U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37)
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From: Commanding Officer, USS PRINCETON (CV-37)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) CTF 77 (2)
(2) Com7thFlt
(3) ComNavFE
(4) CinCPacFlt

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Subj: Action Report for the period of 14 April 1952 through 16 May 1952

Ref: (a) OpNav Instruction 3480.4
(b) CVG 19 Confidential ltr ser 012 of 16 May 1952 - Air Attack Reports for the period 1 May through 13 May 1952

1. In accordance with reference (a) the Action Report for the period 14 April 1952 through 16 May 1952 is hereby submitted.

PART I Composition of Own Forces

Pursuant to CTF 77 Confidential dispatch 220458Z of April 1952, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), with CVG 19 embarked, departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan and proceeded to the operating area via Okinawa. On 30 April the PRINCETON rendezvoused with TASK FORCE 77.

TASK FORCE 77 was composed of four Aircraft Carriers, the USS PRINCETON (CV-37), the USS BOXER (CV-21), the USS PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), and the USS VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), along with various heavy support and screening ships.

MISSION:

The mission of this force, as set forth in CTF 77 OpOrder No. 22-51, second revision, was to conduct a systematic program of air and surface interdiction, provide close air support of ground operations, assist in maintaining control of vital sea areas and operate as a fast carrier task force when directed, in order to support UN Forces in Korea and to support the policy of the United States in the Far East.

[redacted]L
SECURITY INFORMATION

PART II Chronological Order of Events.

14-17 April

Arrived Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan. Granted dock side availability for voyage repairs.

18 April

Moored outer harbor in a ready carrier status.

19-20 April

Underway off Eastern Coast of Honshu, Japan conducting refresher flights.

21-24 April

Moored outer harbor Yokosuka in a ready carrier status.

25-26 April

Departed Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan and proceeded to Okinawa.

27-28 April

Operating off Okinawa, a total of 158 sorties were flown to provide CAP, ASP, Close Air Support, Photo, Strike and Tactical Air Coordination Missions for a joint Army, Air Force, and Navy amphibious training operation.

Departed Okinawa on the afternoon of 28 April for the operating area.

29 April

Enroute operating area and TASK FORCE 77.

30 April

Rendezvoused TASK FORCE 77 early in the morning and proceeded to replenish at sea.

The first launch of the helicopter resulted in the loss of the helicopter off the port bow. The pilot and the two passengers were recovered unharmed.

Shortly after the crash and while alongside the USS CACAPON (AO-52), the PRINCETON had an electrical fire in engine room number one (1) and lost steering control temporarily, resulting in a minor collision with the CACAPON.

1-2 May

Conducted air operations off northeastern Korea. Day and night attacks were made from Hamhung to Songjin. 185 sorties were conducted during the period.

3-4 May

Air operations were restricted due to replenishment on the Third, and due to adverse weather on the Fourth. A limited number of attacks were made between Wonsan and Songjin. 90 sorties were conducted during the period.

5-6 May

Conducted air operations off northeastern Korea. Both day and night attacks were made from Wonsan to Chongjin. 181 sorties were conducted during the period.

One F4U-4 was lost due to mechanical malfunctioning. The pilot was recovered unharmed.

7 May Replenished at sea.

8-10 May

Conducted air operations off northeastern Korea. Day and night attacks were made from Wonsan to Chongjin. 289 sorties were conducted during the period.

11 May Replenished at sea.

12-13 May

Conducted air operations off northeastern Korea. Day and night attacks were made from Wonsan to Chongjin. 207 sorties were conducted during the period.

One F4U-4 was lost due to enemy action. The pilot was recovered unharmed.

14-15 May

Departed TASK FORCE 77 and proceeded to Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan.

16 May

Arrived Yokosuka, Honshu, Japan for a period of rest and recreation.

PART III Ordnance.

A. Performance

1. Ship:

There were no casualties to ordnance equipment during this period. The following casualties occurred to fire-control equipment:

(a) After MK 37 director - This vessel experienced a casualty which caused the MK 25 Mod 2 radar on the after MK 37 director to be inoperative for approximately 1½ days. The solenoid control switch C-02653, which shifts the antenna from spiral to conical scan, was defective, and the automatic radar tracking feature would not track in automatic because the antenna would not remain in conical scan. Repair consisted of cleaning and adjusting contacts in the solenoid control switch. The excessive time required to effect repair was due to high winds and darken ship. Details will be covered in the Radar Monthly Performance and Operational Report.

(b) Forward MK 56 director Radar MK 35 Mod 2 - This casualty occurred in the automatic frequency control circuits of the MK 35 radar in the forward MK 56 director. Approximately 10 hours of working time were required to restore the casualty, which was due to change of value of several resistors in the discriminator.

(c) After GFCS MK 56 - This vessel formerly experienced severe casualties due to vibration in radar room 54, compartment C-0204-C. In some instances, welded mountings were shaken off bulkheads. Shock mountings (ShipAlt CV 185) were installed during yard overhaul. There have been no major casualties traceable to vibration since that time.

(d) Casualty to 40MM Director MK 51 Mod 6, GFCS MK 63, Ship's No. 41 - As a result of ship collision, the director foundation and surrounding structure were damaged. The director system and MK 34 radar suffered no casualties and remained operable. Structural damage to the director foundation caused the roller path to be positioned out of alinement with the horizontal reference plane. New roller path data is required to determine the amount of shimming necessary to reorient the director in the horizontal reference plane.

40MM director MK 51 Mod 6 GFCS MK 63, Ship's No. 419 - During a yard period the foundation and pedestal of this director were strengthened and reinforced in an effort to eliminate excessive vibrations experienced at operating speeds. This modification caused the vibrations to be transmitted to the director tracking head, rendering the MK 15 sight 100 percent inoperative. During the latest yard period the director with modified pedestal was removed and a new director was installed on the strengthened foundation. A complete evaluation report was made to the Bureau of Ordnance and activities concerned by means of CO ltr CV37/X10 Serial 776 dtd 21 April 1952. Since the

vibration still exists and to a degree that is detrimental to the fire control system, the MK 15 gunsight has been removed to prevent its destruction. A director MK 51 open ring sight has been installed as a substitute. A pair of MK 37 binoculars were mounted for use with the ring sight to facilitate acquisition of visual targets beyond 6000 yards range. Two firing runs (Uncle Type) were made with satisfactory results using the director as modified to control the mounts.

2. Aviation:

(a) More than 50 percent of the aircraft parachute flares (ANM26) used during this period failed to operate satisfactorily. The flares are of an old lot, manufactured in 1943. However, one was broken down to see if the cause of the failures could be determined. It was noted that the copper tear-wire connecting the hang-wire and tear-wire cord was bent and kinked, and the knot in the cord tying into the tear-wire was loosely connected. Also, in some flares the indentations in the flare case, which prevent the stabilizer chute cover from coming out until the flare is released, were slightly dented. This slight indentation could allow the stabilizing chute to fall out on a hard catapult shot. An experiment was conducted on a daylight flight, using three flares as received and three in which the cord had been securely retied, the tear-wire had been replaced with new wire of the same diameter without kinks and the indentations had been corrected. On the experimental flight all three of the modified flares functioned perfectly. Two of the three dropped as received failed. Close observations made as the flares were released on this flight indicate that the wire and knot are the principle causes of the failures of this type flare. However, cancelled operations did not permit additional use of the flares for thorough evaluation of the modifications. This modification can be accomplished locally. An RUDAOE is being submitted.

(b) Bomb Racks and Launchers:

(1) The Aero 14A racks have proved to be very satisfactory as to loading and operation, however, the following parts are critical items and in short supply:

a. Arming solenoid-Aero 14A bomb rack R94MGX14D65

b. Release solenoid-Aero 14A bomb rack R94S-50A70B68

(c) The following 20MM gun parts are considered critical supply items and have hampered operations involving the guns in many instances:

(1) Link chutes, 20 MM outboard

R.H. R94C-291200
L.H. R94C-291205

(2) Chargers, Aero 13A, 20MM - R94-C-78550

(3) Gun circuit relay delay, R17R-5852-150

(4) Four-way valve, R94-V-10000

(5) Pressure switch, Aero 2 A R94-8-800505

(d) Out of 4732 bombs carried, 47, or 1.01% were not dropped due to malfunctioning of release units. Of this total, three (3) malfunctions occurred on Mark 8 Mod 2 shackles with AN-A2A release units; twenty-seven (27) on Aero 14A launchers; twelve (12) on Mark 51 racks, and the remaining five (5) on Mark 55 racks.

3. Recommendations:

It is recommended that 1½ ordnancemen per plane be established as the minimum allowance for squadrons deployed to WesPac.

B. Expenditure:

| QUANTITY | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| 8 | 2000# GP |
| 315 | 1000# GP |
| 510 | 500# GP |
| 1463 | 250# GP |
| 2244 | 100# GP |
| 12 | 220/260# FRAG |
| 54 | AN-M103A1 |
| 2629 | AN-M139A1 |
| 18 | AN-M146 |
| 63 | AN-M166(T51/E1) |
| 64 | AN-M168(T91/E1) |
| 706 | AN-Mk 219 |
| 3724 | AN-M100A2 (ND) |
| 510 | AN-M101A2 (.025) |
| 321 | AN-M102A2 (.025) |

| QUANTITY | DESCRIPTION |
|---|---|
| 25467 | 20MM HEI, M97 |
| 25331 | 20MM INC, M96 |
| 23343 | 20MM APT, M95 |
| 74974 | Link, 20MM M8 or M8E1 |
| 92115 | Cal. .50 API M8 |
| 92115 | Cal. .50 INC. M1 |
| 46060 | Cal. .50 API-T. M20 |
| 209390 | Link. Cal. .50 M2 |
| 1320 | lbs., Napalm Type 1 or M3 |
| 29 | Igniter M15 |
| 29 | Igniter, M16 |
| 32 | Gas Tank |
| 18 | A/C Parachute Flare AN-M26 |
| 151 | Bomb Ejtr. Ctf. Mk1 |

PART IV Battle Damage

A. Own

The ship sustained no battle damage. See reference (b), Air Attack Reports 1-52 through 66-52, for the battle damage sustained by PRINCETON aircraft.

B. Enemy

See reference (b), Air Attack Reports 1-52 through 66-52, for damage inflicted upon the enemy.

PART V Personnel Performance and Casualties.

A. Performance

Personnel performance has been very satisfactory and morale has been high. The general mess feeds well and constant efforts are made for improvement. A liberal liberty policy is maintained in port. Ship's disciplinary infractions are much less numerous than when in CONUS. Incoming first class mail was received every three (3) or four (4) days on the line.

Due to the implementation of the Japanese peace treaty, rest camp facilities are being sharply curtailed. When indicated, three day general leave privileges are being granted in lieu of the rest camps. While more expensive, this is considered satisfactory.

Since leaving the Navy Yard on 1 February, the ship has practiced a voluntarily controlled fresh water program with no assigned water hours. Water rationing has not been necessary for nearly four months of operating. The gallon per man per day consumption of fresh water is widely publicized throughout the ship and can be quite closely controlled by regularly informing the crew of the per man consumption necessary to avoid controlled water hours. If the ship can continue this practice during the forthcoming hot summer weather, . this program will have proved completely successful.

The "Princeton Varieties", initiated during the ship's previous Far Eastern cruise, has been continued at sea. This program, broadcast by MC to all ship's spaces at 1800, is generally listened to by all hands. It sets forth the days news, the latest reports on the days operations over Korea, matters of an administrative or informative nature desired for statement or discussion, and finally a question and answer period. The latter has proved of great interest to all hands and tends to circulate ship's news, to correct the circulation of misinformation and to air the minor items of gripes and discontent which can be corrected by general knowledge of their existence. The "Varieties" program is an established institution of the ship and her crew.

A troupe of four VALLEY FORGE officers, transported by helicopter, contributed an excellent show to all hands in Hangar Bay One (1) while on the line.

Inter-division softball competition is in progress while in port. The ship's baseball team is receiving solid support. It is hoped that the above mentioned plus a program promoting civilian show troupes on board and daily bus tours to surrounding points of interest in Japan will generate a corresponding decrease in VD casualties.

b. Casualties

There were no battle casualties suffered by either ship or air group personnel.

During the replenishment of 7 May 1952, EARLY, Kenneth P., 735 34 50, SA, USN, suffered a traumatic amputation of the right foot when he became entangled in a rapidly running line and was carried against a fair-lead block on deck with sufficient violence to sever his right foot.

PART VI Special Comments

A. Aerology

1. Weather Conditions

During this operating period the summer monsoon season began. Flying conditions were average to good, except for one instance when fog persisted throughout most of the day. Haze was prevalent during the period although on only three days did it restrict visibility to less than seven (7) miles.

2. Communications

Facsimile reception in general was satisfactory although considerable interference from CW transmission occurred.

Radio-teletype reception was poor due to atmospheric interference.

B. AIR GROUP NINETEEN

1. Personnel

During this first period of combat operations, Air Group personnel performance was excellent and morale outstanding. Pilots exhibited a high degree of flight proficiency as evidenced by the absence of any prop barrier crashes and only two minor barrier engagements; one due to a parted wire, the other the result of a no-flap landing.

No personnel casualties occurred and only two (2) aircraft were lost at sea; one a ditching, the other a bailout. Both pilots were recovered uninjured.

A summary of pilots and pilot time lost to the Air Group from 1-14 May 1952 is as follows:

| | |
|---|---|
| Death | 0 |
| Psychological | 0 |
| Injury | 1 |
| Illness | 2* |
| Disposition Board | 1 |
| Total | 4 |

*Pilots grounded for colds for a period of two (2) days each.

2. Operations.

From 1 May through 14 May 1952, Carrier Air Group NINETEEN flew 951 sorties for a total of 2325.5 hours during ten (10) operating days. All regularly scheduled missions, plus two (2) additional night heckler missions, were flown.

Operations during the period were primarily of an interdiction nature, with railroad bridges, fills, track, and rolling stock as the main targets.

In low density flak areas bombing was done by divisions in rotation, with the division leader notifying the strike leader as he commenced his attack. Each plane in the division then made an individual glide bombing run from 6,000' - 8,000', released at 2,500' - 3000', and recovered above 1,500'. One division always stayed on top to spot possible flak opposition and the drops of the division bombing. Directions of dive and recovery were varied. For missions in high density flak areas, coordinated attacks were made, using the VF aircraft for flak suppression. Flights were always briefed as to the direction of run, retirement, and rendezvous, and all were varied. Out-of-the-sun runs were favored. Standard releasing altitudes of 2,500 - 3,000 feet and pull outs by 1,500 feet were followed.

Damage assessment was made after all runs had been completed by both visual inspection and the use of the K-25 camera.

One week prior to joining TF-77, six pilots were sent to the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) to fly indoctrination flights with ATG-1 squadrons. This method of indoctrination of selected pilots proved to be most beneficial and a great deal was learned about tactics, task force operating procedures, and the everyday mechanics of conducting routine missions.

Four pilots of CVG 19, one each from VF-192 and VA-195 and two from VF-193, were loaned to ATG-1 for the operating period to help alleviate a critical personnel shortage created by heavy losses suffered.

Air Group NINETEEN adopted the method of a master flight schedule previously used by Carrier Air Group FIFTEEN. This system combines the full day's flight operations for all squadrons on one schedule and contains the following information:

(1) Event Number
(2) Type Mission
(3) Launch and Land Time
(4) Pilots
(5) Squadron
(6) Voice Call
(7) Plane Assignment
(8) Briefing Ready Rooms and Times
(9) Strike Leaders

Largely as a result of this centralization, no scheduling problems were encountered and the Air Group was able to meet all assigned missions with ease.

Additional planes from VF-192 were scheduled with the VC-3 night hecklers, as approved by CTF 77, and their success indicates that an increase in night missions will result in added locomotive, rolling stock, and vehicular kills.

It was found during night heckler missions that motor convoys and trains could be detected at a considerable distance at altitudes of 1000 - 3000 feet above the terrain, depending on the visibility. Initial night attacks on targets known to be defended by AA batteries often meet with little or no AA fire, but subsequent attacks resulted in a rapid build up of AA as batteries were manned and put into action.

On the night of 12-13 May, CTF 77 executed Operation Insomnia, a series of highly successful night attacks. The success of Operation Insomnia was due in some measure to a departure from a scheduled routine in operations and the element of surprise thus gained. It is recommended that more effort be made to avoid a set pattern in TASK FORCE Operations. With four (4) large carriers now available in the area this could easily be accomplished. Variations in schedule could well include periodic operation of the four carriers in the

TASK FORCE at one time. Heavy strikes might be scheduled on profitable targets, particularly those protected by heavy flak concentrations.

3. Maintenance.

Squadron aircraft availability was high. No unusual maintenance problems were encountered.

4. Electronics.

It is believed that the effectiveness of ASP flights would be greatly increased by consistent use of the AN/APR 9 ECM receiver in conjunction with the AN/APS 20 radar. Because only about 10 percent of the ASP flights are flown in company with an aircraft carrying the AN/APR 9, a large number of contacts have disappeared upon investigation with no positive evaluation possible. Since the AN/APR 9 provides a good means of positive evaluation on submarine contacts and is equipped with multiple tuning units which cover the existing radar frequency bands, it is recommended that the AN/APR 9 be incorporated in the AD4W aircraft if at all possible.

Many of the APX-6 IFF sets have been found to contain faulty holding clamps for the high voltage rectifier and modulator tubes. Replacements of these tubes, which may be necessary after only a few carrier landings, have required approximately two (2) man-hours per plane.

The nose sections of two APS-31B radomes were lost in flight causing damage to the antenna. Flight limitations were not being exceeded at the time the accidents occurred. RUDEE's have been submitted. These accidents revealed a critical shortage of APS-31B spares and the fact that a parts catalog or allowance list is not available has made requisitioning and replacement of spare parts almost impossible.

VC-3 detachment EASY has had several APX-6 impact destructor switches actuated on carrier landings. It is believed that the swing or whipping motion that may result from a rough carrier landing is responsible for the unintentional destruction of the equipment. At the present time, an investigation is being made to determine more conclusively the cause and the possibility of correcting this situation.

5. Survival

MK III exposure suits were issued to approximately 95 percent of the pilots prior to deployment. Ninety percent were fitted at that time and the remainder while enroute to

Pearl Harbor. All remaining pilots were issued suits and fitted prior to departing Yokosuka for the combat area.

The following recommendations and comments are submitted regarding the MK III exposure suits:

a. The inside liner should be manufactured in short, medium, and long sizes to fit pilots satisfactorily. Due to variations in physiques, the single size presently issued is not comfortable for all pilots. Primarily the discomfort results from the short length between shoulder and crotch, especially when sitting.

b. Wrist and neck seals are easily torn.

c. G-suit hose-fitting is not available.

d. Gloves are not satisfactory. They cause excessive perspiration of the hands in flight, and afford very little protection in the water.

e. About 25 percent of the suits had to be repaired prior to use due to manufacturer's leaks which were discovered when the suits were water tested.

f. Boots included with the MK III suit are unsatisfactory for travel on foot. It is suggested that the M1 insulated rubber boot be substituted.

g. Legs of the outside suit should be made longer. It is impossible to fit long-legged men in the prescribed manner with the present leg-length of the suit.

The ADSK-1 droppable survival kit is designed for cold weather conditions and must be modified for summer conditions. Also, all equipment in the kit should be packed in a knapsack to facilitate removal from the kit and to enable the pilot to travel with his survival gear.

Rations should be replaced in the PK-2 raft.

C. CIC

1. Radars

(a) SX - The SX Radar is the best all-purpose radar except for jets and was in use continuously during operations. Preventive maintenance checks were made during replenishment days.

(b) SPS-6B - The SPS-6B radar is the most reliable radar for long range air search of jets.

(c) SG - The SG radar is very good for medium and short range surface search, and has proved satisfactory for radar navigation. The Fire Control Radar has also been used in navigation and anchoring. It is suggested that when using the Fire Control Radar for this purpose, distinct reference points should be selected. Then the radar should be locked on and the range and bearing used for a fix.

It is advisable, however, to check these fixes at frequent intervals with a surface search radar fix.

2. Communications (CIC)

Communications during this period of operations has been satisfactory. The TDQ transmitters were used as the primary means of communication and the AN/ARC as the secondary.

The URD has been working very well and has as much range as any receiver now being used.

3. Air Control

Each Air Controller has been assigned an Air Control Team consisting of four (4) men, as follows: (1) RHI Operator and Talker; (2) CAP Plotter on Air Status Board; (3) Strike Plotter on Air Status Board; (4) Plotter and Talker on Vertical Air Plot. This system has worked exceptionally well and the air picture has been timely and accurate at all times.

4. Training

Prior to joining TF 77, the CIC Officer, one Air Controller and the Assistant Air Operations Officer were sent to the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) for indoctrination in task force operational procedures and doctrines. The experience gained proved to be a great help toward making a smooth entrance into the task force combat operations. It is recommended that ships joining the task force for the first time make every effort to gain this type of training.

D. Communication

1. Personnel

The problem created by the shortage of qualified personnel is critical and will be intensified by additional losses during the next six months. Unless qualified rated personnel losses are met with replacement, communication functions will be effected adversely. In spite of the satisfactory and constant improvement of strikers as a result of the on-the-job training program, the supply of personnel is exceeded by the loss of those in the higher rates. To meet circuit commitments during this period of operations, it was necessary to utilize maintenance personnel as watchstanders. Further commitments or unreplaced losses would necessitate a watch and watch.

It is felt that the following recommendations would be of wide benefit in this area in that they would fit in with personnel limitations:

a. GUAM 'GEORGE' FOX transmissions should be held to 18 words per minute. At present the speed of transmission runs from 22 to 28 W.P.M. Shipboard personnel could be used to better advantage at this suggested speed because it would provide a standard of ability for strikers to meet before being placed on a circuit and it would negate the necessity of placing a well trained circuit operator on a FOX schedule. Many of the smaller ships have made numerous requests for re-transmission and repetitions from the larger fleet units, imposing an even larger traffic burden on already overcrowded circuits.

b. Since all ships and commands afloat in the Far East area are required to maintain a FOX guard, it is felt that a RATT broadcast from radio GUAM would be of distinct advantage. The establishment of such a circuit probably would eliminate the need of Radio GUAM utilizing an overflow circuit for individual fleet units. Circuit B-32 has been used by Radio GUAM as an overflow circuit for this command. Much difficulty was experienced in copying this broadcast because of weak signal strength during morning broadcasts. When afternoon and evening broadcasts were made, they were generally better, although far below the desirable standard of reception. It has been noted that slack periods exists from time to time on the 'G' FOX broadcasts, some as long as two hours. After one of these slack periods, this command was requested to come up on the overflow circuit to copy with difficulty traffic that could have been sent during the slack period on B5.

2. Equipment

The loss of seven (7) antennas forward, incidental to contact with the CACAPON, resulted in slight curtailment of two-way communications, but all commitments were met. All of the receivers and three transmitters (2 TDQ's and 1 TCZ) in Radio Two were affected. An extension to the AN/ARC-1 in Flag Plot was laid out to Air Operations. This permitted shifting the TCQ (Radio 7) utilized by Air Operations to the control of CIC.

At the time the ESSEX's letter regarding the corrective measures taken for separating burtoning lines and antenna counterbalances was received, this vessel had completed a similar modification of antenna counterbalances for trial purposes. However, instead of placing a bolt directly under the counterbalance extension (where it is right-angled), the lower bolt was replaced in its original position with a locking key, and a chain affixed to the counterbalance itself. This chain is utilized for raising and lowering the counterbalance and also for holding it in

k. Catwalk at Frame 15 demolished.

Damage to the load center panel caused by the short circuit was repaired by ship's force. Bus connections and connection studs were burned off, making it impossible to determine the cause of the short circuit.

It is believed to have been caused by a loose connection. Failure of the circuit breaker (ACB, Type AL-2N, 1600 ampere frame) feeding the panel to open and isolate the short circuit aggravated the casualty and led to the temporary loss of steering control. Later examination of this circuit breaker revealed its contacts were fused together.

2. Personnel

The shortage of experienced petty officers in engineering ratings is becoming progressively more acute. A vigorous training program is being prosecuted in an attempt to alleviate the situation, but lectures, training films, and "on-the-job" training cannot completely substitute for practical experience. The prosecution of an effective routine maintenance and repair program with the few experienced personnel now available poses a very serious problem.

F. Gunnery

1. Replenishment at Sea

During the period covered by this report, no two replenishments have been completely alike in their methods of rigging for fueling or receiving ammunition.

For fueling at sea, the Elokomin method was introduced for trial and comparison with the Elwood method. Rigging arrangements on this ship have been modified until the Elokomin rig compares favorably with the Elwood method both in convenience and time spent in rigging and unrigging. The Elokomin rig requires less effort and personnel than the Elwood rig, and may be cast off much more quickly than the latter. Principal difficulties are the lack of suitable locations for securing the hose inhaul block and the hose riding line, especially at the forward fueling station. The rig for the gasoline hose differs very little from the method used by this ship for the Elwood method, as the inhaul block is hung from the two steam wench whips in the same place normally used to secure the Elwood high wire.

For ammunition replenishment, an attempt was made to increase loading rates by the use of various rigs leading from the hangar deck opening at frame 72 on this ship to the No. 4 hatch of the ammunition ship. The overhead at this station

was locally strengthened and a strong padeye installed to receive a wire-span and trolley rig from the ammunition ship. This rig was tested statically with a 6000 lb weight and was used on replenishments on 3 May and 7 May. Information was obtained from the U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) as to the type of rig they were using at this station, and an arrangement similar to theirs has been made up and put into service at this station, with the modified house-fall method of cargo transfer in mind. A six-inch steel ring is suspended 36" below the overhead from the above mentioned padeye by a 3/4" diameter chain. The ring is restrained from moving outboard by two 3/4" wire straps running to padeyes in the hangar deck overhead at frames 70 and 74. The ring is restrained from moving upward by a 7/8" wire strap shackled to a new padeye on deck. The block sent over by the replenishment vessel for the modified house-fall rig is secured to this suspended ring, and is thereby positioned to permit easy landing of loads without striking the roller curtain at the top of the hangar deck opening, and to allow liberal station keeping. The accommodation ladder stowed outboard at this point is lowered below deck edge level and secured to normal securing brackets, where it is safely out of the way and remains conveniently located for rigging upon entering port. This station has been used successfully with the modified house-fall rig on two occasions, handling approximately 15 tons per hour.

G. Intelligence

1. Photographic Interpretation

A. Working Conditions

At present, all photographic interpretation work is being done in the Air Intelligence Office. This space is unsatisfactory at best due to the large number of ship and air group personnel required to use the office, and the tremendous volume of photography involved in everyday operations in this area.

It is highly recommended that some space be set aside and designated for use by the PI Teams being assigned to carriers operating in WesPac.

B. K-25 Photography

The value of K-25 photography as used during this tour is doubtful. Good quality K-17 photography at a scale of 1/5000 is far superior for damage assessment and for ascertaining rail cuts.

C. Touraids

The concensus of opinion among the pilots on the subject of touraids seems to be that, except for specific targets, they are of little value. The flak indicated on the touraids is subject to change from day to day and better flak briefings are given by AIO's using 1/50,000 maps of the routes with the current flak plotted on them. Most of the pilots have 1/250,000 charts covered with acetate and are using these in preference to touraids. This can be attributed to the fact that most touraids are approaching a scale of 1/50,000 and lose, in copying, considerable detail which appears on maps. In the case of specific targets, i.e., bridges, industrial areas, supply dumps, etc., it is understood that target pictures and/or mosaics are of great value and can be used to good advantage.

2. Briefing and debriefing

Ready room display space for maps and charts and other intelligence briefing materials is wholly inadequate. Squadron air intelligence officers have improvised with temporary displays that are satisfactory. However, it is recommended that a minimum of three (3) permanent map boards be installed in each ready room for briefing.

Due to the schedules that are being flown, it has been necessary to set apart a section of the ready rooms for debriefing. It is felt that prior to deployment each ready room should have rods installed for curtains so that simultaneous briefing and debriefing operations can be conducted in the same ready room.

H, Photo Lab

1. The Photographic Laboratory during the past operation has experienced the most difficulty with the A-10-A Aerial Film Dryer, Stock No. E18-D-791-200. An electrician was needed almost continuously to keep the dryers operating efficiently. It is recommended that heavy duty switches replace those currently in use and that spare parts be made available as soon as possible. No instruction booklets were received with the dryers.

2. The spaces alloted the Photographic Laboratory on the modern type CV carrier are not adequate to accommodate the equipment assigned. Storage of large items such as aerial cameras and camera cases offer a major problem. Without "borrowing" space from other departments, efficient storage is practically impossible.

3. Due to the increase of copy work necessitated by photographic intelligence, it is recommended that some space be assigned to the Photo Lab to be used as a copy room. At present the copying is being done in the office of the Photo Lab, thus hindering the operation of other photographic work.

4. In the forward area the Photographic Laboratory operated on a 24 hour, 3 section basis; a flight deck crew, a day crew and a night crew.

5. The work accomplished during the past operating period is as follows:

| NEGATIVES | PRINTS |
|---|---|
| 4 x 5 - 175 | 8 x 10 - 1750 |
| 8 x 10 - 50 | 9 x 9 - 40,608 |
| 9 x 9 - 6696 | 11 x 14 - 200 |

MOTION PICTURES - 16MM

B & W - 6700'
Color - 5750'

I. Medical

The health of the crew has remained at a high level. There was one major accident: EARLY, K. P., SA, USN, 1st Division received amputation traumatic, right foot, while working on high line at Forward Ammunition Transfer Station on 7 May 1952, (replenishment day). There were 104 Venereal Disease admissions to the sick list during the subject period.

J. Supply

Replenishment of aircraft stores was made for the first time at sea by this ship. The USS JUPITER had the stores ready on deck, and the transfer was made expeditiously. Approximately 6 tons (332 line items) were transferred in a period of 31 minutes using one transfer station.

The allowance of 38 inch catapult sheaves (Section D) appears to be adequate, however, procurement of these items is almost impossible. It is recommended that a definite policy be established whereby these spares may be procured to fill allowance, or that special support procedures be promulgated if it is not intended to procure further spares for the currently installed type pending availability of the later type being installed as part of the 27A conversion.

A request for a shift-over valve to replace an installed component vital to steering control was sent by Priority dispatch 25 April. It was necessary to request special assistance of ComServPac on 10 May when no definite action had been taken 15 days later. The valve was reported available by PSNS Bremerton, on 14 May, and is being traced for delivery in satisfactory manner at present.

PAUL D. STROOP

Copies to:

CNO (2) (Advance)
CinCPacFlt (5) (Advance)
ComAirPac (10)
ComFairAlameda (1)
CinCPacFlt Evaluation Group (5)
ComNavFE (1) (Advance)
Com7thFlt (1) (Advance)
CTF 77 (2)
ComFairJap (1)
ComCarDiv ONE (1)
ComCarDiv THREE (1)
ComCarDiv FIVE (1)
U.S.S. ESSEX (CV-9) (1)
U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) (1)
U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) (1)
U.S.S. KEARSARGE (CV-33) (1)
U.S.S. ORISKANY (CV-34) (1)
U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45) (1)
U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47) (1)
ATG 1 (1)
CVG 2 (1)
CVG 11 (1)
CVG 19 (1)
Naval War College (1)