4. Aircraft Maintenance (Ship)

a. Engine Changes

(1) All engine changes were performed by the V-4 Division with the assistance of two CAG maintenance men. The number of engine changes, exclusive of swaping engines from dud aircraft, consisted of one jet (J-42) engine, one R-2800-32W; seven R-2800-18W and five R-3350-26WA engines.

(2) Although 21 F9F's were on board, only one jet engine was changed. The ship had been issued five canned jet engines. It is recommended that only three engines of this type be issued as they are available in the area and may be picked up during in-port periods.

(3) The original outfitting also included four jet engine stands of which only two were required. Two special can-puller stands which proved to be unnecessary were off loaded. Seven jet QEC's were received of which only one was used. It is recommended that only three QEC's be provided. Twelve jet hoisting slings were furnished. It appears that three would be adequate. Four F9F tail dollies were furnished and were adequate as to number but had to be modified to fit the aircraft as specified in VF-52 RUDM 27-50. The screw operating mechanism is very weak. It is recommended that a hydraulic mechanism be provided.

(4) The jet engine change was performed by hoisting the engine into place by using a fork lift. This procedure proved satisfactory. The fork lift was used due to lack of space under the only chain fall in Bay #1 of the hangar deck, which space was utilized for jet parking and maintenance. It is recommended that three chain hoists be provided in Bay #1. Two additional chain falls could have been installed by the ship, but the suspension hangers were not obtainable. The hangers provided were completely satisfactory, if obtainable.

b. Propeller Changes

(1) The V-4 Division is charged with the assembly, stowage and installation of all propellers. This was satisfactorily accomplished without undue moving of aircraft by the use of a fork lift and a ship constructed attachment which projects 32 inches forward and 40 inches upward from the fingers of the lift. A total of 15 Aero A-652-G8 and 11 Hamilton 24E-60-45 propellers were changed. It was found advantageous to spot one assembled propeller of each type in the vicinity of Hangar Deck Control to avoid unnecessary shifting of aircraft on the hangar deck.

c. The electric hoist on the monorail in the after end of the hangar deck was satisfactory. However, an additional manually operated chain hoist on the monorail would facilitate the changing of engines in that an engine could be removed from an aircraft, moved away and another moved into place without taking one engine off the hoist to pick up the other. No spare hooks for hoists were available.

d. The engine storage space, C-414A, on this type of CV was designed for the storage of spare engines in boxes and has insufficient clearance for canned engines other than jets. Spare engines had to be stored in the sponson on the starboard side aft and on the hangar deck.

e. Adequate preservation of all off load engines and aircraft was accomplished with difficulty due to the lack of a portable pre-oiler. Furthermore, newly installed engines had to be started without adequate pre-oiling. It is recommended that a portable pre-oiling outfit be provided each ship.

f. Hangar deck lighting for aircraft maintenance was inadequate. It is recommended that portable lighting stands be provided for this purpose.

g. It was found that a spark plug hot locker was mandatory. A satisfactory one was built by the Aviation Metal Shop for this ship. It is recommended that this be made part of each CV's allowance. All plugs used were drawn, checked, tested and placed in the hot locker for issue to the operating squadrons by the V-4 Division.

h. All tires and tubes were drawn and assembled by the V-4 Division's tire detail. This insured a supply of ready issue assembled wheels and assured compliance with all safety orders applicable.

i. It was found necessary to tap in on the catapult system to obtain high pressure air for refilling the air bottles of the F9F aircraft. It is recommended that all CV's be provided with a high pressure air pump.

j. The five bottle type of oxygen cart was found to be too cumbersome to move around closely packed aircraft. Three of this type were provided. One was disassembled and stowed and the other two were spotted on the hangar deck. Aircraft oxygen bottles were removed from the aircraft and refilled at the spotted carts, which saved the trip to the oxygen shop. It is recommended that a two-bottle cart be provided that can be readily maneuvered around the aircraft. 43,983.8 cu. ft. of oxygen were expended during the six months tour.

k. Considerable repair of potential class 265 material was effected; however, repairs were limited by the lack of a small spot welder, a heat oven and a set of sheet metal dimpling tools. It is recommended that the aforementioned equipment be furnished all CV metal shops. The heat treat oven should be of sufficient size to handle items up to 24 inches in length.

l. The ship had inadequate racks for aviation sheet metal. Temporary racks were installed at frames 193-195 outside the aviation metal shop and frames 186-187 inboard, inside the metal shop.

m. All aircraft recovered on board from other carriers and all COD aircraft were serviced and repaired by plane captains and crews of the V-4 Division. It is recommended that a limited number of spare parts such as tires, tubes and control surfaces for TBM type aircraft be carried on board.

n. The parachute loft effected pararaft inflation, inspections and repack on board. 118 parachutes were repacked monthly at Naval Air Facility (Oppama) Yokosuka, Japan. 37 parachutes and 35 rafts were expended.

o. The Ford Ferguson type of plane handling tractors were unsatisfactory until the governors were removed. It required low gear operation to move loaded aircraft and insufficient speed in the low gear required the removal of the governors. Furthermore, the step between the 2nd and 3rd gear ratio is too high, and where one provides power, the speed is inadequate, and visa versa. It is recommended that a tractor be developed with a diesel engine of more power, fluid drive to eliminate the clutch and gear shift and smaller wheels to increase the pulling power.

p. The establishment of a tractor pool at Yokosuka was highly satisfactory. Four tractors were exchanged.

q. Operating and safety instructions for mobile equipment and heavy machinery were promulgated and posted on all equipment.

r. The disposal of waste gasoline has proved a definite fire hazard. It is recommended that a waste gasoline drain line be installed from the flight deck and hangar deck to exhaust below the water line of the ship aft.

s. The system of aircraft maintenance by individual squadrons of the Air Group has been excellent as shown by the availability of aircraft; however, the duplication of effort, storage space and tools seems to offset any esprit de corps that might be gained by this system. At times some squadron personnel were working short handed while those of other squadrons were idle. Each squadron and the CAG office maintained a technical libary while the Air Department also maintained one. The squadron logs and records were kept in the Aircraft Maintenance Office thereby effecting centralization; however, each squadron had its own yeoman to maintain its logs. It is recommended that the CASD system be adopted to eliminate duplication and also establish a system of job control in the various shops, especially in the sheet metal shop where competition at times was objectionable. Consideration should also be given to providing equipment more suitable and useable in various phases of maintenance.

t. Aviation Electrical Shop

(1) During the tour the Aviation Electrical Shop was operated by ship's personnel for use by the Air Group personnel. It was found that the space provided is inadequate for maintaining test equipment and the squadrons' need for space when repairing defective electrical equipment. Although all the necessary test equipment was available, sufficient space was not provided to install all test setups needed with the present type of aircraft in use. It is recommended that consideration be given to utilizing the space normally utilized for stowing diving gear which is located aft of the aviation electrical shop. Rearrangement of the stowage of diving gear would probably permit the use of a portion of this space and enable the performance of a better maintenance job.

u. Battery Shop

(1) Under the present setup the battery shop is operated and maintained by personnel in the Engineering Department of the ship. During operations when an Air Group is embarked the load on this shop is primarily aircraft batteries. Present space is inadequate and it is recommended that consideration be given to rearranging the space, taking into consideration the type of aircraft batteries serviced.

v. Aviation Electronics

(1) Shop Arrangement

(a) Under the present arrangement, the AN/APS-4 and AN/APS-19 test bench setups were installed on the platform, 02 level, between frames 107-111. 28 volt power was utilized from the main shop and an 800 cycle AC Supply from an Onan installation was reworked to provide better voltage regulation. This arrangement eliminated congestion in the main electronics shop and isolated the maintenance of radar equipment from other types of electronic gear. It also provided easy access to the stowage spaces for radar equipment.

(b) In the event additional types of electronic equipment such as AN/APS-31 and AN/APS-30 are to be maintained during the next tour along with the present types now aboard it will be desirable to rearrange some of the test bench setups. In this connection it appears desirable to increase the platform space and it is recommended that a review be made to determine a solution for maintaining additional equipment which could be further developed as maintenance changes occur.

(2) Auxiliary Power Units

(a) During the first five months of operation the use of auxiliary power units was limited primarily to maintenance of electronic equipment, and to operating wings on the AD type aircraft in connection with ordnance loading. The 28 volt Homelite units served these purposes very satisfactorily except for maintenance of electronic equipment in F4U-5NL, AD-4N and AD-4W aircraft where the load was heavier, thereby necessitating the use of the 28 volt Wakesha units. However, with the advent of colder weather which required the starting of engines with auxiliary power, it was necessary to rely solely on the heavier APU's. In this connection suitable space was not provided on the flight deck for stowage of these units when not in use. It is recommended that consideration be given toward providing a satisfactory space for stowage purposes. It appears that suitable space could be provided by the addition of a platform outboard of the flight deck on the starboard side near the after 5 inch gun mount.

(b) During this ship's tour of duty in the forward area the inadequate stowage space for auxiliary power equipment resulted in the damage of several units which could not be repaired or replaced in the area. It is recommended that suitable repair facilities be made available for such repairs during yard availability and that replacements also be on hand when units cannot be repaired.

(3) Material Usage

(a) Except for shortages which constantly occurred due primarily to items not being available in the area, the usage during the six months period did not, in general, exceed that normally provided under the Section R Allowances. However, these shortages existed prior to the ship's departure from the States and such shortages were not filled until the latter part of this tour. There were a few items where the allowance was inadequate, and recommendations have been included in the Air Group's section of this report.

(4) Performance of Test Equipment

(a) The test equipment was adequate and very little trouble was experienced during the period. However, it is recommended that consideration be given toward reviewing the quantities provided to determine if some items could be eliminated or reduced and others increased.

5. Aircraft Servicing

a. Aviation Ordnance

(1) Personnel

(a) The total number of permanently assigned personnel was insufficient to carry out the V-6 Division's task as required by air operations in TF-77. An average of 65 men was permanently assigned during the operating period. Twenty non-rated men were furnished by the Gunnery Department to augment the work load in the division while in the operating area. It is therefore recommended that a minimum of 85 men be provided to efficiently carry out the assigned duties of this division. The assigned duties included mess cooks, compartment cleaners, special weapons personnel, bomb supply crews, 20MM belting crews, bomb elevator operators and napalm mixing crews. The day crew worked from 0730 to 1930 whereas the night crew worked from 1930 to 0730. Other crews worked as required by the air plan.

(b) After an initial breaking in period, the ordnance personnel performed their duties in an excellent manner, meeting all loading requirements in a minimum of time.

(2) Bomb and Rocket Handling

(a) The ship's bomb elevators are small and of 2500 lb. capacity which is far under the capacity needed for modern operations. Vaned 2000# GP bombs and assembled 6.5" ATARS are too long to be safely handled on the elevators and must be vaned or assembled on the flight deck. Additional trips of the elevators were required as the ATAR heads and rocket motors had to be sent up separately. This was not conducive to the rapid handling that is required when only forty-five minutes (sometimes less) is allowed to re-arm 6 AD's, 8 F4U's and 6 F9F's.

(b) Mk. 10 suspension bands were assembled on the 2000# GP on the hangar deck when received on replenishment days. These bombs were then stowed in the magazines. The time required to install the bands was saved when they were required to be loaded for a strike.

(c) The bomb elevators gave satisfactory service from a maintenance viewpoint. No bomb elevator was out of commission due to mechanical failure for any extended period.

(3) Napalm

(a) The napalm mixing procedure used proved satisfatory. During close air support flights approximately 50 tanks per day were filled, without difficulty, using incendiary mixers, Mk 1 Mod 1, modified to add Xylenol. A crew of 10 Air Department men handled all the details such as manning the gasoline stations, keeping an adequate supply of tanks available for the squadron ordnancemen, and filling the tanks when hung.

(b) The Mk 77 fire bomb was evaluated from the ship's standpoint as to assembly and handling. A crew of 3 men could assemble one (1) Mk 77 in approximately 25 minutes. This included uncrating. The hanging, filling and installing of the igniters required 15 minutes per bomb. At a usage rate of 50 per day a crew would be required for full time duty, just for assembling fire bombs. While no extensive experience has been accomplished in moving the filled Mk 77 on deck, it is believed that a hoisting lug on future models would simplify handling.

(c) In warm weather about one-half a gallon of Xylenol per tank was sufficient to give a very satisfactory gel. In cold weather this amount was increased to one gallon to obtain the same result.

(4) Advanced Underseas Weapons and Mines

(a) The torpedo shop is in an overcrowded condition due to this vessel carrying a full allowance of tools and spares for the MK 13 torpedo, Mk 24 and 25 mines. It is recommended that the Mk 13 torpedo equipment be offloaded as the space is required for stowage of Mk 24 and 25 mine equipment.

(b) Four Mk 24-0 aircraft mines were kept in a ready condition and one was used each day for DASP. No difficulty was experienced with maintenance, although servicing facilities were less than adequate. No cold storage space was available for the "B" batteries or M25 mine SD4 sterilizers. A minimum of 8 cu. ft. of refrigeration should be available for this. Battery charging facilities were not adequate nor in a good location near the torpedo shop. Facilities for keeping 12 batteries on charge should be available but under the present arrangement of using the ship's battery shop facilities, this was not possible due to lack of space.

(5) Ordnance Disposal and Safety

(a) The ship had at least one qualified explosive ordnanceman on board during the entire tour. This man and an assistant were stationed on the flight deck at all times during flight operations, and were responsible for the following:

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1. Handling and disposal of all returned explosive ordnance.
2. Assist in inspection of loaded bombs and rockets for proper installations and safe condition.
3. Guarding against all unsafe or dangerous practices which may be detected in the handling and loading of explosives, taking immediate and positive corrective action as necessary.
4. Under the supervision of the Air Ordnance Officer, installation of all long-delay, anti-withdrawal fuzes. This included inspection and assembly of these fuzes and gauging threads in the bomb fuze cavities.

(6) Ammunition Belting

(a) All .50 caliber ammunition received was belted, most of it in 265 round belts. This was highly satisfactory from the ship's viewpoint. With only two squadrons using 20mm aircraft ammunition, a belting crew of eight men was able to keep up with requirements easily. If all aircraft aboard had 20mm guns installed, it would be necessary to have a day and a night crew, as sufficient space is not available for two crews to work at one time.

b. Aviation Fuel

(1) The Gasoline Division (V-7) has a total of 57 men assigned. This number, while not extremely critical, is insufficient for complete coverage of all work to be accomplished. Experience indicates that an increase of personnel to 71 men is needed for the most efficient operations, particularly if two jet squadrons are embarked.

(2) The division is proud of the fact that no flight was delayed for lack of gasoline. The stress laid on safety has paid off in that during this six months of "stepped-up" operations there was no damage to equipment or injuries to personnel.

(3) The operation of receiving gasoline at sea was accomplished by the standard Elwood method of replenishment. Due to the construction of this vessel's gasoline piping system, it was impossible to take advantage of the modified gasoline re-fueling hook-up offered by all the tankers (AO's) that have serviced this ship, except the USS ASHTABULA (AO-51), which utilized the four inch hose and single connections. By installation of a three-way, three-position valve in the refueling line at the fueling connection on the forward port side of the hangar deck, it would be possible for this ship to receive the modified hook-up and increase the receiving rate by about thirty percent. At present, the receiving rate is approximately forty thousand gallons per hour with tank top pressure of 10 psi or less.

(4) During a refueling operation, early in the operating period, a minor casualty was experienced. During this casualty, in order to prevent excessive gasoline spillage, the ship used the eductor for a positive and immediate drain-back. This proved to be so effective that on the next replenishment operation the eductor was used instead of the customary Inert Gas blow-back method for clearing the hose and found to be superior in that a positive drain-back was made and there was, therefore, no raw gasoline exposed to create a serious fire hazard. The eductor method decreased the time involved in unhooking from the tanker from approximately fifteen minutes to something less than five minutes.

(5) On two occasions the gasoline received by this vessel was of doubtful quality. First, on 7 July 1951, gasoline was received from the USS CALIENTE (AO-53), that was suspected of being contaminated. The gasoline was of a dark brown color. An immediate investigation was started to determine the cause and nature of the possible contamination. This gasoline was put into one piston type aircraft and one jet powered aircraft and ground checked. Neither plane engine indicated any trouble, loss of power, failure to take throttle or inclination to cut out. The Maintenance Officer of CAG-102 determined that the gasoline was usable. To support this decision, a sample was sent to the Quartermaster, Petroleum Products Laboratory (Motor and Aircraft) Sasebo, Japan (Yokose Terminal), for analyzing. Their report: "According to the distillation test, the sample is satisfactory for use." The second occasion was on 5 November 1951, when this ship refueled from the USS ASHTABULA (AO-51). During the first hour, about fifteen thousand gallons of water and eleven thousand gallons of gasoline were received. In the water, in suspension, was great deal of foreign matter that looked like rust. After two hours of pumping, the gasoline cleared up. Upon completion of re-fueling a sedimentation test was made on a sample of the fuel. The particles, resembling rust, were found to be too heavy to suspend in gasoline and they rapidly settled out of the water that carried it. Extensive checks were made at all filtering points of the system with negative results. It was decided that the fuel was fit to use. It proved to be satisfactory.

(6) Aviation lubrication oil, received on board in drums was struck down by use of a finger lift which supported the drums above the funnel at the hangar deck oil inlet ports. It took approximately three (3) minutes to drain each drum.

(7) Gasoline is issued from the flight and hangar deck fueling stations by teams made up from the V-6 division. These teams consist of a hose man and one man with a CO2 bottle and a swab. The plane captain assists and is responsible for the fueling of his plane.

(8) For normal operations, the fueling of jets is accomplished by the use of the gasoline-lube oil fuel proportioner (3% by volume). It was found that the use of this proportioner cut down the discharge rate of the station as the output of proportioned fuel was dependent on the oil inlet pressure to the proportioner. Since the maximum pressure drop in pumping station is fifty psi and with the resultant pressure drop in the pumping up to the discharge points, the pressure at the proportioner inlet was usually about twenty-five psi. This deficiency was overcome by installing a de-fueling pump in the oil line immediately ahead of the proportioner. This acted as an oil pressure booster. The oil pressure thus attained was set at approximately sixty psi at the proportioner inlet and resulted in nearly one hundred percent increase in proportioned fuel output. The pump employed was the Navy standard de-fueling pump.

(9) In the event that time for re-fueling aircraft is limited, the proportioner outlets are augmented by the plane captains carrying the necessary oil in a metal dispenser and the gasoline crews useing a straight gasoline outlet. The quantity of oil was predetermined by the amount of gasoline required to fill the plane being serviced.

(10) To insure against the possibility of a plane leaving the ship short of fuel, personnel are employed to check with the plane captain of each plane scheduled for a flight thirty minutes prior to launching time.

(11) To prevent possible contamination of gasoline on board, the hose nozzles, when not in use, were covered with canvas boots.

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(12) Daily, prior to any fueling, the ship's filtering devices were all checked and drained and the system inspected for leaks.

(13) The lube oil is issued from one lube oil outlet on the hangar deck and from three outlets on the flight deck (at present only one flight deck outlet is used for bulk issue). The oil for these outlets is supplied from a gravity tank on the 05 level. This tank is maintained and kept full by the two men assigned to the lube oil pump room.

(14) No alcohol was received on board during the six months tour. When issued, it was done so under the strictest supervision and then only on request of the Maintenance Officer or CPO of the activity requiring it. Alcohol was issued only in safety cans.

(15) De-fueling of aircraft was accomplished by means of the standard Navy de-fueling pump. Whenever possible, de-fueling was accomplished back into the main system to avoid unnecessary waste of fuel. Jets, due to the oil mixture used, were degassed over the side.

(16) When night landings were to be made, the last two rows of aircraft on the flight deck were completely de-fueled to reduce the fire hazard in the event of a barrier failure. (Ref: Com CarDiv One-Three-Five Standard Operating Instructions, para. 204). To assist in handling the de-fueling pump, the pump was mounted on a Mk 1 Bomb skid. The pump was set on the skid and secured with the straps attached. By using a "C" clamp on either side, additional security was gained. No modification of the skid was necessary.

(17) The major part of the training program was under the cognizance of the Air Department Training Officer. The part the division played was for the most part, an "on the job" version. This was done by a periodic rotation of non-rated men from one job to another. For the rated men the same applies but the rotation was made at greater intervals and when possible, to a job with a higher degree of responsibility.

(18) There were two incidents during the six months tour in which aviation gasoline was spilled from wing tip tanks on the F9F. Both occurred on the hangar deck and therefore, created a serious fire hazard. In one, the tip tank dump switch was inadvertently pulled in the cockpit, thereby partially jettisoning the fuel in that tip tank. In the other case, the tip tank was punctured by a projection from the hangar deck bulkhead when one oleo of an F9F dropped. In each occurrance, the casualty was immediately detected, and the proper safety precautions were instituted to prevent a serious fire. It was and still is the policy to fuel all the tip tanks of jets as soon after landing as operations permit in order to be prepared for any emergency launch.

6. Safety

a. This ship has made an effort during this past tour to stress safety as much as possible consistant with the demand for fast, efficient flight operations. The keynote of the safety effort was to convince each man that he was responsible for his own safety. As time progressed and each individual became more familiar with his job and more used to working in the vicinity of danger he tended to become less safety conscious. To offset this dangerous trend each division officer was required to personally ascertain that all existing safety orders were reviewed to each man in his division at least once per month. Flagrant violations of safety were immediately brought to the attention of all hands and corrective measures were taken. As the need for it became apparent a pamphlet concerning safety was published and distributed to Air Department and Air Group personnel. In this pamphlet an effort was made to highlight dangerous practices with an interjection of a bit of humor for readability. Despite all efforts to make each man aware of his own safety, certain practices creeped into operations from time to time. Some of these for which definite corrective measures were instituted are commented on here:

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(1) It was discovered that during cold rainy weather, plane captains while manning their aircraft, tended to close the canopies of the cockpits when the planes were being moved from hangar to flight deck or visa versa. If a plane went overboard from rough seas and/or high winds, the chances of escaping from the plane would be greatly lessened by a closed cockpit. Cooperation of Squadron Safety Officers and instructions to elevator operators, not to operate elevators while the canopy was closed on a plane solved this problem.

(2) The use of elevators as a means of transportation between the flight and hangar decks endangered those who tried to get on at the last minute, be the first person off, or stand closest to the edge. The safety man on the elevator was held strictly accountable for giving the up and down signal.

(3) On two occasions jets taking late wave offs passed dangerously low over the number two elevator. This necessitated keeping planes and personnel off of number two elevator during jet recoveries.

(4) Because of the inherent danger of a jet jumping or going through the barriers and crashing into the pack, NO personnel were allowed on the forward part of the flight deck during jet landings except the directors. Prior to each jet recovery the Air Officer passed the word for all personnel to get clear of the forward part of the flight deck and unnecessary and unauthorized personnel to get clear of the catwalks. Masters-at-arms stood by to enforce the Air Officer's order.

(5) After a launch when aircraft were being taxied forward, chockmen drifted up the deck and tended to "grab" their planes as they came forward. Chockmen were instructed to keep "hands off" the plane until it was parked by the director.

(6) Filled tip tanks on the folded wings of the F9F created a hazard during high wind conditions and ship maneuvering. Several near upsets occurred. Personnel were continually reminded not to get under the sides of jets opposite the direction of turn during the ship maneuvers.

(7) The urge to get to the other side of the flight deck despite the fact that planes were being taxied up the deck resulted in frequent dashes across to the other side. Close supervision by personnel in primary Flight Control and the supervisory personnel on the flight deck resulted in a lessening, but not cessation, of this dangerous practice.

(8) An unbelievably large amount of small bits of metal (arming wires, clips, bolts, pins, screws, etc.) collected on the flight deck. In propeller or jet blasts each bit of metal became a potential hazard. Prevention at the source was the best method of eliminating this hazard. Instruction of ordnance crews, maintenance crews, and plane captains to pick up all bits of metal for which they were responsible helped, but did not eliminate this practice.

(9) Maintenance personnel often drew a small amount of gasoline from aircraft. It was discovered that in some cases personnel disposed of this gasoline through the deck drains rather than walk aft to the garbage chute on the fantail, (the designated place for gasoline disposal). It would be desirable to have at about four different spots on the hangar deck, a waterline drain for disposing of contaminated gasoline.

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(10) The area just forward of Flight Deck Control tended to collect such items as chocks, bomb carts, tie-downs, reels, etc. Items that drifted too far out into the deck were caught in blasts during jet launches and became dangerous missiles. Closer supervision by flight deck personnel and indoctrination of all concerned lessened this hazard.

(11) The need for safety consciousness on the flight and hangar decks is ever present. Not only must all personnel be made to constantly think safety, but supervision must be constant to eliminate and prevent certain short cut practices that personnel tend to adopt from time to time.

(12) Two accidental firings of 20MM rounds occurred on the flight deck during the six months tour. One was controlled, the possibility of a round firing from a jammed gun was considered and precautions were taken that personnel and objects in the line of fire were clear. The other inadvertent firing occurred after the night landing of an F4U-5NL while the ordnanceman was clearing the guns. One round was fired causing extensive damage to the fuselage of an F4U spotted forward. The policy had been to return the breech back to battery position (forward) after the guns were cleared and prior to the new ammunition being wound back into the feed mechanism. The disadvantage of this system is that of the possibility of carelessly overlooking a remaining round in the gun, particularly at night. The policy was changed so that the breech block is left back (out of battery) after the guns are cleared. Prior to cleaning guns, the line of fire was checked to determine that personnel and obstructions were clear. Furthermore, all guns were cleared prior to the aircraft being moved to the hangar deck.

(13) During this six months tour in the Korean area, the following personnel casualties occurred on board ship during air operations: One man was fatally injured when he walked or fell into a propeller. One man was fatally injured and two were moderately injured during the inadvertent catapulting of a jet.

7. Statistics

a. The following is the expenditure of the indicated items for the six (6) months tour:

(1) Aviation Material Issued

ITEM	F4U	F9F	AD	TOTAL
Wing panels	5L & 10R	1	2	18
Ailerons	11	1	6	18
Flaps	13	27	2	42
Dive brakes	0	0	3	3
Stabilizer (Horiz.)	2	0	4	6
Elevators	10	2	7	19
Rudder	3	3	10	16
LG Main Strut	3	0	2	5
LG Tail/nose strut	7/1 Yoke	3	0	10/1 Yoke
Wheels (main)	8	9	2	19
Wheel brakes	28	4	2	34
Wheels, Tail/nose	43	16	7	66
Tires (main)	28	61	34	123
Tires, nose/tail	0	28	0	28
Tubes (main)	43	62	34	139
Tubes, nose/tail	0	28	0	28
Tail hooks	15	9	7	31
Cowling (Eng.Ring)	1	1	1	3

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(2) Aviation Material Repaired

ITEM	F4U	F9F	AD	TBM	F6F	MATERIAL
Wing panels	1	-	-	-	-	1½ sq.ft. 24ST
Flaps	3	1	1	-	1	10 sq.ft. 24ST
Elevators	2	2	2	1	-	12 sq.ft. 24ST
Rudders	-	-	3	-	-	4 sq.ft. 24ST
Cowling, Speedring	-	-	2	-	-	2 sq.ft. 3 SO

(3) Aviation gasoline - 3,064,000 gallons.

(4) Aviation lube oil - 46,087 gallons.

(5) Alcohol - 300 gallons.

b. The following is the number of catapult shots, deck launches, arrested landings and barrier crashes made during the six months tour:

(1) Catapult shots:

	F9F	F4U	AD	TBM	F6F	Total
Port Catapult	1045	284	225	18	3	1575
Stbd Catapult	1104	243	150	6	4	1507
TOTAL	2149	527	375	24	7	3082

(2) Deck Launches

F4U	AD	TBM	F6F	Total
2207	1673	35	0	3915

(3) Arrested Landings

F9F	F4U	AD	TBM	F6F	Total
2126	2694	2030	59	7	6916

(4) Barrier Crashes and Engagements

Type	Strikes	Major O/H	Repaired On Board	Total
F9F	0	2	4	6
AD	0	1	4	5
F4U	1	3	3	7
TOTAL	1	6	11	18

F. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

1. Personnel

a. During the period covered by this report 54 men have been transferred from the ship, 47 of whom were for separation; 20 men were received on board for duty, making a total loss of thirty-four men. However, the total remaining on board in ship's company is 1,934, which is the approved allowance for this vessel. During the last stay in Yokosuka 246 enlisted, 246 officers were sent on rest leave.

2. Training

a. Training was conducted during each trip to port and whenever operating conditions permitted. 26 USAFI courses were completed, three shipboard classes in Physics, Algebra and Geometry were organized; forty-five (GED) (High School Level) and 15(College Level) test were administered. 726 men have been recommended for advancement and service wide competitive examinations have been requested for the examinations to be conducted in January 1952. 883 men became eligible for advancement to pay grade E-3 and 562 were advanced.

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3. Recreation

a. Recreational facilities in port consisted of service rest hotels, beach facilities and use of athletic and recreational activities at Fleet Activities, Yokosuka, Japan. It is considered that during the limited times the ship is in port a motor vehicle should be made available to the Commanding Officer. This is particularly true at Yokosuka for official visits, transportation to NAS, Atsugi, for administrative flying and for recreational activities. Recreational facilities at sea were limited by the nature of the operations during this period. Motion pictures provided the main form of recreation, being shown nightly in six different places, though it was not always possible to have movies shown on the hangar deck. Football contests in the weekly ship's paper brought an average of 150 entries per week. A chess tournament and a photography contest were brought to a successful conclusion. Band concerts were hel daily, weather permitting, and proved very popular. Plans, preliminary to the return of the ship to the United States, were made for a ship's dance upon arrival on the West Coast.

4. Awards and Discipline

a. During this period corrective discipline remained low. There were 32 men brought before Captain's Mast, seven were tried by Summary Court Martial and three were tried by Special Court Martial. Twenty-four men received Good Conduct Medals and one Legion of Merit, three Bronze Star Medals and fourteen Letters of Commendation with ribbon were awarded.

5. Operations

a. On 29 October, while clearing Yokosuka Harbor enroute to the operating area as a unit of the Task Element under command of Commander, Cruiser Division FIVE in the LOS ANGELES, the Commanding Officer of the BON HOMME RICHARD was directed to assume the duties of OTC of the Task Element, composed of the NEW JERSEY, DESTROYER SQUADRON FIFTEEN and DESTROYER DIVISION ONE SEVEN TWO, totaling fourteen ships, when the LOS ANGELES was delayed in Yokosuka for emergency repairs. The Task Element rejoined Task Force 77 and the replenishment force on the afternoon of 31 October, after conducting training exercises enroute.

CECIL B. GILL

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