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2 FEB 1951

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DOD DIR 5200.10

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division ONE
(2) Commander Seventh Fleet
(3) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(4) Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

Subj: Narrative Report of Action for the period 7 January 1951 through 19 January 1951

Ref: (a) CNO ltr OP-345/aa ser 1197P34 of 3 Aug 1950
(b) U.S.S. LEYTE Action Reports "439 through 505 of January 1951"
(c) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 092A of 9 November 1950
(d) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 0121 of 18 December 1950
(e) U.S.S. LEYTE ser 08 of 8 January 1951

1. The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) Narrative Report of Action for January 1951 is forwarded herewith in accordance with reference (a).

PART I

COMPOSITION OF FORCES AND MISSIONS

The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) sortied from Sasebo-Ko, Japan on 7 January in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE classified dispatch 052345Z of January 1951 as a unit of Task Group 77.3 to join Task Force-77 operating in the strike area, Sea of Japan. Task Force-77 was composed of the following: OTC was rear Admiral E.C. EWEN, CTG-77.3 (ComCarDivONE) in the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47). SOPA Vice Admiral STRUBLE, U.S. N. Commander Seventh Fleet in the U.S.S. MISSOURI, ComCarDivFIVE and CTF-77 in the U.S.S. PRINCETON, Comdesronll in the U.S.S. WILTSIE. Ship's included: U.S.S. MISSOURI (BB-63), U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), U.S.S. VALLEY FORGE (CV-45), U.S.S. JUNEAU (CLAA-119), U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), U.S.S. ST PAUL (CA-77), U.S.S. BERRY (DDE-858), U.S.S. KEPLER (DDE-765), U.S.S. NORRIS (DDE-859), U.S.S. MC CAFFERY (DDE-860), U.S.S. GURKE (DD-783), U.S.S. HENDERSON (DD-785), U.S.S. THOMAS (DD-833), U.S.S. OZBOURN (DD-846), U.S.S. SHELTON (DD-790), U.S.S. KYES (DD-787), U.S.S. HIGBEE (DDR-806), U.S.S. ISBELL (DD-869), U.S.S. BRINKLEY BASS (DD-887), U.S.S. STICKWELL (DD-888) and U.S.S. DUNCAN (DD-874).

The U.S.S. LEYTE (CV-32) conducted operations in accordance with ComCarDiv ONE's Op-Order #4-50 and air operations plans Z-1, Z-2, Z-3 and Z-4 as modified by daily dispatch orders. The mission was to support United Nations Forces in Korea and to furnish defensive combat air patrol and anti-submarine patrol for Task Force Seventy Seven.

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PART II

2 FEB 1951

(a) TOTAL SORTIES FOR JANUARY 1951: 508

Sorties over Korea	300
Sorties over TF-77	162
Days in operating area	12
Days on which flight operations were conducted	7
Total hours flown	1,456.9 hrs.

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS

(b) 1/8/51: Conducted weather recco over South Central Korea. Further air strikes cancelled by OTC due to poor visibility over target area.

1/9/51 thru 1/11/51: No flight operations were conducted on these dates due to low ceiling and poor visibility.

1/12/51: In logistics support area. Replenished 44 tons of ammunition, 18,732 gallons aviation gasoline, 8,590 barrels of fuel oil.

1/13/51: Commenced flight operations with TARCAP over South Central Korea. Close Air Support Missions and TARCAP were flown over the Suwon and Wonju areas in support of advance patrols engaging the enemy in those areas. 69 sorties were flown.

1/14/51: Air operations consisted of concentrated close air support missions in the Wonju and Yongwol areas. A photo reconnaissance mission was directed to Seoul for advance planning purposes. AD-3 BUNR 122797 crashed into sea after takeoff as a result of complete engine failure. The pilot, ENS D.A. Jacobs, 470708, U.S. Navy was recovered by LEYTE helicopter within 4 minutes after crashing, and was aboard safely and uninjured within 7 minutes after crash. 109 sorties were flown.

1/15/51: Commenced air operations with strikes against military emplacements and ammunition dumps in the Kangnung, Wonju, Tanyang and Namdae-Ri areas, destroying 38 buildings and one ammunition dump. Six villages housing enemy troops were destroyed by burning with napalm and numerous troops were killed. 68 sorties were flown.

1/16/51: Rendezvoused with logistics support group in logistics area. Replenished 87.5 tons of ammunition, 128,000 gallons aviation fuel, 6,220 barrels of fuel oil. Received 7 Korean refugees from the Wonsan area who were in critical condition from the U.S.S. NORRIS (DDE-859). U.S.S. NORRIS rescued 21 Korean refugees from drifting Sampan upon orders from OTC (Commanding Officer, U.S.S. LEYTE).

2

 2 FEB 1951

DECLASSIFIED

CHRONOLOGICAL ORDER OF EVENTS
(Continued)

1/17/51: Conducted air strikes against Hungnam, Yudong-Ni, Wonju, and Seoul with close support missions in the Wonju, Yongwal, Nokchonni and Hoengsong areas. 96 sorties were flown.

1/18/51: Directed fighter sweeps into the Hungnam area. Close air support missions were conducted in the Machiri, Hoengsong, Oktongui, Kusanni, Hajinburi, Yongju and Murungni areas. 104 sorties were flown.

1/19/51: Concentrated close air support missions were directed to the Yongwal and Machari areas. At 1512 departed strike area enroute to Sasebo, Japan in accordance with CTF-77 classified dispatch 180330Z. 35 sorties were flown.

(c) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR JANUARY 1951:

DATE	CAS MISSION	AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED	LOCATION	TARGETS HIT
1/13	135	2	Suwon	Troops, houses
1/13	136	3	Wonju	Troops, houses
1/13	137	2	Suwon	Troops
1/13	138	5	Yongin	Troops, buildings
1/13	139	4	Wonju	Troops, buildings
1/13	140	4	Wonju	Buildings
1/13	141	4	Suwon	Supply Dump
1/13	142	5	Wonju	Aborted due to weather
1/14	143	6	Wonju	Burned enemy village
1/14	144	2	Yongwol	Troops,tank,truck,bridge
1/14	145	6	Seoul	Tank, truck, troops
1/14	146	2	Yongwol	Troops, houses
1/14	147	6	Wonju	Troops, military supplies
1/14	148	4	Wonju	Troops, houses
1/14	149	13	Yongwol	Buildings.
1/15	150	4	Kangnung	Troops
1/15	151	8	Wonju	Warehouses
1/15	152	6	Tanyang	Troops,enemy village
1/15	153	4	Namdae-Ri	Troops, buildings
1/15	154	4	Wonju	Troops,Dest.Ammo Dump.
1/15	155	6	Tanyang	Troops, buildings

DECLASSIFIED 21 FEB 1951

PART II (Continued)

(c) CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORT MISSIONS FOR JANUARY 1951(Cont'd):

DATE	CAS MISSION	AIRCRAFT EMPLOYED	LOCATION	TARGETS HIT
1/17	156	2	Hungnam	Buildings
1/17	157	2	Hungnam	Warehouses
1/17	158	2	Yudong-Ni	Troops, Pack Animals
1/17	159	2	Wonju	Troops
1/17	160	4	Seoul	Troops, enemy village
1/17	161	4	Pungnim-Ni	Supplies,buildings,troops
1/17	162	3	Hungnam	Troop column
1/17	163	2	Yongwol	Troops, houses
1/17	164	2	Nokchonni	Barracks, troops
1/17	165	4	Hoengsong	Troops (500)
1/17	166	4	Yongwol	Troops, enemy village
1/17	167	4	Yudong-Ni	Enemy village, troops
1/17	168	2	Wonju	Enemy village, troops
1/18	169	2	Machiri	Troops, houses
1/18	170	4	Moengsong	Troops, houses
1/18	171	4	Oktongin	Troops, tank
1/18	172	4	Kusanni	Gun emplaements, troops
1/18	173	4	Hajinburi	buildings
1/18	174	2	Yongju	Troops, buildings
1/18	175	6	Murungni	Troops, buildings
1/18	176	4	Hajinburi	Enemy villages
1/18	177	4	Wonju	Troops
1/18	178	4	Yongin	Troops
1/18	179	2	Kusanni	Enemy village
1/19	180	12	Yongwal	Troops
1/19	181	4	Machari	Troops, buildings

PART III 2 FEB 1951

DECLASSIFIED

PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIAL AND EQUIPMENT

(a) Ordnance expended during the period 1 January to 19 January 1951:

TYPE		QUANTITY
Bombs:	100# FRAG (Daisy Cutters)	256
	220# FRAG	263
	350# ADB	9
	500# GP	6
	TOTAL	534 Bombs
Rockets:	3.5" AR	22
	5" HVAR	831
	TOTAL	853 Rockets
Machine Gun Ammunition:		
	.50 cal.	91,260
	20 MM	23,466
	TOTAL	114,726 Rounds
Napalm:	MK-5 and MK-12 (9% mixture) tanks	341
	TOTAL	22,506 # Napalm

(b) Performance of Aviation Ordnance:

(1) Napalm:

With the advent of cold weather, greater care was taken that napalm was mixed well in advance of take-off, gasoline was heated while mixing and the mixture was agitated to insure a good "gel". Some improper burns and duds were still encountered so a continuing record of location, altitude, angle of drop and results was kept to ascertain the causes of failure. Of 341 MK-12 and Jap F51 tanks dropped, 46 failed to ignite properly. Most of these were dropped in snow and either slid along on top of the snow without the sudden deceleration and bursting of hitting a hard object or they buried themselves in the snow so the results could not be observed. It is recommended that a study of snow drops and fuze action be made to determine and correct the probable causes of failures under these conditions.

(c) 20 MM Guns:

Careful maintenance, routine inspection and cleaning and wiping the guns dry has resulted in excellent 20MM gun performance in spite of the cold weather encountered.

DECLASSIFIED

2 FEB 1951

PART IV

BATTLE DAMAGE

(a) Ship: - None

(b) Aircraft:

	COMBAT				OPERATIONAL			
	F9F	F4U	AD	TOTAL	F9F	F4U	AD	TOTAL
Lost:	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
Damaged:	0	3	4	7	0	0	0	0

(c) Damage Inflicted on Enemy:

TARGET	DAMAGED	DESTROYED
Buildings containing enemy troops	52	227
Villages containing enemy troops (Less than 50%)	6	(Over 50%) 7
Supply Dumps	00	1
Ammunition Dumps	00	1
Tanks	1	2
Trucks	2	1
Gun Positions	2	1 (20MM Quad)

Numerous enemy troops were killed by highly effective close support missions in the Wonju - Suwon area.

PART V

PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE AND CONDITION

1. Medical:

(a) Casualties:

(1) One aviator, ENS William George Wagner, U.S. Navy, reported missing in action in December report officially declared killed in action.

(b) Injuries:

(1) Aircraft - 1
(2) Major - 5
(3) Minor - 21

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(c) Surgery:

(1) Ships Company - 11
(2) From Other ships - 0
(3) Major surgery - 3
(4) Minor surgery - 8

(d) Average number patients treated daily - 125 (out-patients)

Average number of patients on sick list daily - 10

(e) First Aid Lectures to various divisions - 19

(f) General Health of the crew. Training Films and Lectures:

(1) General health of the crew has been good. Incidence of venereal disease has run unusually high as a result of contacts in Sasebo, Japan.

(2) Training Films were shown and 31 lectures were given on the problems of survival to the ships company and air group during the period covered by this report.

(3) During the month 19 venereal disease training films and lectures were given to remainder of ships company and air group personnel who were unable to attend lectures during December as well as all new personnel upon reporting aboard during this month.

(4) Seven (7) Korean refugees suffering from frost bitten feet were received on board for treatment from U.S.S. NORRIS on 1/16/51. They were transferred on 1/17/51 to U.S.S. ISBELL for further transfer to Army authorities at Pusan.

2. Dental:

(a) During the month of January, the Dental Department staffed by two dental officers and four dental technicians completed 460 restorations, surgically extracted 13 teeth, performed 50 uncomplicated extractions with 16 miscellaneous treatments and 170 oral prophylaxis at 479 individual sittings.

7

2 FEB 1951

DECLASSIFIED

PART VI

SPECIAL COMMENTS

1. Night Operations:

(a) Air operations in close support of ground troops continued to emphasize that a continuing umbrella of aircraft is required over the front lines in order to provide the air cover when and where needed. It is relatively simple to provide this in a reasonable amount during daylight hours and to increase the amount of cover as more carriers are made available. But, to provide, in addition, an effective night cover to hold down the enemy's nocturnal movements results in a hardship on the flight deck crews, taxi pilots and ordnance crews of the daytime operating carriers. With three or more carriers however, such cover can be provided. The night or all-weather detachments on carriers should be continued in preference to a night carrier because all CV deck crews should be expert in night operations, and a more complete overall night coverage is available if required.

2. Engineering:

(a) The main engine and boiler installation of the LEYTE has worked without breakdown in over 2½ years and 200,000 miles of steaming. The LEYTE has only lighted off eight boilers for required full power runs and by steaming on four or six boilers has been able to schedule a continuing rotational upkeep and maintenance program on all boilers and auxiliary machinery. Six boilers have always been used when jets were scheduled. In all kinds of air operations from the light winds in the Mediterranean to the variable winds of the Japan Sea, six boiler power for speeds up to 30 knots has proven adequate for even jet operation.

3. Jet Barriers:

(a) Another case of a voluntary no-hook jet landing occurred during this period of operations. The hook of an F9F-2 extended during a catapult shot and the hook shoe was broken off. The plane was brought aboard in a normal approach without hook. Approach speed was 103-104 knots, wind over the deck was 42 knots. Davis Barriers 1, 3, 4 and 5 were rigged. The plane engaged three barriers and was arrested with damage to only the wheel fairings. The plane was ready to be flown 24 hours later. After three such successful no-hook landings in the past six months, it is considered that the Davis Type Barriers is very efficient and causes minimum damage to the aircraft. It is recommended, however, that touch-down speeds be held as low as possible.

DECLASSIFIED

4. MARK-V IFF Doctrine:

(a) It is recommended that the employment of Mode 2 (personal identification and Mode 3 (flight leader identification) of Mark-V IFF be regulated by specific air control orders from fighter air directors when needed for positive identification. The automatic and uncontrolled use of these methods of special electronic identification severely reduces the effectiveness of the designed purpose by saturating the air controllers "PPI" scope with too many similar responses so as to preclude positive individual identification. This is especially the case in the air control umbrella over the Task Force.

(b) It is recommended that during emergency operation, the letter for Mark-V identification usage assigned to a carrier be the letter appearing on the aircraft configuration as prescribed for U.S. Navy and Air Force Aircraft.

(c) It is recommended that a policy be promulgated for the emergency employment of IFF similar to the following:

(1) Aircraft Equipped with Mark V System:

(a) Plane having emergency, go to Mode IV (Emergency) and key morse identification letter prescribed for air group involved in emergency.

(b) If plane goes down, Division Leader or Wingman of aircraft in emergency turn on Mode IV (Emergency) and key morse identification letter.

(c) No two airborne aircraft in same flight should key identification letter.

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5. Air Operations (Total Summary):

(a) Air Operations conducted against North Korean and Chinese Communist Forces 9 October 1950 through 19 January 1951:

Overall total sorties	3,933
Total Offensive and Defensive sorties plus aborts	3,736
Total Offensive sorties plus aborts	2,540
Total defensive sorties plus aborts	1,196
Total overall flight time	10,933.5 hrs.
Total time over target	2,513.36 hrs.
Total offensive sorties less aborts	2,456
Total offensive aborts	84
Total Defensive sorties less aborts	1,183
Total Defensive aborts	13
Total Administration Flights	197
Total Offensive flight time	7,813.5 hrs.
Total defensive flight time	2,718.3 hrs.
Total Administration flight time	401.7 hrs.
Total time over target under support controller	1,225.43 hrs.
Total time over target on strikes	1,287.93 hrs.

6. VHF Radio Installation in Primary Fly:

(a) During this period a more complete evaluation was made of the AN/ARC-1 VHF transmitter/receiver installed in Primary Fly on a trial basis. This installation has resulted in more complete and flexible control of aircraft. It is especially useful while operating with other carriers that utilize individual land/launch frequencies. In one instance the flexibility of control resulted in expediting the recovery of a "sick chick" that had just been launched from another carrier, thereby saving an aircraft and possible a pilot. This installation consists of an AN/ARC-1 unit installed in Primary Fly, with local controls, power supplied from the ships 28 volt system and with an antenna so situated on the mast to give 360° coverage.

7. Intelligence:

(a) General: During this period the Air Intelligence Office continued to operate with four permanently assigned officers. All pilots were briefed and debriefed in the ship's Air Intelligence Office by the ship's intelligence officers. This system was initiated due to the absence of squadron and air group non-flying intelligence officers. It proved a very expeditious means of accomplishing both briefing and debriefing, expedited the submission of strike flash reports and facilitated the maintenance of accurate records.

(b) Air Intelligence Office spaces: The use of the intelligence office for briefing and debriefing presents a problem due to the lack of sufficient space available not only for the accomodation of the pilots of a strike group but also for the display of necessary intelligence. Display boards are lacking in number and generally too short to accomodate charts of the entire operating area. In order to partially alleviate this difficulty a 1/250,000 scale chart (AMS L-552) of Korea was joined and attached to a roller curtain. This unit was secured to the overhead (with temporary attachments) immediately in front of the chart desk. This location of the chart makes the entire length of the office available for the accomodation of large groups and makes the chart easily visible for all. For briefing the chart is rolled down (by means of an attached cord) to the desired area. A sheet of clear plexiglass is suspended before the chart showing all the information required for the particular flight. The chart is especially useful in debriefing airfield sweeps and armed reconnaissance missions which frequently extend beyond the usual operating area.

(c) Maps and Charts: In spite of the difficulty presented in storing and handling the large number of charts used by the air group it is felt that the nature of the operations in the Korean theatre makes it mandatory that a complete set of charts be maintained on board. This ships inventory of charts of the Korean area off-loaded in Sasebo totaled 35,000 sheets. Charts of each individual series should be carried in enough numbers to provide one sheet per pilot with several spares (a total of 140-150 of each chart). The problem of storage was solved by establishing a chart store room in the blower room adjoining the number 2 elevator machinery room. The store room in the Intelligence Office was used to stock approximately ten to fifteen sheets of each series of charts, available for ready issue.

7. **Intelligence: (Continued)**

(d) Intelligence: With a very few exceptions this ship received sufficient material to remain well informed on the overall situation.

(1) One exception to be noted is that current information regarding the activity of ground troops was lacking in the initial phases of the operating period. The importance of having this information for accurate briefing and for maintaining high interest level among pilots during close support operations cannot be overemphasized. The recent initiation by CTF-77 of a program for submitting detailed accounts of recent ground action to carriers and the inclusion in the General Situation Summaries originated by Commander Naval Forces Far East of detailed ground action was of extreme value to the overall operating efficiency of this ships air group.

(e) In several instances during close support work strike groups experienced difficulty in identifying friendly troops. The problem was due primarily to the fact that ground troops were not prompt in displaying recognition signals and in some cases did not show the correct signals for the day.

(f) Recommendations:

(1) That the practice of briefing and debriefing strike groups as a whole rather than by squadron elements separated in ready rooms be considered for adoption as standard practice. The adoption of this practice will also serve to decrease the total number of air intelligence officers required and squadron intelligence officers could be utilized in the main Intelligence Office.

(2) That the Intelligence Office of CV-9 carriers be rearranged and refurnished to better utilize the space now available and to accommodate more and larger display boards.

(3) That in the design of the chart storage space for this class carrier, space be made available for a maximum inventory of 75,000 charts. Further consideration should be given to the stowing of folded (WAC and Pilotage charts) and rolled (AMS and Approach charts) charts.

(4) That intelligence material be more expeditiously disseminated.

(5) That ground forces be advised of the necessity for prompt and correct display of identification signals upon sighting friendly aircraft operating in their area.

T. U. SISSON.

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