Skyraiders and Corsairs flew a Cherokee mission in support of the X U.S. Corps, destroying supply shelters and personnel shelters. Several Naval Gun Fire missions were flown during the day. A total of 111 sorties were flown, 101 of them combat missions.

3-15-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished. At approximately 1536I the USS VALLEY FORGE with ComCarDiv-3 embarked, and the USS MADDOX (DD-731) in company was detached from Task Force 77 to proceed to Hong Kong via Sasebo in accordance with CTF-77 dispatch 120612Z. RADM F. HICKEY USN ComCarDiv-5 on board the USS ORISKANY (CVA-34) relieved RADM A. SOUCEK USN, ComCarDiv-3 as CTF-77.

3-16-53: Arrived Sasebo at 0856I, detached the USS MADDOX (DD-731). Departed Sasebo for Hong Kong at 1300I.

3-17-53: Enroute Hong Kong.

3-18-53: Enroute Hong Kong. Rendezvous was effected with the USS PHILLIP (DDE-498) at 0500H and elements of Patron 46 at 0700H, who are to escort the Valley Forge to Hong Kong. Captain R.E. DIXON conducted Personnel Inspection in the forenoon. Memorial services for LTJG DAVENPORT and LTJG GEDNEY were conducted by the ships Chaplain following the personnel inspection. A smoker was held in the afternoon

3-19-53: Arrived Hong Kong 1402H.

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PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. The following ordnance was expended during this operating period:

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	179
40MM	2031

AIRCRAFT

Bombs	
2000# GP	22
1000# GP	375
500# GP	1,038
250# GP	3,586
100# GP	1,469
220#260 Frag	799
100# Incendiary	132
Rockets	
3.5" Solid	19
3.5" Smoke	16
HVAR	364
ATAR	282
A/C Para. Flares	272
Napalm	13
Leaflet Bomb	215
Depth Bomb 350#	4
Gun Ammunition	
20MM	228,310
50 Caliber	200,970

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted on Communist forces by the ship's air group is included in enclosure (1) and Part VI of this report.

3. Damage inflicted on the air group by Communist forces is included in enclosure (1) and Part VI of this report

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PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

Performance of personnel during this second tour in the operating area was excellent. Commander Task Force 77 message 141120Z of March 1953, addressed to the Valley Forge is quoted:

THIS HAS BEEN A LONG HARD TOUR BUT YOU HAVE WITHSTOOD IT LIKE THE TRUE VETERAN THAT YOU ARE X VALLEY FORGE WITH HER FINE AIR

GROUP IS NOW THE HUB OF THIS BIG WHEEL AND CTF 77 PROUD TO FLY HIS FLAG FROM A SPOKE X MY COMPLIMENTS ON YOUR EXELLENT PERFORMANCE

LAST FIVE WEEKS X WISH YOU GOOD TIME FORTHCOMING VISIT

The ship's company, consisting of 648 petty officers and 1398 non-rated men, proved adequate. During this period only 24 enlisted personnel were transferred, 10 to be absent only temporarily on leave. 22 Men were received aboard for duty, 10 of whom returned from temporary additional duty. The relative permanency of personnel that these figures indicate is one of the blessings and advantages of being in the Combat area.

A critical shortage is developing in the electronic technician rating, particularly is senior supervisory personnel. A ground camera repairmen (PH-3992) is still urgently required.

Morale continued to be excellent. A minority of the crew was affected by a slight increase noted in the number of divorce cases and domestic problems. Emergency leave requests posed a major morale problem since they were received in a relatively large number during this operating period. All were carefully screened and in 8 cases approval was recommended and granted. 9 other requests were disapproved since they failed to fulfill the Commanding Officer's interpretation of the criteria established by the Area Commander. Those emergency leave requests rejected were marginal cases and the men involved are potential sources of discontent and dissatisfaction in spite of explanations of policy and all the factors considered.

LTJG Howard Maurice DAVENPORT, JR., USN, 5034/1310, VF-54. On 4 March 1953, while flying an AD4, flight purpose 1T3, he received AA damage which set his plane afire. Attempting to effect landing on an emergency air strip, he lost control of his plane and crashed into the water at high speed. His body was not recovered. LTJG DAVENPORT was reported killed.

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LTJG Kendall Courtney GEDNEY, USN, 532820/1310, VF-51. On 9 March 1953, while flying an F9F-5, flight purpose 1T1, LT GEDNEY was apparently hit by AA for he was last seen in his dive and was not heard from again. A hot-burning fire, resembling a crashed aircraft, was spotted after the flight leader's recovery. LTJG GEDNEY was presumed killed in the crash for a further search disclosed no survivors in the vicinity and confirmed the fact that an aircraft had crashed.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT

Recreation Motion pictures continued to be the most popular form of shipboard entertainment. Six to eight films, shown in different locations about the ship, were scheduled nightly to provide the maximum availability.

The stock of Hobby-craft supplies, replenished during the last in-port period, was almost exhausted again as the crew purchased over $2000.00 worth of model boats ships and airplane kits. Japanese manufactured model kits proved as satisfactory and popular as the U.S. product, and are much cheaper.

The two-channel shipboard radio station, operating over the RBO system, continued its contribution to morale. One channel is tuned to AFRS programs, and the other furnishes live shows, from 0615 to taps, featuring musical talent in the crew, disk jockeys and sport and news roundups.

The Crew's Lounge and Library have been opened during normal working hours, in addition to the regular after-hours periods, as a result of the extended and irregular operating hours required of the ship. Both have been utilized to a much greater extent. The stock of magazines is good, and replenishment by mail has been reasonably prompt.

Religious Activities The religious program consisted of Protestant devotions at 0700 and 2130, and Catholic Mass at 0630, with Rosary Services at 1830 each week day. Bible classes were held on Monday, Wednesday and Friday at 2000. Protestant Choir practice was held on Tuesday at 1930. Sunday Services consisting of Protestant Divine Services at 0900, 1430 and 2030, and Sunday School at 1000; and of Catholic Masses at 0630, 0900, and 1430, and Rosary Services at 1830.

The Catholic Chaplain heard regular confessions on Saturday evening and at any time on request. Regular office hours were observed daily by each Chaplain and daily visits were made to the sick bay and to the brig. The lecture, "Marriage and Family Life", has been presented to about half the crew and will be continued until all have had an opportunity to hear it.

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Training. The ship's training room was in constant use for lectures, demonstrations and projection of training films. Most of the training program has been conducted on the division level by division officers; however, classes in beginning and advanced algebra, and a class in beginning German, have been inaugurated. 198 GED Test Sections were administered during this operating period, and 40 USAFI courses applied for.

Public Information. Activities during this period are summarized as follows:

5 News feature stories and layouts.
11 News Photo releases.
1 Magazine article and layout
30 Hometowners (roster and form stories)
109 Feature Stories to FHTNC
38 Hometowner photographs
305 "Letters Home" from the Commanding Officer.

PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CIC (Combat Information Center)

The phenomenon of trapping or ducting of radar energy has been prevalent on a number of days during this period on the "line". Extremely long ranges have been noted on the air search radar. In one instance a PB-1W was detected and tracked from a range of 110 miles at an altitude of 3000 feet. On the same day land appeared at a range of 125 miles.

Difficulty still exists in detecting and tracking Jet aircraft without IFF. Fair results have been obtained on days when ducting was evident.

Video returns on Jets in groups of four and six have been obtained at maximum ranges of 50 miles at altitudes between 15,000 and 30,000 feet using the height system of the SX fed into the PPI. Targets were detected first on the RHI scope due to the better definition. Since the sweep on the PPI was generated by the height system, it is relatively easy for a skilled operator to detect proper bearings by checking the position of the sweep at the instant the target appears on the RHI. Due to the high Pulse Repetition Rate of the height system, all contacts on the PPI are blurred.

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This procedure enabled detection when the SX search system and the DRS-6B showed nothing. No intercepts have been tried following this procedure to date due to the lack of time to perfect the technique, however the results attained thus far indicate that further examination is merited.

PHOTOGRAPHY

During this operating period 49 photographic sorties were flown. The following numbers and types of negatives and prints have been processed by the ships photographic laboratory in support of these sorties:

Negatives

9 x 18	4,362
9½ x 9½	577

Prints

9x 18	24,383
9½ x 9½	3,180

Processed negatives and prints of reconnaissance flights are now being forwarded to the NAS Atsugi from CVA-37 via COD approximately two day after the flight is made. This time-table requires that the laboratory processing be done as expeditiously as possible. Steps are being taken to improve the laboratory efficiency without sacrificing quality wherever possible.

A Type B-6 developing outfit has been received for installation. Since receipt, this unit has been in almost continuous use. A report of the operation will be submitted to ComAirPac when sufficient operational data has been accumulated to warrant a complete report.

The time required to dry aerial film has been substantially decreased by the addition of two 1000 watt heating elements and a rubber squeegee to the A-10-A dryer. A report will be submitted on the results obtained when evaluation has been completed.

AIR INTELLIGENCE

[redacted]. During the period of this report no actionable location or movement of A/W or Heavy AA positions were noted. Photography and pilot reports indicate that the old practice of moving AA guns has diminished considerably.

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Wonsan, Hamhung, Hungnam and several other main rail and transportation centers still continue to be heavily defended as are all the major MSR's south and west of Wonsan. Coordinated events were designed to suppress flak in certain selected areas for Cherokee strikes. These events were significant in that the coordination was between the Air Groups of the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45) and the U.S.S. ORISKANY (CVA-34), each flying flak suppression for the other. These events proved highly successful though carried on without the benefit of joint briefings.

Weekly Meetings. Periodic meetings between the Staff Intelligence Officers and the Ship's Intelligence Officers have clarified many of the small details of daily operations. It is recommended that weekly meetings be held between all the Intelligence Officers on the operating carriers, thus clarifying the Staff's desires as to Strike Flash Reports, damage assessments, target selections, coordinated strikes, flak, and any other currently important intelligence matters.

Damage Assessment. The primary missions during the period of this report have been Cherokee strikes and close air support. Damage assessment has been very difficult on Cherokee strikes due to the nature of the targets and the fact that there is no air controller. Air controllers on Close Air Support missions have heretofore been giving the damage assessment as a percentage effectiveness and a percentage coverage of the target area. Fifth Air Force is now trying to standardize their method of damage assessment so that we can get a more accurate picture of actual damage done. This will be a great aid in making a more accurate strike flash report and a great morale builder for the pilots.

Daily Intelligence Summary. A daily intelligence summary is given by the Ship's Intelligence Officer over the 1MC circuit to all officers and men. It includes a summary of the days operations, a short schedule for the next day, and any intelligence information that has been cleared for common usage. This has been a great help in keeping everyone interested in the overall picture.

Hong Kong. A twenty page general information Hong Kong booklet was prepared by this office on our impending visit to that port. It was found that the print shop can give excellent service on large quantity production and that enough booklets should be printed so that all hands have an individual copy.

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Recommendation. It is strongly recommended that the ship's Intelligence Officer board the current operating carrier each time the ship joins CTF-77 after its period of upkeep. This procedure will insure that the ship has the very latest intelligence information and will facilitate a smooth first day of operations.

DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

	DESTROYED	DAMAGED
OXCARTS	15	13
SUPPLY DUMPS	0	4
AMMO DUMPS	1	0
RR CARS	39	124
LOCOMOTIVES	1	4
RR BYPASSES	1	1
RR BRIDGES	2	10
HIWAY BRIDGES	4	1
TRUCKS	86	60
HIWAY BYPASSES	0	15
WAREHOUSES	2	4
GUN EMPLACEMENTS	34	16
POWER INSTALLATIONS	1	1
FACTORIES	1	0
BUNKERS	33	25
BARRACKS AND BLDGS	766	179
SUPPLY SHELTERS	68	58
PERSONNEL SHELTERS	42	0
VEHICLE SHELTERS	20	8
CAVES	24	3
MINE AREAS	1	0
TROOPS KILLED	40	
HIWAY CUTS	39	
RR CUTS	111	
YARDS OF TRENCHES DESTROYED	637	
TOTAL SORTIES	1,830	

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

Forty-nine photographic missions were flown during the operating period with target search as the primary mission. Camouflage is being used effectively by the enemy. Buildings are hidden in valleys, under trees or are revetted. Many are earth covered with shrubs planted on the roofs. Installations of this type are usually dispersed to preclude destruction of more than one buildings in a single strafing or bombing attack.

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Increased use of small villages for storage has been observed. Attacks on these villages have resulted in large secondary explosions and gasoline or oil fires. Villages of this type are frequently found near a main supply route and are further identified by heavy track activity and lack of clutter observed in a typical Korean village.

An effort to acquaint pilots with the capabilities and limitations of photo interpretation has been made. It is recommended that all pilots become familiar with the function of photographic interpretation prior to their departure from the U.S.. In almost every case, assigned targets are discovered through photography, the pilots are briefed from photography and supplied photographs of the target for use during the actual attack. In several cases, pilots familiar with photo interpretation have easily identified installations unfamiliar to the photo interpreter, thus increasing the value of the photography.

Enlargements (19x24) of 8x10 target mosaic negatives are being used to brief pilots. These enlargements have proven to be of great assistance in the case of small or camaouflaged targets. This ship maintains a file containing the latest photographic coverage of each area. The plotting system used is an acetate overlay on a 1:250,000 chart with the UTM grid. Since this system is common in the Far Eastern Area; it is recommended that plot sheets be copied at a 1 to 1 scale on a chart utilizing the UTM grid to facilitate plotting.

During the operating period, photographic interpretation dispatch reports averaged 1,000 characters per dispatch. This includes numerals and letters. In the encrypting process, each letter and number is spelled out to prevent garbles. This further increases the length of the dispatch. There are ten regular addressees to this dispatch in addition to the other carriers which are in the operating area. The first phase photographic interpretation dispatch report is primarily for tactical information. However, during inspection of the photography, strategic information is also obtained and reported in conjunction with tactical information. The reporting of strategic information is a function of second phase photographic interpretation. Current photographic interpretation publications require the dissemination of second phase interpretation reports by mail. It is therefore believed that the communication load could be considerably reduced by the use of a mailgram which would contain all strategic information.

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Visual. Visual communications were highly satisfactory except during inclement weather when visibility was seriously restricted. A summary of messages handled by signal personnel follows:

METHOD	RECEIVED	TRANSMITTED	TOTAL
Flashing light	683	207	890
Nancy	149	81	230
Flaghoist	4	54	58
Total	836	342	1178

AIR DEPARTMENT

Air Department operations during this operating period have been routine.

Present scheduling calls for four to twenty Jet aircraft to be launched for flak suppression fifteen to thirty minutes after the strike launch is begun. With the Task Force conventionally turning out of the wind immediately after the strike is launched, the attendant heel of the ship causes movement of Jet aircraft with wings folded to be extremely hazardous. Consequently, the deck spot is committed to "dead packing" the flak suppression Jets aft of the Props. When wind across the deck or the size of the Prop launch makes the deck run critical, catapulting of the first few Props is required. On only a few occasions has this been necessary but the low-wind summer months will dictate this type of launch more frequently. To prevent "blowing down" both catapults one cat is used for Jets and one for the first Propellers, launching both types simultaneously. One aspect of this type of spot is that it reduces the use of the deck-edge elevator in bringing 19000 pound Jets to the flight deck.

Difficulty has been experienced in obtaining "live" bungee for fabrication of forged-eye pendant arrestors. One day's operation was carried out utilizing used F9F inner tubes as a substitute for bungee. Three inner tubes with two nylon webbing grommets and nylon seizing holding the tubes together were used. Eight to twelve successful arrestings of the pendant were obtained.

Two F9F hook point failures were experienced resulting in strike damage to the aircraft. The annealed hook points have not yet been received.

For the first time this deployment, an HO3S-1 equipped with metal rotar blades has been assigned. A full allowance of fabric blade spares is aboard but no metal blade spares are stocked.

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The assignment to carriers of helicopters equipped with fabric rotor blades is considered desirable for two reasons: (1) it is the opinion of Valley Forge pilots that greater pilot fatigue is induced when flying a helicopter equipped with metal blades, and (2) the engaging and disengaging of the rotor is much more hazardous with metal blades.

GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

Deck Evolutions. Nine replenishments were conducted. A brief summary of replenishment data follows:

FUEL OIL AND AVIATION GASOLINE

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	
2-11-53	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	8281.85	Bbls Oil
		45000	Gals Gasoline
2-15-53	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	5647.16	Bbls Oil
		107000	Gals Gasoline
2-19-53	USS KASKASKIA (AO-27)	4497.83	Bbls Oil
		203660	Gals Gasoline
2-23-53	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	6605.28	Bbls Oil
		96030	Gals Gasoline
2-27-53	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	7123.60	Bbls Oil
		159700	Gals Gasoline
3-3-53	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	5588.31	Bbls Oil
		104000	Gals Gasoline
3-7-53	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	5608.83	Bbls Oil
		186130	Gals Gasoline
3-11-53	USS MANATEE (AO-53)	4690.19	Bbls Oil
		111000	Gals Gasoline
3-15-53	USS KASKASKIA (AO-27)	5294	Bbls Oil
		11430	Gals Gasoline

AMMUNITION

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
2-11-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	80 Tons	66.6 tons/hr.
2-15-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	140 Tons	118.7 tons/hr.
2-19-53	USS VIRGO (AKA-20)	298 Tons	119.2 tons/hr.
2-23-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	130 Tons	111.1 tons/hr.
2-27-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	165 Tons	97.1 tons/hr.
3-3-53	USS RAINIER (AE-5)	154 Tons	136.3 tons/hr.
3-7-53	USS VIRGO (AKA-20)	130 Tons	113.4 tons/hr.
3-11-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	203 Tons	166 tons/hr.
3-15-53	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	108 Tons	132 tons/hr.

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PROVISIONS

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
2-11-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	51.5 Tons	60 tons/hr.
2-19-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	47 Tons	56 tons/hr.
3-3-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	39 Tons	78 tons/hr.
3-15-53	USS ALUDRA (AF-55)	113 Tons	108 tons/hr.

AVIATION SUPPLIES

DATE	SHIP	QUANTITY	TRANSFER RATE
2-15-53	USS CHOURRE (ARV-1)	15 Tons	33.3 tons/hr.

On 17 occasions destroyers came alongside for high-line transfers of personnel, light freight and guard mail.

Gunnery Exercises. AA firing at towed sleeves was conducted in area LOVE on 9 February while enroute Yokosuka to the Task Force. The period was of 2 hours duration. Firing was conducted on 3 replenishment days using condition 3 watch personnel. This procedure provides excellent training for those who will be called upon to fire the first rounds in event of a surprise attack. The interest and competitive spirit stimulated between the sections of the condition 3 watch are evident and gratifying.

During this period on the "line" all Line Heads of Departments have been qualified in replenishment ship approaches.

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

Aviation Supply. During this period, non-allowance list spares continued to be the primary cause of ACOG. The 17 non-allowance list items requested on an ACOG basis will be reported in the quarterly usage report to AMC Oakland.

Ten items of aviation spares were furnished to other carriers, seven for ACOG.

Provisions Replenishment. During this period provisions were replenished three times with a total of 137.5 tons being supplied of the 196.5 tons requisitioned.

The policy of the reefers to deliver a mixture of dry, frozen and chill items in the same sling precludes expeditious stowage on the receiving ship as considerable time is wasted in segregation into proper categories. Likewise, surveys of thawed items are considered excessive due to the reefers "breaking out" in early morning with ultimate delivery in late afternoon.

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MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

The general health of the air group and ship's company has been good. There were ninety admissions to the sick bay during the period of this report which were classified as medical. During the first few days of operations after the last in-port period, there were a considerable number of upper respiratory infections, influenza-like in character, accompanied by gastroenteritis. Most of these were handled as outpatients, only two being severe enough to require admission to the ward. No further incidence of these cases has arisen. Other acute upper respiratory infections (common cold, etc.) however, continue to lead in the number admitted to the sick list, and comprise the greatest percentage of cases seen and treated as outpatients at sick call.

The number of casualties due to shipboard accidents has been very low. Minor seven (7); major one (1).

There were three patients received from other ships for treatment. Included in this number is a pilot of Fighter Squadron NINETY-THREE, rescued by a Canadian DDE. The other two cases were contusion, right wrist; and appendicitis, acute, nec, both received from destroyers.

Medical department personnel shortage continues to be an acute problem. It has been an arduous task to perform the requirements of the department with only 60% of allowance on board.

Venereal Disease

The following is a tabulation of venereal disease incidence for the period 25 January 1953, to 10 March 1953. During this period the ship had its second in-port period in Yokosuka, from 25 January to 8 February 1953.

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	15
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	16
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	124
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	7

For comparative purposes, venereal incidence during the last reported period, from 1 January 1953, to 25 January 1953, was as follows:

Syphilis	0
Chancroid	2
Urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus	7
Urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	46
Prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec	3

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It is noted that the incidence of urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, for the present operating period is roughly three times what it was in the previous action report embracing the dates 1 January to 25 January 1953. There have been twice the number of admissions for urethritis, acute, due to gonococcus; and prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, in comparison to the corresponding admissions of the last operating period.

This does not reflect an increasing incidence of VD among all personnel aboard. It can be attributed to two factors:

a. The in-port period in Yokosuka, preceeding the present cruise was twice as long as the first in-port period in Yokosuka, preceeding the previous cruise.

b. There are nineteen cases of resistant urethritis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, and prostatitis, acute, non-gonococcic, nec, included in the present action report stemming from from sexual contacts made during the first Yokosuka in-port period in December 1952.

When these factors are considered, it becomes apparent that venereal incidence has not increased, but has remained at its former low level, which is considered a favorable commentary on the effectiveness of the VD educational program to-date.

Air Group

Twenty-eight (28) pilots and three (3) aircrewmen were grounded. Two (2) pilots for short periods, and two (2) for long periods. The aircrewmen were being grounded for an extended time.

ACCIDENT SUMMARY

ENS D.P. POULSON, 400956/1325, USNR, ditched an AD-4 off the port quarter due to engine failure when attempting an emergency landing on 10 February 1953. He escaped with minor lacerations of head and neck, and was rescued by helicopter.

LTJG T.B. HAYWARD, 498206/1310, USN, sustained a severe laceration of his tongue, contusion over his left eye, multiple contusions of his right shoulder and rib cage, when his F9F-5 crashed into the water immediately after being catapulted. He was soon rescued by helicopter on 24 February 1953.

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LTJG K.V. MC ARTHUR, 521674/1310, USN, escaped uninjured following his ditching an AD-4 in Wonsan Harbor on 24 February 1953, following engine failure due to being hit by enemy gunfire.

LTJG H.M. DAVENPORT, JR., 503413/1310, USN, was mission and presumed drowned as he was seen entering the water in his AD-4 which had been hit by enemy gunfire North West of Wonsan, Korea, on 4 March 1953.

LTJG J.B. OVERTON, 496981/1315, USNR, sustained first and second degree burns on his face, hands and thighs, and ruptured quadriceps tendon on 4 March 1953. His F4U caught fire due to enemy gunfire near Wonsan. He parachuted and landed on the beach, however, his parachute only partially opened. He was rescued by helicopter from the USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135) while his wingman, LT L.A. HENKE, 406945/1315, USNR, flew RESCAP.

ENS D.A. BRYLA, 408037/1325, USNR, sustained a simple strain-fracture of the left ischium on 5 March 1953, when his F4U flipped over on its back as he was pulling out of a dive. The ailerons froze and he was unable to roll out to an upright position. Recovery was accomplished by then pulling through a half-loop or split "S". He was transferred to the U.S. Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Japan.

LTJG K.C. GEDNEY, 532820/1310, USN, was missing in action on 9 March 1953, as his plane apparently failed to pull out of a dive in the presence of heavy enemy anti aircraft fire over Korea.

In was noted that symptoms of chronic fatigue developed after the first twenty-one days on the line. Morale, motivation, were markedly lowered during the latter part of the cruise. Although pilot performance was not measurably affected, it is believed that continued extension of tours over three weeks may result in a significant drop in performance not only of pilots, but also of flight and hanger deck personnel. This observation has also been made by other carriers in their previous action reports.

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PART VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are made in this report.

a. Weekly meetings of Air Intelligence Officers be held. Page 15 paragraph 2.

b. Ships Air Intelligence Officers to board an operating carrier when rejoining CTF-77 in order to obtain current intelligence. Page 16 paragraph 1.

c. Pilots be familiarized with the functions of photographic interpretation prior to departure for the Combat Zone. Page 17 paragraph 2.

d. Plotting sheets be copied at a 1:1 scale. Page 17 paragraph 3.

e. Mailgram be substituted for dispatch method of reporting of strategic information to certain addressees. Page 18 paragraph 1 and 2.

R. E. DIXON

Distribution List:

CNO (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT (advance)	2
CINCPACFLT Evaluation Group	1
COMNAVFE (advance)	1
COMNAVFE Evaluation Group	1
COMSEVENTHFLT (advance)	1
CTF SEVENTY SEVEN (advance)	1
COMAIRPAC	5
COMSERVPAC	1
COMFAIRALAMEDA	1
COMFAIRJAPAN	1
Naval War College	1
COFAIRBETUPAC	2
VC 3	1
VC 11	1
VC 35	1
VC 61	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)	1

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CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-9)	1	
CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA-34)	1	
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)	1	
CO, USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39)	1	
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA-40)	1	
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)	1	
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)	1	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA-18)	1	
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)	1	
CO, USS BOXER (CVA-21)	1	
NLO JOC Korea	1	
COMCARDIV ONE	1	
COMCARDIV THREE	1	
COMCARDIV FIVE	1	
COMCARDIV FIFTEEN	1	
COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN	1	
ATG-1	1	
ATG-2	1	
CVG-2	1	
CVG-5	5	
CVG-7	1	
CVG-9	1	
CVG-15	1	
CVG-19	1	
CVG-101	1	
CVG-102	1	
CVG-11	1	
COMFAIRHAWAII	1	
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)	1	
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)	1	
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	1	
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)	1	
USS SICILY (CVE-118)	1	
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)	1	
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE-119)	1	
USS TRIPOLI (CVE-64)	1	