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U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
Care Fleet Post Office
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Refer to
File No.
CV-47/A9
40/DWC/ct

Serial: 0118

[redacted]

NOV 11 1950

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)
To : Chief of Naval Operations
Via : (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 22 September through 4 October 1950; Forwarding of

Ref: (a) CNO ltr OP-345/aa serial 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) Resume of damage inflicted

1. The subject report is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

Part I - Composition of Own Forces and Mission

U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) with CTF 77 and CTG 77.4 (ComCarDivONE) embarked was steaming off the west coast of Korea on 22 September 1950 in company with other units of Task Force 77. This vessel was operating in accordance with ComCarDivONE Operation Order No. 1-50. The mission of this force was to isolate the INCHON - SEOUL objective area, to provide air cover for ships in INCHON HARBOR and to furnish close support aircraft when requested in order to support United Nations ground forces in KOREA.

Part II - Chronological Order of Events

On 22 September 1950, Task Force 77 was operating approximately 130 miles west of INCHON, conducting strike operations against North Korea. Aircraft from this vessel did not conduct offensive flight operations this day. The day was set aside for replenishment. Offensive strikes were conducted on 23 and 24 September from SINANJU to the 38th parallel. Close support missions were also flown in the vicinity of SEOUL. On 23 September the Executive Officer of VA-115, LCDR L.W. CHICK, USN, was shot down 12 miles southeast of PYONGYANG. The pilot parachuted to safety and was picked up by a MAG-33 helicopter. The following day, LT C.C. DAGE was hit with A/A while flying an F9F near CHORWON. He managed to remain airborne until over the YELLOW SEA where he parachuted to safety. The U.S.S. CHEVALIER (DDR-805) picked up LT DAGE 7 hours later. September 25 was another replenishment day. The only launch of the day was a two plane ASP which was sent out after one of the screening destroyers reported a sonar contact. For the remainder of the period the above pattern of two days combat operations and one day of fueling was followed. The only other unusual happening during this period was

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at 1816I on 29 September when an F9F crashed through all barriers and hit the aircraft parked forward of the barriers. Twelve aircraft were damaged; five received major damage. Five enlisted men were injured, two seriously. The Task Force left the combat area on 3 October and arrived at SASEBO HARBOR about 1700I, 4 October 1950.

Part III - Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

a. Ordnance expended during the period:

TYPE	QUANTITY
BOMBS	
500 lb. G.P.	289
1000 lb. G.P.	60
220 lb. FRAGS	194
260 lb. FRAGS	166
350 lb. ADB	3
ROCKETS	
3.5" with 3.25" motor	12
5" (MK 2 head) with 5" motor	110
5" (MK 6 head) with 5" motor	1060
NAPALM	
Navy Type 1	780 lbs.
MACHINE GUN AMMO	
20MM	93,456 rounds (ratio 1:1:1)

Part IV - Brief Resume of Battle Damage

a. Ship - None

b. Aircraft

	COMBAT				OPERATIONAL			
	F9F	F4U	AD	TOTAL	F9F	F4U	AD	TOTAL
Dmgd.	1		1	2	1			1
Lost		2	1	3	4	9	1	14
	1	2	2	5	5	9	1	15

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c. For damage inflicted, see enclosure (1).

Part V - Personnel Performance and Casualties

a. Health and performance of crew:
(1) Health and Performance of the crew has been excellent. Approximately 200 men are treated daily in the Sick Bay and every effort is being made to reduce time lost from work.

b. Complement
(1) The enlisted complement of the Medical Department is considered adequate. The addition of one medical officer to fill the authorized allowance is urgently recommended. It is further recommended that at least one medical officer assigned to this type of vessel be a qualified surgeon.

c. Casualties:
(1) There have been no fatalities during the period. Five enlisted members of the flight deck crew were injured when an F9F aircraft went through the barriers. Two of these individuals suffered fractured legs, MARSHALL, Harvey H., 256 29 99, ADC, USN and SCHROEDER, Milton E., 999 36 14, ATAN, USN. The condition of SCHROEDER was considered serious when a fat embolism developed. Two officers sustained injuries due to the result of enemy action. LCDR L.W. CHICK, 98522, U.S. Navy, bailed out resulting in a fracture of the seventh and ninth ribs left. LT C.C. DACE, 347432, U.S. Navy, bailed out resulting in severe sprain of the lower back and a mild abrasion of the left hip. Minor injuries consisting of lacerations, contusion etc., while numerous, do not show any appreciable increase in rate.

Part VI - Special Comments on Doctrine and Operational Procedure

a. Operations
(1) Downgrading of classification on operation orders:
(a) The classification of "SECRET" and "TOP SECRET" for operation orders prior to execution is understood and concurred in. However, the matters of stowage, accessibility, and dissemination indicate the desirability of downgrading these documents at the time there is no longer any danger of compromise. It is also felt that many annexes to operation orders could be given much lower classification than the operation order itself, thereby materially aiding dissemination.

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(2) Recommendation:
(a) It is recommended that the 3 (X) paragraph of all operation orders include a statement that this operation order, except _____, be downgraded to RESTRICTED/CONFIDENTIAL (delete one). on _____(date).

b. Target analysis and damage assessment:
(1) Correct target data can be maintained by:
First - Locating the target
Second - Determining physical characteristics of the target
Third - Assessing damage to the target through strike reports
Fourth - Incorporating third step into second

(2) In the Korean operations correct target data has been difficult to maintain due to incomplete damage assessment photography and inherent inaccuracies in pilots report. Every effort has been made in Air Group 11 to obtain accurate reports on what was seen and accomplished. The reports obtained to date, as verified by photography when available, indicate that pilots from this ship have been very accurate in reporting damage accomplished. An attempt to keep accurate target data from pilot reports of other units and forces has been more difficult. It appears that claims in many cases are highly exaggerated. As accurate information on target status is necessary for sound planning, it would appear that a change is in order for determining damage inflicted.

(3) Recommendations:
(a) It is recommended that the:
1. Number of photographic planes for CV detachments be increased to six and that each strike have one or two photo planes, included as a component part for the purpose of obtaining damage assessment photography and reconnaissance photography as practicable.
2. Damage inflicted be classified as "possible" unless substantiated by photography.

c. Ordnance loading:
(1) Loading of ordnance, perhaps more than any other single item, has been the limiting factor on speed of operations principally because of the greater ordnance capacity of modern aircraft. Emphasis during these operations has been on maximum bomb and rocket loads. The use of napalm has been found particularly effective against North Korean forces and has been used on an unprecedented level. The main difficulty in loading such large quantities of napalm, however, is that Mark 12 tanks must be filled <u>after</u> they are loaded

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on the planes and it is impossible to load in advance without creating an unacceptable fire hazard.

(2) Recommendations:
(a) Facilities for pre-filling MK 12 tanks and for hoisting pre-filled tanks on to aircraft without damage to the tanks should be developed.
(b) Suitable storage for pre-filled tanks should be developed which will permit jettisoning when danger of fire or attack exists.

d. In-port replenishment:

(1) In spite of an obvious and commendable all-out effort on the part of Commander Service Squadron 31, replenishment of this ship in port, which could have been accomplished in a matter of a few days, was dragged out for the entire period in port. Ammunition arrived in small lots and according to no set schedule. Similarly the schedule for loading stores and provisions, fuel and aviation gasoline was most unpredictable. This resulted in curtailment of liberty and interference with much-needed and well-deserved rest and recreation for the crew. It is believed that the main cause of this difficulty is that too many combatant ships have to utilize too few facilities during too short a period.

(2) Recommendations:
(a) In-port replenishment periods should be assigned carriers and a proportionate number of other ships on a rotational basis so that unnecessary competition for logistic services will be avoided.

e. Flight deck operations:

(1) Although no mention was made of the problems connected with flight deck operations in previous action reports, this does not mean such problems did not exist. On the contrary, these problems have been continuous since this vessel entered combat and can be expected to continue as long as carriers of this class continue to operate as all-purpose carriers. These comments, therefore, are applicable to the entire combat experience of this ship, and represent considerably more opportunities for considered thought than the period indicated by the inclusive dates of this report.

(2) It is realized that operational requirements commit the carrier task force to many varied tasks which must be carried out

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by apportioning them to the individual carriers. When these tasks are combined with requirements for maintaining ready decks and having fighters on deck in a ready condition on a round-the-clock basis, the individual carrier's flight deck problems become extremely complex. It has not been unusual for this vessel to be confronted with the problem of having to perform six or more distinct missions on a single launch. When this task is repeated several times a day, followed by night operations, it is not difficult to appreciate the complexity of flight deck operations requiring constant spotting and respotting of the nine different types of aircraft comprising this ship's air group. The flight deck operations of World War II, if compared to the present operations, would seem most elementary.

(3) It is believed that the increased present day difficulties in flight deck operations, which have been introduced by the increased weight and size of modern aircraft and the variety and number of specialized aircraft assigned, is not generally understood at the present time. As carrier aircraft increase in size and complexity much of the deck handling equipment of World War II vintage must be increased both in capacity and numbers. Air Department personnel allowances must be increased, and old concepts of flight deck techniques must be discarded if full benefit is to be obtained from the increasingly large investment in carrier aircraft.

(4) It is believed that the limitations of the presently installed elevators and catapults are common knowledge and that alterations outstanding will ultimately correct these deficiencies. Other material deficiencies, not so readily apparent, may not be receiving the same corrective attention.

(5) For example, both the quality and number of present flight deck tractors is totally inadequate. Lack of sufficient numbers of more powerful tractors has been a serious detriment to flight deck crews. Since the operation of both jets and propeller type aircraft exactly doubles the amount of deck spotting required due to the lesser endurance of the jets, either an exorbitant amount of taxiing must be conducted, or unacceptable delays in reports must be expected. Present tractors do not have sufficient power to tow the heavier modern airplanes (particularly AD's) into a 30 knot wind at the speed required for an

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expeditious respot. Furthermore, the present allowance of 8 tractors will simply not permit an orderly tractor maintenance program and still leave enough operating to insure an uninterrupted flow of towed aircraft. It is estimated that the lack of towing facilities has resulted in the loss of utilization of the equivalent of at least one aircraft, the cost of which would more than cover the cost of procurement of adequate towing equipment. Similarly, no satisfactory method of towing tricycle landing gear aircraft to the rear exists at the present time. Tow bars have been modified locally to permit after towing, but they have proved to be unsatisfactory both from the standpoint of speed of towing and the damage caused to tail skags if used continuously. Except for certain special situations, it has been found that F9F's on this ship can be moved more rapidly using forward towing facilities and turning the plane around.

(6) Flight deck surfaces (suitable for the slower, lighter planes of World War II) have proved to be inadequate for the high speed, heavy planes of today under continuous operating conditions. The much greater landing impact loads now being experienced are literally chewing up the decks at an alarming rate. The condition of the deck in the vicinity of the first three pendants has become particularly critical and the worn planking near the after edges of metal surfaces is considered especially hazardous. It is believed that numerous cases of hook-bounce can be attributed to the condition of the deck in this area. Jet blast has blown and burned out caulking and contributed in some measure to deterioration throughout the flight deck. Continuous operating periods and lack of facilities have prevented all but the most urgent repairs.

(7) In spite of the difficulties they have had to contend with, the flight deck crews of this ship have attained a commendable degree of proficiency in their jobs. Every conceivable means of cutting corners and saving time has been thoroughly examined and tested in order to eliminate every possible delay in carrying out exacting schedules. It is believed that there is still some room for lightening the load of flight deck crews by appropriate modifications to schedules. In the interest of morale and efficiency, flight deck capabilities and limitations must be given as much emphasis as tactical considerations in the preparation of schedules.

(8) Recommendations:

(a) Increase the allowance of flight deck tractors from 8 to 12.

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(b) Replace present flight deck tractors with tractors of sufficient power to tow the heavier carrier planes now in use or in the design stage.

(c) Develop suitable tow bars for rear towing of aircraft with tricycle landing gear.

(d) As a long range solution to the tractor problem, develop a tractor which will move the plane to its final spot without the necessity for unhooking and moving the last 10 or more feet by hand. A tractor which moves beneath the plane instead of in front or behind, is suggested.

(e) Establish within each service squadron command supplying logistic support, a team of suitably equipped and trained flight deck repairmen who will be available to provide expert flight deck repair service, in combat areas, to the carriers during their brief in-port replenishment periods.

(f) Establish a doctrine, when two or more carriers are operating together, a schedule of alternate launches and recoveries, so that a ready deck will be a natural result of the air schedule. Schedule peculiarities which call for respotting the deck with all planes aboard should be particularly avoided..

f. Engineering:

(1) Operational requirements continued to be strenuous during this period. The operation of jet aircraft coupled with fuel conservation measures required full boiler power during daylight hours and resulted in frequent and radical changes in speed. No serious damage to machinery has been noted, however, considerable repair work has been required, especially brickwork.

(2) Insufficient upkeep time has been allowed. During the short time in port, the engineering personnel have worked around the clock to accomplish the minimum repairs required for the immediate operation. At the present time two (2) boilers have been exceeding 2000 steaming hours without mechanical cleaning and four (4) additional boilers are in need of cleaning. A large amount of routine maintenance must be accomplished when conditions permit.

(3) The performance of engineering personnel and material has been excellent. The personnel situation is now satisfactory.

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(4) Recommendations:

(a) It is recommended that greater consideration be given to machinery upkeep. In-port periods of definite and sufficient length must be provided in order to ensure reliable engineering performance.

g. Damage Control:

(1) As this ship sustained no battle damage, the damage control personnel had little opportunity to demonstrate their abilities. Continued training, with damage control personnel standing condition watches, characterized this period. This watch was very useful in enforcing material conditions while operating in an area known to contain floating mines. The repair load continued to be heavy with flight deck repair, a major item.

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USS VALLEY FORGE
USS LEYTE
USS BOXER
CAG-11

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DAMAGE INFLICTED

TARGET	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Trucks	43	18	35
Jeeps	9		
Carts	28	18	10
Automobiles			2
Vehicles (type unknown)	4		
Tanks			3
Locomotives		2	7
Boxcars	2	9	20
A/A Positions	8	6	5
Gun Emplacements	5	2	2
Artillery Pieces			4
Aircraft			1
Warehouses	26	20	26
Ammunition Dumps	4		
Oil Dumps	3		
Hangars			4
Bridges		1	1
Junks			6

ENCLOSURE (1)

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TARGET	DESTROYED	PROBABLY DESTROYED	DAMAGED
Trucks	43	18	35
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Hangars			4
Bridges		1	1
Junks			6

ENCLOSURE (1)

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