

trigger. Restriction of arm movement caused by the Mk III anti-exposure suit makes it extremely difficult to reach the face curtain. In addition, a tall (six foot or over) pilot must first pull the face curtain up before he can bring it over his helmet and down to fire the seat. The leading edge of the curtain may thus be exposed to the slipstream and could be blown out of the pilot's hands.

g. Safety belts

It is recommended that a standard safety belt testing machine be made available to carriers for testing the tensile strength of safety belts. The type outlined in Technical Note 1-48 of 9 January 1948 is inadequate and will not stand any great usage.

5. VC DETACHMENTS

a. Photo Unit - VC-61 Unit NAN

(1) Unit NAN of Composite Squadron SIXTY-ONE, the only Air Pac unit assigned Air Group SEVEN, joined the Air Group in San Diego just before deployment. The unit consisted of five pilots and 19 men. Its original aircraft complement was three F9F-2P's. After the first tour on the line the unit received three F2H-2P's and spent the in-port period checking out in the new aircraft. None of the pilots had any previous time in the Banshee. Seventy-five combat missions were flown in the Banshee during the next tour on the line. Upon the completion of the second tour on the line the F2H-2P's were transferred to the Photo Unit on the ORISKANY and Unit NAN reverted back to the F9F-2P's. This transition presented no unusual difficulties. For the last tour the Photo Unit received three F9F-5P's and spent a large portion of the in-port period in familiarization and FCLP. Fifty-eight combat missions were flown in F9F-5P's. This was the first time that the F9F-5P's were flown in combat.

(2) Recommendations

On the basis of this unit's experience with three different types of photo-configured aircraft, it recommended that all photo units deploying to WESTPAC should be self supporting and capable of performing their own aircraft maintenance. The advantage of a small, integral group, completely familiar with several aircraft can not be overemphasized.

(3) Aircraft

The F9F-2P was an O & R modification of an F9F-2B and was the best interim photo plane available until the arrival of the F2H-2P and F9F-5P. In general, the Banshee is a far superior photo plane to the F9F-5P. Operationally, it has greater range, better stability as a photo platform, and excellent carrier landing characteristics. Photographically, it has greater versatility with three rotatable camera bays versus two bays, only one of which is rotatable, in the F9F-5P. Furthermore, the camera bays on the Banshee were very accessible on the deck. Specific discrepancies on the two planes are listed as follows:

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F2H-2P

(a) Interval controllers failed in two aircraft.

(b) Manual operation was dependent on the interval controller and main inverter. Failure of either prevented any photo coverage.

(c) When first received, three of the camera mounts would not rotate and the vacuum motors ran continuously even with the camera power switch in the off position.

(d) The following parts burned out on the view finder assembly:
(a) circulating air motor, (b) motor for rotating view finder, (c) grid lights.

F9F-5P

(a) The forward camera bay which houses the 12" focal length camera was not designed to rotate, requiring all obliques to be taken by the longer focal length camera in the rear bay. This is an extremely impractical arrangement.

(b) The cameras are dependent on the interval controller and main inverter for manual operation. Failure of either prevents any photo coverage.

(c) Dzus buttons on the camera windows should be fastened and unfastened only with a dzus screwdriver. This unit has secured a special dzus screwdriver inside the camera compartment of each aircraft making it readily accessible.

(d) The view finders are unsatisfactory because sighting through them is difficult, as the pilot must keep his head in a definite position to obtain any view finder vision. In addition, the center grid lines are off center.

(e) The camera bays are reached only from the top of the nose section, necessitating a ladder for routine magazine changes. A camera davit must be utilized to remove cameras. This is very impractical especially on a windy and cold flight deck.

(4) Photographic Equipment

(a) The unit experienced twenty-three camera failures. Fifteen of these occurred in A8 and A8 modified magazines and in the camera case drive. The latter was caused by the breakdown of the magazines.

(b) The A8 magazines should not be used with cameras that have $1\frac{1}{2}$ second recycle time. In fact, the A8 magazine should be considered obsolete for all practical purposes.

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(c) The A8 Baker magazine should be further modified before issue to operating units. Modification simply consists of replacing the plastic gears with metal ones. Plastic gears in A8 Baker magazine No. 1331 failed on the first exposure taken with the new magazine

(5) Recommendations for Camera Repair

(a) Each carrier should establish an adequate camera repair shop on board with necessary tools, testing equipment, and spare parts.

(b) At least one camera repairman should be included in the ship's complement. His main duties would be to make minor adjustments, tests, repairs, and preventative maintenance on all photo equipment. (Fortunately this unit had a skilled camera repairman whose efforts were solely responsible for keeping a workable number of cameras in an operating condition).

(c) A camera repair facility should be established in the Far East area. This facility should stock sufficient photographic equipment as replacements for that which is turned in for repairs. In this way, ships could request replacement of defective equipment by dispatch and receive timely action. It is illogical to establish elaborate procedures to maintain aircraft and not provide facilities to maintain in serviceable condition the equipment for specially configured aircraft. With the constantly increasing demand for photo reconnaissance, definite steps should be taken to improve the present weak camera repair system.

(6) General Recommendations

Photo aircraft have progressed much more rapidly than aerial cameras. Consequently the limiting factor in jet photography is the camera. Speed must be decreased because of slow shutter speeds and amount of coverage is lessened by magazine capacity. Until a camera designed to utilize the capabilities of jet aircraft is available, progress in photo reconnaissance will remain at a standstill.

b. VC-12 (ASP & AEW)

(1) The limitations of APS-20A radar carried in the AD4W are not fully appreciated by some controlling ships. A snorkel submarine can be detected at a maximum range of 35 miles under ideal conditions but the range is markedly reduced in high sea states. The sea return on the APS-20A also becomes

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appreciable under high sea conditions, often exceeding 30 miles at a search altitude of 1000 feet. Reduction of sea return necessitates the use of special circuits which in turn reduce the chance of target detection. However by careful attention to altitude, range, and special circuits, the radar operator will utilize the maximum target detection capabilities. The search altitude and radius of the "box pattern" type of search over the Task Force can best be determined by the pilot after he becomes airborne. In this way the force could be held on the radar scope free from clutter at all times, a condition sometimes impossible to attain when maintaining a constant distance of 20 miles from the force.

(2) The use of an additional AD4W for AEW radio relay in addition to the ASP is recommended under the following circumstances:

(a) When night hecklers are airborne. A great amount of weather information is requested of night hecklers and the standard practice has been for the ASP to relay this weather. This procedure has been very unsatisfactory because of the altitude (1000' - 1500') and the distance (20 miles) the ASP normally operates from the Task Force makes radio contact and relay with distant hecklers either impossible or very unreliable.

(b) When day strike groups are scheduled for inland northern targets or any targets beyond reliable radio contact with TACC or SAR facilities, an AD4W on off-the-coast-barrier offers a radio contact or relay which, because of factors of range, altitude, and terrain, the previous mentioned facilities are unable to maintain.

(c) When the Task Force is launching from a considerable distance at sea. In this case the AD4W can provide what it was designed for - AEW. In addition it can assist CIC in vectoring returning strikes, relaying, and locating surface vessels at a greater range than can the ASP.

(3) When such AEW or radio relay flights are scheduled, the communication plan should be included in the Air Plan. Difficulty has been encountered in the past due to confusion about the frequency guarded by the AEW plane, resulting in unnecessary relaying and radio traffic.

c. VC-33 (Night Attack)

In order to insure smooth night operations a thorough understanding of the details of night operations is most essential, and must be clearly

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understood by the detachment and ship. These details include hours of operations, armament requirements and capabilities, ship's lighting, catapult and deck launch procedures to be used at night, special berthing and messing requirements, and the general capabilities of each VC detachment, including such items as ECM, radars, VHF middleman, radar bellhop, and other features that will aid both the detachments and the ship.

It is firmly believed that a major amount of damage can be inflicted on the enemy by increasing night operations, preferably by adding a night carrier to the force. In the Navy sector, enemy movements are virtually unrestricted for a period of 6 to 9 hours a night depending upon the season. Night hecklers from the carriers prove their worth by stopping and destroying enemy transportation of troops and materials, but they are limited in the extent of their efforts by the demanding day schedule.

d. VC-4 (Night Fighters)

(1) Comments

(a) Night Fighter detachments have two basic missions in this combat theater:

1. Defense of the Task Force against enemy air attack during the night and during periods of low visibility.
2. Night attacks against the enemy's transportation system.

(b) In regard to defense of the Task Force, it is seriously questioned whether the F4U-5N in Condition Four is capable of a successful intercept against an enemy aircraft other than a slow patrol plane. It was found during World War II that, with a night interceptor of limited speed and rate of climb, Condition One was the only defensive state of readiness

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other than that of an airborne CAP, which allowed a reasonable chance of successful interception of enemy aircraft prior to the completion of their mission. It is further felt that the effectiveness of night interceptors depends not only upon the individual ability of the pilots and directors, but especially upon the degree of teamwork between these individuals, which can be developed and maintained only by frequent practice. No practice all-weather intercepts nor test alerts from Condition Four have been made during the entire tour of this detachment in the Korean area.

(c) It has already been stated many times that night detachments have not been given a full opportunity to accomplish their mission of night attack because they are not launched during the night hours when North Korean traffic is at its heaviest. Of the average hour and a half that the night hecklers spend over the beach on each mission, considerable time is wasted because during daylight hours enemy traffic rarely moves.

(2) Recommendations

(a) It is recommended that the potentials of night fighters maintained in Condition Four be thoroughly investigated and that, regardless of which condition of readiness is considered most advantageous, night fighters be launched as frequently as possible to maintain the individual proficiency of those involved, to develop team work between CIC and pilot, and to train the ship and night fighter personnel in rapid night launch techniques.

(b) It is well understood that twenty-four hour operations (or close to that) are impossible aboard a carrier which operates steadily over an extended period of time. Yet it is recommended that a greater night effort be made, either by having a night carrier on the line from time to time or by periodically emphasizing night operations at the expense of day operations.

6. PERSONNEL

a. Transfers

It is strongly believed that squadron officers and men should be frozen in their billets during combat tours. Squadrons should be able to operate at peak efficiency during combat operations, and the loss by transfer or detachment of even a few officers and men obviously affects adversely the ability of squadrons to maintain the high standards of availability and maintenance required to operate successfully in this theater. No personnel eligible for discharge to inactive duty should accompany squadrons being deployed to the combat area unless they reenlist or extend. As mentioned in a previous Action Report, it is hoped that the Bureau of Naval Personnel will refrain from transferring men to shore duty during combat tours, for while replacements are provided by ComAirPac or ComFairJap, the time lag and break in continuity result in a decrease of operating efficiency.

b. Use of Manpower

It is believed that the officer personnel allowance of CVG-7 squadrons

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is sufficient, providing that the staff of the Air Group Commander contains a qualified Maintenance Officer, Ordnance Officer, Electronics Officer, Operations Officer, Administrative Officer, and Flight Surgeon. If such officers are not provided the Air Group Commander, it is essential that they be furnished at the squadron level. It is felt that one thoroughly qualified Maintenance Officer on the CAG Staff, for example, with the assistance of squadron pilot-maintenance officers, can adequately fulfill all maintenance requirements without the need for a ground maintenance officer assigned to each squadron.

Squadron allowances for rated personnel are considered reasonably adequate for combat operations, particularly in view of the revised allowances for ordnancemen. Based on the old allowances, however, the ordnancemen of this Air Group have been consistently overworked due to the sustained and heavy operating schedule. The necessity for each squadron to provide mess cook, compartment cleaners, laundrymen, etc., to the ship has cut down to a serious degree the number of "working hands" available to the squadrons. However, it is doubted if corrective measures can be taken, since lack of berthing space of Essex class carriers precludes an increase in either allowance or complement of seamen, and the squadrons cannot sacrifice rated men in order to obtain more seamen.

c. There has been no morale problem of any kind within the Air Group during the entire cruise. The morale of both pilots and enlisted personnel remained at a high level throughout the cruise and was at its peak during the last and final tour on the line.

7. AVIATION ELECTRONICS

a. General

(1) ARN-6 Loop Antenna difficulties were encountered when low wind conditions required 4000 psi accumulator pressures to be employed on the H4B catapults. The high "G" forces imposed on the loop antenna mounting rack caused it to tear loose from the aircraft frame. A report of the difficulty plus the temporary fix employed was made to BuAer and all other interested commands.

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PART VII

STATISTICAL SUMMARY

A. STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE PERIOD 8 NOVEMBER 1952 TO 18 DECEMBER 1952

1. Medical

a. Admissions to the Sick List

Patients admitted to the sick list	188
Total sick days	252
Possible work days	85,860
Percentage of work days lost to sick days	.29%
Pilots admitted to sick list	2
Patients treated from other vessels	14
Total sick days	37

b. Treatments Accomplished - Non-Admission

Medical	1,729
Surgical	142
Venereal Disease	45

c. Grounded Flight Personnel

	<u>Physical</u>		<u>Post Accident Psychological</u>		<u>Disp. Board</u>	
	No.	Days	No.	Days	No.	Days
Crewmen	2	10	0	0	0	0
Pilots	15	41	0	0	0	0
Total Pilot days possible					3,618	
Total Pilot days lost to sick days and grounding					41	
Percentage of pilot days lost to sick days and grounding						.7%

2. Air Operations

a. Sorties Flown in Operating Area

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U-4</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD-4</u>	<u>AD-4ML</u>	<u>AD4-W</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
STRIKE/RECCO	393	236		235			864
CAP	143						143
PHOTO/PHOTO ESCORT	122						122
NGF SPOT		6	4	6			16
HECKLER			46		41		87
ASF/AEW					4	39	43
GATOR		2		18	13		33
CAS		16		12			28
SPECIAL SEARCH			3		6	3	12
→ ECM RECCO		26		2	20		48
TAR CAP	32						32
MISC. (slow time, ferry abort, etc)	7	6		9	10	1	33
TOTALS	697	292	53	282	94	43	1461
					Minus Aborts		-10
					Total Sorties		1451

Total Sorties Scheduled 1474
 Total Sorties Flown 1451
 % Total Scheduled Missions Flown 98.4
 Total Hours Flown 3237.1
 Days of Operations 15
 Average hours per operating day 215.1

Total Sorties Scheduled 1474
 Total Sorties Flown 1451
 % Total Scheduled Missions Flown 98.4
 Total Hours Flown 3237.1
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3. Operational Damage

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>BUNO</u>	<u>E</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>G</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
23 Nov 1952	F9F-2	123407	1W2	A	P	D-3	Barrier
29 Nov	F9F-2	123409	1W2	A	K	D-3	Landed with port gear folded
12 Dec	F9F-5P	125321	1V1	A	P	D-3	Barricade engagement

4. Battle Damage

<u>DATE</u>	<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>BUNO</u>	<u>EMPLOYMENT</u>	<u>CAUSE</u>	<u>DAMAGE</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
29 Nov 1952	AD-4NL	124759	3T2	B	D-3	Bomb blast, port stub wing.
29 Nov	F9F-2	123400	1T1	AA	D-3	Flak, stbd flaps stabilizer.
5 Dec	AD-4	128965	1T1	AA	L	Shot down.
6 Dec	F9F-2	123409	1T1	B	D-3	Bomb blast, nose section
6 Dec	F9F-2	123400	1T1	B	D-3	Bomb blast, port stub wing.
12 Dec	AD-4	128982	1T1	AA	D-3	Flak, port wing leading edge.
12 Dec	F4U-4	81006	1T1	AA	D-3	.50 Cal. holes, port flap.
12 Dec	F9F-2	123498	1T1	AA	D-3	Flak, stabilizer
12 Dec	F4U-4	80905	1T1	B	D-3	Bomb blast, port wing, leading edge.
12 Dec	F4U-4	81985	1T1	B	D-3	Stabilizer hit by tail fuze spindle.
13 Dec	F9F-2	127101	1T1	B	D-3	Bomb blast, stbd wing leading edge.
17 Dec	F9F-2	123413	1T1	B	D-3	Bomb blast, port elevator.
17 Dec	F9F-2	123422	1T1	F	D-3	Bomb blast, port wing.
17 Dec	F9F-2	123416	1T1	F	D-3	Bomb blast, nose section.
17 Dec	F9F-2	127200	1T1	B	D-3	Bomb blast, wings.

5. Analysis of Flak Damage

<u>Type</u>	<u>F9F/F9F-5P</u>	<u>F4U/F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD/AD-4NL</u>	<u>Total</u>
Sorties	547	311	322	1180
Hits (heavy/AW)	2	0	2	4
Hits per 100 sorties	.37%	0	.62%	.34%
Hits (Small Arms)	0	1	0	1
Hits (Small Arms) per 100 sorties	0	.32%	0	.085%
Total hits	2	1	2	5

<u>Type</u>	<u>F9F/F9F-5P</u>	<u>F4U/F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD/AD-4NL</u>	<u>Total</u>
Total hits/100				
sorties	.37%	.32%	.62%	.42%
Aircraft lost	0	0	1	1
Aircraft lost/100				
sorties	0	0	.31%	.085%

6. Ordnance Expended

a. Ship

5"/38AAC
40MM

147 Rounds
1,805 Rounds

b. Aircraft

<u>Bombs</u>		<u>Rockets</u>	
63	2000# G.P.	32	3.5" Solid
528	1000# G.P.	434	5" & 6.5" ATAR
562	500# G.P.		
2,715	250# G.P.		<u>Gun Ammo</u>
1,342	100# G.P.		203,431 20MM
6	500# SAP		52,340 50 Cal.
10	1000# SAP		
683	260# Frag		<u>Pyrotechnics</u>
		315	MK 6 Parachute Flare

B. STATISTICAL DATA FOR THE ENTIRE CRUISE IN
FAR EAST (21 June - 18 December 1952)

1. Personnel

a. Average Sorties and Flight Time Per Pilot

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Average No. Pilots</u>	<u>Sorties Per Pilot</u>	<u>Hours Per Pilot</u>
VF-71	24	64	104
VF-72	23	67	111
VF-74	23	67	183.1
VA-75	24	65	173
VC-4	4	55	97.9 Night 89.1 Day
VC-12	6	44	29.4 Night 89.5 Day
VC-33	6	64	120.9 Night 74.7 Day
VC-61	4	64	128

b. Flight Personnel Casualties

<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Injured</u>		<u>Missing</u>		<u>Killed</u>	
	<u>Oper</u>	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Oper</u>	<u>Enemy</u>	<u>Oper</u>	<u>Enemy</u>
VA-75						1
VF-74				1		1
VF-72		1				
VF-71	1					
VC-33				2		
VC-4						
VC-12						
VC-61		1				
TOTAL	1	2	0	3	0	2

c. Medical Statistics

Patients admitted to sick list	1,090
Total Sick days	2,728
Total treatments rendered (sick calls)	21,946

d. Dental

<u>Number of</u>	<u>During period</u>	<u>Average per month</u>
Patients treated	3,592	598
Sittings	4,603	767
Restorations	4,345	724
Extractions	330	55
Apicoectomy	39	6

2. Air Operations

a. Missions in Operating Area(21 June thru 18 December 1952)

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U-4</u>	<u>F4U-5N</u>	<u>AD-4</u>	<u>AD-4NL</u>	<u>AD-4W</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
STRIKE/RECCO	1786	1233		1210	5		4234
C/P	999	4	6				1009
PHOTO/PHOTO ESCORT	556						556
RESCAP		7	4				11
NOF SPOT		67	11	9	4		91
HECKLER			160		161		321
ASP/AEW				1	7	210	218
GATOR		21	6	99	75	1	202
CAS		63		75			138
WEATHER RECCO		4	14				18
SPECIAL SEARCH			3		6	3	12
→ ECM RECCO		34		6	49		89
TAR CAP	36	15		1			52
FISH NET RECCO		1	1				2
MISC. (Slow time ferry, abort, etc.)	129	73	40	83	74	18	417
TOTAL	3506	1522	245	1484	381	232	7370
					Minus aborts		53
					Total sorties flown		7317

a. Missions in Operating Area (cont'd)

Total Sorties Scheduled	7572	Total Offensive	5512
Total Sorties Flown	7317	Total Defensive	1441
% Scheduled Missions Flown	96.6%	Total Misc.	<u>364</u>
Total hours Flown	16,025.9	Total Sorties	<u>7317</u>
Days of Operation	80		
Average hours per operating day	200.3	Total CVG 7 landings	7529
Training Sorties (ORI)	736	CVG 7 landings (ORI)	673
		Grand Total Carrier Landings (including qual.)	8202
Total number of COD landings			73
Total emergency landings of aircraft from sister ships.			
		Total aircraft landed	<u>25</u> 9051 8300

b. Number of aircraft Catapulted

Starboard Catapult	2421
Port Catapult	2232

c. Aviation Gasoline used

3,650,931 gallons

d. Aviation Lube Oil used

73,002 gallons

e. Alcohol used

120 gallons

f. Barrier Crashes and Engagements

<u>TYPE A/C</u>	<u>Repaired on Board</u>	<u>Major O/H</u>	<u>Strike</u>	<u>Total</u>
F9F-2	3	1	1	5
F9F-5P	0	1	0	1
AD-4	4	0	0	4
AD-4NL	2	0	0	2
AD-4W	0	1	0	1
F4U-4	1	0	0	1
F4U-5N	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>1</u>
TOTAL	<u>11</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>15</u>

g. Aircraft Lost, Operational

AD-4	1
F9F-2	3
TOTAL	<u>4</u>

h. Aircraft Damaged Beyond Shipboard Repair, Operational

AD-4	1
AD-2Q	1
AD-4W	2
F9F-2	2
F9F-5P	1
F4U-4	1
F4U-5N	1
TOTAL	<u>9</u>

i. Minor Damage Repaired on Board, Operational

AD-4	4
AD-4NL	1
AD-4W	2
F9F-2	20
F2H-2P	11
F4U-4	2
F4U-5N	4
TOTAL	<u>34</u>

j. Analysis of Flak Damage

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>F9F/Photo</u>	<u>F4U/F4U5N</u>	<u>AD/AD4NL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Sorties	2378	1613	1521	5512
Hits (Heavy/AW)	16	17	22	55
Hits / 100 sorties	.67%	1.05%	1.4%	1.0%
Hits (Small Arms)	10	19	13	42
Hits (Small Arms)/ 100 sorties	.42%	1.18%	.86%	.76%
Total hits	26	36	35	97
Total hits/100 sorties	1.1%	2.2%	2.3%	1.7%
Aircraft lost	2	3	3	8
Aircraft lost/100 sorties	.09%	.19%	.19%	.14%

k. Aircraft Availability

<u>2 July to 20 August</u>		<u>5 Sept to 28 Sept</u>	
F9F-2	85.0%	F9F-2	87.5%
F4U-4	96.2%	F4U-4	91.1%
AD-4	89.5%	AD-4	85.6%
F4U-5N	85.7%	F4U-5N	65.2%
AD-4W	97.0%	AD-4W	98.6%
AD-4NL	93.3%	AD-4NL	88.9%
F9F-2F	97.0%	F2H-2P	92.3%

<u>10 Oct to 5 Nov</u>		<u>21 Nov to 17 Dec</u>	
F9F-2	96.1%	F9F-2	95.7%
F4U-4	98.2%	F4U-4	97.5%
AD-4	95.9%	AD-4	96.2%
F4U-5N	98.0%	F4U-5N	97.1%
AD-4W	97.3%	AD-4W	98.7%
AD-4NL	98.0%	AD-4NL	99.2%
F9F-2F	97.3%	F9F-5P	96.1%

Entire Combat Period (21 June - 18 Dec)

F9F-2	91.1%
F4U-4	96.8%
AD-4	91.2%
F4U-5N	86.6%
AD-4W	97.9%
AD-4NL	94.8%

3. Ship's Operations

a. Ship's Employment

	<u>Days</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
On the line	117	64.6%
Enroute to and from the operating area	23	$\frac{12.7\%}{77.3\%}$ (at sea)
Alongside Piedmont Pier Yokosuka, Japan	32	
Moored to Buoy Yokosuka, Japan	4	
Moored to Buoy Sasebo, Japan	5	22.7% (in port)
TOTAL	<u>181</u>	<u>100%</u>

3. Ship's Operations (Cont'd)

b. The data given below has been compiled from Engineering records and covers the period from time of mooring at Yokosuka on 18 June 1952 through 2400 on 18 December 1952:

(1) Amount of NSFO onboard 2400 18 June 1952	1,284,305 gallons or 30,579 barrels
(2) Total NSFO received onboard during period	10,775,688 gallons or 256,564 barrels
(3) NSFO expended underway	8,492,856 gallons or 202,163 barrels
(4) NSFO used at anchor	320,144 gallons or 7,623 barrels
(5) NSFO delivered to DD's (34)*	1,538,181 gallons or 36,623 barrels
(6) NSFO on hand 2400 18 December (by figures)	1,708,812 gallons or 40,686 barrels
(7) On hand 2400 18 December (soundings)	1,693,778 gallons or 40,328 barrels
(8) Loss by inventory	15,034 gallons or 358 barrels
(9) Number of hours underway	3,354.2 hours
(10) Number of hours at anchor	1,037.8 hours
(11) Engine miles steamed	55,169.0 miles
(12) Water distilled ship's tanks	7,276,002 gallons
(13) Water distilled to Reserve Feed Tanks	3,565,368 gallons
(14) Water received from outside source	3,737,919 gallons
(15) Average gallons/ capita	18.7 gallons
(16) Average gallons Feed Water per mile	55.0 gallons
(17) Average gallons Feed Water per hour at anchor	419.0 gallons
(18) NSFO gallons per mile underway	153.9 gallons (average)
(19) NSFO gallons per hour at anchor	308.5 gallons (average)

* This figure includes 132,400 gallons or 3,152.4 barrels delivered to four DD's on 16 June 1952 while enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

4. Ordnance

a. Total Ordnance Expenditures

(1) <u>Ship</u>	
5"/38 Caliber	878 rounds
40MM	8,519 rounds

a. Total Ordnance Expenditures (Cont'd)

(2) Aircraft

	<u>Bombs</u>		<u>Rockets</u>
460	2000# G.P.	100	3.5" Solid
2,241	1000# G.P.	4,676	5" & 6.5" ATAR
2,919	500# G.P.	145	5" HVAR
10,220	250# G.P.		
5,217	100# G.P.		<u>Gun Ammo</u>
6	500# SAP		20MM
10	1000# SAP	1,035,917	50 Cal.
4,206	260# Frag	625,681	
8	350# D.B.		<u>Fire Bombs</u>
100	Incendiaries		161 - F51 Drop Tanks
500	Frag Clusters		<u>Pyrotechnics</u>
			1,226 - MK 6 Parachute Flares

Aircraft ammunition listed above represents a total tonnage of 6,264.35 short tons.

b. Ordnance Malfunctions

(1) <u>Bombs</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Hung	13	9	12	34	.13%
Dropped on arrested landings	8	5		13	.05%
Dropped during catapult shots	24			24	.09%
TOTAL	45	14	12	71	.27%

(2) <u>Rockets</u>	<u>F9F</u>	<u>F4U</u>	<u>AD</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Percentage</u>
Duds	89	17	12	118	2.40%
Unplugged	10	10	4	24	.60%
Broken Pigtails	39	14	11	64	1.3
Circuit failures	10	41	2	53	1.0
TOTAL	148	82	29	259	5.27%

c. Ordnance Material Failures and Repairs

<u>Material</u>	<u>Casualty</u>	<u>Action</u>
5 LCK MK 14-8	Out of adjustment	Replaced
8 LCS MK 15	Out of adjustment	Replaced
1 Limit stop MK Fuze setter	Broken	Replaced

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c. Ordnance Material Failures and Repairs (Cont'd)

<u>Material</u>	<u>Casualty</u>	<u>Action</u>
1 Elev. Rec. Reg Synchro MK 5-2	Burned out	Replaced
3 Stroke Generators MK Power drive	Burned out	Replaced
Cable - MCOOP-10 (40MM Mts 40-6 and 40-13)200 feet.	Grounded out	Renewed
Cable - DCOP-4 (Firing lead cable Mts. 55,56 and 58) 75 Feet.	Open leads	Renewed
3 Firing motors	Burned out	Rewound
4 Cooling motors	Burned out	Rewound
7 Starting switches	Burned out	Replaced

5. Total Damage Inflicted on the Enemy in Terms of Targets noted as Follows:

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Buildings	648	679
Warehouses	18	29
Powerhouses	7	28
Factories	3	15
Locomotives	5	15
Railroad Cars	110	536
Boats	127	568
Patrol Ship	1	0
Bridges(Highway)	21	111
Bridges(Railroad)	13	61
Oxcarts	135	40
Vehicles	341	628
Tunnels	0	16
Gun Positions	73	57
Fuel Storage Facilities	3	4
Ammo Storage Facilities	2	1
Transformer Stations	10	18
Observation Posts	0	8
Roundhouses	1	4
Railroad Turntables	2	2
Radar and/or Radio Stations	2	4
Hangars	0	3
Airfield	0	1
Lumber Mills	3	11
Radar Antennas	4	2
Lighthouses	0	3
Coal Loading Facilities	0	1
Tanks	4	6
Bunkers	68	30
Personnel Shelters	18	0
Fish Traps	2	1

Damage inflicted on the Enemy (Cont'd)

<u>Targets</u>	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Other</u>
Heavy Construction Equipment	1	1	
Supply Dumps	0	13	
Penstocks	7	22	
Surge Tanks	0	2	
Control Houses	1	3	
Water Towers	0	1	
Power Line Towers	0	5	
Switch Yards	4	1	
Railroad Facilities	4	2	
Dams	0	3	
Piers	1	2	
Truck Parking Areas	0	1	
Pulp Mill	0	1	
Grainery	0	1	
Coke Oven	0	1	
Ore Station	0	2	
Underground Storage Facility	0	1	
Enemy Casualties			118
Rail Cuts			607
Road Cuts			54
Trenches Destroyed			785 yards
Rail Tracks Destroyed			1,260 yards

The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only when photographic interpretation clearly showed the damage to the target, or in those instances when the pilots could definitely assess the damage, is it reflected in this tabulation. In many attacks, weather, smoke, flak, or time prevented pilots from inspecting the damage. Damage inflicted by Close-Air-Support missions could rarely be assessed, and results could only be reported in terms of coverage and effectiveness. The specific effects of these CAS missions may never be known.

6. Ship's Records Established During the Cruise

<u>Type of Operation</u>	<u>Nb. Aircraft</u>	<u>Total Time</u>		<u>Average Intervals</u>
		<u>Min</u>	<u>Sec</u>	
Jet Launch	17	5	24	21.6 Sec
Prop Launch	28	7	55	17.6 Sec
Mixed Launch	42(15J, 27P)	12	57	19.4 Sec
Jet Landing	10	4	40	26.4 Sec
Prop Landing	24	9	33	24.9 Sec
Mixed Landing	28(4J, 24P)	13	00	25.8 Sec

7. Photographic Product

	18 to 27 June	28 June to 4 Aug	5 Aug to 18 AUG	19 Aug to 28 Sept	29 Sept to 5 Nov	6 Nov to 18 Dec	TOTAL
NEGATIVES PROCESSED							
4 x 5 inches*	657	1946	116	2159	2895	2155	9888
8 x 10 "	65	447	74	290	176	411	1463
9 x 9 "	309	6635	3604	5738	8493	798	25577
9 x 18 "	0	0	0	6740	50	4461	11251
TOTAL	<u>1031</u>	<u>9028</u>	<u>3794</u>	<u>14927</u>	<u>11614</u>	<u>7785</u>	<u>48179</u>
PRINTS PROCESSED							
Contact prints							
4 x 5 inch	502	2230	317	3615	4804	3093	14561
8 x 10 "	<u>142</u>	<u>3699</u>	<u>1160</u>	<u>4253</u>	<u>3749</u>	<u>7443</u>	<u>20446</u>
TOTAL	<u>644</u>	<u>5929</u>	<u>1477</u>	<u>7868</u>	<u>8553</u>	<u>10536</u>	<u>35007</u>
Somme	2408'	40649'	23315'	89250'	37163'	47800'	240585'
Average per Op Day	1204'	2319'	4663'	5250'	2654'	3186'	3224'
Largest single days production	1307'	6485'	8547'	10067'	7443'	5600'	10067'
Enlargements							
8 x 10 inches	116	1206	242	1889	2050	1171	6674
ACTION PICTURE FILM							
Processed							
16mm P&W	850'	1450'	550'	720'	18000'	2100'	23670'
35mm B&W	<u>0'</u>	<u>0'</u>	<u>799'</u>	<u>152'</u>	<u>0'</u>	<u>0'</u>	<u>951'</u>
TOTAL	<u>850'</u>	<u>1450'</u>	<u>1349'</u>	<u>872'</u>	<u>18000'</u>	<u>2100'</u>	<u>24621'</u>
16mm Kodachrome film forwarded to NPC	0'	0'	0'	1250'	2650'	3750'	7650'

*Included K-20, K-25, and sheet film.

1. F9F-2P photo planes operated two days and flew six sorties.
2. F9F-2P photo planes operated seventeen days and flew seventy-two sorties.
3. F9F-2P photo planes operated five days and flew twenty-one sorties.
4. F2H-2P photo planes operated seventeen days and flew seventy sorties.
5. F9F-2P photo planes operated fourteen days and flew fifty-eight sorties.
6. F9F-5P photo planes operated fifteen days and flew fifty-eight sorties.

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8. Communication Traffic

a. Communications Traffic Handled by Visual Means

	<u>Incoming</u>	<u>Outgoing</u>
June	255	146
July	567	382
August	301	203
September	470	364
October	476	246
November	279	210
December	<u>125</u>	<u>71</u>
TOTAL	2473	1622

b. Communications Traffic Handled by Electrical Means

	<u>Sent</u>		<u>Received</u>	
	<u>Originated</u>	<u>NDT Fox</u>	<u>George</u>	<u>On TF Circuit and Relay</u>
June	296	2716	2196	289
July	1948	7750	6968	3539
August	996	7964	6500	1108
September	1816	8668	6497	2785
October	1373	6872	5681	2191
November	766	7500	5894	2008
December	<u>1108</u>	<u>7056</u>	<u>6350</u>	<u>1716</u>
TOTAL	8303	48526	40088	13636

Grand total of messages sent and received electrically: 110,553

c. Post Office Turnover

(1) Incoming

Mail bags	2,804
Letters	750,000
Parcels and newspapers	60,000

(2) Outgoing

Mail bags	3,405
Letters and small parcels	700,000
Large items	525

(3) Stamp sales 18,630.80

(4) Money Orders sales \$480,926.34

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REPLENISHMENT STATISTICS - All replenishment operations were conducted without incident or casualty.

<u>TYPE OF SHIP</u>	<u>NO. THIS PERIOD</u>	<u>NO. ENTIRE TOUR</u>
AO, AE, AF & AKA	15	72
DD	31	150
TOTAL	46	222

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>NO.</u>	<u>TIME ALONGSIDE TOTAL</u>	<u>TIME ALONGSIDE AVERAGE</u>
AO	34	100 hrs. 1 min.	2 hrs. 56 mins.
AE	32	59 hrs. 8 mins.	1 hr. 50 mins.
AF	3	4 hrs. 32 mins.	1 hr. 30 mins.
AKA	3	5 hrs. 58 mins.	1 hr. 59 mins.
	72	169 hrs. 40 mins.	2 hrs. 21 mins.

MATERIAL TRANSFERRED

Av. Gas.	3,331,042 gals.
NSFO	197,275.1 bbls.
Freight	1,210.4 tons
Ammo	5,912.4 tons

P. W. Watson
P. W. WATSON

Copy to:

CNO (2) Advance
 CINCPACFLT (2) Advance
 CINCPACFLT EVALUATION GROUP (1)
 COMNAVFE (1) Advance
 COMSEVENTHFLT (1) Advance
 COMNAVFE EVALUATION GROUP (1)
 CTF 77 (1) Advance
 COMAIRPAC (5)
 COMFAIRALAMEDA (1)
 COMFAIRHAWAII (1)
 COMFAIRJAPAN (1)
 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE (1)
 COMCARDIV ONE (1)
 COMCARDIV THREE (1)
 COMCARDIV FIVE (1)
 COMCARDIV SEVENTEEN (1)
 CO, FAIRBETUPAC (2)
 CO, USS ANTIETAM (CVA36) (1)
 CO, USS BOXER (CVA21) (1)
 CO, USS ESSEX (CVA9) (1)
 CO, USS KEARSARGE (CVA33) (1)
 CO, USS ORISKANY (CVA34) (1)
 CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CVA47) (1)

CO, USS PRINCETON (CVA37) (1)
 CO, USS VALLEY FORGE (CVA45) (1)
 CO, USS BADOENG STRAIT (CV116) (1)
 CO, USS BAIROKO (CV115) (1)
 CO, USS POINT CRUZ (CV119) (1)
 CO, USS RENDOVA (CV114) (1)
 CO, USS SICILY (CV118) (1)
 CO, USS BATAAN (CV129) (1)
 CO, VF 73 NAS, QUONSET PT., R.I. (1)
 COMAIRLANT (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU TWO (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU FIVE (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU ELEVEN (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU FIFTEEN (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU NINETEEN (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU ONE HUNDRED ONE (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU ONE HUNDRED TWO (1)
 COMCARAIRGRU SEVEN (25) (for Squadron
 and parent VC
 Units)
 COMCARAIRGRU (ATU) ONE (1)
 COMFAIRQUONSET (1)
 COMSERVPAC (1)
 NLO JOC KOREA (1)