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Serial 069

6 May 1951

DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
To : Chief of Naval Operations

Via : (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 23 February 1951 through 6 April 1951

Ref : (a) CNO rest ltr Op 345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) Air Intelligence Organization Chart P. 26
(2) Intelligence Assignments P. 27
(3) CVG 19 conf ltr 023 of 20 April 1951 - Action Report for the period 26 February 1951 through 2 April 1951 P. 28

1. In accordance with reference (a) the action report for the period 23 February through 6 April 1951 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces:

Pursuant to Com7thFlt secret dispatch 181316Z of February 1951, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), with ComCarDiv FIVE and CVG NINETEEN embarked, departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan on 23 February 1951 in company with DesDiv 111.

On 25 February 1951 the USS PRINCETON and DesDiv 111 rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was composed of three aircraft carriers, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), the USS VALLEY FORCE (CV-45) and the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), along with various heavy support and screening ships.

Upon completion of conference with ComCarDiv ONE, ComCarDiv FIVE assumed command of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

On 26 March 1951 the USS BOXER (CV-21) joined TF 77 relieving the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45).

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Mission:

The mission of this force as set forth in CTF 77 Op Order No. 1-51 was to perform close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, air bombardment missions in order to destroy enemy forces, communications, and installations in support of United Nations Forces.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

23 February - 25 February

The USS PRINCETON with DesDiv 111 departed Yokosuka and proceeded to the operating area. Upon arrival the USS PRINCETON rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

26 February -

Flying close air support, bridge strikes, armed reconnaissance and naval gun fire spot, 26 F4U's, 21 AD's, and 10 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 389 runs on the targets. Armed reconnaissance flew from Wonsan to Pukchong, from Pukchong to Songjin, from Songjin to Chongjin and from Hamhung to Pukchong to DV 4090. Most flights were not under the direction of a controller.

Striking the east coast from Pyongchang on the south to Chongjin on the north and inland as far as Seoul, the strikes destroyed 1 truck, 2 oxcarts, 3 T34 tanks, 1 span each of 2 highway bridges, 2 warehouses, 75% of a village at CS 3155, 2 mortar emplacements, 2 gun positions, 5 buildings, 1 jeep and 2 railroad tracks. Damaged were 1 oxcart, 1 railroad handcar, 3 highway bridges, and 4 railroad bridges. Probably damaged were 2 T34 tanks and 3 buildings.

A photo reconnaissance flight, 1 F9F photo and 1 F9F escort, was flown covering supply routes from Chongjin to EA 5575.

Combat air patrol, 12 F4U's, and anti-submarine patrol, 6 AD's were flown throughout the day.

27 February -

Unfavorable weather conditions over the target area forced cancellation of flights except for pre-dawn heckler and anti-submarine patrol flights. 2 F4U's and 4 AD's were launched and made an estimated 6 runs on the targets. Strikes were vectored by the USS MANCHESTER to Hamhung and Sinpo which were bombed through the overcast with unobserved results.

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[redacted]

28 February -

Continued unfavorable weather conditions forced the cancellation of flights except for the pre-dawn heckler and anti-submarine flights. Two F4U's and 4 AD's were launched and made an estimated 40 runs on the targets.

Flying from Songjin to Chongjin, the heckler flight destroyed 1 truck and damaged 1 locomotive, 4-5 railroad cars and 2 trucks. Tanchon and Songjin were bombed but the results were unobserved.

1 March -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

2 March -

In order to furnish interdiction strikes, armed reconnaissance flights, naval gun fire spot, and photo reconnaissance missions, 26 F4U's, 18 AD's and 14 F9F's were launched. An estimated 304 runs were made on the targets

Hitting the Kilchu area and north from Hapsu estimated damage to the enemy was as follows: destroyed 3 buildings, 1 span of a highway bridge, 2 spans of a railroad bridge, and 5 luggers; damaged 3 spans of a highway bridge, 1 span of a railroad bridge, 1 warehouse and 1 truck; probably destroyed 4 buildings, 2 warehouses and 15-20 troops.

Two photo reconnaissance flights covered the bridges from Pukchong to Chongjin.

Naval gun fire spot was flown for the bombardment group in the Wonsan area.

3 March -

Continuing interdiction strikes, armed reconnaissance flights, naval gun fire spot and photo reconnaissance missions along the eastern coast of Korea, 34 F4U's, 21 AD's and 16 F9F's were launched. An estimated 405 runs were made on the targets.

Attacking in the Iwon, Kilchu area and along the coast from Wonsan to Chongjin damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 2 warehouses, 3 trucks, 1 span each of two railroad bridges, and 2 spans of a highway bridge; damaged 4 railroad cars, 2 locomotives, and 2 warehouses; probably killed 10-15 troops.

[redacted]

Three photo reconnaissance flights cover the Wonsan area; transportation routes from Wonsan to Pukchong, from Hungnam to Changjin and from Pukchong to Songjin and the Choshin Reservoir.

CAP and ASP were flown during the day.

Mr. William H. Graham, civilian war correspondent, was killed when the plane in which he was riding crashed into the water on takeoff. The pilot, LCDR BRUCE of VC-190, was rescued by the helicopter in less than 2 minutes after the plane hit the water.

4 March -

Interdiction strikes hitting tunnels and bridges, armed reconnaissance flights, photo reconnaissance missions and heckler missions were flown. Thirty-five F4U's, 21 AD's and 20 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 528 runs on the targets.

Attacking tunnels, bridges and enemy activities on the east coast supply routes from Wonsan to Chongjin, damage to the enemy was as follows: destroyed 4 oxcarts, 3 trucks, 2 warehouses, 1 span of a railroad bridge, 50% of a railroad bridge, 1 span of a highway bridge and 2 spans of a wooden highway bridge; damaged 5 tunnels, railroad tracks at several points, 2 locomotives, 2 jeeps, 3 buildings and 1 truck; probably destroyed 4 boxcars, 1 jeep, 1 building, 1 truck and 2 warehouses; killed 10-15 horses and 15-20 troops.

Three photo reconnaissance missions covered beaches at Songjin, Tanchon, Songsan-ni; the highway bridge at Hamhung; routes from Kowon to Mau-ri; and supply routes leading south and west from Wonsan.

Naval gun fire spot at Wonsan and CAP were also flown during the day.

5 March -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

6 March -

Unfavorable weather conditions limited air operations to a single heckler strike from Pukchong to Chongjin. Two F4U's and 3 AD's were launched and made an estimated 32 runs on the targets.

Estimated damage was as follows: destroyed 1 truck, 1 warehouse, 1 train of 8 to 10 cars, and 1 span of a highway bridge; killed 5 oxcart drivers and 2 oxen.

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7 March -

Continued interdiction strikes on the east coast supply lines, along with heckler strikes, armed reconnaissance strikes and photo reconnaissance missions were flown. For all air operations, 37 F4U's, 27 AD's and 10 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 265 runs on the targets.

Striking in the Hamhung, Kilchu areas, from Wonsan to Chongjin and from Wonsan to Kangdong estimated damage to the enemy was as follows: destroyed 1 truck, 2 oxcarts, 1 section railroad track, 1 span each of two highway bridges, and 1 span each of 2 railroad bridges; damaged 1 span each of 2 highway bridges and 1 span each of 2 railroad bridges; probably destroyed 1 truck.

Two photo missions covering bridges between Songjin and Chongjin were flown incomplete due to unfavorable weather conditions. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

8 March -

Continued interdiction strikes on east coast supply routes, heckler strikes, armed reconnaissance strikes and photo reconnaissance missions were flown. Thirty-three F4U's, 28 AD's and 14 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 368 runs on the targets.

Attacking in the Kilchu, Chuuwonjang areas and from Pukchong to Chongjin, estimated damage to the enemy was as follows: destroyed 5 trucks, 3 oxcarts, 1 supply dump, 4 buildings, 5-6 railroad cars, 1 span each of two railroad bridges, and the approaches of 1 railroad bridge; probably destroyed 4-5 oxcarts, 19 buildings and 1 train.

Photo reconnaissance coverage of the transportation system and coast around Chongjin was flown. ASP and CAP were flown throughout the day.

LCDR John J. Magda, commanding officer of VF-191, was killed in action when his plane crashed into the sea off Tanchon. The cause of the crash is unknown.

9 March -

After a pre-dawn heckler strike of 4 aircraft, 2 F4U's and 2 AD's, which bombed Sinpo, and an ASP flight of 2 AD's, the PRINCETON proceeded to replenish at sea.

LTJG B. H. COOK of VC-3 was reported missing in action after he crashed into the sea at Latitude 39-57 N, Longtitude 128-56 E. The cause of the crash is unknown.

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[redacted]

10 March -

Unfavorable weather conditions delayed flight operations. Interdiction strikes, close air support strikes, naval gun fire spot and photo missions were flown. Sixteen F4U's, 7 AD's and 4 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 251 runs on the targets.

The interdiction strikes in the Iwon, Sinchong-ni areas and the close air support strikes in the Hajinbu-ri, Chonjin-ni areas inflicted damage to the enemy as follows: destroyed 1 span of a railroad bridge, damaged approaches to a railroad bridge and probably destroyed 1 warehouse. The controllers reported good coverage for all CAS flights.

A photo reconnaissance mission covered the routes between Songjin and Chongjin for damage assessment.

ResCap was flown with negative results over DV 639477, 15 miles east of Pukchong, where ENS William E. PATTON crashed due to unknown causes.

11 March -

Unfavorable weather conditions again delayed flight operations. Interdiction strikes, heckler strikes and photo reconnaissance missions were flown. Seventeen F4U's, 9 AD's and 4 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 165 runs on the targets.

Striking in the Songchon area and Songchon-ni area, damage to the enemy was as follows: destroyed 1 vehicle, 1 jeep, 2 trucks, and 1 span of a railroad bridge; damaged the approach to a bridge; probably destroyed 6-7 buildings.

Two photo missions covered the following areas; bridges from Choshin Reservoir to Hungnam, DV 639477 where a pilot was lost the day before, and Tanchon and Pukchon. ResCap was flown with negative results over the area where the pilot was lost.

12 March -

Continuing interdiction strikes, armed reconnaissance strikes, naval gunfire spot and photo reconnaissance missions, 50 F4U's, 24 AD's, and 17 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 331 runs on the targets.

Striking in the Songchon, Ullyong, Choshin Reservoir areas and along the central front to Seoul. Damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 1 building, 7 boxcars, 4 trucks, several sections

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of railroad track, and 1 span each of 2 railroad bridges; damaged 1 oxcart, 2 vehicles, and 1 span of a railroad bridge; probably destroyed 1 heavy mobile gun and 36-38 buildings; killed 11 troops.

Photo reconnaissance covered transportation routes south from Wonsan, the coastal areas north of Hungnam, and bridges from Kilchu to Tanchon.

Naval gun fire spot was flown for the bombardment group at Wonsan. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

13 March -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

14 March -

Furnishing interdiction strikes, close air support, naval gun fire spot, heckler flights, photo reconnaissance, anti-submarine patrol and combat air patrol, the PRINCETON launched 37 F4U's, 16 AD's and 12 F9F's. An estimated 331 runs were made on the targets.

Striking in the Hoeyang, Kumsong, Hongwon areas, along the eastern front areas, from Wonsan to Pukchong and from Hakalwoo-ri to Huichon, damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed railroad tracks at 3 points, 20% of a highway bridge, 2 spans in a highway bridge and 2-3 spans in a highway bridge; damaged 2 buildings; probably destroyed 4 buildings; killed 50 troops.

Two photo reconnaissance missions were completed as assigned. One covered railroads leading to Kilchu, the other covered airfields in the Wonsan-Hungnam area.

15 March -

Continuing the interdiction strikes of the east coast supply routes the PRINCETON launched 33 F4U's, 20 AD's and 12 F9F's. An estimated 306 runs were made on the targets.

Striking in and around Kilchu damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 4 trucks, 1 lumber supply dump, 2 spans each of 2 railroad bridges, the approach to a railroad tunnel and the mouth of a railroad tunnel, which was sealed, damaged 1 section of railroad track.

Two photo reconnaissance missions covered target in the Kilchu area for damage assessment. Naval gun fire spot was furnished the USS MISSOURI. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

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16 March -

The PRINCETON continued its pounding of the enemy's east coast supply routes. A total of 32 F4U's, 18 AD's and 14 F9F's were launched for interdiction strikes, photo reconnaissance, CAP, ASP and naval gun fire support. An estimated 328 runs were made on the targets.

Striking in the Kilchu, Yupyong-dong and Chongjin areas, damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 1 oxcart, 10 railroad cars, railroad track at 15 points, 1 span of a highway bridge, 2 spans of a railroad bridge, and 1 span each of two railroad bridges; damaged 1 warehouse, 1 railroad car, and 1 span of a railroad bridge; probably destroyed 1 truck, 4 buildings 2 warehouses.

Two photo missions were flown. One mapped a strip from YV 0580 to YV 1493. The other was incomplete due to weather. Naval gunfire spot was flown for the USS MISSOURI.

17 March -

The PRINCETON launched a total of 46 F4U's, 29 AD's and 19 F9F's for interdiction strikes, close air support, photo reconnaissance, naval gunfire spot, CAP and ASP. An estimated 460 runs were made on the targets.

Striking in the Pachunjang, Pukchong, Choshin Reservoir areas and along the central and eastern front damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 4 railroad cars, 3 buildings, 2 tanks, railroad tracks at 5 points, 2 wagons, 2 spans each of 2 highway bridges, 1 span of a highway bridge, 1 span of a railroad bridge and 4 spans of another railroad bridge, damaged 1 span of a highway bridge and 3 spans of a railroad bridge; probably destroyed 8 buildings and 1 section of railroad track; killed 3 mules, 1 horse and 12-13 troops.

Three photo missions were flown. One covered the enemy gun emplacements at Wonsan. One covered bridges in the Hamhung area for damage assessment. The third was incomplete due to weather.

Naval gunfire spot was flown for the shelling of troop concentrations in Anbyon.

18 March -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

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19 March -

Furnishing close air support and interdiction strikes the PRINCETON launched 33 F4U's, 23 AD's and 16 F9F's and made an estimated 349 runs on the targets.

Striking from the Choshin Reservoir south to Sachang-ni, in the Huichon area and along the front north of Seoul and Yangyang, damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 3 camouflaged vehicles, 1 truck, 2 buildings, 6 railroad cars, 1 span of a railroad bridge, and 1 span each of 2 highway bridges; damaged 2 trucks, 17 buildings and 2 spans of a highway bridge; probably destroyed 5-6 supply piles and 12 buildings; killed between 80 and 90 troops.

Two photo missions were flown. One covered highway bridges and gun emplacements from Wonsan to Kangdong. The other covered railroads in the Hamhung area.

Naval gunfire spot was flown for the USS MISSOURI. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

20 March -

The PRINCETON furnished close air support, interdiction strikes, photo reconnaissance, CAP and ASP. A total of 40 F4U's, 25 AD's and 18 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 378 runs on the targets.

Striking in the area around and south of the Choshin Reservoir and along the eastern front, damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 1 truck, 23 buildings, 1 section of pipeline, 40-50 oxcarts, 1 section of railroad track and 2 spans of a railroad bridge; damaged 1 truck, 5 railroad cars, 2 buildings, 1 section of railroad track and 3 warehouses; killed between 120-170 troops.

Naval gunfire spot was flown for shore bombardment in the Songjin area. Three photo reconnaissance missions were completed. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

21 March -

The PRINCETON launched a total of 39 F4U's, 32 AD's and 16 F9F's in order to furnish close air support, interdiction strikes, photo reconnaissance, CAP and ASP. An estimated 470 runs were made on the targets.

Interdiction strikes in the Songjin and Hamhung to Fusen Reservoir areas and close air support along the front north of Seoul caused damage to the enemy estimated as follows: destroyed 3 trucks, 10 oxcarts,

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15 buildings, 1 railroad bridge, 1 warehouse, sections of railroad tracks at 18 points, 2 gun emplacements and 1 highway bridge; damaged 2 trucks, 1 oxcart, 5 buildings, 1 railroad bridge and 1 highway bridge; probably destroyed 5 trucks and 40-50 buildings; killed between 250 and 300 troops.

Two photo reconnaissance missions were flown and completed. One covered the transportation systems north of Hamhung to CV 6177. The other covered from Tanchon to Songjin.

22 March -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

23 March -

Launching a total of 26 F4U's, 15 AD's and 12 F9F's the PRINCETON continued its interdiction of the eastern supply routes of Korea. An estimated 311 runs were made on the targets.

Striking from Hapsu to Kilchu and in the area south of Kilchu, damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 5 oxcarts, 1 tractor, 4 railroad cars, 1 locomotive, 1 truck, 4 buildings, railroad tracks at 8 points, 1 span each of 3 railroad bridges and 3 spans of a highway bridge; damaged 1 railroad car and 1 span to a railroad bridge; probably destroyed 2 buildings.

Naval gunfire spot was flown for the ST PAUL in the Wonsan area. Two photo missions were completed in the Chongjin area. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

24 March -

Launching a total of 25 F4U's and 17 AD's the PRINCETON furnished close air support and interdiction strikes to the day's war effort. An estimated 258 runs were made on the targets.

Striking Songchow-Songjin areas and along the front north of Seoul damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 2 buildings and 2 artillery pieces; probably destroyed 6 trucks and 1 locomotive; killed at least 10 troops.

Naval gunfire spot was flown for the ST PAUL in the Songjin area. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

25 March -

Due to unfavorable conditions all flight operations were cancelled.

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26 March -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

27 March -

Unfavorable weather conditions forced the cancellations of all flights except CAS and ASP. Launching 12 F4U's and 12 AD's an estimated 193 runs were made on the targets.

Furnishing the CAS along the front north of Chuchon, north of Kansong and north of Seoul the controllers reported good coverage for all strikes. The ASP was flown throughout the day.

28 March -

Unfavorable weather conditions forced the cancellation of all air operations.

29 March -

Unfavorable weather conditions forced the cancellation of all air operations.

30 March -

Launching a total of 45 F4U's, 35 AD's and 8 F9F's the PRINCETON furnished close air support along with a continuation of the interdiction of the enemy supply routes. An estimated 560 runs were on the targets.

Striking in the area south of Wonsan and along the eastern front damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 7 trucks, 10 buildings, 2 to 3 railroad cars, 3 spans of a railroad bridge and 2 spans of another railroad bridge; damaged 7 trucks, 10 buildings and 2 warehouses; probably destroyed 12 trucks, 35 to 40 buildings and 1 warehouse; killed between 40 and 50 troops.

Two photo missions were flown and completed, covering the bridges on the railroad south of Songjin. Naval gunfire spot was flown for the bombardment group in Wonsan Bay. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

31 March -

Furnishing close air support, interdiction strikes and ResCap to a group of trapped U.S. Rangers, a total of 41 F4U's, 18 AD's and 18 F9F's were launched. An estimated 521 runs were made on the targets.

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Striking in the Songjin area, south of Wonsan, near and in Kansong and at CT 9575, where the U.S. Rangers were trapped, estimated damage was as follows: destroyed 4 trucks, 40 to 45 buildings, 7 oxcarts and 2 spans and the bypass of a highway bridge; damaged 3 trucks and 8 to 10 buildings; killed 55 to 65 troops 6 mules.

Three photo missions were flown and completed covering the supply routes along the northeast coast of Korea. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

1 April -

Moving the interdiction strikes to the north the PRINCETON launched 30 F4U's and 21 AD's. An estimated 329 runs were made on the targets.

Striking the transportation systems around Chongjin, Songjin, and Kilchu damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 5 trucks, 1 building, 4 railroad cars, railroad tracks at 19 points, railroad switches at 5 points, 1 railroad water tank and 1 railroad bridge; damaged 5 buildings, 1 truck and railroad track at 3 points.

ResCap was flown over LTJG W.C. WINDSON, of VA 702 stationed aboard the USS BOXER. LTJG WINDSON bailed out of his AD-4 about 15 miles northwest of Kilchu after being hit by enemy AA fire. The PRINCETON's helicopter, piloted by LTJG J.L. BLADES of HU-1, traveled 20 miles inland to effect the rescue and safe return of the downed pilot.

CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

2 April -

Launching a total of 44 F4U's, 25 AD's and 10 F9F's the PRINCETON furnished close air support to the advancing United Nations forces along with interdiction strikes against enemy supply routes. An estimated 583 runs were made on the targets.

Striking from Wonsan to Pyonggang, from Wonsan to Kangyong and along the front in the Chunchon and Yangyang areas, damage to the enemy was estimated as follows: destroyed 8 trucks, 1 jeep, 4 buildings, 16 oxcarts, 1 locomotive, railroad tracks at 18 points and spans of 2 railroad bridges; damaged 4 trucks; probably destroyed 5 trucks, and 3 railroad cars. Planes from the PRINCETON also destroyed 1 helicopter which crashed behind enemy lines while rescue work on 31 March.

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A photo mission was flown and completed for damage assessment on bridges along the northeastern supply routes of the enemy. CAP and ASP were flown throughout the day.

3 April -

The USS PRINCETON replenished at sea.

4 April -

Unfavorable weather conditions forced cancellation of all air operations on 4 April at which time the USS PRINCETON departed the operating area and proceeded to Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan. On 6 April the PRINCETON arrived Yokosuka for scheduled availability and recreation.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

A. Maintenance of Ordnance:

(1) The general performance of the ordnance equipment for the period covered by this report was very good. No casualties were experienced on the 5"/38 or 20MM gun mounts and only minor casualties occurred on the 40MM mounts. Fire control casualties were normal in number. At this time, it may be said that by following instructions on winterizing equipment, as laid down in various ordnance pamphlets and ordnance data booklets, this vessel has experienced satisfactory performance of all ordnance equipment throughout the past winter months.

(2) The most serious fire control casualty occurred on the after GFCS Mk 56, located in the vicinity of the port gallery deck. This casualty, the exact nature of which has not been determined, limited automatic fuze settings to a maximum value equivalent to 8,000 yards of range on the after port 5"/38 single mounts for a period of five (5) weeks of operation. To date, this casualty has not been eliminated. GE engineers are assisting ship's force in locating the trouble.

(3) When this vessel was recommissioned, two (2) GFCS Mk 56 replaced the two (2) previously installed GFCS, Mk 57. The new systems are far more complex and require a great deal more maintenance by highly qualified personnel. It is felt that the present allowance of four (4) FT's is not adequate to service the electronic equipment assigned to the fire control division including the two (2) GFCS, Mk 56 mentioned above. It is recommended that the present allowance of four (4) FT's be increased to six (6) for the presently installed equipment.

[redacted]

(4) The fire control radar Mk 25 located in the forward Gun Director Mk 37 was discovered to have a considerable quantity of water in the wave guide. This water apparently gained entrance via an improperly installed radar antenna flexible wave guide seal.

(5) Approximately five (5) percent of the 250# bombs dropped on targets requiring skip bombing technique resulted in cases bursting or low order detonations. Some of these malfunctions were probably due to the excessive speed of the dropping aircraft; others due to the bombs' thin case.

(6) Numerous 250# and a few 500# G.P. bombs have loose base plates and as a result the tail vane cannot be tightened, making it necessary to survey the bombs. Indications are that the bombs are not getting a thorough inspection after being overhauled. Approximately fifty (50) percent of all bombs received on board to date have an excessive amount of grease in the fuze cavities.

(7) The bomb elevators were not designed for constant use, as is necessary for the present type of operations, and therefore require very frequent and regular maintenance with replacement of parts, mainly automatic switches of all types.

B. Ammunition expended - during period of this report:

Bombs		Fuzes	
2000 lb GP	257	AN-M103A1	174
1000 lb GP	732	AN-M139A1	3079
1000 lb SAP	7	AN-M140A1	738
500 lb GP	362	AN-M168	4146
250 lb GP	3008	AN-M100A2	6681
100 lb GP W/F	3714	AN-M101A2	297
260 lb Frag	1765	AN-M102A2	920
Bomb Ejector Cartridge Mk 1	28	AN-M166	70
		M115	387
		M116	163
Napalm		M117	106
		M157	924
Jap Manufactured Napalm Tanks	468	M243	138
Napalm Thickener	21,510	M124A1 (6 Hr)	2
		M124A1 (12 Hr)	1
Rockets		M124A1 (24 Hr)	9
		M125A1 (6 Hr)	14
6"5 ATAR Head	231	M125A1 (12) Hr)	15
5" Rockot Head Mk 6 HVAR	1243	M125A1 (36 Hr)	10
		AN-M219	116

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5" Motor	1480	Aircraft Ammunition	
3"5 Rocket Motor	104		
3"5 Head MK 8 Solid	7	20MM Aircraft	119,774
Fuze Rocket		Calibre .50	431,870
Mk 172	38	A/C Parachute	
Fuze Rocket		Flares Mk 6	186
Mk 149	1247	A/C Parachute	
		Flares Mk 8	8

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

A. Own - The ship sustained no battle damage.

B. Enemy - For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (3).

PART V Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

A. Casualties:

There were no personnel casualties suffered by ship's company during these operations. See enclosure (3) for Air Group NINETEEN casualties.

B. Performance:

The performance of personnel during the period of this report was excellent.

PART VI Special Comments:

A. Operations:

1. Air Operations:

Due to the limited information derived from a surface navigation chart laid on the DRT in Air Operations, an aeronautical chart of the target area, covered with a sheet of plexiglass mounted on a hinge, was laid on the chart table, and a parallel motion protractor was installed in order to obtain quicker and more accurate information. All bearings and distances from Point Oboe were thus readily obtainable. An overlay with rocco routes, dump targets, jig points, and the current bombline was placed over the aeronautical chart, thereby keeping this vital information current as well as readily accessible. The DRT with surface chart is now used for surface information only, such as: ship's bearing and distance from Point Oboe, and the locations of various other shipping in the area plus their movements. This system has proven to be very satisfactory.

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To provide a ready reference for flight information and to eliminate unnecessary voice communications, an edge lighted status board was installed in Air Operations facing the entrance to CIC. The back of this status board was covered with plywood in order that the readability from within CIC would be facilitated. The procedure for its use is as follows: the daily hops are listed by Air Operations with launch time, recovery time, event number, number and type of aircraft scheduled, mission, and flight leader's call. CIC lists the control ship and control channel for each hop. As flights are launched, the launch time is erased and an arrow drawn in its place to signify that all planes for that flight are airborne. The number launched is then corrected if it differs from the number scheduled. When planes are shifted to the control frequency, the letter "S" is placed in front of the arrow (S→) indicating to CIC that the planes have shifted frequencies. This method requires no voice transmissions between Air Operations and CIC. When planes are returning, and shifted from control ships to Land/Launch frequency, Air Operations assumes positive control, and the frequency shift designation (S), launch arrow, and the landing time are erased, and L/L placed alongside the returning flight. As flights are recovered, they are completely erased from the status board. This system has proven very satisfactory for the purpose for which it was designed.

2. Intelligence:

a. Charts:

(1) The following is an evaluation of the charts now in use by the pilots of Carrier Air Group NINETEEN, and is based on a poll conducted among approximately 80% of the pilots on board. The charts in use by the Air Group are the World Aeronautical Chart (scale 1:1,000,000), the Pilotage chart (scale 1:500,000), the Aeronautical Approach Chart (scale 1:250,000), the AMS Map series L-552 (scale 1:250,000), and the AMS series L-751 (scale 1:50,000).

(2) Probably the most popular of the above charts is the Pilotage Chart (scale 1:500,000), since it combines, in the newer issues, a well presented UTM grid, ground elevation represented by color variations, and a convenience in size not afforded by the larger 1:250,000 scale charts.

(3) In some cases (CAS, recco of small area, etc.) more detail and a larger scale are necessary, and many pilots are using a 1:250,000 scale chart for such work.

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There is a divided opinion, however, which chart (the Aeronautical Approach Chart or the AMS Map Series L-552 is the better for this purpose. Some pilots prefer using the Aeronautical Chart because of the elevation presentation in color, while other pilots have accepted the L-552 Map for its greater detail and accuracy, regardless of its many physical drawbacks.

(4) The world Aeronautical Charts (WAC) receive a limited amount of use for long range navigation and for orientation purposes when pilots are now in the area. The AMS Map series L-751 (scale 1:50,000) has proven valuable for briefing purposes, and for pinpointing pre-briefed targets where photo coverage is not available.

(5) The pilots criticism of the charts are included below for information and consideration of possible revisions to charts in the future.

(a) General suggestions applicable to all charts

(1) Add compass roses to charts.
(2) Add more scales to charts.
(3) Print all charts with UTM grid.
(4) Use a plastic material on which a grease pencil may be used without harming the chart permanently.
(5) Indicate elevations in feet rather than meters.
(6) Standardize names used on charts or include both names.

(b) WAC (scale 1:1,000,000)

(1) Indicate major railroads and highways more clearly.
(2) Use same color ink on all printings. There is some confusion in reading elevations by color variation because of this discrepancy.

(c) Pilotage Chart (scale 1:500,000)

(1) Make greater distinction between railroads and highways.
(2) Again the color variations from chart to chart cause confusion in reading elevations.
(3) Coast line blends too well with the water, consequently coastal features are lost and exact positioning becomes difficult.

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(d) Approach Charts (scale 1:250,000)

(1) This chart lacks detail on small roads, hills, towns, and other ground features which it should have for accurate reporting of locations attacked.

(e) AMS Map series L-552 (scale 1:250,000)

(1) Use a good grade of paper on succeeding issues. The present paper tears after only a few missions.
(2) Make designations for bridges, tunnels, roads, and railroads more outstanding.
(3) The coloring of the chart is perhaps its most serious drawback. Grid lines, small towns, secondary roads, etc., do not stand out against the green background. The red dotted representation of the main highways disappears under red light used by the night fighters. The shadows on the hills are such that the sun would be from the north., which confuses recognition of ground features.
(4) The detail and accuracy of this map, combined with the color code elevation system of the aeronautical charts, and printed on a more durable paper would make an ideal chart for use by naval aviators.

(6) Comments by the Jet Fighter Squadron are included separately because of the specialized type of mission they perform.

(a) The maps presently used by this Squadron are: (1) 1:500,000 Pilotage, (2) 1:250,000 Approach and (3) the 1:250,000 L-552. The L-552 is used very extensively by the majority of pilots who have accepted it as accurate and reliable. The remarks of this report should be considered in the light of the assignments of the F9F which has been low-level, armed reconnaissance over the main lines of travel.
(b) The main criticism seems not to be with the L-552 itself, but rather the physical handling of the charts in the cockpit. This is due to the size of the map and also due to the fact that one flight may require the use of 2 or 3 charts. It has been suggested that strip maps be printed to facilitate handling. Also, the need for some sort of a folder is apparent.

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A folder in which charts are folded and acetate covered so that pertinent information can be noted in grease pencil while in flight would be preferable. Possibly the type of paper should be of better quality, having more resistance to folding and rough usage. Another suggestion for improving readability is to bring out coordinate lines and designations through the use of contrasting color lines. The present printing is difficult to read quickly because the coordinate lines blend into the green contour shadings.

b. Personnel allocation, recommendations:

(1) As the direct result of four (4) months operations in the Korean combat area it is recommended that the air intelligence section on board CV class ships be augmented as indicated:

(a) That an allowance of five (5) officers, qualified for ship air intelligence duties be established for a CV class ship, and that these officers be on board prior to the departure of this class ship from the continental United States for any forward combat area.

No.	Rank	Qualifications
1	Lt.	Ship's Air Intelligence Officer
1	Lt.	Ship's Photo Interpreter
1	Lt.(jg)	Asst. Ship's Air Intelligence Off.
2	Ens.	Asst. Ship's Air Intelligence Off.

(b) That the Air Group be provided with an Air Group Intelligence Officer of the rank of Lt. or LCDR and that each squadron (less composite units assigned) be provided with a non-flying Air Intelligence Officer of the rank of Lt.(jg) or Ens. This complement would normally allow five (5) AIO's for a carrier air group.

(c) That the qualifications of the officers listed in (a) and (b) above prior to assignment be as follows:

(1) Ship's Air Intelligence Officer-graduate of Naval Intelligence School, Anacostia, D.C. (6 months intelligence course or 8 weeks air intelligence course) or the Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet Air Intelligence School, N.A.S. Alameda, California.

(2) Ship's Photo Interpreter-graduate of a PI school.

(3) Assistant Ship's Air Intelligence Officers and Air Group Intelligence Officers—

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graduates of Naval Intelligence School, Anacostia, D.C. (8 weeks air intelligence course) or the Commander Air Force Pacific Fleet Air Intelligence School, N.A.S. Alameda, California.

(d) It is further recommended that officers considered qualified by their commanding officer (ship or air group as applicable) as Air Intelligence Officers have an entry to that effect placed in their official record and that a code number be assigned for this qualification. This entry would aid the Bureau of Naval Personnel, as well as individual commands, in the selection and assignment of such officers, and in filling any authorized allowance with qualified personnel.

(e) That an additional allowance of four (4) enlisted men be established to serve as intelligence office personnel; this allowance to be as follows:

1 Quartermaster - 3rd class
1 Yeoman - 2nd class
2 Yeoman Strikers

(2) Although the allowance recommended above represents a radical increase in the present allowance of one (1) Lieutenant, it is considered well justified, and vitally essential under present combat operating conditions. The intelligence process is not a part time job in any sense of the word. It not only requires the full attention of every officer assigned to air intelligence duties, but requires a 24-hour day in order to function properly and coherently. The organization of the Air Intelligence section on board this ship requires the full services of the assigned ship's AIO's in order to prepare flash reports, daily air intelligence summaries, situation and flak plotting, correction, and maintenance of intelligence publications, pilot interrogation, and the preparation of target briefing material. On board the PRINCETON, the Air Intelligence section is fully responsible for the adequacy, and correctness of all air intelligence data that is disseminated to Squadron AIO's.

See enclosures (1) and (2) for Section Organization and Assignments.

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3. Communications:

In order to provide more working space for the Crypto personnel, it has been necessary to relocate the Crypto Room from compartment B-0207-C to the after end of compartment B-0101-CL. This arrangement has proven most satisfactory in that the heavy volume of traffic can now be handled with comparative ease. However, it has "spread" the Main Communication Section over three decks.

It is recommended that Radio One, Main Communication Office, and Crypto Room be relocated in adjacent compartments with access between compartments on board this class ship. By separate correspondence, above recommendation will be forwarded via official channels to the Bureau of Ships. Such relocation would provide a more efficient organization of the Communication Section of the Operations Department, and result in a decrease in personnel requirements. Additional files now required and much duplication of effort could be eliminated by such relocation.

4. Aerology:

On the whole, weather conditions caused a marked decrease in the number of days with favorable flying conditions, as compared with previous action periods. Cloud cover increased and visibility decreased as the winter monsoon began to give way to the summer monsoon.

The following general summary indicates average weather conditions experienced:

(a) During the first half of the period, precipitation was usually in the form of light snow. During the latter half of the period, precipitation form changed to rain or drizzle with occasional light snow.
(b) Toward the end of the period, the frequency of fog over the cold water off the northeast coast of Korea showed a marked increase. There were eleven days during the period when visibility was reduced below 5 miles due to fog, haze or precipitation.
(c) Maximum temperature experienced was 60 degrees F.; minimum temperature was 15 degrees F. daily average temperature was 41 degrees.
(d) Highest wind velocity logged was 49 knots; lowest velocity was calm. Average velocity for the period was 17 knots and predominant direction was WNW.

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(e) The average water temperature in the operating area was 42.5 degrees F. The maximum water temperature logged was 58 degrees F. and the minimum was 34 degrees F. Water temperature showed a marked difference depending upon the location of the ship.

(f) At times, atmospheric static, cw interference, and fading signals made it impossible to obtain any weather information via RATTY for several hours. It is recommended that transmission power of AIF Tokyo be increased, as this station is the primary source of weather information in the Korean area.

Recommendations:

It is strongly recommended that all carriers, especially flagships, be provided with radio facsimile equipment as soon as possible. Such equipment will aid forecastors in the Korean area immeasurably.

B. Engineering:

(1) Damage Control - no comments

(2) Main Propulsion - With jet planes on board, it is necessary to steam eight boilers quite frequently, which prevents any boiler cleaning while underway. Therefore, it is necessary to enter port periodically to permit boiler cleaning and repair work.

(3) Electrical - no comments

(4) Electronics -

(a) Model AN/SPS-6B Radar

The general performance of the AN/SPS-6B radar, for the period covered by this report, was good. Its performance could be considered excellent except for the fact that the antenna stalls when relative winds blow across the deck at forty-five knots or greater. Numerous performance checks have been made by the ship's force in an effort to improve the rotational stability of the antenna in high winds. The antenna drive system, and its associated control circuits, are considered to be operative in accordance with design specifications.

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(b) Mark V IFF Equipment

A Model AN/UPA-3 antenna is installed for operation with the Mark V IFF system. This antenna, as in the case of the AN/SPS-6B antenna, stalls in relative winds of forty knots or greater. Performance checks indicate that the antenna drive system is operating in accordance with designed specifications.

Two antennas are installed for operation with the Mark V IFF system. The AN/UPA-3 antenna is slaved to the SX radar antenna when IFF presentation is desired on the SX scope. The AN/SPS-6B antenna supports a small R.F. radiator as an integral part of the antenna, and is used when IFF presentation is desired with the AN/SPS-6B scope. Since both antennas become inoperative in relatively high winds, the Mark V IFF system, as well as the AN/SPS-6B radar, is rendered useless. This is considered a dangerous situation, particularly when aircraft equipped with Mark V IFF are airborne.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that wind tunnel tests be performed on subject antennas and corrective action be promulgated to the fleet in the form of Field Changes.

(5) Radio Communications:

Considerable communication difficulties, in the form of severe receiver interference, have been encountered during the period covered by this report. The source of the radio interference, for the most part, is known to originate on board. Due to the heavy demand on radio communication facilities, equipment suspected of generating the noise could not be shut down for adequate inspection.

C. Air Department

(1) Catapult operations during the period of this report were heavier than normal due to an increase in the use of jet type aircraft. The total number of shots for this period was 489 as compared with 264 for the last operating period. Catapult shots by type were 288 F9F's, 83 AD's, 112 F4U's, and 6 TBM's. During a pre-dawn hecklor launch on the morning of 31 March, one (1) AD-4 with a gross weight of 20,000 pounds received a cold shot due to a broken bridle. This was the third accident of this nature during pre-dawn catapult launches. All three accidents have been with AD type aircraft. Fortunately, however, all three aircraft have

stopped approximately one-half way down the catapult track. Although it has not been definitely determined, it is believed that the last accident was caused by one loop of the bridle being above the shuttle when the catapult was fired.

(2) The total number of deck launches for the period was 1,253. Deck launches by type were 750 F4U's, 485 AD's, and 18 TBM's. One AD-4Q, loaded for a strike mission and grossing 22,240 pounds, became airborne at the number one elevator in a semi-stalled attitude. The pilot continued to increase the nose attitude until the aircraft stalled and crashed into the water just forward of the port bow. The pilot was recovered and returned to the ship by helicopter within two (2) minutes after the crash. However, the crash proved fatal for a civilian who was an authorized passenger aboard the plane. The deck run was started at 580 feet with 44 knots of wind across the deck.

(3) Arrested landings for the period totaled 1,741. Landings by type were 287 F9F's, 864 F4U's, 566 AD's, and 24 TBM's. On 26 February, one (1) F9F was successfully landed with the tail hook in the streamed position after all attempts to lower the hook had failed. The pilot, instructed to land in a very tail low attitude, caught the number 2 cross deck pendant.

(4) On 27 February while the guns of an F4U-5N were being cleared on the hangar deck prior to a hydraulic check, one (1) round of 20MM ammunition was fired from each outboard gun, resulting in extensive damage to two (2) aircraft. Fortunately, there were no personnel injuries. The accident was caused by the failure of the ordnanceman to follow known safety procautions.

W. O. GALLERY

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ComAirPac
CTF 77 (advance)
ComCarDiv ONE
ComCarDiv THREE
ComCarDiv FIVE
CO, USS PHILIPPINE SEA
CO, USS BOXER
CO, USS BON HOMME RICHARD
CO, USS ESSEX
CAG 2
CAG 5
CAG 11
CAG 19
CAG 19X
CinPac Evaluation Group (5)

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
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

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ENCLOSURE "2"