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DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer, USS PRINCETON (CV-37) **DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10**

To: Chief of Naval Operations

Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(2) Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Action Report for the period 18 January 1951 through
15 February 1951

Ref: (a) CNO rest ltr Op345 ser 1197P34 of 3 August 1950

Encl: (1) Comm-Line Armed Recco Plan #3 **P. 24**
(2) CVG 19 conf ltr ser 02 of 7 January 1951 - Action **P. 25**
Report for period 18 January 1951 through 15
February 1951

1. In accordance with reference (a) the action report for the period 18 January 1951 through 15 February 1951 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces:

In accordance with Com7thFlt secret dispatch 150446Z of January, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), with ComCarDiv FIVE and Carrier Air Group NINETEEN embarked, departed Sasebo Harbor, Kyushu, Japan. The time of departure was approximately 1000 on 18 January 1951. In company with the USS PRINCETON (CV-37) was DesDiv 111 composed of the USS WILSTIE (DD-716), USS CHANDLER (DD-717), USS HAMNER (DD-718), and USS CHEVALIER (DDR-805).

At 0719, 19 January 1951, the PRINCETON and DesDiv 111 rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN at Latitude 37°56'N and Longitude 129°55'E. TF 77 was composed of four aircraft carriers: the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), USS PRINCETON (CV-37), and USS LEYTE (CV-32) with various heavy support and screening ships.

Upon rejoining the force, ComCarDiv FIVE, in the PRINCETON, resumed the duties of Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN,

relieving ComCarDiv ONE. This change in command was directed by Com7thFtlt conf dispatch 131428Z of January.

Mission:

At this time, Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was operating in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE's Operation Order No. 4-50. This operation order continued in effect until 4 February 1951; at which time, Operation Order No. 1-51 was originated by Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. Operation Order No. 1-51, placed in effect by CTF 77 restricted dispatch 032359Z of February, provided that the task force would perform close air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment missions. These missions were to be conducted in order to destroy the enemy forces, installations, and communications in support of the United Nations Forces.

The carrier air groups were to:

1. Provide air support to the East Coast of Korea, to support friendly troop operations, and to interdict enemy supply lines as directed in coordination with the FIFTH Air Force in Korea.
2. Be prepared to provide air cover for Task Group 79.1.
3. Protect the force against air, surface, and sub-surface attacks.
4. Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as necessary.

Throughout the period covered by this report, FAFIK (FIFTH Air Force in Korea) and Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN complemented the work of each other through cooperation in the use of all information relative to hitting the enemy where it hurt him most.

A liaison group, known as JOC (Joint Operations Command), had been established at Taegu, Korea for the purpose of coordinating air operations between FAFIK and Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. CDR. R.C. MERRICK, Commander, Air Group ELEVEN, was ordered to Taegu as representative of the Task Force, relieving CDR Ralph WEXMOUTH, Commander, Air Group ELEVEN.

JOC initiated and disseminated air plans, FAFIK air intentions, special target information, grid coordinates of the TACP's, and the grid locations of the latest dump targets. This information was used daily by the planes of the task

force. In return, CTF 77 dispatched daily summaries of targets attacked, damage to targets, enemy troop movements, supply activity, and special targets.

The close air support strikes of Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN used the following procedure throughout this period. Upon departure from the ship, the strike group formed up and proceeded to a pre-arranged rendezvous point. In the meantime, a liaison pilot had flown directly to the front line area. Here, on designated frequencies, the liaison pilot contacted various "Mosquito" air controllers or tactical ground control posts (TACP). Thus, by the time the strike planes arrived, the liaison pilot had cleared the radio channels, determined the needs of the various controllers, and expedited the assignment of targets. In the event that the TACP had no targets or communications were such that it was impossible to contact a TACP, then the strike group attacked pre-assigned last resort dump targets.

The reconnaissance and night heckler planes found good targets along the railroads and highways advised by JOC to be the enemy's main supply and communication routes. Enclosure (1) is a copy of these routes.

Commencing 26 January 1951, a coordinated program of interdiction was initiated. The primary targets of the pre-briefed interdiction strikes were highway and railroad bridges on the main enemy supply routes. Occasionally, tunnel blocking was successfully attempted. Photo reconnaissance by F9F-2P aircraft was valuable to the interdiction program in obtaining target information prior to the strike, and assessment of the damage after the attack.

PART II Chronological Order of Events:

18 January 1951 -

The USS PRINCETON departed Sasebo Harbor, Kyushu, Japan in company with DesDiv 111, which was composed of four destroyers. This group of ships proceeded to rendezvous point with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the North Korean Coast, conducting AA practice firing enroute.

19 January 1951 -

The USS PRINCETON rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN at 0719. Close air support missions were flown in an area about twenty-two miles east of Wonju. A total of 13 F4U's and 7 AD's were launched for these missions and made

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an estimated 124 runs on the targets. The estimated damage was 50 to 60 buildings destroyed and many fires started in the village of Oktung-ni (DS 6208). The "Mosquito" controller reported 2 large buildings and several smaller buildings containing troops destroyed at Yongtan-ni (DS 6438).

The combat air patrol consisted of 8 F9F CAP and 6 F9F TARCAP, the latter covering the airfields of Wonsan, Sondok, Yonpo, Hamhung West, and the close air support missions.

20 January 1951 -

Close air support missions were flown in the Wonsan and Tanyang areas, along with armed reconnaissance flights on routes Green 1, Brown 1 and Brown 2. A total of 17 F4U's, 7 AD's and 2 F9F's were launched for these missions and an estimated 133 runs were made on the targets. Liaison planes accompanied the close air support strikes. Difficulty was encountered in contacting the controllers and some strikes were not under the direction of a controller for this reason.

The estimated damage was 70% of three villages (DR 3861 to DR 3866) destroyed; two buildings destroyed and two others damaged at DT 7901; and railroad tracks destroyed near the approach to a railroad bridge at DT 6818.

Combat air patrol (ten F9F sorties) was flown throughout the day.

21 January 1951 -

A predawn heckler flight, two F4U-5N's and two AD-4N's, covering Green 1, and Brown 1 and Brown 2 and an anti-submarine patrol, two AD-4's, were the only flights launched. All other flights were cancelled due to unfavorable weather conditions. An estimated 11 runs were made on the targets by the heckler flight.

The estimated damage was a locomotive at CV 8231 and two of six boxcars destroyed at CV 9820 by strafing.

22 January 1951 -

Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN replenished at sea.

23 January 1951 -

Strong enemy resistance was being built up around the

Wonsan, Kangnung, Pyongchang and Suwon areas. In an effort to weaken this resistance by close air support, heckler and armed reconnaissance missions, 26 F4U's, 13 AD's and 12 F9F's were launched. An estimated 330 runs were made on the targets. Heckler and armed reconnaissance flights flew scheduled interdiction routes believed to be in use by the enemy.

The estimated damage was 45 houses destroyed and 15 others damaged in a village (DS 4921 to DS 4926), reported containing supplies; 70% of a village (DS 1742), reported containing troops, destroyed; one large building (DS 9178) destroyed; one span of a wooden bridge (DT 4478) probably destroyed; the approach to a highway bridge (DT 2207) made impassable; and one truck (CS 9098) destroyed.

Photo reconnaissance was made of airfields at Wonsan, Sondok, Yongpo and Hamhung West by 2 F9F-2P's.

AD-4N's flew anti-submarine patrol throughout the day.

24 January 1951 -

Close air support missions were flown in the Yongwol and Chumunjin areas, 22 F4U's and 14 AD's were launched and an estimated 360 runs were made on the targets. All close air support strikes were under the direction of a controller.

The estimated damage was 50 buildings destroyed and 30 others damaged in Chumunjin (DS 8694); two buildings (DS 8686) destroyed; 15 troops killed in a troop concentration (DS 7694) by bombing and strafing; haystacks (DS 8382) containing supplies destroyed; and four buildings (DS 8988) probably destroyed.

Three combat air patrols, 2 F4U's each, and 3 anti-submarine patrols, 2 AD-4W's each, were flown throughout the day.

25 January 1951 -

In an effort to maintain maximum air support for a U.N. drive to the north, 28 F4U's, 20 AD's and 6 F9F's were launched for close air support, heckler, and armed reconnaissance missions. An estimated 367 runs were made on the targets. Heckler and armed reconnaissance routes flown covered enemy roads and railroads in the central sector of Korea.

The estimated damage was 40% of Pyongchang (DS 4835)

destroyed; 25% to 30% of Yondong-ni reported by a controller as destroyed; a large building (CS 0442) destroyed; 12 buildings probably destroyed in two villages (DS 7570); in the villages of Kusan-ni (DS 8777) and Kunson-ni (DS 8674), 25 buildings believed destroyed; railroad tracks and 3 railroad cars (CT 5270) destroyed; one building (CT 5050) destroyed; one truck (CV 7529) destroyed; also nine trucks destroyed and the approach to a bridge (CU 8858) made impassable.

During flight operations four anti-submarine patrol sorties were flown.

26 January 1951 -

Armed reconnaissance flights in the Ichon, Hungnam and Yongwol areas were flown along with close air support strikes as directed by controllers. 31 F4U's, 18 AD's and 8 F9F's were launched, and made an estimated 545 runs on the targets. Many of the close air support strikes were conducted in areas where U.N. troops were in direct contact with the enemy.

Enemy strong points at CS 5029 and CS 5922 were neutralized effectively. The controller reported that the advance which had been held up was able to move forward. Ten fires were started in three villages around CS 4533. An estimated ten troops were killed at CS 4233. Enemy forces along a ridge (CS 4723) were neutralized, allowing U.N. forces to continue their advance. Several buildings were damaged and four others left burning at CS 4430. Troops dug in at CS 4928 were attacked, but results were unobserved. Two buildings of a command post were destroyed and a gun emplacement was damaged at CS 4923. Caves at DS 4219 containing troops and supplies were attacked, but results were unobserved. Taegongni at DS 7508 was 75% destroyed. Fires were started in Chumunjin at DS 3594. 12 buildings containing troops and supplies were destroyed in a village at CS 4345. On the road from Hamhung to the Choshin Reservoir one truck was destroyed and four others were damaged. In Hamhung, four ox carts were destroyed and three oxen were killed. A wooden bridge at CS 9293 was extensively damaged.

A photo reconnaissance flight over the bridges along the road from Pukchong to Anbyong was made by a F9F-2P.

Throughout the day 12 F4U-4's were launched to fly combat air patrol and 6 AD-4W's were launched for anti-submarine patrol.

27 January 1951 -

Continuing to give maximum support to the U.N. offensive, close air support, heckler and armed reconnaissance strikes were flown in the Chechon, Hancheon, Ichon and Wonsan areas. 33 F4U's, 19 AD's and 8 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 587 runs on the targets. Liaison planes accompanied each close air support mission and all such strikes were under the direction of a controller. Heckler and armed reconnaissance flights were made along scheduled interdiction routes.

Strikes hitting within a 15 mile radius from Konjian-ni (CS 5435) concentrated on enemy ground forces and villages estimating damage at 20 troops killed; troop shelters, 14 buildings and 60% of a village (CS 6243) destroyed; and 5 gun emplacements and 12 buildings damaged. Strikes working within 15 miles of Pyongch'ang (DS 4635) estimated damage at 31 buildings destroyed, 15 to 20 buildings damaged and 1 village set afire. Estimated damage in other areas was as follows: supply dump (CS 9182) 50% destroyed; 2 large buildings (CS 9382) destroyed; 4 buildings (DS 0263) left burning; 15 to 20 troops, a tank and 2 vehicles (CT 8052) destroyed; and the approach to a bridge (CV 6030) extensively damaged.

Photo reconnaissance flights were flown by 2 F9F-2P's over the road bridges from Hamhung to Pukchong and over Wonsan Harbor.

AB-4W's were launched on 2 anti-submarine patrols during flight operations.

28 January 1951 -

Close and deep air support strikes in the areas of Hamcheon, Wonju and Suwon were flown along with bridge strikes in the Sinpo area. 31 F4U's, 21 AD's and 4 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 734 runs on the targets. Armed reconnaissance flights flew the scheduled interdiction routes.

At DS 0730 five buildings were left burning. Two gun emplacements were destroyed, one at CS 1951 and one at DV 3332. An oil storage tank and 2 buildings were damaged at DV 2432. An area at DS 5353, containing 200 troops, was attacked, leaving 15 known to be dead. A village was 40% destroyed at CS 3239. A railroad bridge and a highway bridge were destroyed at DV 2532. A warehouse was damaged and 3 buildings were destroyed at DV 2932. Two gun emplacements

at DV 3132 were knocked out. 15 huts were destroyed at DS 4858. A concrete highway bridge at DT 3869 was destroyed. At DV 3032, two buildings were destroyed and one other was damaged. A 3 $\frac{1}{2}$ inch gun emplacement was destroyed at DV 2930.

The first bridge strike destroyed 3 spans of a railroad bridge at DV 4547 and 3 spans of a highway bridge at DV 0932. The approach to the highway bridge was also damaged. The second bridge strike scored damaging hits on a railroad bridge at DV 0021, but the bridge was not put out of service. Two locomotives and four railroad cars were damaged and four buildings and six railroad cars were destroyed by the second bridge strike.

Photo reconnaissance flights of 2 F9F-2P's were flown over bridges on Green 2 and over the bridge strikes.

Combat air patrol, 12 F4U's, an anti-submarine patrol, 6 AD-4W's, were flown during the flight operations.

29 January 1951 -

Close and deep air support strikes were flown in the areas north of Suwon, Kangdong and Hongchon in support of the continued U.F. offensive. A bridge strike was made in the Anbyon area. 30 F4U's, 17 AD's and 3 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 401 runs on the targets.

In the village of Hwachon-ni at CT 9589, 3 buildings were destroyed. At CU 6937, 3 gun emplacements were silenced. A large building at DT 3035 was damaged extensively. A building at DT 4537 was destroyed. In the village of Haenni-ri at DS 5244, 20 buildings were left burning. 10 buildings were left burning in the village of Pangnin-ni at DS 5043. At DS 0272, Hongchon was left with 14 buildings burning and one large building extensively damaged. A truck and troop concentration at CT 6279 was attacked and one gun emplacement was destroyed. 10 buildings in Kangnung at DS 9178 were destroyed. At CT 5785, a railroad bridge was extensively damaged and 5 buildings were destroyed. At Sinhung-ni located at CU 5085, 5 troops were killed and one oxcart was destroyed at CV 6729. At CU 4968, 15 to 20 troops were killed and 5 oxcars were destroyed by strafing. The bridge strike scored damaging misses on railroad bridges at CU 7122 and CT 5885. Both bridges remained serviceable.

A photo reconnaissance flight, 2 F9F-2P's, was flown on the bridges on routes Black 1, Green 1, Brown 6, and Brown 7.

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Four anti-submarine sorties were launched during flight operations.

30 January 1951 -

Bridge strikes were the missions of the day for which 23 F4U's and 12 AD's were launched and made an estimated 235 runs on the targets. Three bridge strikes were flown.

The first strike destroyed a highway bridge approach at DT 5941, and the approach to a railroad bridge at the same location. The tracks at both ends of the railroad bridge were also destroyed. The second strike damaged a highway bridge at DT 5254, but it remained serviceable. A railroad bridge at DT 9241 was also damaged. The third strike damaged the approach to a highway bridge at DT 4865.

31 January 1951 -

The USS PRINCETON, USS JUNEAU and four destroyers left TF 77 for replenishment at sea.

1 February 1951 -

Close air support, armed reconnaissance, heckler and a bridge strike were flown, with 21 F4U's, 17 AD's and 4 F9F's launched, making an estimated, 275 runs on the targets. All close air support strikes were under the direction of a controller. The close and deep air support missions operated over the Wonsan, Pyongyang and Kangnung areas.

The estimated damage was one building (DT 4372) destroyed and two buildings (DT 4372) damaged; one truck destroyed and six fires started in Koam-ni (CV 5950); and two trucks and three ox carts destroyed along with 10 troops killed at DV 3536.

2 February 1951 -

A bridge strike in the vicinity of Mithun, was flown along with close air support, armed reconnaissance and heckler flights, in the vicinities of Suwon, Pyongyang, Mongwon and Kangnung.

21 F4U's, 12 AD's and 4 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 275 runs on the targets. Close air support strikes were under the direction of a controller.

The estimated damage was 12 buildings (DS 9177), containing troops destroyed and 4 others set afire by bombs,

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napalm, and strafing; 8 buildings in the villages of Kon-
jiam-ni (CS 5335) and Kinjiam-ni destroyed by bombs, rockets,
and strafing; 6 buildings set afire in Oro-ri (CV 6536);
troops entrenched on a ridge (CS 8343) attacked with 20
troops being killed; one soldier killed (DS 5345); a bull-
dozer (CV 6533) extensively damaged; and a railroad bridge
(DV 5941) had one span damaged and the tracks destroyed,
putting the bridge out of service.

A photo reconnaissance flight, 3 F9F-2P's, flew routes
Green 6, Brown 1 and Green 3, covering the bridges on these
routes.

3 February 1951 -

Close and deep air support strikes in the vicinity of .
Suwon, Pyongchang and Hamhung, and a bridge strike in the
vicinity of Matong-ni were flown with 15 F4U's and 14 AD's
being launched. An estimated 261 runs were made on the tar-
gets.

The estimated damage was one truck (CV 7320) and 2
trucks (CV 6512) destroyed; a village (DS 4037) of 15 to 20
buildings destroyed; 2 villages (CS 0838) bombed, strafed
and rocketed, resulting in 12 buildings being destroyed;
and entrenched troops in two areas (CS 8340) and (CS 0936)
attacked. The area was well covered, but results were un-
observed. The bridge strike hit a railroad bridge and a
highway bridge at CV 5841, damaging the railroad bridge but
missing the highway bridge.

A photo reconnaissance flight, four photo planes with
4 F9F escorts, covered all bridges from the Fusen Reservoir
to Chori and all bridges on route Green 6 from Kilchu to
Tanchon.

A predawn anti-submarine flight was flown.

4 February 1951 -

Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN replenished at sea.

5 February 1951 -

A bridge strike in the Choshin Reservoir area along
with close air support and armed reconnaissance strikes
near Konjiam-ni, Kwachon, Pangnim-ni, Kangnung and Wonsan
were flown. 30 F4U's and 19 AD's were launched and made
an estimated 490 runs on the targets. Most close air sup-
port strikes were in areas where U.N. troops were in direct

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contact with the enemy. For this reason all close air support missions were under the direction of a controller.

The estimated damage was five fires started in Sagimang-ni (DS 8482); 12 buildings destroyed in a village (DS 8183); heavy destruction in a village (DT 3857); 2 buildings located on a ridge (DS 9479) destroyed by bombs; and 7 buildings destroyed and 5 damaged at CS 1845. The area contained troops, but casualties were undetermined. Entrenched troops were attacked at 5 points (DS 5537 to CS 5540, DS 1855 to DS 1865, CS 4137, DS 5241, and DS 5942). The areas were well covered with bombs, napalm, and strafing, with undetermined results. Two camouflaged trucks later observed to be dummies were strafed at CU 7326. One span and the approach to a highway bridge (CU 5585) was destroyed.

Two photo reconnaissance flights, 3 F9F-P's and 3 escorts; covered the bridges which had been hit on routes Green 1, Black 1, Brown 1, and Brown 6. They also took a 1/50,000 strip of route Brown 2 from the Choshin Reservoir to Hungnam and from Fusen Reservoir to Chori; and a 1/50,000 strip from Kilchu to Pukchong.

Combat air patrol, 10 sorties, and anti-submarine patrol, 6 sorties, were flown.

6 February 1951 -

Scheduled close air support flights were cancelled due to unfavorable flying conditions over the target areas. An armed reconnaissance flight flew routes Brown 6 and Brown 7. 4 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 32 runs on the targets. Strafing attacks killed an estimated 20 enemy troops (EV 0982).

A photo reconnaissance flight, 2 F9F-2P's and escorts, covered bridges along routes Green 2, Green 3, and Green 6.

Anti-submarine patrol was flown by 2 AD-4W's.

7 February 1951 -

Armed reconnaissance and heckler flights along routes Brown 1, 2, 6, and 7, with two bridge strikes in the areas of Chungsan-ni and Yongdae-ri comprised the days offensive operations. 12 F4U's, 16 AD's and 6 F9F's were launched for the strikes and made an estimated 267 runs on the targets.

The estimated damage was a locomotive (DV 6872) destroyed and a tank car (DV 6872) damaged; one locomotive

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(DV 6863) destroyed by an attack upon the locomotive and 6 railroad cars, while damage to the cars was undetermined; 3 trucks (EB 5119) destroyed by strafing; one truck destroyed and 4 damaged by bombs and strafing at CV 8160; one truck destroyed (CV 5095); 2 vehicles destroyed (DV 0727); 15 troops killed and 5 oxcarts destroyed by strafing along route Brown 7; 2 spans, the tracks and the ties of a railroad bridge (DV 6754) destroyed by the first bridge strike; and 4 spans of a railroad bridge (DV 2532) destroyed by the second bridge strike.

Anti-submarine patrol was flown by 2 AD-4W during the afternoon.

8 February 1951 -

Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN replenished at sea.

9 February 1951 -

Due to unfavorable weather conditions over the target areas, the only strike flown was a special strike on railroad tunnels in the vicinity of Sinpo, Songjin and Pukchong. 2 F4U-5N's and 4 AD-4's were launched and made an estimated 95 runs on the targets.

The tunnels (EV 0281, EV 0482, DV 8973, and DV 3332), reported containing troops and supplies, were bombed and strafed. The railroad tracks leading into them were damaged, but other than this the damage could not be determined.

Anti-submarine patrols, 4 sorties, were flown throughout the day.

10 February 1951 -

The strikes flown included a special mission on troop concentrations, close and deep air support and a bridge strike. 22 F4U's, 11 AD's and 4 F9F's were launched and 280 runs were made on the target.

The estimated damage was 13 buildings destroyed by bombs, napalm, rockets, and strafing, in a village (DS 0071); 5 buildings destroyed at DS 0075; 8 buildings destroyed at DS 1278; several buildings destroyed at DS 0878 by bombs and strafing; one building (CS 9970) and 3 buildings (CS 9565) destroyed by bombs; 7 buildings in a village (CS 9969) destroyed; a three story building (DT 0199) attacked with 75% hits being scored by rockets and 20MM, casualties were undetermined; 3 locomotives destroyed by strafing (one each at

CS 6078, CS 7190, and CT 4232); one T34 tank destroyed by 4 6.5 ATAR's; entrenched troops and gun emplacements at three points (CS 6444, DT 5050 and along the Han River) attacked with bombs, rockets, napalm and strafing with controller estimating 50 troops killed and one gun emplacement destroyed; and, one span and the south approach of a highway bridge (CT 7984), destroyed, by the bridge strike using 2000 pound G.P. bombs.

Combat air patrol, anti-submarine patrol and a photo reconnaissance flight were flown.

11 February 1951 -

Close air support in the vicinity of Seoul, deep air support in the areas of Wonsan, Hamhung and the Choshin Reservoir and two special mission flights in the Hoehyonni area were conducted. 20 F4U's 18 AD's and 17 F9F's were launched and made an estimated 592 runs on the targets.

The estimated damage was 2 trucks damaged at DV 3735; 20 railroad cars damaged in the marshalling yard at Pukchong; some buildings and trackage damaged in a marshalling yard (DV 3836); a camouflaged locomotive and boxcar destroyed at CT 6201; 2 buildings destroyed and 3 buildings left burning at DS 3858. These buildings contained troops and the casualties were heavy. 8 buildings containing troops were left burning; a village (CS 5544) left with four buildings burning; 25 to 30 barracks near Kungnam bombed, rocketed, and strafed, resulting in 12 buildings damaged; a warehouse left burning at DV 9277; at CT 6023, one building destroyed; one building damaged at CS 5639; a village (CV 7318) left with several buildings damaged; 3 barracks (EA 1700) bombed and napalmed, resulting in 2 being destroyed; 5 oxcarts destroyed from CU 5053 to CU 5087; troops and equipment attacked at several points (DS 4547, CU 6825, CU 4989 to CU 5084, CT 6201, CT 6023, CT 4509, and CS 5639) resulting in 55 troops and 35 horses being killed; one span of a highway bridge destroyed at CV 6618; 2 T34 tanks damaged by ATAR's at CT 7884; and at Hoehyon a highway bridge slightly damaged.

Photo reconnaissance flights, 3 F9F-2P's, covered routes Green 2, Green 3, Brown 2 and Brown 6 for damage assessment on the bridges.

12 February 1951 -

Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN replenished at sea.

13 February 1951 -

The USS PRINCETON, in company with DesDiv 111 less the USS WILTSIE, was enroute for its scheduled availability.

14 February 1951 -

The USS PRINCETON, in company with DesDiv 111, continued enroute Yokosuka, Japan.

15 February 1951 -

The USS PRINCETON arrived Tokyo Bay.

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment:

A. Maintenance of Ordnance:

09E (1) The general performance of ordnance equipment for the period covered by this report was very good. No serious casualties occurred on any of the gun batteries. The fire control equipment, and particularly the radar units, suffered the greatest number of casualties; however, the trend of casualties even here was downward as compared to the initial experience, immediately after the ship was reactivated. There is no doubt that frequent exercise of the various units, a better preventive maintenance program, and the procedure of keeping F.C. radars in a standby status on condition watches were the reasons for the downward trend.

(2) Condition watch 5"/38 ready guns were regularly shifted to prevent the breech block closing springs from taking a permanent set.

434 (3) The after portion of the ship experiences excessive vibration whenever speeds of 20 knots and better are maintained. This vibration has been great enough to be detrimental to the operation of both the Mk. 56 and Mk. 63 GFCS installed aft. As a comparison the after Mk. 56 GFCS has experienced twice as many failures as did the forward Mk. 56 GFCS, where practically no vibration occurs. The vibration has caused brackets, 5/8" steel bolts, synchro shafting and amplifier mountings to snap off. It has necessitated the ship's force to schedule a weekly screw tightening program in place of the normal monthly program. A letter is now in the process of being prepared to the Bureau of Ordnance describing the above condition.

(4) Although no extremely cold weather nor extensive precipitation was encountered during the period of this report, temperatures did range as low as 18°F., and snow conditions were encountered which prevailed up to 12 hour periods. A high standard of operational readiness was maintained throughout the period. This standard may be credited to regular transmission checks and systematic exercise of equipment through its full operational limits in addition to proper lubrication in accordance with the cold weather provisions of OD 3000, Revision B.

B. Ammunition expended - during period of this report.

<u>Bombs</u>		<u>Fuses</u>	
2000# GP	90	AN-M100A2	3461
1000# GP	297	AN-M101A2	168
500# GP	162	AN-M102A2	380
250# GP	98	AN-M103A1	1113
100# GP	2059	M115	62
260# FRAG	1372	M116	2
		M117	10
		M139A1	397
		M166	520
<u>Napalm</u>		M168	2251
Gas Tanks Mk.12	83	M157	816
Jap Manufactured		Igniters M15 (WP)	417
Napalm Tanks	290	Igniters M16 (WP)	416
Napalm Thickner	24960		
		<u>Rockets</u>	
<u>Aircraft Ammunition</u>		11.75 Tiny Tim	3
20MM Aircraft	67728	6.5" ATAR Head	70
Cal. .50	368325	5" Rocket Head Mk.6	2886
A/C Parachute		5" Motor	2958
flares Mk.6	91	Rocket Fuze M149	2898
A/C Parachute		3.25" Rocket Motor	24
flares Mk.8	33	3.50" Head Mk.8 (Solid)	24

C. Cold Weather Protection for Gun Crews:

Heavy winter clothing provided for the gun and director crews is unsatisfactory. The arctics provided are definitely inadequate in providing warmth for the feet. Heavy woolen socks which were issued cannot be worn inside of shoes because of their bulk. The alternative of wearing the woolen socks inside of the arctics without shoes does not keep the feet warm either. The combination leather and woolen mittens provide necessary warmth except where men must handle cold steel, e.g., hand wheels. Although necessary for protection of the crews from the cold, parkas have not been issued because of insufficient supply. Even less the cumbersome parkas, the clothing in general is too bulky for quick and efficient handling of directors, guns and ammunition.

Recommendations:

1. Increase the allowance of Gun Sights Mk. 15 for CV's from one to two.
2. Modify Task Force Op-Order 1-51 to keep 5"/38 ready ammunition in the fuze pots instead of in the tray of the gun.
3. Investigate the cause of the extreme vibration on the after section of the ship and also the possibility of remounting, reinforcing or relocating the after GFCS Mk. 56 and Mk. 63.
4. Develop a warmer, less bulky cold weather clothing outfit for gun and director crews.

PART IV Resume of Battle Damage - Own and Enemy:

- A. Own - The ship sustained no battle damage.
- B. Enemy - For damage inflicted upon the enemy see enclosure (2).

PART V Personnel, Performance and Casualties:

A. Casualties:

There were no personnel casualties suffered by ship's company during these operations. See enclosure (2) for Air Group NINETEEN casualties.

B. Performance:

The performance of personnel during the period of this report was excellent. It is considered that the training received by both officers and enlisted men "on the job" during the continuous operations produced highly satisfactory results. In most instances, both officer and enlisted personnel have acquired much valuable professional background and operating "know-how" that could only be gained in such a short period of time by actual continuing combat operations.

PART VI Operations:

A. Communications:

201/ Radio--Atmospheric disturbances and interference from the ship's own electronic equipment caused many NDT RATT

FOX numbers to be missed at night. Difficulty was experienced by this ship in trying to obtain the missing numbers from other major ships in the force. It is recommended that a survey be taken of all major ships copying the NDT RATT FOX to determine if they also have difficulty at night with this circuit. It is further recommended that a system be instigated to rerun important high precedence traffic utilizing a pre-determined time delay before retransmission.

Visual--No comment.

Crypto--The crypto board was able to handle all encrypted traffic without difficulty. However, in view of numerous mechanical failures experienced with the ECM's it is recommended that each carrier division flagship be allowed one qualified CRF repairman. This repairman would be available to repair ECM's of other ships operating with the carrier division flagship.

B. Intelligence:

04E
322
The AIO store room (B-201-1L) does not provide sufficient stowage space for the intelligence material required by the type of operations now in progress. It is recommended that additional stowage facilities be provided all CV's being readied for service to accommodate the large quantities of charts, recognition equipment, target dossier, and photographic files necessary for intelligence work.

The AIS L552 and 542 map series were used during this period and are still being evaluated. Present indications are that this chart has great value for ground plotting and for briefing purposes. However, the texture of the paper used does not stand the rough handling received by charts in aircraft, and tends to tear easily. Also, pilots have difficulty in determining altitudes as they must follow contour lines rather than the color codes previously used.

C. Photo:

553
①
It is recommended that the K-3A Houston Machine for developing 16mm gun camera and motion picture film be completely overhauled and defective parts replaced before a ship leaves the Navy yard after being reactivated. Present operational work load required of this machine is heavy and it is essential that this machine be in perfect operating condition.

A few reserve rated personnel received in the photo lab do not meet the requirements of their job code numbers. It

is recommended that reserve rated personnel be given refresher courses when they are called back to active duty. It is also recommended that a rated man with a job code number for Photographic camera repairman be included in the allowance of a CV type carrier to keep the photographic equipment in operating condition for present heavy operational work load.

(b) It is recommended that the Aerial Film Dryer (Smith Automatic Navy stock #18-D-796, now on present allowance list be replaced by the Army type A-10 (or equivalent) Aerial Film Dryer. The present dryer is incapable of handling the present operational work load, whereas the Army A-10 is capable of handling the same work in two-thirds the time.

(c) When the photo lab began processing the present operational work load it was discovered that the main power cable did not have sufficient carrying capacity to accommodate the load required of the equipment being used. This caused continual over loads on the circuit and a heavier cable had to be installed.

D. Engineering:

On 5 February 1951 this ship sustained a steering casualty which sent the rudder hard over without rudder control. This casualty resulted from the failure of the follow-up assembly, and was caused by the parting of a follow-up rod at a universal joint, due to the dropping out of a lock pin. The pin is not tapered and is kept in place only by the end of a small hexagon sockethead screw which locks in a shallow groove in the pin's mid-section. The commanding officer has recommended to BuShips that a more reliable design be installed.

Electronics:

09E The SX Radar system was inoperative for approximately 50% of the time covered by this report. The primary source of difficulty with this equipment was faulty components. Vacuum tubes comprised the greatest single source of trouble. Lack of essential electronics maintenance repair parts (peculiar) on board hindered repair of the equipment. Two Philco engineers were assigned to this ship by ComServPac to assist ship's force in making necessary repairs to provide satisfactory operation of this equipment. By the end of the period covered by this report, the ship succeeded in providing SX Radar service commensurate with its designed capabilities.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that Electronic Maintenance Repair Parts Allowance for complex equipment, such as the SX, be increased to provide a greater variety of essential "peculiar" items.

Damage Control: No Comments.

E. Air Department:

1. Catapult operations were not as heavy during this period due to a lighter schedule of jet flights. Catapult shots by type were: 158 F9F, 71 AD, 30 F4U, 5 TBM, totaling 264 compared to 435 for the last operating period. During morning operations of 19 January 1951, the No. 1 oil gear pump on the port catapult froze leaving only three (3) pumps for port catapult operations. This pump will be replaced during next upkeep and maintenance period.

During pre-dawn heckler launch on the morning of 3 February 1951, one (1) AD-4N received a cold shot due to a broken bridle. The cause of the accident has not been determined at this writing. The plane had been properly tensioned on the catapult, the bridle and hold back unit were visually inspected for proper position and tension by the catapult chief. The gross load of the aircraft was 19,350 pounds and all bridles to be used for the launch had been visually inspected ten (10) hours prior to the launch and placed along the deck edge. The bridle used had no visible broken wires prior to the shot. Upon firing the catapult, the tension ring broke and sparks were observed in the shuttle area. The plane moved forward in a three point attitude and stopped approximately one plane length forward of the proper position. This broken bridle struck and ruptured the belly tank and a large quantity of gasoline poured out on deck. No fire resulted.

Deck launches this period by type were: 468 F4U, 285 AD, and 14 TBM, totaling 767 with no accidents occurring. The AD type carried everything but the kitchen sink. On some special strikes, their loading consisted of 2-2000# G.P. bombs, 1-1000# G.P. bomb, 8-250# G.P. bombs, 4-HVAR type rockets, and a full load of ammunition; this brought the gross weight slightly over 22,000 pounds.

Arrested landings for the period by type were: 154 F9F, 506 F4U, 341 AD, and 19 TBM totaling 1020 with minimum repairs to the machinery necessary. One (1) AD-4 was landed

aboard on 9 February 1951, with no hook due to malfunctioning of the equipment. A minor barrier crash resulted. On 11 February 1951, another AD after being damaged by AA fire over the target and using all methods available to lower the landing gear with no success, was landed aboard with the gear up. The resultant damage to the aircraft and flight deck were minor.

During this period the walkie-talkie sets which were ordered at San Diego were received. They were to be used between primary fly and flight deck control officers during deck operations while jet aircraft were turning up. The sets were modified by the Naval Electronics Service Unit, Naval Air Station, San Diego to be worn as a belt, using headset and lip mike, and with an aerial that could be clipped to the clothing of the user. The operation of these sets proved most satisfactory with the important exception that the pre-set frequency of 140.58 MCs cannot be used to any extent because it is the guard frequency. The use of this interfered too much with C.I.C. operations throughout the task force, shore stations when close in, and other aircraft. It is recommended that these sets be pre-set to the assigned land-launch frequency of each carrier, or that a set be provided in which any crystalization changes may be made by each operating activity. The use of direct communication with control officers on the flight deck would definitely speed up normal operations and would be an invaluable aid during emergencies such as fires or crashes. The walkie-talkie in the present form does not fulfill this requirement.

During this period, several opportunities for the removal of snow and ice on the flight deck were encountered. All present means aboard were utilized in order to determine the most effective methods for varied conditions. For unobstructed areas, the use of the tractor rigged as a snow plow followed by the tractor rigged with rotary snow brush proved very effective for the removal of dry or wet snow. In obstructed areas around aircraft, tie-downs, etc. plane handling crews with individual snow shovels working from the center outboard removed the snow fairly rapidly. The use of jet aircraft proved very effective also. By swinging the tail of idling jets while pushing them aft cleared the deck of icy patches left by the snow plow and brush and proved most effective in drying the deck. The jet was also found useful for the initial removal of snow. However, the tail must be swung, stopped, and more power added for a blasting effect to remove the snow. This is generally slower than the use of the snow plows and brushes.

2. The constant use of bomb skids, hoists and handling equipment and the rough treatment this equipment receives, due to changes in schedules calling for rapid handling of ordnance loads, necessitates a system of overhauling and repairing this equipment be set up to keep it in operable condition. The allowance of handling equipment will have to be increased to operate under present conditions. Normally it is necessary to have bombs fuzed and on skids for two strikes. A sudden change in schedule or loading calls for the use of another set of bomb skids as time normally is not available to unload skids and replace the bomb loads. Under these conditions, it is suggested the allowance be increased to 150 Mk. 1 skids with various types of adapters and 25 Mk. 8 type skids.

Repeated handling of parachute flares, due to flight cancellations, caused damage to the flare and has resulted in the parachute pulling out during catapult shots in two instances. This is caused by the cardboard seal at the after end of the flare which retains the parachute becoming weakened. This can be remedied by the use of masking tape to strengthen the seal.

Continued trouble was had with reworked rockets, mainly due to the pigtails coming apart. This trouble is especially applicable to the F9F aircraft because of the high flight speeds. New rockets arriving in the area should eliminate this problem.

The Mark 5 rocket launchers on F4U-4 aircraft have begun cracking and breaking from prolonged use. The planes are loaded with the wings folded and the weight, especially in the case of 100# bombs on adapters, acts with a strong moment force and puts considerable strain on the launchers. However, it is pointed out these planes and launchers are about six years old which probably contributes to the failures.

Considerable experimentation was done with napalm tanks, igniters and mixing equipment to obtain perfect napalm and to eliminate dud bombs. A modification was made to the Mark 1 hopper so that xylenol can be added to the gasoline at the same time as the napalm powder. This is accomplished by using a xylenol feeder tank which has a means of controlling and measuring the flow of xylenol through a line with a valve control, leading from the feeder tank into the gasoline line at the base of the napalm hopper. The xylenol is drawn into the gasoline line by eduction, the rate of flow of the xylenol being controlled by the valve in the line. Thus the percentages of xylenol and napalm, as given in OP 1361, can be varied

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to give the desired consistency of napalm jelly for the various temperatures encountered. In this procedure the napalm powder and xylene are well mixed at the hopper, resulting in good agitation of the mix and rapid jelling.

An occasional dud napalm bomb was caused by the .033 gauge arming wire, which is used with the Mk. 157 fuze, breaking due to the fact the wire was not getting a straight pull-out on dropping. This was remedied by running the .068 gauge arming wires from the arming plate through the tank suspension lugs to the fuze. This assures a straight pull-out of the .033 gauge arming wires in the fuzes upon dropping, and with this procedure very few duds are encountered due to breakage of the .033 gauge arming wires.

Due to the large work load of the aviation ordnance personnel it is believed that the ordnance complement should be increased. Although loading can be handled with the present complement; very little time is available for repair and upkeep work, and time is not available to give the men training courses in all phases of ordnance work. Replenishment day does not give much opportunity for rest and upkeep work, as it normally involves a large amount of work for the ordnance crews.

F. Navigation:

During the subject period of operations, excessive difficulty was had in the maintenance of the DBE-Loran. The equipment was out of commission practically the entire operating period despite the expenditure of very large amounts of labor in attempts to repair it. The DBE Loran was repaired just prior to entering port on 16 February 1951.

2/41
Because of poor weather and the failure of the DBE Loran there were periods as long as forty-eight (48) hours where navigation of the ship was on a dead-reckoning basis. Radar was of great aid during this period of bad weather in checking the dead-reckoning plot.

W. O. Gallery
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