

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

~~ORIGINAL~~

27 APR 1952

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47)

To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
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Subj: Action Report for the period 17 March through 19 April 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4 as modified by OpNav Instruction 3480.5

Encl: (1) Commander Carrier Air Group ELEVEN conf ltr ser 014 of 20 April 1952. *P25*

I. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 17 March 1952 through 19 April 1952 is hereby submitted:

PART I - COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION:

The USS PHILIPPINE SEA in company with USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), USS MC KENZIE (DD-836) and USS TWINING (DD-746) got underway at 0625, 17 March to join Task Force 77 by authority of CTF-77 dispatch 130228Z of 13 March 1952. SOPA and ComCarDiv THREE were embarked on this vessel. The ship joined the Task Force at 1005I, 19 March in the operating area off the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by RADM F.W. MC MAHON, USN, on the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd revision) dated 6 December 1951. The Task Force was composed of the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), units of DesDiv 11, 72, 92 and 261. Air Group ELEVEN was embarked on the USS PHILIPPINE SEA. After a period of 29 days of operations the ship with DesDiv 51 formed TF 77.02 and departed for Yokosuka for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operations, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force when directed; in order to support UN forces in Korea, and support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

PART II - CHRONOLOGY

17 March At 0655 in company with the USS ROCHESTER (CA-124), USS MC KENZIE (DD-836) and USS TAUSSIG (DD-746) got underway to join TF-77 by authority of CTF 77 dispatch 130228Z of 13 March 1952.

18 March Underway for the operating area. Air Defense for AA firing on towed sleeve.

19 March Joined Task Force 77 at 1005I. SOPA and OTC was ComCarDiv FIVE embarked on the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)

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- Three marine helicopters that were aboard for transportation were launched for K-18.
- 20 March In company with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ROCHESTER (CA-124) and units of DesDiv 11, 72, 93, and 262 air operations were commenced. LTJG D. J. KLAPKA, USN, of VF-113 landed at K-18 due to a locked left aileron. ENS M. G. WICKER, USN, flew escort.
 - 21 March Conducted air operations and air defense.
 - 22 March Conducted air operations and air defense.
 - 23 March Task Force replenished.
 - 24 March No air operations due to inclement weather.
 - 25 March Conducted air operations. Despite bad weather 24 sorties were flown with no losses for a total of 73.1 hours.
 - 26 March Conducted air operations and air defense.
 - 27 March Conducted air operations. LCDR A. G. RUSSEL, USN, while on a night heckler mission ditched his aircraft in Wonsan harbor. The USS BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887) effected the rescue. LTJG W. J. COOPER, USN, when released from rescap landed at K-18.
 - 28 March Conducted air operations.
 - 29 March Task Force replenished.
 - 30 March Conducted air operations. One F4U flown by LTJG W. J. COOPER, USNR, crashed and burned 5000 yards from the ship. Pilot was recovered by the USS LAWYER (DD-770) in good condition. This was an early morning heckler flight. The cause of the crash was believed to be a mechanical failure. Aircraft not recovered.
 - 31 March Conducted air operations with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and USS BOXER (CV-21).
 - 1 April Conducted air operations with USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) and USS BOXER (CV-21).
 - 2 April Task Force replenished. USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) departed area. ComCarDiv THREE assumed command as CTF-77.
 - 3 April Conducted air operations. LTJG DE GOEDE, USN, while flying an AD crashed in the water. He was picked up uninjured by the helicopter from the USS BOXER (CV-21). Cause of the crash was not determined.
 - 4 April Conducted air operations. LTJG W. R. CARTER, USN, was wounded about the face and hands while flying an F9F on a jet strike over Korea. Unable to land aboard ship he was escorted to K-18.
 - 5 April Conducted air operations and air defense.
 - 6 April Task Force replenished.
 - 7 April Conducted air operations.

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- 8 April No air operations due to inclement weather.
- 9 April No air operations due to inclement weather.
- 10 April Conducted air operations. One (1) F4U piloted by CDR G. B. BJORNSON, USN, crashed on the take-off. He was picked up 200 yards from the ship by the helicopter. One (1) AD piloted by LTJG D.S. SWANSON, USN, was forced to ditch in Wonsan harbor. The pilot was picked up uninjured by the helicopter of the USS ST PAUL (CA-73). No apparent injuries were sustained.
- 11 April Conducted air operations and radiological defense drill.
- 12 April Task Force replenished.
- 13 April Conducted air operations.
- 14 April Conducted air operations.
- 15 April Conducted air operations and air defense.
- 16 April Task Force replenished. 1655I departed Task Force for Yokosuka. Conducted air defense and gunnery exercises.
- 17 April Conducted air defense and gunnery exercises.
- 18 April 1412I moored to Piedmont Pier, Yokosuka, Japan.

PART V - PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CASUALTIESa. PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE OF THE CREW

1. The morale and general health of the ship's company continued at its previous good level. The weather became warmer, and considerably fewer colds were seen at sick call, and the number of personnel admitted to the sick list fell to about one half (about .3 percent) of what it had been during our previous operating period.

2. The number of venereal disease patients has increased, and the various entities seen have been, and still are, very resistant to treatment. The VD situation has become a serious problem.

3. Casualties

(a) On 3-28-52 an SA fell 40 feet into a hatch on another ship, and was transferred to us the next day. He suffered a severe head injury, and will require hospitalization upon arrival in port.

(b) On 3-26-52 an ADE1 sustained a fracture of his right radius when he caught his forearm in a closing power-driven canopy of an airplane.

(c) Two pilots were injured during this period. The first, LTJG W. R. Carter, USN, suffered a puncture wound of his left eye as the result of enemy ground fire. He was able to land at a friendly field, and was hospitalized. It is expected that he will return to duty. The second, LCDR G. B. Bjornson, USN, crashed into the sea with his F4U immediately following a launch in early dawn. He suffered several contusions and a compound fracture of his right patella.

PART VI - GENERAL

a. AIR DEPARTMENT

1. Safety - No comments.
2. Napalm - No comments.
3. VT Fuses - No comments.
4. Catapults

(a) Replacement of two broken sheaves on the port machine and cable tensioner repair on the starboard machine resulted in having the subject machine out of commission at irregular intervals. Improper bridle tensioning function caused delays in firing of the port machine. Replacement of cross-head slippers should remedy this situation.

(b) By types, 546 F9F's, 85 AD's, 77 F4U's and 8 TBM's for a total of 716 aircraft were catapulted.

(c) Acceleration of maintenance intervals resulted in satisfactory performance of the machines.

5. Arresting Gear

(a) No major difficulties were encountered.

(b) Installation of the double barricade during last port availability proved satisfactory in operation.

(c) Two F9F's entered the barrier area when hook tips were snapped during landing.

(d) Only one F9F entered the barricade after the major shock of barrier engagement was taken up by barriers #2 and #4. Negligible damage to barricade webbing.

(e) The first double barricade installation was removed after 743 landings, numerous respots, bomb skid and tractor traffic plus weather, showed appreciable wear and tear of the barricade webbing.

(f) Of the 1,675 landings during this period a total of 5 aircraft were abruptly halted by the barrier system. By types this includes 2 F9F's, 2 F4U's and 1 TBM. Only one double engagement of pendants #2 and #3 by an F9F during this period. Pendants #1, #2 and #3 continue to bear the brunt of engagements.

(g) To prevent engagement of the barricade webbings #2 and #3 are now rigged for nose-wheel aircraft, while #1 and #4 are rigged to halt conventionals. Believe this system should, after a little more evaluation, prove to be standard rigging when operating with mixed type aircraft.

6. Aircraft Maintenance

(a) During this period of operations five R-2800-18W and one R-2800-32W engine build ups have been used. On departure from the operating area no R-2800-18W or 32W engines are available. Although two R-3350-26WA QE's have been available this period no difficulties have been experienced that would cause the need for an engine change. Two J-42-P8 Jet Engines have been built up and installed. It appears from the useage of the J-42-P8 engine in the past two operating periods that no more than four spare engines should be carried as spares when one Jet Squadron is embarked. Six J-42-P8 engines were loaded aboard prior to ships deployment to the forward area and only a total of three engines have been used in two operating periods. Four Jet Engines are recommended as standard initial allowance for supporting one squadron of Jet Aircraft. With the decrease in the numbers of Jet Engines, stowage space can be used more advantageously.

(b) Mk III Anti-Exposure Suits continue to be a source of general repairs and upkeep. At present, an average of four suits are repaired each day. Damage ranging from minute punctures in the fabric to complete separation of the cuff or collar from the suit. The majority of the ruptures appear to be in the rubber cuffs and collars. One experiment which seems to have met with success, was the cementing of a conical shaped extension, 8 inches long, to the sleeve with a layer of sponge rubber $\frac{1}{4}$ inch thick and 2 inches wide on the inside of the extension. This necessitated the removal of the rubber cuff. Water tightness is attained through the adjustment of an adapter fitted strap around the outside of the cuff, as on the old Mk II Anti-Exposure suit.

7. Aircraft Handling

(a) Flight deck crews have been arranged in two 12 hour shifts as an experiment. The duty shift can handle normal traffic during their tour and the off duty shift is on a short notice alert if a rush job arises. The system has worked satisfactorily so far in flight deck operations and has proved very effective in enabling the off duty section to conduct training and also upkeep work.

(b) Tip tanks on a few F9F's have been damaged by contacting the overhead while being taxied from #2 aircraft elevator to the hangar deck due to abnormally high oleos. This condition is not apparent until the damage has been done as the elevator must be cleared immediately. Plane Directors, at present, are not authorized to deflate the oleos.

(c) A work request has been submitted to move the large speaker box, located on the overhead, port side, immediately forward of #2 Aircraft Elevator, approximately $1\frac{1}{2}$ feet nearer the bulkhead. The heavy jet traffic at #2 elevator and the constant use of the space under the chain fall in Bay 2 for jet checks makes their passage through to Bay 1 unnecessarily hazardous

(d) Jet operations have resulted in the deck caulking aft of the catapult area melting and blowing out in many places. The wood planking has been heated so often by jets that the wood is dry and brittle, and the deck planking appears to splinter more easily than it should. It is believed that a special caulking substance with a higher melting ratio could be developed. No solution seems readily available to remedy the brittleness of the flight deck wood.

(e) The attrition of Universal Tow Bars has been high during this period of operations. It has been found that it is necessary to have one man devote his entire working time to the repair and upkeep of each group of 30 Universal Tow Bars. Most difficulty is experienced with pins bending out of shape or breaking, and the female fitting in the tow bar, or cross piece, becoming elongated. It is believed that these conditions are aggravated by the ramp deck fitting on the new barricade. Everytime an aircraft is towed over this ramp at normal towing speed the Universal Bar is subjected to a jolt. If each tractor slowed down slow enough to avoid this jolt while going over the ramp, the time for respot or making a ready deck would be increased a noticeable amount. A channel type recess for housing the barricade straps would seem to be a better arrangement in so far as handling the flight deck traffic. It is realized, of course, that this would require alteration of the stanchion and other parts of the barricade, therefore no recommendation is made on this matter as yet.

(f) Experience in deck crashes has resulted in the AIR BOS'N developing specialized crash dollies for all occasions. A dolly to fit under the wing of an F4U or AD and bring it up to a normal height and leave it in a towable condition was made by using the wheels from a spotting dolly, boiler plate for the top and 2½ inch pipe to build up the frame. A bunk mattress was used as a pad to leave the wing undamaged. If a crash knocking out part, or all of the aircraft under-carriage occurred, it was found that the easiest and quickest way to remove it was to lift the wing up with a fork lift and securely strap one of the wing dollies under it. The aircraft could then be towed to any desired place. The smaller tail dollies were found to be satisfactory for AD's and F4U's. Two dollies have been found satisfactory for F9F nose wheels. Each has two wheels and a bar for steering. One is designed to fit over a broken oleo strut, and the other is designed for use when the entire strut has been sheared off. Conventional dollies were found satisfactory for replacing main landing gears of F9F's for towing purposes.

(g) Use of many different types of aircraft has made it necessary to spot the flight deck in such a manner so as to have any one of several types of aircraft in position to be launched within a minimum time. This carrier has found that the most flexible ready spot is as follows: AD's aft on port side, regular F4U's aft on starboard side, Night AD's at head of regular AD's and seven F9F's just aft of port catapult. Night fighter F4U's should be at head of the regular F4U's. The hangar deck is utilized primarily as follows:

- Bay 1: For jets only.
- Bay 2: For night gear.
- Bay 3: For duds and conventional aircraft checks.

This spot has proven satisfactorily and is flexible enough to allow changes to be made in flight schedules.

8. Gasoline System

(a) The following quantities of gasoline, oil and alcohol were issued:

115/145 Av/Gas	695,020 gallons
Symbol 1100 Av/Lub Oil	4,240 gallons
Alcohol, Ethyl, Spec. Mil-A-6091	75 gallons

(b) Gasoline received from tankers during this period contained water to an estimated 5% by volume, judging from samples taken at regular intervals during replenishment operations.

b. Aerology

1. With one exception, the lows which passed through the Sea of Japan or strongly influenced the weather in the operating area developed along the coast of China. Three such systems were experienced during the present period of operation but none caused the Task Force to cease operations except for short periods.

2. The exception mentioned above was first seen west of Lake Baikal and moved southeastward to the Sea of Japan. When the center moved into the Sea of Japan the system stopped and deepened rapidly. The low deepened to 998.7 mbs. and remained stationary for about 18 hours before accelerating rapidly and moving eastward across the northern tip of Honshu. During the deepening of the system the maximum hourly wind was westerly 50 plus with short gust to near 65 knots. Very rough to high seas persisted for 48 hours in the wake of the system which passed roughly 100 miles north of the force.

3. On 7 April a dense blanket of advection fog moved up on a moderate southerly breeze and covered the operating area for two days until the wind backed to easterly preceding a warm frontal passage.

4. Approximately five days operations were cancelled because of weather, half for high winds and heavy seas and half for low visibility.

U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA CV-47
WEATHER SUMMARY

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITION	VISIBILITY	SURF WIND		ZEBRA DAYS SEA CONDITION AND TEMP	1952 AIR TEMP	
				DIR	AVG MAX		MAX	MIN
18 March	Cloudy-Rain	Clear becoming low overcast	10 miles, 1/2 to 4 in rain	NE	25 33	Slight to rough 48 to 66°F	70	37
19 March	Partly-cloudy rain & snow	Low overcast becoming scattered to broken	10 miles lowering to 1/2 in snow	NE	15 26	Very rough to moderate 34 to 48	42	35
20 March	Mostly-clear	low scattered to clear to high scattered	10 to 15 miles	W ^{ly}	14 18	Slight 36 to 46	52	40
21 March	Mostly-clear	high scattered to clear to low broken & high overcast	10 miles	W ^{ly}	14 21	Slight 39 to 43	52	45
22 March	Partly-cloudy rain	Low scattered to broken middle overcast to broken	10 miles	S ^{ly} to W ^{ly}	22 31	Slight to very rough 38 to 50	52	39
23 March	Cloudy, Rain- showers, Snow- showers and fog	Low broken to overcast	10 miles with 1/4 to 4 in precipitation and fog	W ^{ly}	36 50	Very rough to high 45 to 52	44	34
24 March	Partly-cloudy Snow	Low overcast becoming scattered to clear	10 miles becoming 1/2 in Snow	N	21 46	Very rough 34 to 44	43	36
25 March	Mostly-clear	High scattered and clear	8 to 10 miles	S ^{ly}	8 14	Rough 34 to 44	50	41
26 March	Cloudy	High to middle overcast	10 miles	S ^{ly}	11 16	Moderate 40 to 42	53	45
27 March	Mostly-clear Rain	Low and middle broken becoming clear	10 miles	NW	6 17	Slight 38 to 44	50	42
28 March	Partly cloudy	Mostly clear becoming scattered to broken middle and high	10 miles	SW	11 14	Smooth 40 to 51	56	46
29 March	Partly-cloudy	High broken to overcast becoming low scattered to broken	10 miles	S	10 16	Slight 40 to 52	59	45

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITION	VISIBILITY	DIR	AVG	MAX	SEA CONDITIONS	AIR TEMP MAX MIN
30 March	Partly-cloudy	Low broken to overcast, high scattered	10 miles	E'yly	14	25	Slight 40 to 44	50 42
31 March	Cloudy-Rain	Middle broken to overcast becoming low overcast	8 to 10 miles	E'yly	13	18	Slight 41 to 51	51 39
1 April	Partly-cloudy	Low broken to overcast, middle broken to scattered	10 miles	E'yly	7	12	Slight 42 to 52	57 40
2 April	Partly-cloudy	Low scattered, middle and high scattered to broken	10 miles	SE	10	14	Slight 38 to 52	60 43
3 April	Partly-cloudy	Low scattered and high scattered to broken	10 miles	SW	13	15	Slight 42 to 50	56 48
4 April	Mostly-clear	High scattered	10 miles, 4 to 8 in haze	W'yly	8	13	Slight 38 to 48	56 46
5 April	Mostly-clear	High scattered	10 miles, 4 to 7 in haze & fog	S	14	22	Slight 40 to 54	60 50
6 April	Cloudy	High broken to overcast middle broken	6 miles Haze	S'yly	13	16	Slight 42 to 52	68 51
7 April	FOG	Middle broken to overcast	0 to 4 in fog	S'yly	14	24	Slight 36 to 47	58 44
8 April	FOG	Low overcast	0 to 5 in fog	S'yly	11	15	Slight 42 to 52	57 44
9 April	FOG, Cloudy	High overcast, middle scattered to broken	0 to 5 in FOG becoming 6 to 10 miles	E'yly	14	19	Slight 43 to 52	64 48
10 April	Cloudy	Middle scattered to broken High broken to overcast	8 to 10 miles	E'yly	14	18	Slight 40 to 50	56 45
11 April	Cloudy-Rain	High and middle overcast low broken to overcast	4 miles average, 1/4 to 5 in haze and rain	S'yly	18	33	Slight to moderate 38 to 59	61 45
12 April	Cloudy- Rain	Low scattered to overcast middle broken to overcast	10 miles, 2 to 6 in rain and haze	N'yly	19	29	Rough 34 to 54	56 42

DATE	WEATHER	SKY CONDITION	VISIBILITY	DIR	AVG	MAX	SEA CONDITION	AIR TEMP MAX	MIN
13 April	Partly-cloudy	Middle and high scattered to overcast	10 miles	N'y	10	16	Slight to moderate 36 to 48	52	39
14 April	Partly-cloudy Rain & drizzle	Low and middle scattered to overcast	10 miles, 7 to 8 in rain & drizzle	E'y	15	27	Slight 42 to 51	53	45
15 April	Mostly clear	Low and middle scattered	10 miles	W'y	23	39	Slight to rough 40 to 50	57	46

WEATHER SUMMARY

1952

DATE	CEILING(Below 10,000 feet)	IFR	Reason IFR
18 March	16 hrs 1000 to 6500 feet	11 hrs	low visibility
19 March	14 hrs 800 to 2500 feet	4 hrs	low ceilings and visibility
20 March	CAVU		
21 March	3 hrs 4500 feet		
22 March	21 hrs 2000 to 9000 feet		
23 March	19 hrs 500 to 7000 feet	7 hrs	low visibility and ceilings
24 March	12 hrs 800 to 2000 feet	3 hrs	low ceilings and visibility
25 March	CAVU		
26 March	14 hrs 7000 to 10000 feet		
27 March	4 hrs 3500 to 7000 feet		
28 March	CAVU		
29 March	6 hrs 2500 to 5000 feet		
30 March	8 hrs 3500 to 9000 feet		
31 March	23 hrs 900 to 7000 feet	2 hrs	low ceilings
1 April	10 hrs 2000 to 8000 feet		
2 April	CAVU		
3 April	CAVU		
4 April	None		

DATE	CEILING (Below 10,000 Feet)	IFR	REASON IFR
5 April	None		
6 April	None		
7 April	7 hrs Zero	13 hrs	low ceilings and visibility
8 April	23 hrs Zero to 900 feet	24 hrs	low ceilings and visibility
9 April	7 hrs Zero to 7000 feet	3 hrs	low ceilings and visibility
10 April	3 hrs 7000 to 8000 feet		
11 April	17 hrs 1000 to 6500 feet	11 hrs	low visibility
12 April	10 hrs 800 to 9000 feet	2 hrs	low ceilings
13 April	3 hrs 7000 to 9000 feet		
14 April	7 hrs 1500 to 5000 feet		
15 April	1 hr 8000 feet		

c. AIR INTELLIGENCE

1. The importance of the use of up to date photography in briefing cannot be over emphasized. This was recently evidenced, for example, in the "all out" force strike on Chongjin. Two days prior to the event, photo coverage of Chongjin was attained. P.I.'s were able to locate much of the flak, targets were selected, and from these annotated photographs the strike leaders and pilots planned their approaches and runs. Accurate orientation, location of pinpoint targets and flak positions is virtually impossible without recent photo coverage. The results achieved were attributable, in a large measure, to these photos.

2. In rail cutting and coordinated flak suppression, photos are valuable in ratio to their age. Using photos taken two days prior to an event flak can be located and thus suppressed more effectively.

3. Photographs are also helpful for recco flights over unfamiliar terrain. This is especially true for jet aircraft.

4. The advantages of photography in practically every phase of carrier operations are readily apparent. The difficulty lies in the supplying of the desired photos. "Commitments of the Task Force are such that only a minimum number of photo missions assigned are for immediate Task Force use. Processing and annotating photos taken for other commands take precedence over "local" work." It is believed that better results could be achieved if the present photo units worked directly on the specific targets for the operating carriers.

5. Photo Interpretation

(a) Fifty-three photo missions were flown during this operating period. These missions were flown for the purpose of flak study, target search, rail status and damage assessment. One special mapping mission was flown over Chongjin for the purpose of picking targets for a strike on that city. Also a special damage assessment mission was flown after the strike.

(b) Eight flak study "Touraid" booklets were made during this period, and distributed to other carriers and staffs in the Task Force. Target annotated mosaics were made for strike against Chongjin and against enemy gun positions on Hodo Pando.

(c) Some excellent results for damage assessment were obtained from the K-25 camera carried in the AD type aircraft.

d. CIC

1. General

(a) In general there has been little change in the complement in CIC. As it now stands, there are eight qualified watch officers, two of whom are qualified All Weather Air Controllers, and three Assistant Watch Officers not fully qualified as Watch Officers yet, whose main function is to act in the capacity of Surface Control Officers. The enlisted complement remains at eighty four including one Chief Radarman who is also listed above as a CIC Watch Officer. This total includes Lookout personnel, as the present Ship's Organization requires the activation of an O-L Division only under wartime conditions.

(b) Although approximately seventy percent of the CIC personnel is composed of inexperienced seaman strikers, progressive training has been accomplished by utilizing these personnel to the fullest extent during actual operations at sea.

(c) The organization of the watch is the same as that reported for the previous operating period and is in accordance with the Ship's Battle Bill and that recommended by ComAirPac. The Condition Three watch consists of two watch officers on each watch, each watch being of six hours duration. In addition, two Air Controllers are assigned to all watches during the hours of air operations. Also, operations permitting, individual watch officers are required to spend two additional hours each day in CIC practicing Air Control procedures. The Condition One Watch includes the Operations Officer as Evaluator, the CIC Officer, the Surface Control Officer and an Assistant, three Air Controllers, a Radar Control Officer, Radar Countermeasures Officer, CCA Officer, and the Lookout Officer stationed in Air Defense Forward. The Gunnery Department furnishes one Liaison Officer during Condition Three watches and two officers in CIC during Condition One. With the Flag on board, one additional officer from the staff has been added to the CIC Watch to handle the duties of the Force CIC Officer.

(d) Enlisted stations are manned in accordance with standard CIC doctrine plus the additional plotter and strike talkers listed in the previous report.

2. Radar Performance.

(a) None of the radar equipment has been out of operation for any extended periods other than those required for routine maintenance.

(b) Both the SG-6B and the SG-7 radars have been utilized alternately for surface search, station keeping, and radar navigation with equal satisfaction. During sortie and entry exercises both surface radars are used simultaneously giving excellent results.

(c) The SPS-6B radar has proved to be superior to the SX for tracking jet aircraft, although without the aid of the Mark V/Mark X IFF neither radar is ideal for work with jet aircraft. Both the SX and the SPS-6B radars are excellent for long range air search and tracking of targets other than jet aircraft.

(d) Excellent results have been obtained with the installed PO equipment, although thus far it has not been utilized extensively. This equipment presents a very clear picture of land areas and surface contacts at considerable range. However, it leaves something to be desired in its presentation of high altitude air targets at any worth while range.

(e) There has been no change in the status of the COA equipment in this ship. At present it is not in operating condition, and although it can be readied for operation upon short notice, the physical location of the equipment makes it impractical as the vibration of the ship causes immediate failure of one or more parts.

3. Air Control

(a) No difficulties in air control have been experienced during this period. The training and subsequent qualification of three additional Controllers has lessened the work load previously imposed upon the few Air Controllers with which we formerly were forced to operate.

4. Communications

(a) Communications difficulties including cross talk and feed back, as stated in the report for the last operating period, have been largely corrected by the technicians. The electronics division has worked long and hard at these problems and has succeeded in eliminating practically all communication troubles in the CIC.

(b) The ARC-1s have proved most reliable for air control work and the addition of one or more AN/ARC-1s to CICs in this type vessel would be highly desirable.

5. Lookouts

(a) As stated in previous action reports, the lookout personnel are included in the O-I Division with provisions for activating an O-L Division, as a separate unit, should conditions so dictate. An Assistant CIC Watch Officer is assigned as Lookout Officer, and as such is in charge of training, assignment of watches, and general supervision. Personnel are rotated to lookout duty within the O-I Division, thus affording all personnel an opportunity to learn all phases of the CIC including lookout duties.

6. Recommendations and Comments.

(a) The recommendation pertaining to the addition of one or more AN/ARC-1s to CIC, as stated in paragraph 4(b) of this report, is believed to be worthy of mention again. The AN/ARC-1, of which there are now two in CIC, has proved invaluable for air control and is more satisfactory than the RCK for this work, although the exact reason for this has not been determined.

(b) No comments are indicated at this time. The CIC as a team, has performed satisfactorily with only minor discrepancies, which, it is believed, can and will be corrected in the course of future operations by routine on the job training. It should be emphasized that vigilant supervision by qualified watch officers and watch petty officers, and constant training in practical operating procedures will be necessary to maintain and improve the efficiency of the CIC.

e. Communications

1. This ship became the flagship of Commander Carrier Division THREE prior to leaving for the operating area and for CTF-77 the last two weeks on the line. Traffic volume increased to such an extent that every piece of equipment was utilized to the maximum extent.

✓2. The ship-to-shore RATT circuit A4.8 presented the biggest problem. Outages on this circuit were not excessive but no alternate CW circuit was available except the Primary ship-to-shore A1 series. As A4.8 is operated on a shared basis, it is strongly recommended that a CW circuit with NDT be activated, particularly during the time that CTF-77 is not permitted to use A4.8.

3. The personnel situation continues to become more and more critical. The situation is recognized and an accelerated scheduled training program is being intensified in conjunction with on-the-job training. The results however, cannot approach the attrition rate.

f. Photography

1. Photo missions were flown on a total of 18 days. A total of 53 photo hops were flown in this time and 66 rolls were exposed. Both vertical and oblique K-17 cameras were used as fixed installation cameras in the F9F2P jet planes. From these hops 6,212 usable negatives (9 x 9) were made. The distribution of these prints ended with a total of 43,603 finished Sonne Prints.

2. In addition to the routine ship work like RUDM's, PIO, and copy work, the Photography Laboratory processed 70 K-25 rolls of aerial film exposed from AD4 aircraft using pod installations. Projection prints from these rolls made an excessive work load.

3. The A10A Aerial Film and Sonne Paper Dryer has proven itself much superior to the Model J automatic dryer. The Morse B-5 film processing unit has proved to be much superior to the Smith Tank outfits.

4. Much loss of availability of equipment could be minimized by stocking spare parts, especially those which break down most frequently. Included in this latter category are:

a. 15 ampere switches for the A10A dryer. It is believed that the moisture accumulated in machine causes the failure of this part.

b. The rubber belts which are used in the motor of the B-5 outfit also wear considerably especially under the work load which they are subjected to on this ship.

c. The cores for Sonne Paper used on the strip printer are easily bent causing uneven take-up of paper and eventual jamming.

5. Sonne Strip Printers issued from NASD, Oakland did not have spare part kits. It is strongly recommended that repair kits and spare parts be part of the original item issued.

6. Additional rated personnel are constantly needed. In order to expedite the work the Photo Lab was divided into a Day and Night crew which taxed our compliment to maximum. Compartment cleaners, mess cooks, working parties and other Departmental and Divisional responsibilities must be manned by personnel who are theoretically assigned to photo billets. An increase of six to ten men would bring us up to par.

3. Gunnery

1. The following AA practices were fired:

Z-4-G	16 April
Z-5-G	6 April
Z-7-G	17 April

The above practices were fired with good results and no significant casualties. 188 rounds of 5 inch AAC MTF and 342 rounds 40MM HET-HEIT were expended. AA Coordination drill, Z-3-G, was held ten (10) times.

2. The routine maintenance program was carried out although handicapped by personnel shortage. The wiring in the bow 40MM mounts was shorted out for several days when heavy seas were taken over the bow on 23 March. There were no other significant casualties to ordnance and fire control equipment.

3. Deck evaluations:

a. A total of five (5) destroyers were refueled and twelve (12) were alongside for transfer of mail, personnel or freight.

b. The ship refueled from AO's five (5) times.

c. The ship re-armed five (5) times, taking a total of 1,356 tons of ammunition.

d. The ship replenished twice, taking 233 tons of provisions.

e. While re-arming on 6 April number two (2) winch failed. A housefall was rigged but was unsuccessful due to chaffing on the overhead beam and difficulty in landing load on deck. A high line was then rigged and one ton loads were brought over using manpower with good results.

h. Supply

1. Aviation Supply

(a) Prolonged combat flying has started to take its toll on aircraft as reflected by the number of AOG's resulting from depleted section (A and B) allowances. Table I summarizes the AOG's for the period by a/c type and cause. An average of 10 days was required to obtain the necessary part for each AOG.

TABLE I AOG's BY A/C TYPE AND CAUSE

	F9F	HO3-S	AD-4	AD-4W	AD-4NL	F4U-4	F4U-5NL	Total
Parts peculiar to BUMR				1				1
Allowance depleted	5					2		7
Not on allowance	1		1			1		3
Total	6		1	1		3		11

(b) One AOG (AD-4W BUMR 124079) has left both the parent squadron (VC-11) and this vessel with a feeling that inadequate supply support was received in this particular case. It should be noted that, concurrent with this strut procurement problem, the ship was endeavoring to determine which parts were not listed in current publications. As mentioned in the last action report, this program was initiated on our 111014Z Feb and culminated in ASO's 071540Z Mar which gave current strut stock numbers and applications. The chronology of the ill-fated AD-4W follows:

1. 15 February A/C first AOG for struts, Struts R82-DG-5266156-502, -503, which we were outfitted with, did not fit. Ship dispatched the Jupiter on 1503203Z Feb for R82-5255156-504, -505 on CV47/SR10957-52.

2. 18 February Jupiter passed to AMO Oak on 180523Z Feb

3. 29 February Received R82-DG-5385588-1, -2 substituted by NIS Alameda. Struts would not fit.

4. 29 Feb-5 Mar Attempted to adapt struts to A/C. Consulted Douglas Far East Representative and decided to reorder original struts. Dispatched the Jupiter on 050258Z Mar for R82-DG-5266156-504, -505 on CV47/SR11076-52

5. 6 March Jupiter passed to AMO Oak on 060739Z Mar.

6. 6 March AMO Oak passed to ASO Phila on 061519Z Mar.

7. 12 March AMO Oak followed up on 121059Z Mar.

8. 26 March Ship followed up on 260810Z Mar to ASO.

9. 26 March AMO followed up on 260749Z Mar to ASO.

10. 4 April Ship asked for a reply to its 260810Z Mar.

11. 5 April Received ASO's 202001Z Mar by mail asking BAR El Segundo if they could furnish struts.

12. 10 April Ship asked for a reply to its 260810Z Mar and 040002Z April on 100500Z April.

13. 12 April Received ASO's 292111Z Mar by mail following up BAR El Segundo.

14. 15 April Ship asked for a definite shipping date on its 150750Z April.

The A/C is still AOG and it is not known at this writing whether or not struts will be furnished. Because the subject A/C has been AOG 80% of the time the ship has been on the line and represents 33% of the total air power of VC-11, the squadron is seriously considering offloading the plane. VC-11's maintenance crews have been taxed to the breaking point in order to keep the squadron's other two planes in flying condition.

(c) The practice of sending dispatches concerning AOG's, whether action or info, by mail is entirely unsatisfactory. Operational plans cannot be made without logistical facts on hand.

(d) Excellent cooperation was received from both the USS VALLEY FORCE (CV-45) and the USS BOXER (CV-21) in furnishing priority A shortages.

2. GSK

(a) There were no critical shortages of General Stores or Ordnance Material. It was necessary to procure one item of Machinery Repair Parts and one item of Electronics Material from other ships in the Task Force.

(b) The replenishment ships delivered approximately 10 tons of Fleet Freight to this ship while underway. This included some badly needed items of Electronics Material, Machinery Repair Parts and General Stores Material. In addition, cylinders of compressed gasses were replenished each time the ship was alongside a replenishment tanker.

(c) On 12 April CAPT Berkley, CAPT Wellings, CDR Watson, LCDR Wickstrom, and LCDR Cunnare representing the Bureau of Ships, the Electronics Supply Office, and CONSERVAC came aboard for the purpose of discussing shipboard electronics problems. The operation of the Shipboard Integrated Electronic Maintenance Parts system was also discussed with Supply and Engineering Department personnel. The visit proved to be of great benefit in that the visitors were able to clarify several problems that this vessel experienced in the operation of the new parts system. In general, these representatives were well satisfied with the progress made in the use of the system since its inauguration several months ago.

3. Disbursing

(a) Disbursing functions progressed in a routine manner during this period at sea. \$200,000.00 in MFC was secured prior to leaving port to augment approximately \$150,000.00 on hand for disbursing purposes. The two pay rolls had a total expenditure of \$260,197.00 by cash and \$22,707.00 by check. Cash sales of the ship's stores, C&SS, and Post Office money orders returned a total of approximately \$124,630.64 to the cash fund.

4. Commissary

(a) During the current tour in the combat area, the ship provisioned twice, first from the USS POLARIS (AF-11) and last from the USS ALSTEDE (AF-48). Approximately 150 tons were requisitioned each time by despatch with about 20% NIS each time. Provisioning ships were on each occasion well prepared to receive the ship alongside and were able to send the nets over as fast as this vessel could receive them. This reduced normal replenishment time considerably over

previous replenishment time.

(b) Many items of dry provisions, such as crackers, flour and sweet potatoes have been in short supply since our arrival in this theater, while fresh provisions, including lettuce, cabbage, and celery have been badly decomposed and ready for survey when received. Practically all citrus fruits have been damaged and containers broken, apparently by excessive handling prior to receipt on board and during the transfer at sea.

(c) It has been noted that during all provisioning at sea, the nets are received with mixed loads, which makes it extremely difficult to segregate and strike below without considerable delay. If nets could be restricted to one type of material per load, with minor exceptions, it is felt that provisioning at sea could be accomplished more expeditiously in the future.

5. Ship's Store and C&SS

(a) Requisitions for Ship's Store Stock and C&SS merchandise were submitted to ComSerDiv 31 prior to leaving Yokosuka for operating area. Items that could not be supplied through fleet supply ships were filled by U.S. Fleet activities. Stock was rounded off to a three months supply of usually carried items.

(b) Ship's Store luxury items and foreign made products were procured in limited amounts through the Ship's Store ashore, Yokosuka and Central Purchasing Office, Tokyo. Japanese merchandise sales were very good. The best sellers were items in the category of chinaware, silver products, binoculars and raw silk yardage.

(c) Soda Fountain activities were at a peak level. Present equipment was not adequate to supply the demand even though operating at full capacity. Soft ice cream equipment or an increase in hardening cabinet space would eliminate the ice cream shortage.

j. Welfare and Recreation

1. At Sea

(a) Recreational facilities were limited at sea by the nature of the operations. Motion Pictures provided the main form of recreation. Morning Press was issued daily with a Sunday Supplement featuring cartoons and ships news. A radio program was broadcast over the ships R.B.O. System for four and one half hours daily. It appears quite popular. Record players for the living spaces seem to be enjoyed. There is a rather extensive selection of records. Divisional basketball games were played when space was available. Warm up for baseball was conducted when practicable. Badminton and Volleyball have been played on hangar deck when possible.

2. In Port

(a) The recreational program is continued when the ship is in port. Divisional parties are being held ashore. Tours are arranged and stage shows are brought aboard for entertainment. Stars and Stripes newspapers are obtained each evening and Nippon Times newspapers in the morning.

k. Chaplains Functions

1. At Sea

(a) Weekdays

(1) Daily morning religious services are conducted in the crews library consisting of: (a) Catholic Mass at 0630 and Protestant Morning service at 0715 and on Wednesdays and Fridays Protestant communion service at 0715.


(b) Catholic Lenten services in the crews library at 1900 Mondays and Fridays.
 (c) Protestant Bible Study in the crews library at 1930 Tuesdays and Thursdays.
 (d) Latter Day Saints service in the crews library Wednesday at 1930. (e) Jewish Sabbath service in the crews library at 1700 Fridays. (f) Evening Prayers are offered nightly at taps.

(b) Sundays

- (1) Catholic Mass at 0630 - 0830 - 1630
- (2) Protestant Divine Service at 0715 - 0930
- (3) Latter Day Saints Service at 1000

(c) Jewish Passover was celebrated 9 April 1952 in the crews library.

(d) Easter Services for Catholics, Protestants and Latter Day Saints were held 13 April 1952.


ALLEN SMITH, JR.

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