U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
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From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1
By: OP-098920

Subj: Action Report for period 30 December 1952 through 25 January 1953

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4 of July 1951

ANNEX (1) Cold Weather Photographs

Encl: (1) Air Group FIVE Action Report

1. In compliance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 30 December 1952 through 25 January 1953 is submitted herewith.

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In accordance with Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Confidential Dispatch 260936Z of December 1952 the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CVA-45), CAPTAIN ROBERT E. DIXON USN, Commanding, REAR ADMIRAL APOLLO SOUCEK USN, ComCarDiv THREE and CVG-5 embarked, departed Yokosuka Japan for the Operating area at 0700I on 30 December 1952.

On 2 January 1953 the USS VALLEY FORGE joined Task Force 77. At various times during this operating period other ships in company were the USS ESSEX (CVA-9), the USS ORISKANY (CVA-34), the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33), the USS MISSOURI (BB-63), with Commander SEVENTH FLEET VADM J.J. CLARK embarked, and various cruisers and screening destroyers.

On 5 January 1953 Commander Carrier Division THREE RADM APOLLO SOUCEK USN, embarked in the USS VALLEY FORGE, assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77. The USS KEARSARGE with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed the Task Force.

On 21 January 1953 Commander Carrier Division FIVE RADM R.F. HICKEY USN, embarked in the USS KEARSARGE rejoined Task Force 77 and assumed duties as Commander Task Force 77 on 22 January 1953. Commander Carrier Division THREE embarked in the USS VALLEY FORGE departed Task Force 77 and the Operating Area for Yokosuka, arriving there 25 January 1953.

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The MISSION of this force is that assigned to the Carrier Group in Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN Operation Order No. 2-52.

PART II

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

12-30-52: At 0700I the ship departed Yokosuka, Japan for the operating area, with RADM A. SOUCEK USN ComCarDiv THREE and Air Group FIVE embarked. Training exercises and routine ship drills were conducted. The U.S.S. HIGBEE was escort.

12-31-52: Enroute operating area. Conducted refresher air operations in the vicinity of Southern Kyushu. Routine Ships training exercises were held.

1-1-53: Conducted AA firing in the morning and refresher air operations during the afternoon. Took delivery of replacement fleet spare HO3S-1 from K-3. The helicopter crew was flown in by AD's and escorted by them on return to ship.

1-2-53: The Valley Forge was back once again having joined Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN at 0700I to begin her fourth Korean Tour. To celebrate her homecoming the "Valley", starting at 1145, launched a total of seventy-two (72) offensive sorties, striking warehouses, troop billeting and supply areas. Fourteen (14) buildings, two (2) bunkers and a power sub-station were destroyed. LTJG KRAMER, VF 51 started the fireworks by being the first pilot launched.

1-3-53: The first full day of operations saw the "Valley" launching a total of ninety-six (96) sorties at the enemy. Targets ranged from supply concentrations at the bomb line to power installations in the Northern most section of Northern Korea. Part of the days results showed a supply area completely destroyed, a powerplant and factory knocked out along with many other buildings and warehouses. LTJG E. RAWSTHORNE, VF 92 was forced to ditch his Corsair when his engine failed while on his way to the target. He was recovered by helicopter badly shaken and suffering from exposure. On the last recovery of the day LT RUSSEL, VF 51 ditched his F9F along side the ship when on a wave off, his plane experienced an internal explosion and burst into flames. He was picked up almost immediately by the plane guard helicopter and suffered no ill effects from exposure

1-4-53: No air operations were held this date as the Task Force replenished.

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1-5-53: The morning hecklers opened the days operations with a successful attack on truck parking areas destroying three trucks and seven (7) buildings, while damaging three (3) more trucks and five (5) buildings. Added to this tally was a road cut and two (2) railcuts. What started to be a promising day was cut short due to non-operational weather. The balance of the days flights was confine to a Jet recco and a CAS mission.

1-6-53: Non-operational weather limited todays air operations to eight (8) sorties.

1-7-53: No air operations were held this date due to weather.

1-8-53: The first good flying weather in three days found the Valley Forge unleashing destruction at various targets in North Korea. Principal targets were Cherokee targets in the vicinity of the front lines, which were hit repeatedly by Jets and Props from the Valley Forge. Although the Cherokee strikes were successful it was the CAS missions that provided the fireworks for the day. With AD's and F4U's working together four-hundred (400) yards of trenches, ten (10) bunkers, and two (2) artillery positions were destroyed and the pilots were rewarded with a well done by the forward air controller. During this attack ENS BURKEMPER flying an AD from VF 54 was hit by flak and forced to land wheels up at a friendly emergency strip. He was picked up in good condition, and returned to the Valley Forge via COD flight from K-16.

1-9-53: The morning hecklers kicked off the days operations by destroying three (3) trucks, one (1) gun position and getting six (6) rail cuts. This mission was followed by three (3) Jet reccos and a strike, which proved the most successful Jet attacks of the cruise to-date. The marshalling yard at Hyesanjin was severly damaged, one (1) truck and five (5) buildings were destroyed, two (2) rail cuts made along with heavy damage to a round house, one (1) highway bridge, six (6) trucks, several gun positions and buildings. Due to bad weather a CAS mission, the last offensive mission flown, attacked its weather alternates. With the exception of CAP and ASP all further air operations were cancelled. LCDR FICHMAN, Commanding Officer of VF 92 was forced to ditch his F4U due to engine failure just East of Yo-Do Island and was recovered uninjured by a helicopter from the LST 735 after spending 20 minutes in his raft.

1-10-53: No air operations were held as the Task Force replenished. Rough weather prevented completion of replenishment.

1-11-53: Continued replenishment. No air operations were held.

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All afternoon sorties were cancelled due to weather over the beach and an undetermined number of floating mines in the operating area. On the only Prop strike of the day thirty-nine (39) buildings were destroyed. On that launch ENS KORSGREN VF 54 was forced to ditch his AD due to engine failure. He was recovered by helicopter uninjured in four and one half (4½) minutes. The rescue, though a routine helicopter operation was unique in that it was the first rescue from a helicopter affected with a hand operated block and tackle which was fabricated to substitute for the non-operational hoist on the helicopter.

1-19-53: No air operations were held. The Task Force replenished at sea.

1-20-53: Routine air operations continued as a total of ninty-seven (97) sorties were flown, seventy-nine (79) of them offensive, destroying fifty (50) buildings, eight (8) trucks, two (2) oxcarts, while scoring six (6) railcuts and two (2) highway cuts.

1-21-53: The pre-dawn hecklers found many targets of opportunity in the Wonsan-Hungnam areas. They destroyed eleven (11) trucks and damaged twenty-six (26). Our Jets were assigned storage and supply buildings, while the Props attacked factory buildings, supply shelters and flew Cherokee and close air support missions. A total of eighty-two (82) sorties were flown accounting for the reported destruction of forty-four (44) buildings, thirty-six (36) supply and personnel shelter, twelve (12) trucks, and two (2) railroad cars. In addition to this, they reported damaging twenty-eight (28) buildings, eighteen (18) supply and personnel shelter, thirty-two (32) trucks, two (2) highway bridges, two (2) gun emplacements, and three (3) bunkers.

1-22-53: In the first of the three events scheduled, our hecklers bombed the enemy in the North Korea area. Several trucks and buildings were destroyed. Our Jets flew a recco and made strikes against supply shelters and underground warehouses. Several buildings were destroyed and many left burning. The Props combined forces to knock out another Cherokee target. While flying a F9F-5 Panther Jet, LCDR J.E. MULLIGAN, Executive Officer, of VF 53, experienced a power failure forcing him to ditch his aircraft soon after take-off. The Valley Forge helicopter effected a speedy rescue of the ditched pilot. The Valley Forge departed Task Force 77 at 1142I for Yokosuka. Replenishment was condutec upon leaving the Task Force.

1-23-53: Enroute Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing in area George.

1-24-53: Enroute Yokosuka. Conducted AA firing in area Love.

1-25-53: Arrived Yokosuka 1011I.

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1-12-53: No air operations were held due to non-operational weather.

1-13-53: Continued bad weather cancelled all air operations for the day.

1-14-53: No air operations were held this date due to adverse weather conditions and rough seas.

1-15-53: For the first time in five days operational weather prevailed and forty-two (42) sorties were launched at the enemy over North Korea. All targets for the day were in the vicinity of the bomb line with supply shelters and supply concentrations as the main objectives. Controller reported "80 percent coverage, excellent results", on all targets. All afternoon strikes were cancelled when the weather closed in once again.

1-16-53: A full day of air operations was held as the "Valley" launched eighty-five (85) sorties, sixty-one (61) of them offensive missions. The morning prop strike on supply shelters and vehicle repair areas was a success with fourteen (14) buildings and two (2) highway bridges destroyed. One rail bridge two (2) buildings and a rail car were destroyed by VF 53 on a Jet recco. The second Prop strike of the day was diverted to attack one-hundred-sixty (160) rail cars in Wonsan marshalling yard. Four Corsairs from VF 92 and four (4) Skyraiders from VF 54 destroyed twenty (20) cars while damaging forty (40) more. Night hecklers were unable to locate the remaining good rail cars due to atmospheric haze. They did however find heavy truck traffic in the area and destroyed three (3) trucks and damaged seventeen (17) more.

1-17-53: The Valley Forge launched seventy-five (75) sorties including regular CAP and ASP missions. The high standards of the previous day continued as the early Corsair-Skyraider strike destroyed over twenty (20) buildings in their attack on a mill and storage area. Four (4) medium tanks were sighted by VF 51 on a recco mission. Although damaging two (2) of the tanks they were unable to make the kill due to shortage of ammunition. Two-hundred (200) yards of trench were knocked out with six (6) bunkers by twelve (12) Corsairs and Skyraiders. To close out the day, night hecklers raided the marshalling yards in Wonsan, and reported destroying thirty-six (36) rail cars and damaging four (4) more, as well as destroying seven (7) trucks and damaging nine (9) before returning to the "Valley".

1-18-53: Air operations for the day were limited to forty-eight (48) sorties, thirty-four (34) of which were offensive sorties.

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PART III

ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

1. The following ordnance was expended during this operating period

SHIP

5"/38 Caliber	305
40 MM	4501

AIRCRAFT

BOMBS	
1000#GP	179
500#GP	491
250#GP	1009
100#GP	1064
220/260 Fragmentation	317
ROCKETS	
3.5" Solid	24
ATAR	73
GUN AMMUNITION	
20 MM	85370
50 Caliber	102325

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

1. The ship was not attacked during this period and sustained no battle damage.

2. Damage inflicted by the ship's air group is included in enclosure (1), and Part VI of this report.

3. Damage inflicted on the air group by the enemy is included in enclosure (1), and Part VI of this report.

PART V

PERFORMANCE OF PERSONNEL AND CASUALTIES

A. PERFORMANCE

Performance during this first tour in the combat area was somewhat handicapped by inexperience and non-operational weather. Performance rapidly improved to the degree that the Task Force

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Commander commented in a message on 9 January:

"IT IS A PLEASURE TO SEE YOUR SHIP AND AIR GROUP DEVELOPING IN SUCH A SPLENDID MANNER X IN MY OPINON YOUR PROGRESS THUS-FAR HAS BEEN EXCEPTIONALLY FINE X MY HIGHEST COMPLIMENTS"

Intermittent operations due to weather assisted the inexperienced personnel on board in developing to the extent required for full scale operations. The number of officers with no previous combat area experience is significant. Of an average of 112 ship's officers on board, only 61 were on board for a full month or more of the ship's last tour in the area. Further, 35 percent of the officers now attached to the ship have been aboard less than six months.

There was an average of 1965 enlisted ship's personnel actually aboard during this period, although an additional 96 were attached and absent from the ship on temporary additional duty and emergency leave. This number of personnel was considered adequate, except in some special skills. The following are urgently required: Chief Fire Control Technician, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialis and a Ground Camera Repairman (PH-3992). These requirements have been the subject of separate requests.

Personnel in the Air Department will be well balanced in number when all the 40 AN/AA presently ordered to the ship are received.

Morale was considered excellent, and was stimulated further when actual operations proved the proficiency of the ship and air group as a team. There was marked improvement in morale following the receipt of a significant amount of mail.

B. CASUALTIES.

Although several pilots were compelled to ditch their planes, there were no casualties during this operating period. Weather deck personnel performed with efficiency and safety-consciousness and thereby suffered no casualties despite icy deck conditions and periods of extreme cold and rough seas.

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PART VI

GENERAL COMMENTS

OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

CIC (Radar Countermeasures)

I. Shipboard RCM

A. Equipment. This ship is equipped with the RDO, SPR-2 and APR-9 intercept receivers, the DBM direction finder, RDJ pulse analyzer, and RDP Panoramic Adapter.

B. Operation. Normally, a twenty-four hour watch was maintained by CIC personnel on the RCM intercept equipment, however, occasionally the watch was secured during daylight periods while conducting air operations if this ship was not assigned an ECM intercept guard for the day. This was done when the shortage of personnel forced their use at other stations in CIC. No unfriendly radars were intercepted. However personnel received valuable operator training by intercepting and analyzing the radars of the force.

C. Comments.

1. The ship's electronics technicians have done an excellent job of restoring the RCM equipment to an operating condition and installing the APR-9 receiver.
2. The APR-9 is not yet used to maximum advantage as the received signal can not be fed to the RDJ and DBM for pulse and D/F analysis.
3. The presence of own ship's and many friendly radar signals makes interception of enemy radars doubtfull and their analysis extremely difficult in the affected frequency bands.
4. The results with the DBM equipment have been disappointing so far, probably due to a combination of operator technique and the above mentioned interference.

II. Airborne RCM

A. VC 35 det. B has four AD-4N aircraft equipped with APR-9 receivers and APA-70 D/F gear. Two of these planes also have APR-1 receivers and APA-64 pulse analysis equipment.

B. Operation. These aircraft were operated during the day with RCM as the primary mission and at night as hecklers and gators. RCM results were as follows:

1. Very few unfriendly radars were detected during daylight hours.
2. On night heckler flights, many radars signals were received but the aircraft could not bediverted from the primary mission to analyze the signals and take bearings.

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All intercepts not identified as friendly were reported in accordance with ComNavFe Instruction 003521.1. The detachment is also experimenting with several methods for pinpointing enemy radar positions.

COMMUNICATIONS (CIC)

1. Communication difficulties existing in CIC were principally those of feed-over on the various circuits. This condition was caused by the lack of spread between channels. Those affected most were the Air Control and FAD nets. The outstanding example is 142.56 (CAP CONTROL) and 142.74 (ASP CONTROL). The secondary tactical net, (145.08) and the strike control net, (143.64) also affected each other. It is believed that much of this difficulty may be eliminated by careful antenna positioning and the assignment of greater frequency separation in the VHF channelization.

2. The YE transmitter caused a great deal of interference on 143.64 MCS, requiring strike control assignment on days when the YE guard was assigned to another ship. This condition exists because the two (2) transmitters are located in the same space. This can be remedied by a physical separation of the two. The noise level from various sources on 142.56 MCS. was excessive. Some of this was in the form of CW key clicks, originating from within the confines of the ship and the remainder in a form resembling precipitation static which came from the automotive equipment on the flight and hangar decks. It is believed that the installation of shielded distributors and spark plugs in all such equipment will eliminate this. As a result of this excessive noise level, communication with the CAP beyond 30 to 40 miles became quite difficult, rendering it almost impossible to maintain positive control of the aircraft. Investigation disclosed salt-water corrosion on the antenna insulators. A thorough cleaning of the insulators and antenna coupling reduced the CW interference to a satisfactory level.

RADARS (CIC)

1. During this period the SX, SU and XSG-7 radars operated normally and were available for continued use except when necessary to secure them for regular maintenance.

XSG-7 radar is still not completely dependable because of the blind spot on the starboard bow due to the location of the antenna.

SPS-6B. Two failures in the IFF co-axial line in the AN/SPS6-B antenna pedestal reduced the range considerably in the Mark V IFF.

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Correction of these difficulties and a temporary arrangement to drive the ANUP-11 slave antenna permitted excellent use of the Mark V IFF with ranges up to 204 miles being obtained.

The SPS-6B radar still gives considerable spurious responses within close land range, almost nullifying it's air search possibilities.

2. The effect of temperature inversion of the effective ranges of the various radars was of particular interest. On several occasions when an inversion was reported by aircraft in the area, aircraft were detected and tracked at ranges up to 100 miles on the SX without use of IFF. Under the same conditions G-Band IFF was tracked to ranges of 115 miles and Mark X to 150. At the same time surface targets were detected and tracked to ranges of 43,000 yards on the SU radar.

PHOTOGRAPHIC LABORATORY

PERSONNEL

1. Nineteen (19) men are assigned the photo laboratory as ship's company force, of which seven (7) are petty officers and two (2) are designated PHAN's. Personnel desiring to strike for photographic ratings were canvassed, and ten (10) were accepted to make up the complete team. Intensive on-the-job training with key men in charge of the new strikers has proved satisfactory for maintaining quality and production rate. Maintenance, and repair of equipment has proved to be difficult without an assigned qualified camera repairman. A recommendation for assignment of a qualified repairman to all CVA's has been submitted to BUPERS.

PRODUCTION

2. Twenty (20) photographic sorties were flow during this period. Eight thousand forty-eight (8048) 9x18", four-hundred-seventy-seven (477) 9½x9½, and seven hundred fifty-four (754) 8x10" prints were made from the photographs obtained for target studies. No unusual production problems were encountered.

AEROLOGY

1. On the tenth of January a depression formed in the East China Sea, moving Northeastward, through the Tsushima Straits and South of the Task Force.

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On the eleventh, high winds accompanied by rain which after a short interval turned to snow along with increasing seas caused the curtailment of operations. Winds from the North Northeast exceeded fifty (50) knots at times, and the seas reached an estimated height of twenty-five (25) feet. Snow continued to fall almost continuously until early on the fourteenth. Heavy icing was encountered due to the extremely low temperatures which prevailed in all portio of the Sea of Japan. The minimum temperature of 10.2°F was recorde on the thirteenth. Sea Smoke was present on the water surface duri most of the heavy weather, and on the morning of the fourteenth, it was thick enough to restrict visibility to two (2) to three (3) miles for a period of four hours. (See photographs Annex 1)

AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. Organization

The organization of the intelligence department as set up when first reporting to Task Force 77 proved satisfactory and was not changed. Responsibility for reports was divided among the Air Intelligence Officer, the assistant Air Intelligence Officer, CAG Air Intelligence Officer and the Squadron Air Intelligence Officers. That Officer which could most easily obtain the required information was given the responsibility of making the reports. The ship's Air Intelligence Officer acted as coordinator.

2. OPERATIONS

Operations of the Air Intelligence Office have functioned on a twenty-four hour basis during the period of this report. The use of standard forms by both the squadron Air Intelligence Officers and the ships Air Intelligence Officers has greatly helped in the processing of information within the prescribed time limits. Daily brief notes were published nightly and included all changing intelligence.

3. SPACES

The problem of storing the many charts required was solved by filing only a small number of each type and scale in the storage room in the rear of the Air Intelligence Office. The excess was stored in the fan room 2-65-2. A running inventory was kept and all shortages were noted. Delivery of maps and survival gear from COMFAIRJAPAN and the Air Navigation Office at Atsugi was excellent.

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Proper stowage space for voluminous classified materials received, such as target dossiers and Air Objective folders, is entirely inadequate.

4. CHARTS

Charts originally issued to each pilot included AMS Series 1:250,000 and AF charts 1:1,000,000, 1:5,000,000 and 1:250,000 of all North Korea. The 1:50,000 scale charts were issued to the pilots prior to each Naval Gunfire Spot, Close Air Support or Strike mission as necessary and were collected by ship's AIO upon pilot's return.

5. ESCAPE AND EVASION

COMNAVFE sent an Officer on TAD orders to the Valley Forge just prior to departure from Yokosuka for the purpose of lecturing on Escape and Evasion doctrines and procedures. In addition two naval aviators who were recent evadees gave excellent lectures on their experiences. This method of presentation proved very satisfactory.

6. PHOTO

Because close co-operation of the Intelligence section and the photographic interpretation section is necessary to produce photographic material for reproducing purposes, our present system of having them both in the same office has proved very satisfactory except for the resultant crowding.

PHOTO INTERPRETATION

1. A total of twenty (20) photographic reconnaissance missions were flown during the operating period utilizing three F9F-5P photographic planes mounting the following cameras: K-38 24 inch, 26 inch, K-17 6 inch, 12 inch, 24 inch, K-17-B 6 inch, S7 (Sonne) 100 mm. The efforts of the Photo Interpretation Office have been directed toward target search, flak studies, damage assessment, and touraid preparation with the emphasis on target search. Mosaics of suitable targets, prepared from flash prints, were forwarded to the carrier division staff. The end result was a photograph of the target for each pilot on each target strike. This system has proven highly successful for pilot orientation.

2. The photo interpretation office is located in the Air Intelligence Office. This is a satisfactory arrangement in all respects except for the lack of space required to lay out prints. One officer and two enlisted men are assigned, with one additional officer, an assistant Photo Interpreter, under orders to report.

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It is considered that two officer, photo interpretors, and two assistants will be sufficient for the task assigned.

3. DAMAGE INFLICTED ON THE ENEMY

Target	Destroyed	Damaged
Tanks		2
Oxcarts	9	3
Marshalling Yards		1
Roundhouses		1
Railroad Cars	67	87
Railroad Bypasses	1	
Railroad Bridge	1	
Highway Bridges	4	5
Trucks	40	79
Warehouses	6	
Barracks & Buildings	237	284
Gun Emplacements	4	8
Power Installation		4
Factories	1	1
Bunkers	12	11
Loading Ramps		1
Supply Shelters	33	4
Personnel Shelters	14	37
Sawmills	1	
Lumber Piles	1	
Conveyors	1	
Rail Cuts	46	
Troops Killed	5	
Highway Cuts	9	
Trenches	900 Yards	
Sorties Flown	972 (Includes 110 training sorties enroute)	

The above mentioned table necessarily represents an estimate of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances when the damage could be assessed by the pilot, or confirmed by controllers were used in this table. There were numerous camouflaged targets identified as troop billeting areas, supply dumps, ammunition dumps etc. which were attacked with heavy damage, but no confirmed results could be tabulated.

AIR DEPARTMENT

1. During the period of this report no difficulty was experienced in operating the F9F-5 aircraft from a conventional CVA-9 type carrier with H4B catapults installed.

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However, temperatures have been lower (about 40°F) and wind velocities higher than can be expected in the present operating area during the summer months. Air craft were launched at weights ranging from 17,800 to 19,100 pounds with an average catapult pressure of 3,800 pounds. The ordnance load had to be decreased on three occasions because of low wind. A shuttle velocity recording instrument and an accurate relative wind reading on the flight deck level would provide an accurate end airspeed reading and would be of great value. Aircraft could then probably be launched with greater ordnance loads and a more positive margin of safety maintained.

2. Valley Forge experienced five (5) barrier and barricade engagements due to broken hookpoints on the F9F-5. On two occasions the cracked hookpoint cut the cross-deck pendants permitting the taut wire to whip across the catwalks. Luckily no personnel were injured nor were the purchase cables damaged.

3. An extremely high attrition rate on manila tiedown lines has been experienced, due largely to failure of the manila under exposure to freezing and thawing in winter operations. This fortifies the conclusion that the nylon tiedowns, originated by this ship and found to stand up well under this strain, are superior for all-weather operations. Hooks for the nylon tiedowns manufactured on the west coast prior to deployment proved to be unsatisfactory. It is hoped that about 600 of the nylon tiedowns will have been completed by Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, when the ship returns from this first tour on the line.

4. Extreme cold weather operations required constant attention to flight deck. Snow removal was begun three hours before first launch time. On one occasion the temperature reached a low of 10.2°F with a relative wind across the deck of 45 knots and gusts to over 50 knots. Although spray was freezing on the deck and aircraft, no attempt was made to clear the ice until the ship was turned downwind to reduce the hazard of personnel sliding over the side and to avoid frost bite exposure. Operating temperatures of 25°F were not uncommon. Deck ice was cleared by scrapers and shoveled over the side. Ice formation in catapult tracks was quickly cleared by directing the blast from a jet aircraft down the track. Intermittant operation of barriers, and the exercise of arresting gear and catapults prevented freezing of sheaves. Yielding elements were freed by melting the ice with blow torches. Ice was removed from aircraft surfaces by hand.

5. The deck edge elevator, the life-blood of a respot, is presently taxed beyond its operating capacity. The elevator's designed working load is 18,00 pounds; design load limit, 20,000 pounds; test load, 30,000 pounds.

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In order to meet operating schedules, it is frequently necessary to load the elevator to 23,000 pounds (F9F-5 and tractor), and occasionally to increase the load to 24,000 pounds if the F9F-5 is fully armed. The hoisting cables have elongated under these conditions; compared with an original diameter of 1.150", the minimum diameter is now 1.065". All possible slack has been taken up at the pump room end of the cables, and only approximately 1" remains at the elevator ends.

6. The electric hoist of the embarked helicopter became inoperative and an emergency block and nylon tackle was installed. A successful rescue was made with this emergency gear although twisting of the nylon line prevented raising the rescued pilot sufficiently to permit his entrance into the helicopter.

SUPPLY DEPARTMENT

1. Aviation Supply

The USS CHOURE (AKV-1) replenished aviation stores on 19 January 1953. 60 percent of items requested were supplied. Requisitions for this replenishment were transmitted to the USS CHOURE by dispatch, as weather precluded the employment of a COD flight to forward Forms 220/125.

Two ACOG's were experienced during the tour. The causes were:

(1) R17-SFIC-162, DETECTOR, Item E225, Section "B", F9F-5 is applicable only for certain Bureau Numbers. It is recommended that both this item and the new item, R17-SFIC-181AR-2, DETECTOR, be carried in stock to assure availability for all F9F-5 aircraft.

(2) R82-ARBN-R118M11, ACTUATOR, Item E830, Section "B", F9F-5. Twelve each were shipped from the contractor on 12/17/52 but had not been received on board. A suitable substitute, R82-ARBN-R252M2, was furnished by USS CHOURE.

The aviation stores divisions aboard the carriers comprising Task Force 77 effected interchange of aviation spare parts frequently. This program provided a valuable source of high priority items and was supported to the extent of reducing stock balance aboard the transferring vessel to zero when necessary.

The latest Section "B" for HO3S-1 on board, dated December 1951, lists as Item E790, R86-EC-30E01-1A, GENERATOR. This generator cannot be used on the HO3S-1. The correct generator and stock number is R86-LN-S-24506.

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Cold weather experienced during this operating period proved conclusively that squadrons were not adequately outfitted with winter clothing prior to deployment overseas. As a result, the replenishment allowance carried on board was immediately depleted. It is, therefore, strongly recommended that every squadron be thoroughly inspected for compliance with fulfillment of cold weather clothing allowance prior to departure from CONUS.

2. Provisions Replenishment

This vessel replenished provisions twice during this tour on the line.

On 10 January 1953, the USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29) supplied the first replenishment. Some 112 tons were requisitioned with 95 tons being delivered in 1 hour 30 minutes. The availability of fresh and fresh frozen provisions was not plentiful; many desirable items were not in stock.

On 19 January 1953, the second replenishment was accomplished, again from the USS GRAFFIAS. Approximately 120 tons were requisitioned; 102 tons were delivered in 1 hour 10 minutes. An ample supply of fresh and fresh frozen provision was included among the replenished items.

GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

1. Material

Rough seas and icing conditions encountered on 12-14 January combined to make 40mm mounts #1 and #2 (forecastle) inoperative. During this period the mounts were protected to a limited extent by overall canvas covers and separate loading mechanisim and muzzle covers. However, the weights of sea water and ice to which the covers were subjected eventually caused canvas failure and consequent icing of the mounts themselves. The trainer's open ring sight on #1 mount was broken and the trainer's handwheels were sprung Mk 34 radar wave-guides on both mounts were so twisted as to be useless. The power motors of both mounts were completely grouned out. Further assessment of electrical and/or electronic damage has not yet been completed.

2. Deck Evolutions

a. Three replenishments were conducted while with Task Force 77. A fourth was conducted enroute Yokosuka after leaving the the force. A brief summary of replenishment data follows:

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Fuel Oil and Aviation Gasoline

Date	Ship	Quantity	
4 January	USS CHEMUNG (AO-30)	9472.7	bbls oil
		134800	gals gasoline
10-11 January	USS MISPILLION (AO-105)	5175	bbls oil
		73700	gals gasoline
19 January	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	9710	bbls oil
		158046	gals gasoline
22 January	USS GUADALUPE (AO-32)	3721	bbls oil
		87284	gals gasoline

AMMUNITION

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer rate
4 January	USS MT. MATMAI (AE-16)	75 tons	100 tons/hr
11 January	USS VIRGO (AKA-20)	170 tons	*45.7 tons/hr
19 January	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	205 tons	91.1 tons/hr
22 January	USS CHARA (AKA-58)	137 tons	**80

* Using one burtoning whip and quarterdeck modified housefall rig only because of jammed roller curtain at forward burtoning station.
* Two burtoning whips only used due to weather - wind up to 45 knots.

Provisions

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer rate
10 January	USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29)	99 tons	79.2 tons/hr
19 January	USS GRAFFIAS (AF-29)	88 tons	66 tons/hr

Aviation Supplies

Date	Ship	Quantity	Transfer rate
19 January	USS CHOURRE (AKV-11)	12 tons	40 tons/hr

b. On 10 occasions destroyers were alongside, 1 for refueling, 4 for personnel transfers, and 5 for guard mail or material transfers. High-line transfers of 42 men were made to or from the ship during the period of this action report.

c. All replenishment evolutions and personnel transfers were accomplished without incident. Various officers were qualified in keeping station along side.

3. Gunnery Exercises

AA firing at towed sleeves was conducted in area GEORGE on 1 January while enroute Yokosuka to the Task Force and in areas

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GEORGE AND LOVE on 23-24 January while enroute Yokosuka. These periods were of 2 hours duration each. Although screening vessels and support ships were provided opportunities to fire at towed sleeves on replenishment days, the replenishment requirements of this ship precluded such exercises.

ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Recreation.

Movies proved to be the most popular form of recreation. Nightly showings were held in the Flag Mess, Wardroom, Warrant Officer's mess, CPO mess, POl Mess, and compartments B-301-L and B-318-L. There was a total 144 showings during this period.

The Hobby Shop has again proved to be a worthwhile source of recreation. Sales at cost during the operating period amounted to $600.00, while personnel continued working with the more than $1,000.00 worth of handicraft items they had purchased during the month of December. Leather purse kits and boat and airplane models were the most popular items. Japanese model planes are easily obtainable and afford a great deal of pleasure.

A press newspaper taken from the national press service reports was furnished daily. In addition, the Sunday paper "VALLEY FORGE TAKE OFFS" was published weekly and covered the local news picture.

A full scale radio station was operated over the ship's RBO system. Two channels were always available: channel #1, AFRS broadcasts, and channel #2, local programs. Programming extended daily from 0615 until taps, and included disk jockeys, sports and news broadcasts, and AFRS transcriptions.

The library and lounge have been filled to capacity daily during off-duty hours.

2. Religious Activities.

The Protestant Chaplain conducted 8 Sunday Divine Services and 48 Daily Devotional Services. A weekday Bible Class was held each Tuesday evening. 9 Mormon (Latter Day Saints) services were conducted by LTJG M.E. HARDY USN.

The Catholic Chaplain conducted 14 Sunday Masses and 24 weekday Masses, serving Holy Communion to 564 persons. He held 48 Sunday School and Bible Class sessions.

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The two Chaplains alternated in presenting a series of illustrated lectures to the officers and crew. The BuPers Character Guidance Series was used and the movie "To Be Held in Honor" was shown to groups attending 27 lectures.

3. Training.

The major part of the shipboard training consisted of "on-the-job" instruction and general drills. However, formal instruction in the ship's training room was afforded whenever possible. Among the activities were a daily coxswain's class, a nightly Aviation Boatswain class, and numerous divisional training classes.

Information and Education activities were stimulated by the curtailed flight operations. A total of 214 GED test sections was administered with 42 men completing the high school test and 5 men the college level test. Personnel applied for 29 USAFI and college extension courses during this period, as well as 45 enlisted correspondence courses.

4. Legal.

The first tour on the line produced considerable legal assistance activity principally relating to domestic problems.

Mast cases and Court Martials dropped appreciably. However, such Court Martial cases as arise, immediately prior to departure from Yokosuka are neccessarily delayed for long periods of time due to non-receipt of signed charges and unavailability of witnesses.

5. Public Information.

The Staff Public Information Officer and his journalists on board handled most of the operational material. The ship's Public Information Officer concentrated on material for the Fleet Home Town News Center. These releases are broken down categorically as follows: 30 feature stories, 55 Hometowners (Roster), 65 form stories, and 23 still photographs. In addition, approximately 600 letters from the Commanding Officer have been forwarded direct to the next of kin of personnel serving on board.

MEDICAL DEPARTMENT

1. During this operating period, 1,176 treatments were given by the medical department; 99 patients were admitted to the sick list, 11 for surgery.

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2. 19 pilots were temporarily grounded. Only one pilot required admittance to sick bay for any length of time because of exhaustion from cold incident to flight operations. A complete recovery was made.

3. 40 personnel were inoculated against cowpox; 23 for tetanus; 11 for typhoid; 48 for cholera. There were no untoward reactions noted.

4. There were 9 cases of venereal disease aboard, 7 of which were urethritis due to gonococcus, and 2 of which were chancroid. There were no admissions due to syphilis. It is felt that this low rate of incidence, particularly following the recent holiday in-port period in Yokosuka, is the direct result of the medical department' intensive continuing ship-wide VD educational program. All phases of this program are scheduled, conducted and supervised by the medical department.

5. With the abrupt advent into cold weather, the expected rise in upper respiratory infections was evident among all levels of the ship's company and air group personnel. This was especially true during the first phase of the operating period, followed by a gradual decline in the number of cases, until now there are none on the sick list. Many of these cases were treated in an ambulatory status, and those requiring admittance to the ward were usually released after 2 days.

R. E. DIXON

Distribution List:

CNO (advance)	2
CinCPacFlt (advance)	2
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group	1
ComNavFE (advance)	1
ComNavFE Evaluation Group	1
ComSEVENTHFlt (advance)	1
CTF SEVENTY SEVEN(advance)	1
ComAirPac	5
ComServPac	1
ComFairAlameda	1
ComFairJapan	1
Naval War College	1
COFAIRBETUPAC	2

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VC 3	1
VC 11	1
VC 35	1
VC 61	1
CO, USS ESSEX (CVA-9)	1
CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33)	1
CO, USS ORISANY (CVA-34)	1
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA-47)	1
CO, USS TARAWA (CVA-40)	1
CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA-37)	1
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CVA-31)	1
CO, USS WASP (CVA-18)	1
CO, USS YORKTOWN (CVA-10)	1
CO, USS BOXER (CVA-21)	1
NLO JOC Korea	1
ComCarDiv 1	1
ComCarDiv 3	1
ComCarDiv 5	1
ComCarDiv 15	1
ComCarDiv 17	1
ATG-1	1
ATG-2	1
CVG-2	1
CVG-7	1
CVG-9	1
CVG-15	1
CVG-19	1
CVG-101	1
CVG-102	1
CVG-11	1
ComFairHawaii	1
USS BATAAN (CVL-29)	1
USS RENDOVA (CVE-114)	1
USS BAIROKO (CVE-115)	1
USS BADOENG STRAIT (CVE-116)	1
USS SICILY (CVE-118)	1
USS GILBERT ISLANDS (CVE-107)	1
USS POINT CRUZ (CVE 119)	1
USS TRIPOLI(CVE 64)	1

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