

ORIGINAL

U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21)
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 065
26 June 1951

ORIGINAL
DECLASSIFIED

From: Commanding Officer
To: Chief of Naval Operations
Via: (1) Commander Carrier Division THREE
(2) Commander Carrier Division FIVE
(3) Commander SEVENTH Fleet
(4) Commander Naval Forces, Far East
(5) Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS:
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

Subj: Action Report for the period 30 April 1951 through
4 June 1951

Ref: (a) CNO restr ltr Op-345 ser 1196P34 dtd 3 Aug 1950

Encl: (1) CVG-101 conf ltr ser 08 dtd 5 June 1951:
Action Report of Carrier Air Group 101 (30 April
1951 to 4 June 1951) *p. 16*

1. In compliance with reference (a), the action report for
the period 30 April through 4 June 1951 is hereby submitted:

PART I Composition of Own Forces and Missions

a. Composition.

(1) In accordance with Commander SEVENTH Fleet confi-
dential dispatch 232332Z of April and Commander Carrier Divi-
sion THREE confidential dispatch 270534Z of April, the U.S.S.
BOXER (CV-21), with Commander Carrier Division THREE and
Carrier Air Group ONE HUNDRED ONE embarked, got underway on the
morning of 30 April 1951 enroute from Yokosuka, Japan, to the
operating area in company with Destroyer Squadron SIXTEEN and
rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan
on the morning of 2 May 1951. Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN was
composed of the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), the U.S.S.
PRINCETON (CV-37), the U.S.S. BOXER (CV-21) and various heavy
support and screening ships.

(2) The OTC was RADM R. A. OFSTIE, USN, Commander
Carrier Division FIVE and CTF-77, embarked in the U.S.S.
PRINCETON (CV-37). RADM W. G. TOMLINSON, USN, Commander
Carrier Division THREE, was second in command.

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b. Missions.

(1) The Task Force was operating in accordance with CTF-77's Operation Order 1-51.

(2) The missions of the Task Force were to provide close and deep air support, reconnaissance, interdiction, and air bombardment in order to destroy enemy forces, communications and installations in support of United Nations Forces, and to protect the force against enemy air, surface and subsurface attacks.

PART II Chronological Order of Events.

30 April 1951 -

At 0530 the BOXER, accompanied by Destroyer Squadron SIXTEEN, departed Yokosuka, Japan, for a rendezvous with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN in the Sea of Japan. Training flights and anti-aircraft firing were conducted during the day. Also, 4 AD-4 and 3 F4U-4 replacement aircraft from the ComFairJap Pool at NAS, Atsugi, were landed aboard.

1 May 1951 -

While proceeding through the East China Sea, training flights were again conducted.

2 May 1951 -

At 0645 the U.S.S. BOXER rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN off the east coast of Korea.

At 0700 the first combat flight was launched. Air operations from the U.S.S. PRINCETON, PHILIPPINE SEA, and the BOXER, continued throughout the morning. Fog over the target area forced cancellation of the afternoon flights.

The Task Force replenished during late afternoon and early evening.

3 May 1951 -

The three carriers resumed operations. The U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA departed from the Task Force upon completion of her scheduled air operations about 1620.

4 May 1951 -

The Task Force replenished at sea.

[REDACTED]

5 May 1951 -

Full scale operations from the PRINCETON and the BOXER were resumed.

6 May 1951 -

Operations continued from the PRINCETON and the BOXER.

RADM G. R. HENDERSON relieved RADM R. A. OFSTIE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN and Commander Carrier Division FIVE aboard the U.S.S. PRINCETON.

The forty-first thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made.

7 May 1951 -

Air operations continued. LTJG F. B. ROBBINS, VA-702, was lost on a Close Air Support Mission when his AD-4 crashed and burned.

8 May 1951 -

Shrouded by a heavy fog which reduced the visibility to less than two hundred yards, the Carrier Task Force rendezvoused with the replenishing group.

9 May 1951 -

No air operations due to heavy fog.

10 May 1951 -

Fogbound most of the day; however, limited air operations were commenced at 1600.

11 May 1951 -

The Task Force maneuvered out of the bad weather of the past few days which had held the force fogbound. During the afternoon air operations were resumed. Of particular significance is the fact that two railroad bridges east and north-east of PYONGYANG, which the USAF had endeavored to destroy on numerous occasions, were severely damaged by BOXER aircraft, one span being dropped on one of the bridges and three spans on the other.

One AD and one F4U were lost this date although the pilots were safely recovered. The F4U settled into the water immediately upon take-off apparently as a result of a partial power plant failure; the AD spun-in in the landing circle.

[REDACTED]

12 May 1951 -

All air operations were conducted as per schedule.

13 May 1951 -

Air operations continued.

14 May 1951 -

Replenished.

15 May 1951 -

No air operations due to unfavorable weather.

16 May 1951 -

Bad weather continued through the better part of the day. At 1600 a JETCAP, a PHOTO flight, and a CAS event were launched.

17 May 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0815 the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA (CV-47), the U.S.S. NEW JERSEY (BB-62), the U.S.S. MANCHESTER (CL-83), and screening destroyers rendezvoused with Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

At 1538 Commander Carrier Division THREE, aboard the U.S.S. BOXER, relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN, and the U.S.S. PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, departed for Yokosuka, Japan.

18 May 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 0700 the U.S.S. PRINCETON, with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, rendezvoused with the Task Force after having been recalled to assist in furnishing Close Air Support for UN troops in their stand against a new Communist offensive.

At 0800 two BOXER F4U's were shot down over the front lines; LTJG Marion Thomas DRAGASTIN, VF-884, going in with his plane which exploded upon impact and LT George (n) GARRISON, VF-884, parachuting clear of his aircraft. Neither pilot was rescued. A SAR helicopter reported later, when an attempted rescue was made, that LT GARRISON had left the scene of his landing.

At 2243 Commander Carrier Division FIVE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

[REDACTED]

19 May 1951 -

Air operations continued as per schedule with excellent results. Several strikes from the U.S.S. BOXER were highly commended by the ground controllers. The Task Force replenished during the night hours in order to render maximum air support to the UN front line troops.

At 2255 Commander Carrier Division THREE relieved Commander Carrier Division FIVE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN. The PRINCETON again departed for Yokosuka.

20 May 1951 -

After having replenished throughout the night, air operations were resumed at 0430. Information gleaned from the strike leaders indicated that this was one of the most successful operating days. A total of 111 sorties were flown.

21 May 1951 -

Air operations continued until 1200 at which time schedules were cancelled due to unfavorable weather conditions; and overnight replenishment was again accomplished.

22 May 1951 -

Morning flights were cancelled due to unfavorable weather.

At 1215 the first strike was launched.

23 May 1951 -

Air operations continued with excellent results. The forty-second thousandth landing aboard the BOXER was made this day.

24 May 1951 -

Scheduled air operations continued. LCDR G. L. CARMICHAEL, Commanding Officer of VF-884, died a few hours after parachuting from his F4U which had been hit by enemy flak over the front lines; diagnosis--a crushed chest.

25 May 1951 -

The Task Force replenished, commencing at 0330. Air operations were resumed at 1500.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

26 May 1951 -

With North Korean forces in full retreat offering lucrative targets, unfavorable weather precluded flight operations.

27 May 1951 -

Continued unfavorable weather precluded flight operations.

28 May 1951 -

Full scale operations were conducted with the return of favorable weather.

30 May 1951 -

Air operations which commenced on schedule were terminated at 1200 due to unfavorable weather.

One F9F was lost when it settled into the water after a catapult launch, apparently from partial power failure. The pilot was recovered and returned aboard uninjured in the record time of less than two minutes.

The U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD (CV-31) rendezvoused with the Task Force to commence her initial operations in the Korean Campaign.

At 1910 the U.S.S. PHILIPPINE SEA, having been relieved by the U.S.S. BON HOMME RICHARD, was detached to proceed to Yokosuka for onward routing to the West Coast. Four F4U and four AD replacement aircraft were received from the PHILIPPINE SEA prior to her departure.

31 May 1951 -

Only Weather Reconnaissance, NGF, and CAP flights were flown until late in the afternoon when the weather over Korea cleared sufficiently to launch Armed Reconnaissance flights against targets north of the thirty-ninth parallel.

1 June 1951 -

Normal air operations resumed.

2 June 1951 -

Air operations continued.

At 1054 the U.S.S. PRINCETON (CV-37), with Commander Carrier Division FIVE embarked, rendezvoused with the Task Force.

At 1125 Commander Carrier Division FIVE relieved Commander Carrier Division THREE as Commander Task Force SEVENTY-SEVEN.

At 1350 completed scheduled air operations.

At 1452 the BOXER, accompanied by Destroyer Division 162, was detached from the Task Force, and proceeded to rendezvous with the replenishment group.

At 2106 upon completion of receiving fuel oil, aviation gasoline, and ammunition, the BOXER and DesDiv-162 took departure for Yokosuka, Japan. A record ammunition loading rate of 185 short tons per hour was established.

3 June 1951 -

Enroute to Yokosuka, Japan.

4 June 1951 -

At 1500 , arrived Yokosuka, Japan for a period of restricted availability, during which catapults, flight deck planking, and jet blast deflectors were overhauled as well as numerous repairs made to the engineering plant.

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SUMMARY OF SORTIES

DATE	REMARKS		OFFENSIVE		DEFENSIVE		MISC		TOTAL	
			Day	Night	Day	Night				
	First Launch	Last Recovery	Prop	Jet	Prop	Jet	Prop	Jet		
30 Apr	1000	- 1820	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1 May	1000	- 1445	-	-	-	-	32	-	32	
2 May	0700	- 1305	28	8	-	-	39	10	49	
3 May	0700	- 1610	48	10	-	4	-	-	40	
4 May	Replenished		-	-	13	6	2	-	79	
5 May	0400	- 1610	60	8	-	-	-	-	0	
6 May	0430	- 1640	54	8	4	6	2	-	86	
7 May	0430	- 1645	64	12	4	6	2	1	83	
8 May	Replenished		-	-	6	6	2	-	94	
9 May	Fogbound		-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
10 May	1600	- 2000	16	-	-	-	-	-	0	
11 May	0820	- 1700	55	14	-	-	-	-	16	
12 May	0900	- 1930	43	10	-	18	2	-	89	
13 May	0900	- 2230	47	10	-	20	8	-	84	
14 May	Replenished		-	-	4	24	10	3	98	
15 May	Unfav. Weather		-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
16 May	1600	- 1900	12	6	-	-	-	-	0	
17 May	0600	- 1630	47	12	-	6	8	-	20	
18 May	0430	- 1630	65	14	-	2	6	2	75	
19 May	0430	- 1630	48	16	4	8	8	-	87	
20 May	0430	- 2230	65	14	16	6	8	2	86	
21 May	0430	- 1500	39	12	7	6	6	2	111	
22 May	1215	- 2230	44	-	-	17	6	2	72	
23 May	0430	- 2230	53	20	12	16	8	2	63	
24 May	0430	- 1630	48	14	4	6	6	-	109	
25 May	1500	- 1915	27	-	-	-	2	-	80	
26 May	Unfav. Weather		-	-	-	-	-	2	29	
27 May	Unfav. Weather		-	-	-	-	-	-	0	
28 May	0430	- 1920	34	-	4	-	-	-	0	
29 May	0430	- 1800	56	38	7	-	2	2	42	
30 May	0430	- 1305	39	21	4	4	2	2	111	
31 May	0800	- 2000	29	2	-	8	2	-	70	
1 Jun	0430	- 1700	47	22	4	4	2	1	43	
2 Jun	0430	- 1350	44	16	4	4	2	-	79	
TOTAL			1112	287	82	184	105	20	97	1899

Total Propeller Sorties 1495
 Total Jet Sorties 404
 Total Sorties 1899

[REDACTED]

PART III Performance of Ordnance Material and Equipment

See enclosure (1).

PART IV Battle Damage.

No battle damage was sustained by the ship. See enclosure (1) for damage inflicted on the enemy and for that suffered by BOXER aircraft.

PART V Personnel

a. Casualties

(1) There were no combat personnel casualties during this period except those of the Air Group as reported in enclosure (1).

PART VI Comments.

a. Ship Handling.

(1) At 0700 on 8 May during replenishment, the BOXER was closing the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27) using radar. Fog conditions were such that visibility was reduced to less than 200 yards. The final approach, after radar contact was lost in the sea return, was made at a speed difference of 2 knots, with lookouts alerted to watch for the wake of the KASKASKIA. Replenishment course was 340° T, speed 11 knots. On sighting a strong wake close aboard indicating that possibly the tanker had been closed more rapidly than calculated, the BOXER turned hard left. On heading about 320° T, the wake-maker, a DD also making an approach on the AO, was sighted and course changed to 342° T. Closing the tanker from the quarter without regaining radar contact, had to be accomplished very slowly for safety. The KASKASKIA's searchlight was picked up at about 300 yards.

It is strongly recommended that during low visibility conditions, destroyers not make approaches until after CV's and support ships have reported on station.

b. Air Department.

(1) Flight Deck.

Throughout this reporting period, the flight deck was spotted with a "split spot", consisting of two AD and two or three F4U types across the deck and a dead pack of four to seven F9F's.

[REDACTED]

By 15 May the installation of the AERO-14A rocket launchers on F4U's had progressed to a point where the number of aircraft that could be "split spotted" across the deck was reduced to two AD's and two F4U's. This was due to the fact that F4U aircraft with AERO-14-A rocket launchers requires fourteen inches more deck space athwartship than those with Mark 5 Mod 4 type launchers with which they were formerly equipped. An echelon spotting of AERO-14-A equipped F4U's is being worked out.

The Ford tractors used aboard ship are excellent for size and maneuverability but lack sufficient power in high gear to pull a heavily loaded AD or F9F up the deck against strong winds. Second gear is too slow for expeditious respotting forward during launch/land operations. If an attempt is made to use high gear, the clutch must be slipped to such an extent that clutch troubles result. A faster speed for second gear would solve the problem, the present high and low gear ratios being satisfactory.

(2) Catapults

During the period of this report, a number of catapult troubles were encountered. The flexible return line on the port catapult ruptured. The hydraulic tensioning pump on the starboard catapult failed in the cone bearing. Since a spare cone bearing was not available, the system for tensioning by means of accumulator pressure was reinstalled. The three way valve installed under BuAer Change #29 showed leakage at the "T" fitting, necessitating the reinstallation of the old type valve. In addition, two of the four main hydraulic oil gear pumps on the starboard catapult malfunctioned, one freezing and one reduced to extremely low pressure, making it necessary to continue operations with only two pumps on the line. This resulted in doubling the time necessary to build up pressure with a corresponding increase in interval between launches on the starboard catapult. Jet pairs were launched every other shot, alternating with single jet shots from the port catapult.

(3) Gasoline.

The time required for replenishment of aviation gasoline from the tanker to the carrier is recognized as a retarding factor in the over-all replenishment operation. Experiences of previous fueling operations showed that tankers were not able to supply a steady pressure or continuous rate of flow to the carrier's forward and after gasoline systems.

The fueling rig used by the tankers has been either a four inch hose or a six inch hose with the last section reduced to four inches, from tanker to carrier. These two rigs have delivered an average of approximately 250 gallons per minute to the after tanks and approximately 400 gallons per minute to the forward tanks.

With the excellent cooperation of the U.S.S. KASKASKIA (AO-27), a six-inch hose was rigged from tanker to carrier. On the carrier's end of this six-inch hose were a quick disconnect and a wye fitting for reducing to two four-inch fittings. Two four-inch hoses were attached to the wye connection, one hose being laid out along the starboard hangar deck edge to the fueling station at frame 60 and the other four-inch hose laid out across the hangar deck to the fueling station at frame 40 port side. Gasoline was then pumped directly to the forward tanks via the connection at frame 60 and to the after tanks via the connection at frame 40. It was found that a steady pressure and a continuous rate of flow was maintained which delivered approximately 380 gallons per minute at 9.2 P.S.I. to the after tanks and approximately 600 gallons per minute at 11.0 P.S.I. to the forward tanks.

To secure optimum results with this new six-inch rig the level of fuel in the carrier's tanks must be preadjusted so that each set of forward and after tanks being fueled simultaneously will reach a full state at the same time.

The use of this system of fueling has cut the time alongside the tanker by nearly one-third, thus contributing greatly to the overall efficiency of replenishment at sea.

A report of this experimental rig, which is now accepted as standard, has been forwarded separately.

(4) Aviation Ordnance.

During the initial phases of the period covered by this report, a considerable increase was noted in the number of rockets being returned to the ship by AERO-14-A rocket launchers. Most failures to fire from these launchers was considered due to the pigtails being severed by hot brass and links when strafing was commenced prior to firing rockets.

This problem is believed to have been solved by the design and installation of deflector plates on the after end of the racks to protect the pigtails. A few similar plates have been installed on Mark 5 Mod 4 launchers with a further reduction of returns ensuing. A complete report on the above mentioned deflector plates will be submitted to Commander Air Force, Pacific Fleet as soon as sufficient data has been

collected to substantiate the limited excellent results noted to date.

c. Communications.

(1) Circuit Interference.

Communications, in general, were excellent during this period with the exception of periodic interference on all long range circuits, attributed mainly to ionospheric disturbances. However, the proximity of the transmitter antennae also caused some interference.

Although little can be done in regard to ionospheric disturbances, it is considered that a study of the antennae arrangements of the CV type with a view to reallocation would prove helpful in alleviating transmitter interference.

(2) Daily Summaries.

It is estimated that over fifty per cent of the encrypted message traffic handled by the cryptoboard of this flagship was daily operational summaries, generally of high precedence with numerous addressees. The originators were: Commander Naval Forces, Far East; parallel echelons of command for the U.S. Army and Air Force; and the Commander in Chief Far East. The aggregate of these messages tended, at times, to infringe upon the time required for the expeditious processing of high precedence traffic involving current or impending operations.

It is recommended that either: (1), the reporting of such information essential to operations in progress be continued by messages of high precedence and that the remainder be transmitted by means other than messages or by messages of low precedence or; (2), as an alternative, task unit, element, and group commanders report directly to task force commanders who will in turn, correlate the summaries and transmit one summary for their respective task forces to those who need to know.

d. Supply Department.

(1) Aviation Supply.

During this period of intensified air operations,

the "availability of aircraft" has become of increasing importance due largely to the Air Group's heavy operating schedule, the limited time between operations for maintenance of the planes (particularly when replenishment is carried out at night), the increasing hours of flying time on aircraft in the third and fourth service tours (particularly the F4U's) and the increasing damage to aircraft surfaces from enemy small arms fire. In order to meet this problem immediately, the Aviation Supply Officer has been instructed to "stay on top of" every demand within reason made by the squadrons aboard, even to the extent of improvising where necessary.

The following constructive suggestions are strongly recommended for consideration by higher authority for incorporation within our Aviation Supply system:

(a) Aviation Allowance Lists should be made more realistic. The initial loading on the West Coast was based on the application of peacetime allowances to wartime operating conditions. For certain items in Section Baker Allowance Lists, even the variable multiple factor applied to the Peacetime Allowance Columns is considered to result in inadequate wartime allowances. It is believed that the variable factor column should be increased in order that additional inventories may be carried on board in an attempt to meet the demand arising from increased operating schedules. At the present time, the Supply Officer is currently preparing "marked up" allowance lists for forwarding to the ComAirPac Supply Officer reflecting 90-day usage data which may be useful in revising quantities presently shown on allowance lists.

(b) The afloat Aviation Supply situation should be strengthened to allow for more complete replenishment by the aviation stores ship U.S.S. JUPITER. Possibly, additional non-stock aviation parts could be stocked aboard this "afloat depot", since it is noted that AOG's aboard the BOXER are stemming for the major part from a lack of parts that are not stocked or intended to be stocked aboard a carrier. Insurance items, such as wings, should be stocked in greater quantities. Requisitions for both such types of parts frequently have to be passed to the United States for resupply.

(2) GSK.

Some difficulty has been encountered in routine replenishment of General Stores. Routine (Priority "C") requisitions submitted were cancelled by the supporting activity whenever the material concerned was either not in stock or not carried. This makes it necessary for new requisitions to

be re-submitted at an indefinite time in the future on a "catch-as-catch-can" basis for those routine requirements which still remain. An effort is being made to have routine requisitions obligated against due stocks, or forwarded to the United States by the supporting activity for further action, when the requirements cannot be met.

(3) Ship's Store.


The importance of continuous and adequate service by the Ship's Store cannot be overstressed as an aid to morale aboard ship. In spite of an authorization for an inventory of \$195,000 prior to leaving the States, with monthly sales approaching \$50,000 many of the stocks have been depleted, even the so-called luxury items. All Ship's Store Officers leaving the States should be advised to make sure that all assigned storerooms are filled to capacity with Ship's Store Stock (other than that which is perishable).

(4) Disbursing.

During this period, all ships in the Western Pacific have been ordered to pay in MPC script and to call in all U.S. currency in accordance with BuSanda Manual (Articles 53525 - 53529) and supplementary area directives. All Ship's Disbursing Officers should be advised to carry only enough American currency to meet a few "State-side paydays", since MPC's are purchased in this area by means of Money Requisition or U.S. Treasurer's check and not by converting American money to MPC.

(5) Commissary.

The logistic support given to the BOXER in all kinds of provisions, both from afloat and ashore activities, has been most gratifying.


CAMERON BRIGGS

DISTRIBUTION LIST:

CV21/3-ces
A4-3
Ser 065
26 June 1951

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