

USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45)  
c/o Fleet Post Office  
San Francisco, California

CV45/A9-4  
Serial: 060

27 February 1952

~~SECRET~~

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NAVHISTDIVINST 5500.1  
By: OP-09B92C

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) —  
To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE  
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN  
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet  
(4) Commander Naval Forces, FAR EAST  
(5) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 30 January 1952 through  
22 February 1952

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instruction 3480.5 dated 1 July 1952

Encl: (1) Commander, CATG ONE conf ltr ser 05 dated 27 Feb 1952 p. 14

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period of 30 January through 22 February 1952 is hereby submitted:

### PART I

#### COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

In compliance with CTF 77 dispatch 162350Z of January 1952, the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), CAPTAIN OSCAR PEDERSON Commanding, with ComCarDiv FIVE (REAR ADMIRAL F.W. MC MAHON) embarked, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for the operating area on 30 January 1952.

On 1 February 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) joined Task Force 77 close to the 38th Parallel on the east coast of Korea. The Task Force was commanded by REAR ADMIRAL JOHN PERRY, ComCarDiv ONE, aboard the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and operated under Task Force 77 Operation Order 22-51 (2nd Revision) dated 6 December 1951. It was composed of USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS ST PAUL (CA-73), USS RADFORD (DDE-446), USS O'BANNON (DDE-450), USS FLETCHER (DDE-445), USS H.J. THOMAS (DDR-833), USS SHELTON (DD-790), USS J.E. KYES (DD-787), USS S.N. MOORE (DD-747) and USS MADDOX (DD-731).

On 20 February 1952 the USS VALLEY FORGE departed Task Force 77 in accordance with ComTask Force 77 dispatch 160226Z and arrived in Yokosuka, Japan 22 February 1952 for a period of maintenance and upkeep.

The mission of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the east coast of Korea to provide close air support of

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- (4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.
- (5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.
- (6) Coordinate air operations with the 5th Air Force through JOC, Korea.
- (7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

Commander Carrier Air Task Group ONE is CDR C.H. CRABILL, Jr., USN. The Group had the following on-board count of pilots and aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 2 February 1952.

<u>SQUADRON</u>	<u>NO. OF PILOTS</u>	<u>NO. OF AIRCRAFT</u>
VF 52	22	13 F9F-2
VF 111	23	14 F9F-2
VF 194	27	8 AD-2 7 AD-3
VF 653	26	17 F4U-4
VC 3 (Detachment)	5	3 F4U-5N
VC 11 (Detachment)	5	3 AD-4W
VC 35 (Detachment)	5	1 AD-4N 3 AD-4NL
VC 61 (Detachment)	4	2 AD-2Q
HU 1 (Detachment)	2	3 F9F-2P
		1 HO 3S
TOTAL	119	75

## PART II

### CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

1-30-52: At 0800 the ship departed Yokosuka for the operating area.

1-31-52: The ship was enroute to the operating area. Ship-board training exercises were conducted.

2-1-52: Replenishment day. The ship joined Task Force 77.

2-2-52: Air operations were conducted for the first day of the present period. LCDR W.H. ROGERS, VC 11 Detachment and two crewmen narrowly escaped a serious accident when the catapult ring broke during turnup, and the ice-covered deck denied the full use of brakes. Their AD-4W made a power take-off in only 137 feet of deck space, actually touched the water off the bow, but remained airborne and completed the assigned mission. LT R. HERMAN, VF 653, ditched his F4U within the landing pattern of the ship when his plane caught fire as he was returning to the ship for landing. He was recovered by the VALLEY FORGE helicopter, suffering mild shock, exposure, and minor burns about the face. LTJG P.P. PIERSON, VF 653, attempting a normal deck-run take-off in his F4U, engaged his tail wheel in Davis' barrier Net. This

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2-3-52: Air operations continued. A total of 83 sorties were flown. LTJG N.J. JOHNSON, VF 194, was shot down in his AD by flak just south of Hungnam. He was rescued in good condition by Monte Carlo helicopter (BELTING (LST 799)) about 45 minutes later. LT R.S. GEFTEL, VF 653, was hit by flak near Hungnam but managed to continue his flight to Wonsan Harbor where he ditched his F4U. He was picked up uninjured by the BELTING (LST 799) helicopter. A record number of 80 rail cuts were made this date. Six bridges were destroyed, and a small village containing military supplies was bombed. Numerous secondary explosions were noted and severe fires burned for several hours afterwards. At least 10 large storage buildings were completely destroyed. A total of 50 sorties were flown. 51 rail cuts were made in addition to other interdiction destruction of targets of opportunity.

2-8-52: Air operations began with a dawn launch of a RESCAP to cover the USS ROCHESTER (CA 124) helicopter's attempt to rescue LTJG H.E. ETTINGER, VC 35 Detachment. He had been shot down 13 December 1951 in the Kojo area south of Wonsan and was now in the hands of friendly guerrilla forces. Information received indicated he was in dire need of medical attention. On the first attempt the helicopter from USS ROCHESTER (CA 124) crashed at the scene. During RESCAP operation LT M.P. MC KENNA, VC 3 Detachment, was hit by flak and was last seen heading his F4U-5N seaward over Kojo Bay. LT MC KENNA is listed as missing in action. Five of the six planes on the RESCAP were hit by flak. LT M.E. SCHLUTER, VC 35 Detachment, was forced to land at K-50; all other proceeded to K-18. On a second attempt made immediately after word was received of the misfortune of the first helicopter, the helicopter from BELTING (LST 799) was badly damaged by flak and forced to return to the USS ST PAUL (CA 73). Rescue attempts at this scene were suspended for the remainder of the day. At about the same time, approximately 20 miles west of Kowon, ENSIGN M.S. BROOMHEAD, VF 194, was shot down by flak and crash-landed his AD on a mountain side. A RESCAP was immediately formed and maintained over him. He appeared to be badly hurt about the legs. The helicopter from the USS MANCHESTER (CL-83) attempted to rescue him but unfortunately crashed at the scene. Later, two people were observed carrying a third person up the hillside. A second helicopter furnished by JOC Korea arrived approximately 2 hours later but intense flak, high head winds, and approaching darkness forced him to retire with no success. Rescue operations were then suspended for the day. Relatively little damage was inflicted on the enemy due to diversion of most events to RESCAP. A total of 70 missions were flown.

2-9-52: Task Force 77 replenished at sea. At dawn 8 props were launched to search the rescue areas of the previous day. The planes operated from K-18 to take maximum advantage of daylight. No activity was noticed at either area. All signs indicated the probable capture of ENSIGN BROOMHEAD and the two helicopter crewmen with him. ENSIGN BROOMHEAD is listed as missing in action.

2-10-52: Air operations resumed. LT R. TAYLOR, VC 3 Detachment was hit by flak and landed his badly damaged F4U-5N at K-18. A total of 79 sorties were flown on which 49 rail cuts were made.

2-11-52: Air operations continued. 74 missions were flown

2-13-52: Task Force 77 replenished at sea.

2-14-52: Air operations resumed but were cancelled in the early afternoon because of unfavorable weather. A total of 32 sorties were flown and 35 rail cuts were scored. The Skyraiders and Corsairs destroyed 4 bridges during the morning operations.

2-15-52: Air operations were cancelled because of unfavorable weather.

2-16-52: Air operations were cancelled because of unfavorable weather.

2-17-52: With the advent of good flying weather, air operations were resumed. A total of 75 sorties were flown. The score for the day read: 97 rail cuts, 3 locomotives destroyed, 28 troops killed, 22 ox carts destroyed and 5 RR bridges badly damaged.

2-18-52: Air operations continued. 76 missions were flown scoring a total of 46 rail cuts. The VALLEY FORGE and PHILIPPINE SEA teamed up on a special mission against a barracks concentration at Pungsen. The resultant score was 45 buildings destroyed, 20 severely damaged and 18 received minor damage.

2-19-52: Air operations continued. 68 sorties were flown, scoring 75 rail cuts, killing 121 troops, destroying 21 buildings, 15 ox carts, 4 RR bridges, and inflicting other minor damage. LTJG D.F. TATUM, VF 52, was last seen as he crashed his F9F into a mountain following a glide bombing run on a rail cut. His plane exploded upon impact and LTJG TATUM is listed killed in action. His aircraft is presumed to have been hit by flak. LT W.P. JOHNSON, VF 111, ditched his F9F near the ship because of a flame-out and was picked up by VALLEY FORGE helicopter.

2-20-52: Task Force 77 replenished at sea and upon being relieved by the USS ESSEX (CV-9) and USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), the VALLEY FORGE together with the PHILIPPINE SEA departed for port at Yokosuka, Japan.

PART III

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

A. Ammunition Expended:

2,000# G.P. Bombs	15
1,000# G.P. Bombs	479
500# G.P. Bombs	112
250# G.P. Bombs	1,810
100# G.P. Bombs	1,102
5" HVAR Rockets	250
Flares (Mark 5 & 6)	86
Napalm	45
220/260# Frag	48
20mm Ammunition	80,200
.50 Cal. Ammunition	106,460

B. Damage to Aircraft:

<u>No. of Planes</u>	<u>Types</u>	<u>Causes</u>
5	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	AD-2(3)	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	AD-4NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
18	F9F-2	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F9F-2P	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F4U-5N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Squadron</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Bu.No.</u>	<u>Causes</u>
2-2	VF 653	F4U-4	82038	On fire from fuel leak. Ditched.
2-2	VF 653	F4U-4	97277	Crashed on take-off and burned.
				Jettisoned.
2-3	VF 653	F4U-4	81764	Enemy AA fire. Ditched at sea.
2-3	VF 194	AD-3	122269	Enemy AA fire. Crashed in enemy territory.
2-4	VF 194	AD-2	122327	Enemy AA fire. Ditched at sea.
2-8	VF 194	AD-3	122842	Enemy AA fire. Crashed in enemy territory.
2-8	VC 3	F4U-5N	124495	Enemy AA fire. Missing in action.
2-19	VF 111	F9F-2	127165	Enemy AA fire. Crashed into mountain.
2-19	VF 52	F9F-2	127203	Flame out. Ditched at sea.

D. Damage inflicted on Enemy:

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Damaged</u>
Trucks	61	45
Cars	1	0
Locomotives	3	1
Oxcarts	60	0
Factories	0	1
Warehouses	4	0
Barracks and Buildings	109	42
Gun Emplacements	18	1
Oxen	29	0
Villages	0	2
Bunkers	2	0
RR Cars	46	42
RR Bridges	15	5
RR By-passes	12	0
Observation Post	1	0
Lumber Piles	30	0
M/Y Yards	25	0
Rail Cuts	691	
Troops Killed	171	

The above mentioned table represents a conservative estimate of the actual damage inflicted on the enemy during this operational period. Only those instances where the damage could be assessed by the pilot were used in compiling this table. There were many instances where damage could not be assessed.

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PART VPERSONNELA. Performance:

Personnel performance continued to be excellent. Likewise, morale of the ship's company continued high.

The average on-board count of enlisted personnel during the operating period was 1892, of which 32 were away on temporary additional duty and 10 away from the ship on emergency leave. The total losses for various causes were 22, fifteen of which were petty officer ratings. The total gains were 46, all of which were non-rated personnel, which were badly needed. The petty officer shortages in the electronics, engineering, gunnery, and communications ratings continues critical. A vigorous on-the-job training program for non-rated men and third class petty officers is being prosecuted by all Departments. Likewise, each Department is examining personnel duty assignments to ensure the most efficient employment of personnel to obtain the maximum savings in man-hours.

The comments in the last VALLEY FORGE Action Report concerning the assignment of a Protestant and a Catholic chaplain to CV's deployed in a combat area still apply. It is noted with appreciation that a Catholic chaplain is being assigned to the ship. During this period, to meet the lack of a Catholic chaplain for Sunday services, the exchange of Protestant and Catholic chaplains by helicopter between this ship and the PHILIPPINE SEA and ANTIETAM was carried out when in company. The response of the respective ship's companies was enthusiastic. Our practice of the delivery of a brief prayer by the ship's chaplain at tattoo each evening, over the LMC circuit, was continued. Comments received indicated an appreciative response.

B. Recreation:

The daily program of seven showings of motion pictures was continued for a total of 168 showings for this period.

A daily program of recorded music, news broadcasts, miscellaneous interviews, and re-broadcast of Armed Forces Radio programs from Tokyo was carried out over the ship's RBO system.

The hobby shop program was sustained throughout the period, with rewarding results.

A staff was appointed and work was begun on a ship's cruise book. The printing will be done in Tokyo in accordance with arrangements concluded by the ship's Chaplain during the last in-port period in Yokosuka.

When the ship returned Yokosuka, full advantage was taken by officers and enlisted men of the rest hotels in the area; it is considered highly beneficial for the maximum number of the Air Group to get off the ship and go to a rest camp for a portion of each in-port period. More applicants for this valuable form of recreation than reservations always exist.

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More athletic facilities are needed in the Yokosuka area. Although athletic facilities do exist they are not believed adequate for both shore-based activities and ship personnel. In particular, more basketball courts, volleyball courts, softball and baseball diamonds are needed. At present there are no handball or squash courts. An indoor swimming pool is needed not only for recreation, but for survival training and swimming instruction. It is believed that the addition of more athletic facilities will do much toward reducing further the V.D. rate. The present lack of athletic facilities makes it difficult for AIRPAC units to carry out the AIRPAC Inter/Intra-Mural Athletic Program.

**C. Mail:**

During this operating period the capacity of the Post Office was increased considerably by a modification which consisted of moving the inboard bulkhead further inboard and by providing storage space for mail bags under the ventilation trunk adjoining the Post Office. Rearrangement of the lighting fixtures resulted in improved lighting. The speed and efficiency of mail handling has been noticeably improved by these simple expedients.

Only 97 bags of U.S. Mail were received on this ship during the entire period of this operation. Few, if any, addressed newspapers and magazines were delivered in the operating area. No mail was sent to the operating area during the last week of operations for delivery to this ship, although 10 bags previously dispatched and held by one of the replenishment ships was delivered on 20 Feb 1952.

**D. Casualties:**

LT John Patrick MC KENNA, VC 3 Detachment, 460267/1315, USNR. On 8 Feb 1952, while flying an F4U-4, purpose LX3, cause TARE, he was last seen heading south over Kojo Bay, North Korea. LT MC KENNA was reported missing in action.

ENSIGN Marvin "S" BROOMHEAD, VF 194, 538977/1325, USNR. On 8 Feb 1952, while flying an AD, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he crash landed in remote area of enemy territory thirty miles northwest Wonsan, Korea. He was known to be alive, but injured, on that date. ENSIGN BROOMHEAD was reported missing in action.

ENSIGN Richard Delbert JENSEN, VF 653, 537907/1325, USNR. On 11 Feb 1952 while flying an F4U, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he crashed 1.5 miles southeast of Munchon, North Korea. His plane was seen to explode upon impact with ground. He was reported as killed in action.

LTJG David Franklin TATUM, VF 52, 506484/1315, USNR. On 19 Feb 1952, while flying an F9F-2, purpose 1T1, cause TARE, he crashed into mountain side during run on target, probably the result of AA fire. His plane was seen to explode upon impact with the ground. LTJG TATUM was reported killed in action.

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During a deck run take-off from the 570 foot position the tail wheel assembly of an F4U picked up the engaging straps of Davis-rigged Number 4 barrier (Banshee webbing). The barrier was in the normal down position. The Davis-rigged barrier (Banshee webbing) has a normal tendency to lift about three inches off the deck when any type prop aircraft take-off across it. To prevent the reoccurrence of this freak accident five bungees are rigged from tie-down track to the tie-down track across the engaging straps of the Banshee webbing. This fix prevents lifting due to prop blast on take-offs.

2. Aircraft Maintenance:

No comments.

3. Aircraft Servicing:

No comments.

B. Operations:

1. Air Operations:

In the interest of more efficient communications with aircraft, it is recommended that an AN/ARC 1 be installed in Air Operations. Such an installation would allow more effective utilization of the TDQ transmitters and RCK receivers now piped into Air Operations on remote position units by releasing them for use by the ship and flag based aboard. An AN/ARC 1 would permit more flexibility than now possible in controlling aircraft from other ships. The AN/ARC 1 is generally easier to maintain than the other radio units.

2. Aerology:

During the period 1 February to 20 February 1952, inclusive, the normal winter weather pattern prevailed, except for 14 to 16 February, inclusive. In this latter period the Asiatic high cell was centered far to the north and the polar trough was north of the mean winter position resulting in an easterly to northeasterly air flow over the operating area. During this period the weather in the operating and target areas were non-operations.

a. Communications:

(1) Facsimile (Aerology Laboratory):

The facsimile reception was more satisfactory than during January, but is still poor much of the time.

(2) Radioteletype:

Reception was average.

(3) Radio (CW Radio I):

CW reception of weather was only fair.

(4) Recommendations:

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b. Equipment and Supplies:

(1) Radiosonde:

The radiosonde was frequently inoperative for short periods of time due to mechanical trouble and local interference. Interference from the tractors on the flight deck frequently cut the sounding out entirely, and it is recommended that these tractors have suppressors installed to eliminate this source of interference.

Other aerological equipment operated satisfactorily.

3. Combat Information Center:

a. Radars:

(1) General:

The performance of all radars was considerably better than during the preceding period on the line. There were no serious maintenance problems.

b. Specific:

SX - The SX radar is still considered the best all-purpose radar and was in use continuously except for the regular maintenance checks.

SPS-6B - The SPS-6B radar is best for long range air search, especially for small groups of jets and aircraft at high altitudes. Returning strike groups of jet aircraft were normally detected and tracked from 70 to 85 miles out. As has been noted in the reports of other ships this radar is adversely affected by high relative winds.

SU - The SU radar gave excellent performance during the entire period and is the most reliable of our surface search radars.

XSG-7 - The XSG-7 radar is very good for medium and short range surface search but is not completely dependable because of the blind spot on the starboard bow due to the location of the antenna. There also has been considerable trouble as a result of halyards becoming entangled in the SG antenna.

c. Communications:

Considerable improvement was noted during this period in ship-to-aircraft communications. Some difficulty is presently being experienced with the AN/ARCs located in CIC which could possibly be due to the location of the antenna. The URD in CIC has been of little or no value during this period because it is not reliable beyond 35 miles. It has been determined that this is due largely to the constant vibration of the antenna in its present location.

d. Flag Operations:

CIC served as the Flag CIC for Task Force 77 during this

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The continued operation of all available transmitters again reduced the opportunities for routine maintenance and required restoration of breakdowns under great pressure, as in the preceding operating period.

The same comments as to the Communications complement and as to changes in equipment which were set forth in the last action report are still applicable. The shortage of qualified radio operators is keenly felt, although the school-graduate strikers are progressing very satisfactorily. The non-school-graduate strikers are showing creditable progress, but cannot be given as adequate training as would be liked due to the heavy work load of operations.

b. Visual:

No comments.

5. Air Intelligence:

The often-reported defensive tactic of the use of mobile flak, has been again observed. Different flights over the same assigned track sector reported new positions and photo analysis substantiated these reports. The type of weapon noted has been predominantly the 37mm. Small arms fire continues to be used effectively against low-flying aircraft. An analysis of flak damage sustained during this operating period is included in the ATG-1 section of this report.

The primary assignment during this period has been rail cutting. This mission has been successfully carried out. The rapidity with which rails all along the East Coast have been repaired indicates an increasingly flexible and efficient repair organization.

a. Survival:

The following recommendation is made with regard to the debriefing of aviators who have been forced to ditch in the Korean area:

Upon arrival in Yokosuka the pilots should be sent to COMNAVFE, Tokyo for further interrogation by Navy-Air Force survival personnel and comprehensive reports routed by means of the distribution list to all interested United Nation Commands.

ATG-1 pilots have been partially fitted with the new Mark III Exposure Suit which has been a great improvement over the old type suit. Some difficulties have been experienced with the Mark III, and an elaboration on these points are included in the ATG-1 section of this report.

6. Photo Interpretation:

Thirty-four photo missions were flown against the enemy during the operating period. The missions were flown for route condition,

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The construction of mosaics required considerable time. The use of previously constructed mosaics in the plotting of flak from more recent photography proved satisfactory and resulted in a large saving of time. It was found desirable that the mosaics be constructed so that the north arrow remained constant in succeeding pages in the touraid booklet. Coordinates to six digits have been added for all major targets along the route.

The addition of a P.I. Report on each route study or Touraid was provided during this period. The report contains a brief and concise statement of each target, major flak concentration and recommended targets for strikes when possible. Such a report is believed highly desirable for aid in the selection of targets, ordnance, and in the planning of strikes.

Ten route studies were produced during this period representing the production of over 500 individual booklets and the use of approximately 4,200 8x10 photographs.

Thirty-three target studies were made, the majority of which required the preparation of a mosaic and the location of all flak positions. A P.I. report was made on four of the studies to properly identify and describe the targets located on the mosaics. All target and route studies were given full distribution to all carriers and carrier division staffs.

The ship's P.I. target file was developed further and now contains photography on more than 600 individual targets in Korea.

Preparation of flak studies require a minimum scale of 1/5000. To obtain the necessary coverage over high-intensity flak areas K-38 photography accomplished by the USS ESSEX F2H photographic planes has proven far superior to the K-17 limited to the cone. It is recommended that future photo detachments be equipped with planes capable of carrying cameras with cones giving more desirable photo coverage. Although it is realized that later models of the F9F will be so equipped, it is believed that the K-18 (24") camera can be installed in the F9F-2 with O and R assistance. As the F9F-2 will continue to fly many missions over defended enemy territory from CV9 type ships, this installation should be undertaken without delay.

#### 7. Photography Laboratory:

During the last operating period the Photo Lab experienced a great increase in the copying of large maps and charts in support of aerial reconnaissance and for use in making up "Touraid" booklets for pilots.

Though this was a large scale operation requiring rapid accomplishment this was obtained by a simple modification of our copying equipment. The lamps for illuminating the copy were placed on arms attached on either side to the camera bed and fully adjustable to height and spread of illumination. This arrangement proved very efficient in obtaining even lighting on a wide variety

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C. Gunnery:

1. Replenishment at sea:

In an attempt to increase the rate at which ammunition can be transferred from the ammunition ship to this vessel two new methods were tried during this operating period. During ammunition replenishment on 13 February, a wire highline was rigged from the number 4 hatch of USS CHARA (AKA-58) to the Hangar deck opening at frame 74 starboard. Five and a half tons of bomb fuzes, rocket motors and rocket heads were transferred in 70 minutes.

On 20 February an attempt was made to use the Housefall method for transferring ammunition between these same two stations. The rig was not successful. The starboard forward accommodation ladder is normally stowed across the lower portion of the opening at frame 74. In this position the ladder seriously interfered with the Housefall rig. Also, presently installed padeyes at this station are so positioned that chafing occurs against the upper edge of the Hangar deck opening.

In order to provide an additional ammunition transfer station at frame 74 the following steps have been or will be taken: (a) stow the accommodation ladder in the overhead of the Hangar deck, (b) relocate the padeyes at frame 74, and (c) install a roller along the upper edge of the Hangar deck opening to prevent chafing. With these improvements it is believed that an addition to the overall loading rate of about 20 tons per hour can be obtained by the addition of the Housefall or highline rig at frame 74.

2. Training:

Two anti-aircraft firing exercises were conducted during the period of this report, one while enroute to the operating area and the second while returning to Yokosuka. It is recommended that more frequent opportunities for firing be provided in order to stimulate interest and increase the proficiency of gun and control personnel.

3. Material:

On 2 February an F4U-4 aircraft crashed into five inch mounts two and four and burned. It struck mount No. 4, pivoted and struck mount No. 2, then came to rest supported by mount No. 2 and the outboard side of the gun sponson. Gasoline fires in the area were brought under control and extinguished by the use of fog foam. The rammer assemblies of both mounts, the pointer's and trainer's telescopes on mount No. 4, the pointer's telescope of mount No. 2, and the firing and lighting circuit on mount No. 4 were so damaged as to require replacement. Other damage to the mounts was superficial.

D. Supply:

1. Aviation Supply:

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2. Ship's Store:

Data are being furnished ComAirPac and AirPac CV's, via separate correspondence, of the Ship's Store service facilities supplies recommended for a six months' cruise.

E. Engineering:

No comments.


F. Medical:

No comments.

G. Dental:

It is strongly recommended that a prosthetic unit be installed aboard CV's. The large number of patients requiring prosthetic treatment, and the short time in port where such treatment is available to our personnel, results in a highly unsatisfactory arrangement.

The ability to render prosthetic treatment aboard when indicated, would constitute a positive morale factor, and in some measure afford relief to the already over-burdened land-based prosthetic clinics. Such service would be also of much value to smaller ships in company.



OSCAR PEDERSON

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