U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
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CV31/20:ry
A16-3
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SECURITY INFORMATION

11 December 1951

From: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31)
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander, Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN
(2) Commander, SEVENTH Fleet
(3) Commander, Naval Forces, FAR EAST
(4) Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
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DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 31 October through 30 November 1951

Ref: (a) OPNAV Instructions 3480.4 of 1 July 1951

Encl: (1) Commander, Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED TWO letter of 11 December 1951 p. 39

1. In accordance with reference (a), the Action Report for the period 31 October through 30 November 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I

COMPOSITION OF OWN FORCES AND MISSION

After nine days of repairs and upkeep the USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) departed Yokosuka, Japan, 29 October by order of CTF-77 confidential dispatch 171236Z. The destination was designated "Sugar Area". This area was near the coast of Korea close to the 38th parallel and was reached on 31 October 1951. The Task Force was commanded by RADM J. J. CLARK, whose Flag was carried aboard this ship, and operated under Task Force Operation Plan 22-51, dtd 1 July 1951. It was comprised of the USS ANTIETAM (CV-36), USS ESSEX (CV-9), USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) and other units composing a submarine radar screen. Aboard the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was Carrier Air Group 102. After 31 days of operations the ship departed for Yokosuka, Japan for final preparation and return to San Diego, California leaving the action area on 30 November 1951.

The mission of the Carrier Groups of Task Force 77 was as follows:

(1) Conduct air operations from an operating area off the coast of Korea to provide close air support of friendly troop operations, interdiction of enemy routes of movement and supply and armed reconnaissance of enemy installations and lines of communications.

(2) Provide air cover for replenishment ships and other friendly naval surface forces when necessary.

(3) Protect the force against air, surface and subsurface attacks.

(4) Provide air spot to bombardment forces when directed.

(5) Conduct photo and visual reconnaissance as required.

(6) Coordinate air operations with the Fifth Air Force through JOC Korea.

(7) Exchange intelligence information with friendly naval forces engaged in surface interdiction operations on the east coast of Korea.

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The Commanding Officer of Carrier Air Group 102 is CDR H. N. FUNK, USN, with the following complement of pilots and number of aircraft at the beginning of flight operations on 1 November 1951:

SQUADRON	NO. OF PILOTS	NO. & TYPE OF AIRCRAFT
VF-781	31	18 F9F-2B
VF-782	25	15 F4U-4
VF-874	20	15 F4U-4
VA-923	27	14 AD-3
		1 AD-2
VC-3	6	4 F4U-5NL
VC-11	5	3 AD-4W
VC-35	6	2 AD-4N
VC-61	4	3 F9F-2P
CAG-102	7	2 AD-4Q
HU-1	2(Attached to ship)	1 HO3S-1

PART II

10/31/51: USS BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) arrived at the operating area "Sugar". This day was utilized for replenishment activities and anti-aircraft defense drills.

11/1/51: The weather made flying difficult and obscured target areas. Only 34 sorties were flown, 24 of which were sent on offensive missions, consisting of bridge strikes, rail cuts, armed reconnaissance and weather reconnaissance. Defensive missions were combat air patrol, photographic and anti-sub patrol. The dawn hecklers destroyed 3 vehicles. Bridge strike of 16 planes dumped ordnance on a supply area after destroying one bridge. Weather reconnaissance planes destroyed 2 vehicles and 6 gondolas.

11/2/51: 64 sorties were flown, and only 12 of these were on defensive missions. 1 bypass, 18 oxcarts, 9 buildings, 4 wagons, 6 trucks, 1 transformer and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 15 railroad cars, 1 boat, 2 buildings, 1 locomotive and 1 bridge were damaged. 18 railroad cuts were made and 17 troops were killed.

11/3/51: 74 sorties were flown. 59 of these were offensive and 15 defensive. 30 of the sorties were flown by Jet Squadron 781. 2 piles of supplies and 1 bridge, 13 vehicles, 1 building and 1 truck were destroyed. 4 buildings, 1 locomotive, 1 tank, 1 bridge, 5 boats and 14 railroad cars were damaged. 38 rail cuts were made; 40 troops were killed.

11/4/51: CTF-77 postponed replenishment because of good weather indications. The weather was good and 82 sorties were launched. 19 of these were defensive and 63 offensive missions. 7 railroad cars, 28 trucks, 8 buildings and 4 vehicles were destroyed. 29 railroad cars, 1 factory, 1 bridge, 5 buildings, 1 oil barge and 2 vehicles were damaged. 10 troops were killed. One night heckler plane and pilot were downed late at night.

11/5/51: This day was utilized for replenishment activities while 10 sorties were launched to search for the pilot lost the night before. The results of the search were negative. 2 trucks and 1 AA position were destroyed.

11/6/51: No flights were launched due to bad weather.

11/7/51: No flights were launched due to bad weather.

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11/8/51: The day was clear and 66 sorties were launched. 14 of these flights were sent on defensive missions; the remaining 52 were sent on offensive missions. 5 trucks, 3 buildings, 6 railroad cars, 1 bridge, 1 AA position, 13 vehicles, 1 locomotive and 6 small boats were destroyed. 2 trucks, 6 buildings, 1 bridge and 3 tunnels were damaged. 32 rail cuts were made and 5 to 15 troops were killed.

11/9/51: 72 sorties were launched. 20 of these were sent on defensive missions. Big news of the day was the discovery of four supply trains. The rails were cut before and after these, while events 2,4,6 and 9 were sent to rake them with bombs and cannon fire. 4 locomotives, 18 railroad cars, and 1 roundhouse were destroyed in this action. 8 railroad cars and 3 locomotives were damaged. In other activity 1 boat and 2 railroad cars were destroyed; 3 buildings, 1 locomotive, 3 railroad cars and 7 trucks were damaged. 15 rail cuts were made. At least 75 of an attacked 150 troops were killed. This was sort of a dream day for the Allies and a nightmare for the enemy.

11/10/51: A V.I.P. in the person of General Matthew B. RIDGWAY, Commander-in-Chief, FAR EAST, came aboard this day. In addition to an outstanding demonstration of carrier aircraft operating procedure for which the ship and Air Group were given an emphatic "well done" by Con7thFlt, the results of missions over North Korea were highly satisfactory. Of the 72 sorties flown, 53 were offensive. 12 railroad cars, 10 buildings, 4 gun positions and 1 vehicle were destroyed. 1 truck, 3 locomotives, 1 barge, 2 factories, 31 other buildings, 1 freighter, 36 railroad cars and 3 bypasses were damaged. 23 rail cuts were made.

11/11/51: This day was utilized for replenishment of ammunition, supplies and fuel.

11/12/51: Only anti-submarine patrol, combat air patrol and weather reconnaissance were flown. These totaled 8 missions. No damage was reported. Weather obscured the Korean mainland.

11/13/51: 79 sorties were launched with 15 of these sent on defensive missions. 44 railroad cars, 3 buildings, 1 gun position, 1 boat and 7 vehicles were destroyed. 38 railroad cars, 1 tunnel, 8 buildings, 3 bridges, 3 boats, 10 trucks and 1 locomotive were damaged. 46 railroad cuts were made. 10 enemy troops were killed.

11/14/51: 75 sorties were launched. Only 17 of these were sent on defensive missions. 15 railroad cars, 6 buildings, 1 factory, 51 trucks, 34 vehicles, 12 AA positions and 1 bridge were destroyed. 8 buildings, 14 railroad cars, 2 AA positions, 3 boats, 2 vehicles and 21 trucks were damaged. At least 60 troops were killed as they defended supply convoys attacked. This was another good day.

11/15/51: Bad weather and replenishment kept all planes on the deck.

11/16/51: High seas permitted only afternoon flights. 59 sorties were launched; 19 of those were for defensive missions. 1 railroad car, 10 vehicles 6 boats, 3 warehouses were destroyed. 2 boats, 9 railroad cars, 9 buildings, 2 trucks and 1 bridge were damaged. 23 rail cuts were made.

11/17/51: 67 sorties were launched. 18 of these were sent on defensive missions. 18 vehicles, 4 trucks, 2 bridges, 11 buildings, 1 handcar were destroyed. 1 supply pile, 6 buildings, 1 boat, 2 vehicles, 1 railroad bypass, 2 boxcars, 2 trucks and 2 bridges were damaged. 8 rail cuts were made and 3000 feet of track were destroyed. 25 troops were killed.

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11/18/51: 72 sorties were launched with 22 of these being defensive missions. 6 trucks, 1 jeep, 3 bridges, 10 buildings, 6 vehicles, 8 railroad cars were destroyed. 1 truck, 2 bridges, 9 buildings, 1 factory, 6 boxcars and 16 vehicles were damaged. 20 troops were killed. Panther jets, Corsair fighters and AD bombers combined smoothly and efficiently in a raid on Chungsan-ni. The jet planes leveled about one half of the AA positions; the Corsairs finished the rest and the AD's devastated the bridge. Other strikes were at Uihort and Ilsin-Dong. Naval gunfire spotting was performed for ships at Songjin and Tackon. Recco routes were from Wonsan to Songchon and Kowon to Packsong-ni.

11/19/51: Replenishment was postponed enabling the Task Force to take full advantage of excellent flying weather. 68 sorties were flown, of which 54 were offensive and 14 were defensive. 6 vehicles, 9 railroad cars, 6 bridges, and 9 buildings were destroyed. 1 factory and 1 bridge were damaged. 18 rail cuts were made and 175 troops were killed. Bridges were attacked between Hungnam and Tanchon with high success, as reflected in the above results. Later in the day railroad installations near Songjin were attacked.

11/20/51: No flights were attempted due to replenishment activities.

11/21/51: With a storm moving toward the Sea of Japan, the typhoon, "Wanda" forming, and a cold front gathering over the target areas, the BON HOMME RICHARD managed to fly 66 sorties. Only 14 of these were defensive missions. 7 buildings, 1 crane, 3 railroad cars, 1 locomotive and 10 vehicles were destroyed. 32 railroad cars, 9 buildings, 1 pier, 1 locomotive, 1 bridge, 2 bypasses and 1 gun position were damaged. 8 rail cuts were made. A fatal flight deck accident, loss of one pilot west of Wonsan, and the loss of three planes made this a day in which fortune smiled on the enemy and ignored the BON HOMME RICHARD.

11/22/51: Threatening weather permitted only 3 events of 24 sorties to fly. 8 of these missions were defensive. Armed reconnaissance planes destroyed 7 vehicles, 2 trailers, 20 mounds of supplies and damaged 7 buildings, 1 pier, 11 trucks, 4 bridges and 4 boats. 10 rail cuts were made. Close air support, on the schedule for the first time in many weeks, reported 95% coverage.

11/23/51: No flights were attempted due to replenishment activities and threatening weather.

11/24/51: The weather was clearing but still very ominous. One flight of 16 planes left for missions of anti-sub patrol, strike and naval gunfire spotting. All planes returned to the ship when visibility became dangerously low.

11/25/51: 25 sorties were launched with 6 of those being on defensive missions. 6 buildings and 10 railroad cars were destroyed. 5 railroad cuts were made. The weather remained bad.

11/26/51: No flights were attempted due to high seas and foul weather.

11/27/51: This day is noted for one thing—an attack by 2 MIG-15s upon a flight of five F4Us and 3 ADs northwest of Wonsan. A total of 3 runs were made at the friendly planes, resulting in damage to one AD-3. All planes returned safely to the ship. Although the F4Us fired at the enemy planes, no hits were confirmed. 46 of the 58 missions flown were offensive. 4 buildings, 5 railroad cars and 1 boat were destroyed. 8 buildings, 3 trucks, 1 locomotive, 11 railroad cars, 1 bridge and 1 boat were damaged. 20 railroad cuts were made.

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11/28/51: 63 sorties were flown, 12 of which were on defensive missions. 16 vehicles, 3 bunkers, 1 locomotive and 1 building were destroyed. 1 building, 10 vehicles, 1 locomotive, 5 railroad cars and 2 bridges were damaged. 27 troops were killed.

11/29/51: On this, the last in the operating area, 40 sorties were flown, 30 of which were offensive. 1 warehouse, 9 buildings, 10 vehicles, 1 railroad bridge and 4 railroad cars were destroyed, while 1 factory, 9 buildings, 1 railroad bridge, 1 boat, 1 railroad car and 2 vehicles were damaged. In addition, mainline railroad tracks were cut in 12 places. At 1635 Item the ship left Task Force 77 and headed for Yokosuka, Japan accompanied by the USS LOS ANGELES (CA-135), USS WEDDERBURN (DD-684) and the USS HOPEWELL (DD-631).

11/30/51: The ship was enroute for Yokosuka, Japan for replenishment and minor repairs before leaving the FAR EAST area for the United States.

PART III

BATTLE DAMAGE

A. Damage to Ship

None.

B. Damage to Aircraft

No. of Planes	Types	Cause
22	F4U-4	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
9	AD-3	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
4	F9F-2B	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
3	AD-4N	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
2	AD-4Q	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	F4U-5NL	Enemy anti-aircraft fire.
1	AD-3	Enemy aircraft fire.

C. Loss of Aircraft

Date	Squadron	Type	Bu.No.	Causes
11-4	VA-923	AD-2	122346	Lost over Korea (enemy AA)
11-13	VF-781	F9F-2B	123671	Lost at sea (fuel pump)
11-17	VF-781	F9F-2B	123625	Lost at sea (catapult)
11-18	VF-874	F4U-4	96851	Lost at sea (ditched due to enemy AA)
11-21	VF-781	F9F-2B	123664	Lost at sea (catapult)
11-21	VA-923	AD-3	122767	Lost over Korea (enemy AA)
11-21	VF-874	F4U-4	97295	Lost at sea (engine failure after takeoff)

D. Damage Inflicted on the Enemy

Target	Destroyed	Damaged
Buildings	88	101
Factories	3	13
Warehouses	12	15
Locomotives	8	14
Railroad cars	182	231
Vehicles	282	111
Tanks	0	2
Frigate type vessel	0	1
Freighter (300 ft.)	0	1
Boats	14	28
Bridges	11	27
Tunnels	0	10
Gun emplacements	23	7
Supply dumps	22	3

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Damage Inflicted on the Enemy (CONT'D)

Target	Destroyed	Damaged
Fuel dumps	3	0
Ammunition dumps	1	0
Roundhouses	1	2
Piers	1	2
Transformer	1	0
Rail cuts 338		
Highway cuts 42		
Troops killed 395 (estimated, 116 (confirmed)		

E. The foregoing represents a conservative estimate of the damage inflicted on the enemy. Only those instances where the pilots could assess the damage to a definite total or felt that damage had been inflicted were used in these tables. Close air support was recorded only by percentage of coverage or in other generalized terms. In other attacks on military targets weather, flak, darkness, or shortage of fuel prevented the pilot's inspecting the damage. Results of numerous strafing, fires, delayed action bombing or seeding obviously may never be known. An estimated 1,140 troops were attacked during this period. Of this number it is conservatively estimated that 395 troops were killed. 116 troops were confirmed killed.

PART IV

PERSONNEL

A. Performance

The overall performance of the crew during this last action period was excellent. Each job on the ship was performed efficiently and expeditiously. All hands were extremely careful in their work and in their conduct in view of an early return to the United States.

The development from a green, inexperienced crew to a well drilled and trained team has been an outstanding one. On November 10 the whole Task Force, and especially the BON HOMME RICHARD, was on parade for General Matthew B. RIDGWAY, Commander of United Nations Forces in the FAR EAST.

After this historic day, the following dispatch was received:

"FOLLOWING RECEIVED FROM COM7THFLT X QUOTE X THE WHOLE TASK FORCE SHOULD BE VERY PROUD OF THE SHOW IT PUT ON FOR GENERAL RIDGWAY X IN PARTICULAR THE BON HOMME RICHARD DESERVES A WELL DONE FOR AS FINE A DEMONSTRATION OF CARRIER OPERATIONS AS I'VE EVER SEEN X MARTIN X UNQUOTE X TO THIS I WISH TO ADD MY SINCERE CONGRATULATIONS TO ALL HANDS AND I AM PROUD OF ALL OF YOU X WELL DONE X CLARK

Upon the departure of the ship from the operating area for the final time, two dispatches, one to the BON HOMME RICHARD and the second to COMCARDIVTHREE, information to the BHR, were received from COM7THFLT and COMNAVFE respectively:

FROM COM7THFLT: COMMANDER 7TH FLEET EXTENDS TO OFFICERS, MEN AND EMBARKED AIR GROUP BON HOMME RICHARD HEARTY WELL DONE FOR OUTSTANDING ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN ALL TYPES WEATHER AND UNDER DIFFICULT CONDITIONS X HAPPY VOYAGE HOME X VICE ADMIRAL HAROLD M MARTIN SENDS

FROM ADMIN COMNAVFE: UPON CONCLUSION OF YOUR TOUR OF DUTY IN THE FAR EAST COMMANDER NAVAL FORCES FAR EAST TAKES GREAT PLEASURE IN EXTENDING HIS CONGRATULATIONS FOR THE MAGNIFICENT PERFORMANCE OF DUTY BY THE AIR GROUP AND SHIPS COMPANY OF THE BON HOMME RICHARD UNDER YOUR DIRECTION WHILE SUPPORTING UNITED NATIONS FORCES IN KOREA X WARMEST REGARDS AND BEST WISHES TO ALL X VADM C T JOY

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B. Casualties (enemy inflicted)

ENSIGN GERALD C. CANAAN, 505807/1310

On 4 November while flying an AD-2 on a night hockler mission, Ensign Canaan's plane was struck by 40mm fire south of Wonsan, forcing him to bail out. His own parachute was observed upon the ground near the crashed plane, but because of darkness, no rescue attempt could be made until the following morning. On November 5 an extensive search of the area was made; the parachute had been removed from the ground; truck marks were seen near the crashed plane, but no sign of the pilot was found. Since he did parachute safely, it is believed that he is a prisoner. Ensign Canaan is listed as missing in action.

LIEUTENANT CHARLES J. BADEWITZ, 250770/1315

On November 9 while on a rail strike over North Korea, Lieutenant Badewitz' plane was hit by small arms fire, and he was wounded in the right arm. Due to the injury and the resulting loss of blood, the pilot was forced to land at an airfield in friendly territory. After medical treatment had been rendered, he was returned to the ship.

LIEUTENANT DALE E. MORITZ, 301509/1315

On November 21 Lieutenant Moritz, flying an AD-3 on a bridge strike, was forced to bail out over North Korea when his plane was hit by enemy anti-aircraft fire. A ResCap was immediately set up and a helicopter dispatched from the USS Los Angeles. The first approach of the helicopter over the pilot was unsuccessful because of severe turbulence. Ground fire became intense during the second attempt at rescue; the crewman was wounded in the leg and the helicopter was seriously damaged. At this time Lieutenant Moritz was observed to run up a hill to facilitate rescue. He was then seen to fall and tumble down the hill, presumably as a result of small arms fire which was observed in the immediate vicinity. Any further rescue attempt appeared futile. Because of the observations of the helicopter crew, Lieutenant Moritz is believed to have been seriously wounded and taken prisoner. He is officially listed as missing in action.

C. Casualties (other)

JAMES EDWIN HODGESON, JR., 225 24 21, AD1, USN

On November 21 at 0645, Hodgeson, while assisting in preparing an F9F for a jet reconnaissance flight, was struck and instantly killed by the plane when it was accidentally catapulted. Four other enlisted men were injured as a result of this accident. All have been returned to duty.

RAYMOND J. BUTIN, FN, 345 34 43, USN

From 0400 on November 22 Buntin has been listed as missing from this ship. He was last seen at approximately 2300 on November 21, and did not report to stand his engineering watch at 0400 on the 22nd of November. A thorough and extensive search of the ship was made immediately after his absence was disclosed, but he has not been found. It is presumed that he was lost over the side between the hours of 2300 on November 21 and 0400 on November 22.

LTJG B.L. IVES, 496290/1315

On November 13, while returning from a jet reconnaissance flight over North Korea, LTJG Ives' F9F exhausted its fuel supply before being taken aboard the carrier and was forced to ditch within the Task Force. The pilot was promptly picked up and returned to the ship.

LTJG R. L. SCULLY, 431853/1315

On November 17 LTJG Scully was catapulted from the ship. His plane engine failed to maintain full power after the launch, and it crashed into the sea ahead of the carrier. The pilot was rescued by the ship's helicopter.

C. Casualties (other) CONT'D

LTJG JOHN KEANE, 522000/1310
On November 18 LTJG Keane's F4U-4 was hit and badly damaged over North Korea by enemy flak. He was forced to bail out south of Wonsan. A helicopter from the USS LOS ANGELES was dispatched to the scene and he was picked up and returned to the cruiser. After being treated for immersion, the pilot was returned to the carrier.

LT R.D. ECCLES, 460359/1315
On November 21 LT Eccles' F9F was accidentally catapulted into the sea. The pilot escaped and was picked up by a helicopter without having suffered any injury.

LT. R. E. BROWN, 499805/1310
On November 21 LT Brown, in an F4U-4, was launched from this ship. Shortly after takeoff the engine of his plane lost power, and he attempted to return, but before he was aboard, the engine cut out and he was forced to ditch. He was picked up by a helicopter and returned to the ship.

PART V

GENERAL COMMENTS

A. GUNNERY DEPARTMENT

1. Material

Since arriving in the operating area there have been a total of 70 casualties to ordnance and fire control equipment which have been serious enough to place the affected installation out of commission temporarily. In most cases it has been possible to effect repairs to the equipment within 24 hours. Nine of these casualties have occurred during the period covered by this report.

The installed bomb elevators of 2500 pound capacity are definitely inadequate to meet the requirements of this type operation. The limitations imposed by these small elevators hamper ordnance loading of planes during normal flight operations and cause a very serious delay in striking ammunition below during replenishment operations.

2. Training

The training program for personnel of the Gunnery Department has been modified to render it more flexible and still provide instruction and training periods as permitted by operating schedule. Gun and mount captains have been utilized as instructors for their respective watches with good effect. It is believed that this procedure promotes interest, utilizes to good advantage the time spent on watch and keeps the crew more alert.

The following AA practices were fired between 30 October and 30 November on orders of CTF-77:

Z-4-G	Z-5-G	Z-6-G	Z-7-G	Z-9-G	Z-10-G	Z-12-G
5	5	1	3	1	1	2

The conduct of these practices between air operations greatly improved the ship's ability to deliver accurate gunfire under conditions of combat operations. It is recommended that the ammunition training allowance be increased to provide for additional anti-aircraft practices for ships operating in the forward areas.

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Ammunition expended on these practices: 570 rounds 5"/38 AAC, 84 rounds 5"/38 VT, 80 rounds 5"/38 VT(NF), 734 charges 5"/38(NF) and 7950 rounds 40MM. Ten gunnery coordination exercises were conducted. Target acquisition was good with the Mark 12/22 radar. Target acquisition with the Mark 63 Gun Fire Control System is difficult and usually required coaching. For this reason it is not considered reliable against jet type aircraft.

3. Deck Evolution

For the cruise in Korean water from 30 May to 30 November, the ship was alongside 128 destroyers, 31 tankers and 43 provisioning ships. The transfer of ammunition, provisions, freight, oil and gasoline was accomplish with the maximum of efficiency allowable with available equipment. During the first three months number one steam winch added to the work load and handicapped operations by frequent breakdowns and dragging action. A change was effected for a newer model steam winch from the USS PRINCETON (CV 37) at the conclusion of her tour. The newer winch facilitated operations but still failed to equal the speed, efficiency or workload of the electric winch which bore the brunt of the work. For maximum effort the receiving winches should be of equal power as those of the replenishing vessel.

On several occasions, severe weather and high seas handicapped exchanges but the training and ability of personnel was sufficient to complete the cruise loadings and off loadings without casualty.

Ammunition loading, because of great weight and bulk, proved most difficult of any transfers. Efficiency and cooperation from the USS LEO (ADA-60) simplified the problem. Handling between the USS LEO and the USS BON HOMME RICHARD was coordinated to insure maximum effort and safety with a minimum amount of handling. Ordnance supplies as a result were put aboard at the maximum rate for available equipment.

Due to limited incinerator capacity it was impossible to burn the wood containers in which rocket heads, rocket motors, fuzes, flares and other types of ordnance, freight and stores were received. Limited stowage facilities and their potential as a fire hazard preclude holding these containers on board until they could be disposed of in port. A study of this problem is recommended since realistic instructions are lacking.

4. Aviation Ordnance Expended

2,000# G.P. Bombs	131	Nose Fuzes AN-M103A1	609
1,000# G.P. Bombs	473	Nose Fuzes AN-M139A1	2,374
500# G.P. Bombs	558	Nose Fuzes AN-M140A1	1,298
250# G.P. Bombs	1,728	Nose Fuzes T-50E4	1,489
100# G.P. Bombs	1,783	Tail Fuzes AN-M100A2	3,868
260# Frag Bombs	426	Tail Fuzes AN-M101A2	665
350# Depth Bombs	6	Tail Fuzes AN-M101A2	559
5" HVAR Rockets	805	Tail Fuzes (hydrostatic) AN-MK230-6	6
6.5" ATAR Rockets	375	Exterior Ignitor	61
3.5" Rocket	30	Internal Ignitor	61
20MM Ammunition	144,399	Fuze Napalm	122
.50 Cal Ammunition	291,930	Drop Tanks	64
Napalm Powder (pounds)	3,780	Parachute Flares	378
100# Incendiary AN-M12	49		

Total tonnage this period: 1,109

Total tonage for the period from 31 May to 29 November: 5,287

B. ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT

1. Operations

Four fireroom operation has been most successfully used. During the earlier part of the ship's employment in the Area two firerooms were secured when speed requirements were 25 knots and below in order to secure additional watches. But due to the unstable wind conditions boilers had to be kept available and the saving in watch standing personnel was nullified. The plant was put in a four fireroom status and completely segregated - one fireroom per engine - which affords maximum security. Standby boilers can be brought in on the line without additional time required to warm up steam lines, and with a minimum of valve operations. Boosting standby boilers is accomplished by personnel already on watch.

Six (6) boiler operation is not recommended when it can be avoided. Eight boilers operate almost as economically as six, but with much greater safety and security because the plant cannot be segregated with a six boiler combination; superheat and smoke control is difficult, and there is danger of overheating the superheaters at low power due to unstable steam flow conditions.

During days when there was no wind the ship made a full power run for flight operations on an average of approximately every one and one half hours. There were no casualties, and all operations were smoothly executed. However, this record could not have been maintained without a great amount of work being done on machinery repair at night, and during periods of low power requirements. Much was accomplished on replenishment days, which, for the Engineer Department was not a day of rest, but a day to get caught up and tuned up for the following days of operations.

2. Maintenance

As time progressed a greater amount of time was required for machinery repair due to wear over longer periods and interminable high power runs requiring all units available. Regulators, traps, valves, governors, and other units with movable parts failed frequently and one to six hours of work was required. Since the department was in a one in three watch status it was impossible to accomplish all repairs during the night, when high speeds would not be made, although the major amount of work done was done at night. Much of the night work was reduced by planning, and by the maximum cooperation between the OOD and the OOW. When the OOD could forsee a slack period of from thirty minutes to several hours, he informed the OOW, personne were alerted, and a leaking gasket could be replaced, a regulator repaired, etc. It is recommended that this policy be initiated at the earlist possible moment on all ships in this area.

3. Communications

In connection with communications between the OOD and the OOW: The 1JV Circuit is the main channel, and every effort should be made to improve the efficiency of this channel by close attention to the performance of talkers while making routine reports, and by requiring the highest standards in all details. In addition, the ship's service telephone on the bridge should not be in such a place that it is relatively inaccessible to the OOD, which is the case, when due to foul weather, the pilot house doors are closed and the OOD is on the open bridge. This condition has been corrected on this vessel by relocating a phone forward in the pilot house where it can be reached by the OOD through a porthole. This was not done as a precaution, but as the result of a misunderstanding between the OOD and the OOW, wherein four standby boilers were secured, instead of being put on the line, and the ship was unable to make the required turns for the first, and only time.

4. Personnel

In conclusion it should be noted that there were no rest periods for Engineering Department personnel. During replenishment days it required the maximum from all personnel in the Department to furnish working parties, stand watches, and complete repairs that were required before the ship could be ready for the following day's operations. When the ship was in port the engineers were required to overhaul all unreliable units in addition to perform all of the BuShips required test and inspections that could not be done underway because of the amount of man hours involved. Shore Patrol, and miscellaneous details reduced manpower availabilities. Boiler cleaning, and cleaning of the bilges was a major item. It is therefore recommended that the personnel complement be maintained at allowance at all times. As it is the allowed complement is considered inadequate, being based on the minimum requirements to fill battle stations, and was established prior to around-the-clock flight operations.

5. Recommendations

Completion of the following outstanding ShipAlts is considered mandatory if the ship is to return as an effective fighting unit.

ShipAlt	Brief
CV-72	Install wartime armament
CV-45	Modify Repair Party Lockers to accommodate 3 dimensional diagrams.
CV-88	Install whip antennas
CV-725	CIC rearrangement
CV-581	Blank off sections of wind tunnels and install berthing.
CV-835	Alts of high military importance.
CV-813	Bomb stowage.
CV-937	Explosion proof lighting in gas trunks.
CV-932	Provide electric winches.
CV-879	Install emergency power for gasoline pump room blowers.
CV-972	Replace underwater log equipment.
CV-963	Install whip antennas.
CV-956	Relocate unit repair lockers.
CV-953	Provide rocket stowage.
CV-993	Install casualty communications circuit X40J.
CV-981	Installation of radar repeater system.

Replanking of certain areas of the flight deck is necessary as well as a number of other urgent repair items.

6. Replenishment

The following is a summary of fueling operations conducted:

3 November - In operating area, steaming at various speeds. Refueled USS WEDDERBURN (DD 684), pumped 15,600 gallons of fuel oil in 25 minutes. Refueled USS UHLMANN (DD 687), pumped 10,400 gallons of fuel oil in 20 min.

4 November - Refueled USS BOYD (DD 544), pumped 33,000 gallons of fuel oil in 34 minutes.

5 November - Received 319,400 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 1 hour 55 minutes.

7 November - Refueled USS ERBEN (DD 631), pumped 32,000 gallons of fuel oil in 53 minutes. Refueled USS UHLMANN (DD 687), pumped 18,900 gallons of fuel oil in 39 minutes. Received 131,640 gallons of fuel oil from the USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 44 minutes.

11 November - Received 229,600 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 1 hour 4 minutes.

14 November - Refueled USS BEATTY (DD 756), pumped 20,400 gallons of fuel oil in 29 minutes.

15 November -Received 239,080 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTABULA (AO-51) in 2 hours 8 minutes.

20 November - Received 322,160 gallons of fuel oil from USS TALOVANA (AO-64) in 3 hours 7 minutes.

21 November - Refueled USS WEDDERBURN (DD 684), pumped 50,000 gallons of fuel oil in 1 hour 20 minutes.

23 November - Received 73,000 gallons of fuel oil from USS ASHTUBULA (AO-51)in 1 hour 4 minutes. (One hose connection)

C. OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

1. Communications

a. General: After approximately two months experience as flagship for CTF-77 the comments in this ship's Action Report dated 20 October 1951 are still appropriate. The volume of communications traffic is still excessive and although improvement has been made, a more forceful program will be required to eliminate and consolidate the numerous routine dispatch reports. The delays on high precedence traffic are intolerable and appear to be the result of over classification of precedence and the volume. Even when in port the volume of traffic continues to such a degree that little rest or recreation can be given to the communications personnel. It is strongly recommended that during these in-port periods facilities be provided by shore personnel to assume communication and crypto guard.

The use of Pac 6 leaves much to be desired in rapid handling of encoded course changes, etc. It would appear desirable to eliminate the phrase "shackle/unshackle" when no ambiguity will occur or possibly a better method would be to assign letters daily to the eight cardinal and intercardinal compass points and use the letter plus or minus so many degrees to define the course and/or bearing. Example: Assume King is the letter for North; then King minus 15 would be course 345 if it were preceded by the appropriate signal. Encoding of speeds would require the dual assignment of letters for the numerals 0 to 7 plus two additional letters for 8 and 9.

b. Communication Procedure: It is considered that ACP 125 (A) Art. 304 could be expanded to indicate the appropriateness of indicating feedback, hum, cutting-out, etc., in making "readability of signal" reports. In spite of ACP 125 (A) suggested that Art. 316 be amplified to indicate "roger" is not an answer to a question, but only a receipt for the transmission and that if an answer can be given immediately a receipting transmission is superfluous. In the same vein ACP 124 (A) Art. 110 should be expanded to show the proper method of handling service messages. Under the present Article numerous varieties are being used with resultant confusion. This is true in both inter and intra-service transmission and is responsible for numerous presently unavoidable delays.

c. Command Task Functions: In July this command received information that the ship would have the Force Flag embarked in the near future. On 28 July the Commanding Officer was ordered to assume command of TE 77.01 and proceed to Yokosuka, Japan. This was considered an excellent opportunity to test available Flagship facilities and provide training of a rare nature by setting up a "mock flag" in Flag Plot. This was kept distinctly separate from the ship's command. Such operation was used four (4) times as the command was designated CTE of TE 77.01, TE 77.02, TE 77.03 and TE 77.06. Size of the element varied from three to fourteen vessels, including underway replenishment operations.

The value of this training is unlimited and proved its worth in the smooth orderly change over to a flagship upon the embarking of the Force Commander.

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It is recommended that all vessels so equipped be given the opportunity for this excellent practical training. It is in this type of training that the Ship's Flag facilities can be tested and modified or corrected as required. In addition, the functions, planning, and problems of a Flag Command are learned and Flag requests and directives are more readily understood; therefore a higher degree of cooperation between ship and Flag personnel will exist.

2. Aerology

The summary presented below includes observations taken while in an area of the Sea of Japan bounded by the 37th and 41st parallels on the south and north and the 131st Meridian and the Korean Coast on the east and west. The period covered is from the 1st up to and including the 28th of November 1951.

a. Winds: The prevailing wind direction was northeasterly 33% of the time with winds from the west-northwest 28% of the time. Six hours of calm were recorded. A total of 76 hours of winds over 24 knots were recorded. The average wind velocity was 14 knots with the strongest wind of 42 knots being recorded on the 25th of the month, at the beginning of our most severe storm in the area.

The average air temperature for the month was 49 degrees, with high and low daily average of 53 and 45 degrees respectively.

maximum . temperature for the month was 62 degrees, with a minimum temperature dropping to 30 degrees.

Sea water temperature average for the month was 60 degrees with an average maximum temperature of 67 degrees and an average minimum temperature of 56 degrees. The highest sea water temperature recorded was 72 degrees, with the minimum being 51 degrees.

b. Ceiling:

Greater than 9,950 feet		56%
Greater than 4,950 feet but less than 10,000		6%
Greater than 2,450 feet but less than 5,000		5%
Greater than 950 feet but less than 2,5000		32%
Less than 1,000 feet	less than	1%

c. Visibility:

Over 6 miles		83%
Between 3 - 6 miles		16%
Less than 3 miles	less than	1%

The first snowfall was recorded on the 24th of the month and lasted about 1 hour. The temperature was 35 degrees and the dew point was 28 degre

3. Photo Interpretation:

There has been little change in the type or scope of work in photo interpretation since the last report. Flak studies of nearly all of the strike targets were prepared for pilots briefing as has been done previously