UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET
AIR FORCE
COMMANDER, AIR TASK GROUP ONE
c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SAN FRANCISCO
CALIFORNIA

FF12/CATG-1/A16
DSH; cs
Ser 0230
15 November 1953

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From: Commander, Air Task Group ONE
To: Commanding Officer, U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21)

Subj: Action Report of Air Task Group ONE for the period 28 July through 11 November 1953; submission of

Ref: (a) OPNAV INSTRUCTION 3480.4

Encl: (1) Subject Action Report

1. This report is forwarded as enclosure (1) for inclusion in the Action Report of the U.S.S. BOXER (CVA-21) as required by reference (a).

2. Information, comments and recommendations are presented under the headings listed below:

I Mission and Composition
II Chronology
III Ordnance Statistics
IV Operational Damage
V Personnel Performance
VI Comments and Recommendations
  A. Operations
  B. Intelligence
  C. Maintenance
  D. Ordnance
  E. Electronics
  F. Survival
VII Summary of Recommendations

L. A. WHITNEY

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ENCLOSURE (1)

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PART I
MISSION AND COMPOSITION

A. The mission of Air Task Group ONE during this period has been to maintain combat efficiency through training exercises emphasizing Close Air Support, Bombing, Rockets, Gunnery, Strafing, Tactics, and Type Instruments.

B. Composition of Forces:

UNIT	ALLOW & TYPE A/C	OPER A/C 7/28	OPER A/C 11/11	PILOTS 7/28	PILOTS 11/11
ATG-1 CDR L. A. WHITNEY, USN	0	0	0	*6	6
VF-44 LCDR W. D. HOUSER, USN	16 F4U-4	16	#0	24	#0
VF-52 LCDR J. J. KINSELLA, USN	14 F9F-2	11	14	20	20
VF-111 CDR A. E. VICKERY, USN	16 F9F-5	#0	@0	23	23
VF-151 LCDR J. M. RICKABAUGH, USN	14 F9F-2	12	14	21	18
VF-194 LCDR A. N. MELHUSE, USN	20 AD-4N	AD-4NA 13	@1	29	28
		AD4Q 1	@1		
		AD4L 2	@1		
		AD4 3	@0		
VC-3 DET "H" LCDR W. R. MOORE, USNR	4 F4U-5N	1	4	2	5
VC-11 DET "H" LCDR T. E. NORTON, USNR	3 AD-4W	3	3	5	5
VC-35 DET "H" LT C. R. JOHNSON, USN	4 AD-4N	4	@3	6	6
VC-61 DET "H" LT C. HUTCHINGS, USN	3 F2H2P	2	@0	4	4

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* The Air Group Commander flies with VF-52 and the Air Group Operations Officer flies with VF-151. Three Landing Signal Officers fly with VF's-52,151 and VF-194 respectively. The remaining Landing Signal Officer does not fly from the ship.

VF-44 was transferred to the USS LAKE CHAMPLAIN (CVA-39) 9 October 1953. VF-111 was transferred to the USS BOXER 9 October 1953 with 16 F9F-5 Aircraft.

@ Aircraft transferred to FASRON 11 5 November 1953 included the following:

From VF-111 13 F9F-5
From VF-194 16 AD
From VC-35 1 AD
From VC-61 2 F2H2P

Aircraft transferred to the USS KEARSARGE (CVA-33) 5 November 1953:

From VC-61 1 F2H2P
From VF-111 1 F9F-5

Aircraft off-loaded at Yokosuka 10 November 1953:
From VF-194 1 AD
From VF-111 1 F9F-5

PART II
CHRONOLOGY

28 July - No Air Operations.

29 July - 6 Sorties, All Rescap.

30 July - 32 Sorties, Rescap 4, Banner Shoot 12, Electronic Training 12, ASP 4.

31 July - 6 Sorties; 4 Rescap, 2 SPL Airlift Yokoto.

1 August - No Air Operations

2 August - No Air Operations

3 August - 57 Sorties; 2 Test Flights, 1 Abort--- Total 60; Warning Magenta 22, Gunnery 10, Jetsweep 8, CAP 8, ASP/AEW 6, ECM 2, ADEPT 2.

4 August - No Air Operations.

5 August - 43 Sorties; 4 ABORTS --- Total 47; Warning Magenta 20, CAP 16, Gunnery 5, ECM/AEW 4, Ferry Esc. 2.

6 August - 42 Sorties; 2 Aborts --- Total 44; Intercept 20, Weather Recco 5, ADEPT 4, Gunnery 4, CAP 5, ASP/AEW 4, Type Instr 2.

7 August - 75 Sorties; CAP 20, Tactics 14, Gunnery 10, Warning Magenta 13, ASP 8, Type Instr 6, ADEPT 4.

8 August - No Air Operations.

9 August - No Air Operations.

10 August - 32 Sorties; Tactics 22, CAP 8, AEW 2. (BOXER enroute to HONG KONG.)

11 August - Enroute to HONG KONG, No Air Operations.

12 - 19 August - BOXER at HONG KONG.

20 August - Enroute to Operating Area; 118 Sorties; 3 Aborts — Total 121; Tactics 85, CAP 26, AEW 8, PHOTO 2.

21 August - 34 Sorties; Tactics 22, CAP 8, AEW 2, ECM 2.

22 - 25 August - No Air Operations.

26 August - 59 Sorties; 1 Abort -- Total 60; Rockets 16, Bombing 12, Intercept 12, Gunnery 11, ADEPT 4, Photo 3, ASP 2.

27 August - 61 Sorties; 2 Aborts -- Total 63; Rockets 16, Bombing 12, Gunnery 12, Intercept 12, ADEPT 4, Target (Photo) 3, ASP 2, Test 2.

28 August - No Air Operations

29 August - 39 Sorties; Warning Magenta 22, CAP 12, ASP 2, Courier 2, Test 1.

30 August - No Air Operations.

31 August - 60 Sorties; 1 Abort -- Total 61; Gunnery 14, Bombing 16, Rockets 12, Intercept 10, ADEPT 5, ASP 2, Photo 2.

1 September - Task Force Replenished, No Air Operations.

2 September - 100 Sorties; 4 Aborts — Total 104; Gunnery 26, CAP 16, Type Instr. 16, Bombing 13, Warning Magenta 13, Rockets 11, ASP 6, Intercept 2, Test 1.

3. September - No Air Operations.

4. September - 60 Sorties; Flyaway to Atsugi 14, Type Instr. 11, Bombing 8, CAP 9, ADEPT 4, ASP 4, Gunnery 4, Warning Magenta 4, Test 2.

5 - 6 September - No Air Operations

7 September - 67 Sorties; CAP 20, Bombing 16, Instr. 12, Tactics 8, AEW 6, Ferry 2, Escorts 3.

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8 September - 64 Sorties; Type Instr. 16, Tactics 10, Escort 8, Bombing 8, CAP 7, AEW 6, Bomb/Instr. 7, Ferry 2.

9 September - Underway for Yokosuka.

10 - 17 September - Period of Repair, Upkeep, and R & R in Yokosuka.

18 - 19 September - Enroute from Yokosuka to Task Force 77.

20 September - 38 Sorties; Warning Magenta 27, CAP 4, Photo 4, AEW 3.

21 September - No Air Operations.

22 September - 109 Sorties; CAP 48, Bombing & Rockets 45, Type Instr. 7, FAM 4, ASP 3, Photo 2.

23 September - No Air Operations.

24 September - No Air Operations.

25 September - 66 Sorties; 2 ABORTS - Total 68; Bombing & Rockets 38, Gunnery 10, CAP 8, ASP 6, Type Instr. 4, Photo 2.

26 September - No Air Operations, BOXER enroute to Sasebo.

27 September - 3 October - Maintenance and Upkeep in Sasebo

4 October - Enroute to Task Force 77, No Air Operations.

5 October - 120 Sorties; CAS 44, FAM 24, CAP 12, Bombing 9, ASP 8, Photo 7, Gunnery 6, Heckler 6, Recco 4.

6 October - 66 Sorties; CAS 18, CAP 9, Bombing 9, ASP 8, Photo 8, Recco 8, FAM 2.

7 October - Task Force Replenished, No Air Operations.

8 October - 124 Sorties; Bombing and Rocket 46, Gunnery 23, CAP 16, ASP 11, Warning Maganta 9, Type Instr. 8, Bombing 7, ADEPT 4.

9 October - 98 Sorties; 1 Abort - Total 99; Bombing and Rocket 58, CAP 9, PHOTO 8, Gunnery 9, ASP 6, ADEPT 5. Type Instr. 4, Departed Task Force 77 about 1700 for Sasebo.

10 October - Arrived Sasebo about 0700.

11 October - Departed Sasebo for Task Force 77.

12 October - Task Force Replenished, No Air Operations.

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13 October - 95 Sorties; 2 Aborts -- Total 97; CAS 30, Recco 16, CAP 12, Photo 12, Gunnery 10, ASP 8, FAM 4, Type Instr. 4, LCL Test 1.

14 October - 62 Sorties; 1 Abort -- Total 63; Bombing and Rocket 24, Gunnery 10, CAP 9, Type Instr. 6, ASP 6, ADEPT 4, Photo 4.

15 October - 126 Sorties; 1 Abort -- Total 127; CAP 21, CAS 21; Recco 20, Type Instr. 17, Bombing and Rocket 16, Photo 8, ASP 6, ADEPT 4, AEW 4, Hecklers 4, CA Exercise 4, FAM 2.

16 October - No Air Operations, Task Force Replenished.

17 October - 97 Sorties; Bombing 21; Type Instr. 16; Photo 12, CAP 13, ASP 8, Gunnery 8, Warning Magenta 8, AEW 5, ADEPT 4, FAM 2.

18 October - No Air Operations.

19 October - 106 Sorties; 1 Abort -- Total 107; Bombing 32, Gunnery 26, CAP 18, Type Instr. 13, ASP 8, ADEPT 5, FAM 3, AEW 2.

20 October - 14 Sorties; ECM 12, FAM 2. Ship Departed Task Force 77 about 0800 enroute to Yokosuka.

21 October - Enroute to Yokosuka, No Air Operations.

22 - 28 October - Moored to Buoy #10, Yokosuka harbor.

29 October - Underway, at 0750, Enroute Task Force 77.

30 October - 94 Sorties; 2 Aborts -- Total 96; CAP 24, Bombing and Rocket 19, Gunnery 15, Bombing 10, ASP 6, Gunnery 5, ADEPT 4, FAM 4, Type Instr. 4, COD 2, LCL Test 1.

1 November - No Air Operations.

2 November - 97 Sorties; CAS 31, Recco 25, CAP 12, Type Instr. 8, ASP 7, Photo 6, Straffing 4, COD 2, "SLOW TIME" 1, Test 1.

3 November - 99 Sorties; 3 Aborts -- Total 102; CAS 28, Recco 24, CAP 12, Photo 12, Type Instr. 10, ASP 6, ADEX 4, AEW 2, COD 2, Test 2.

4 November - No Air Operations.

5 November - 97 Sorties; Ferry 32, Recco 20, CAS 14, CAP 9, Type Instr. 8, ASP 5, Photo 5, Gunnery 4. Took leave of Task Force 77 at 1740 bound for the United States Via Sasebo, and Yokosuka, Japan.

6 November - Arrived Sasebo about 1000I

7 November - Departed Sasebo.

9 November - BOXER arrived Yokosuka 0730I.
11 November - USS BOXER departed Yokosuka and WESPAC.

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III ORDNANCE STATISTICS

A. EXPENDITURES

ITEM	VF-44 F4U4	VF-52 F9F2	VF-151 F9F2	VF-194 AD4NA	VC-3 F4U5N	VC-35 AD4N	TOTAL
2.25" SCARS	253	137	201	616	0	0	1207
100 lb. WSF	585	48	48	856	12	16	1565
MK-23 MIN. BOMBS	0	181	104	696	0	0	981
MK-6 FLOAT LIGHT	37	10	15	35	2	0	99
MK-5 DRIFT SIGNAL	0	0	0	34	00	0	34
3.25" ASR	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
MK-6 FLARE	0	0	0	0	0	2	2

B. GUN OPERATION

1. 20 mm GUN MALFUNCTIONS

REASON FOR MALFUNCTION	VF-52 F9F-2	VF-194 AD4NA	TOTAL
AERO 13 A CHARGER FAILURE		6	6
FAILURE OF 4-WAY CONTROL VALVE		6	6
UNKNOWN		5	5
LOSS OF TENSION ON FEED MECH		4	4
AMMO JAM IN FEED MECH	1	3	4
AMMO JAM IN FEED CHUTE	1	2	3
LINK JAM	2		2
FAILURE TO EXTRACT	1	2	3
BROKEN BELT		2	2
BROKEN SOLENOID LEAD	2		2
TOTAL	7	30	37

2. 20 mm GUN EFFICIENCY

SQUADRON	TYPE A/C	ROUNDS	GUNS USED	MALFUNCTIONS	GUN EFFICIENCY
VF-52	F9F-2	7,790	158	7	95.6%
VF-151	F9F-2	2,080	22	0	100.0%
VF-194	AD4NA	13,925	154	30	80.5%
VC-35	AD4N	200	2	0	100.0%
	TOTAL	23,995	336	37	89%

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3. .50 CAL. BAMG OPERATION

VF-44 flying F4U-4 Aircraft fired 8640 rounds of .50 Cal. Ammunition, using 44 guns, without having a stoppage.

C. HUNG ORDNANCE REPORT

TYPE RACK OR LAUNCHER	2.25" SCARS	100 lb. WSF	MK-23 MIN BOMBS
MK9 LAUNCHER WITH MK6 ADAPTER	54		
AERO 14A RACK WITH AERO 1A ADAPTER	60		
MK-55 RACK		2	
AERO 14 A RACK		24	
MK-51 RACK WITH MK47 CONTAINER			16
MK-51 RACK WITH AERO 4B CONTAINER			16
TOTAL	114	26	32

REASON			
DUD ROCKETS	44		
MECHANICAL FAILURE OF MK-55 RACK		2	
PILOT ERROR		10	8
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF MK-47 CONTAINER			8
BROKEN PIGTAIL	8		
FAULTY PIG TAIL ADAPTER	42		
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF AERO 4B CONTAINER			11
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF 1A ADAPTER	1		
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF AERO 14A RACK		6	
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF PLANE FIRING CIRCUIT	11		
BECAME UNPLUGGED IN FLIGHT	5		
OVERSIZED MINATURE BOMBS			5

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REASON			
FAILURE OF STATION SELECTOR	1		
MALFUNCTION OF MK3 MOD4 TOSS BOMGING GEAR		8	
DID NOT TRY TO FIRE	2		
TOTAL	114	26	32

2. 2.25" SCARS. A total of 1207 Scars were carried and of this number, 114 were hung. The following is a percentage break down of the causes:

DUD ROCKETS	3.64%
FAULTY PIGHTAIL ADAPTER	3.48%
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF PLANE FIRING CIRCUIT	0.91%
BROKEN PIGTAIL	0.67%
BECAME UNPLUGGED IN FLIGHT	0.42%
PILOT DID NOT TRY TO FIRE	0.17%
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF 1A ADAPTER	0.08%
FAILURE OF STATION SELECTOR	0.08%
TOTAL NUMBER CARRIED THAT WERE RETURNED	9.45%

A total of 25 hung SCARS came off of the MK-6 Adpater upon arrested landing. No SCARS hung on the 1A Adapters came off upon arrested landings. The sheer wire used on the MK-6 Adapter is too light for the job when used on Jet Aircraft.

3. 100 lb. WSF. A total of 1565 100 lb. WSF were carried and of this number 26 were hung. The following is a percentage breakdown of the causes:

PILOT ERROR	0.64%
MALFUNCTION OF MK3 MOD4 TOSS BOMBING GEAR - PILOT FAILED TO USE OTHER METHOD OF RELEASE	0.52%
MECHANICAL FAILURE OF MK-55 RACK	0.12%
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF AERO 14A RACK	0.38%
TOTAL NUMBER CARRIED THAT WERE RETURNED	1.66%

All bombs remained on the racks upon arrested landings.

4. MK-23 MINIATURE BOMBS. A total of 981 miniature bombs were carried and of this number, 32 were hung. The following is a percentage breakdown of the causes:

ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF THE AERO 4B CONTAINER	1.13%
ELECTRICAL FAILURE OF THE MK-47 CONTAINER	0.81%
PILOT ERROR	0.81%
OVERSIZED BOMBS	0.51%
TOTAL NUMBER CARRIED THAT WERE RETURNED	3.26%

One hung miniature bomb fell out of an Aero 4B Container upon an arrested landing. One full MK-47 Container, which had failed to function, came off of a MK-51 Rack upon an arrested landing. The Safety Bolt used to jam the MK-51 release mechanism was not of the proper size and the rack unlocked upon receiving the jolt from landing.

PART IV
OPERATIONAL DAMAGE

DATE	SQUADRON	TYPE	BUNO	DAMAGE DEGREE	DAMAGE CAUSE
8-5-53	VF-52	F9F-2	123701	D3	Left Landing gear collaspsed.
8-7-53	VF-151	F9F-2	127187	D3	Nose Wheel failure.
8-20-53	VF-151	F9F-2	127187	D3	Right landing gear collapsed.
8-20-53	VF-194	AD-4L	123960	D3	Hangar Deck Accident.
8-21-53	VF-151	F9F-2	123573	D3	Hangar Deck Accident.
8-29-53	VF-194	AD-4NA	125762	D3	Hangar Deck Accident.
8-31-53	VF-151	F9F-2	123484	D2	Hook release failure.
9-22-53	VF-52	F9F-2	123676	D3	Hit hook on ramp.
9-22-53	VF-151	F9F-2	123587	D3	Hard landing.
9-25-53	VF-52	F9F-2	123689	D3	Barrier.
10-5-53	VF-151	F9F-2	123078	D3	Nose wheel up landing.

OPERATIONAL DAMAGE (CONT'D)

DATE	SQUADRON	TYPE	BUNO	DAMAGE DEGREE	DAMAGE CAUSE
10-6-53	VF-52	F9F-2	127162	D2	Barrier.
10-8-53	VF-151	F9F-2	127187	D3	Barrier.
10-8-53	VF-151	F9F-2	122587	D3	Plane in cat-walk.
10-17-53	VF-194	AD4NA	125762	D2	Barrier.
10-17-53	VF-111	F9F-5	125494	D2	Hard landing.
10-31-53	VF-52	F9F-2	123513	D2	Barrier.
10-31-53	VF-111	F9F-5	126657	D3	Barrier.

PART V
PERSONNEL PERFORMANCE

A. Personnel performance following cessation of hostilities has remained excellent. As a result of reduced operations there have been no periods of excessive work required. Spare time has been well utilized for training purposes. It is felt that full work and training schedules are essential for maintenance of morale and for preparedness of peak combat efficiency.

B. Although night operations have been practically nil, on the occasions that night flying was done, rest of day crews upset by night crews entering or departing compartments and vice versa. The situation for officer night crews was alleviated by segregating them in staterooms in one section on the third deck. The size of berthing compartments as well as location precluded such segregation for enlisted night crews.

C. There were no casulties during this period.

D. Vital Statistics

Officers

	VF-52	VF-111	VF-151	VF-194	VC-3	VC-11	VC-35	VC-61	VF-44
Aboard July 28	26	0	23	34	5	7	6	4	26
Received	2	26	1	1	1	0	0	0	0
Transferred	4	1	2	2	1	0	0	0	26
Aboard Nov. 11	24	25	22	33	5	7	6	4	0

Enlisted

Aboard July 28	142	0	111	146	34	24	42	21	126
Received	8	130	26	13	1	1	1	1	0
Transferred	13	5	10	12	6	3	1	1	126
Aboard Nov 11	137	125	127	147	29	22	42	21	0
Captain's Mast	0	2	2	0	2	0	0	1	0
Court Martial	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Figures opposite received and transferred include arrival and departure for temporary additional duty. Fitron Forty Four was on board for the period 28 July through 8 October 1953.

PART VI
COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Operations

1. Flight Statistics

SORTIES

MISSION	VF194 AD4NA	VF151 F9F2	VF52 F9F2	VF111 F9F5	VF44' F4U4	VC35 AD4N	'VC61 F2H2P	VC11 AD4W	VC3 F4U5N	ATR GR
CAP	0	195	154	54	0	0	0	0	10	403
GUNNERY	0	88	117	33	0	0	4	0	0	242
BOMBS & ROCKETS	214	51	46	0	165	0	0	0	12	488
TYPE INST.	10	38	36	28	6	0	19	0	44	181
ADEPT	0	14	35	4	0	0	6	0	0	59
RECCO	0	60	49	29	0	0	0	0	0	133
TACTICS	132	48	55	29	83	53	0	0	0	400
CAS	103	29	26	12	18	0	0	0	0	188
PHOTO & ESCORT	0	6	14	21	0	0	52	0	0	93
AEW & ESCORT	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	20	0	30
ASP & ESCORT	28	0	0	0	0	40	0	70	4	142
ECM	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	0	7
DASP & ESCORT	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	0	5
RESCAP	2	0	0	0	0	5	0	9	1	17
HECKLER	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4
GCI	0	13	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	20
OPERATION WINDOW	0	0	26	0	0	0	0	0	0	26

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COMMENTS & RECOMMENDATIONS (CONT'D)

MISSION	VF194 AD4NA	VF151 F9F2	VF52 F9F2	VF111 F9F5	VF44 F4U4	VC35 AD4N	VC61 F2H2P	VC11 AD4W	VC3 F4U5N	AIR GROUP
FERRY	20	2	7	0	2	22	9	0	20	82
TEST	10	0	3	0	0	0	5	0	15	33
MISC.	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	4
ABORTS	4	1	10	0	0	4	1	0	3	23
TOTAL SORTIES	523	545	585	210	266	142	96	103	115	2585

NOTE: Flight statistics for VF-111 include dates 10 October through 11 November; for VF-44, dates from 28 July through 9 October; for all others, dates from 28 July through 11 November.

	VF194	VF151	VF52	VF111	VF44	VC35	VC61	VC11	VC3	AIR GROUP
TOTAL HOURS	1459.3	820.0	850.1	326.8	798	306.1	120.2	235.8	207	5123.3
AVER. FLTS. PER PILOT	18.0	27.0	37.9	9.1	11.2	23.3	24.0	20.6	22.5	21.9
AVER. HOURS PER PILOT	50.3	41.0	40.5	14.2	33.2	51.0	37.6	47.2	41.4	43.4

2. Summary of Flight Statistics for West Pac Tour, 11 May through 11 November 1953.

	VF194	VF151	VF52	VF111	VF44	VC35	VC61	VC11	VC3	AIR GROUP
TOTAL SORTIES	1505	1519	1565	887	578	321	255	234	230	7,100
TOTAL HRS. FLOWN	4333.9	2392	2355	1388.2	1743	831.3	380	563.5	546	14533.7
AVER. FLTS. PER PILOT	52	72.3	71.0	35.5	22.2	53.5	64	47	46	60.2
AVER HRS. PER PILOT	149.4	114.0	107.0	55.5	67.0	138.5	95.0	112.3	108.3	122.1

3. Fitron One Hundred Eleven was deployed on the U.S.S. LAKE CHAMPLAIN 29 June through 9 October; Fitron Forty Four replaced Fitron One Hundred Eleven for this period.

4. With the cessation of hostilities in Korea the group was faced with the problem of maintaining a high state of pilot readiness under reduced flight operations and a general anti-climactic feeling among the pilots. To meet the challenge "All Pilots Mettings" for each squadron became a part of the days routine. Flight safety, watches, and pilot techniques were discussed. This was a poor substitute for actual flight but it did appear to keep the pilots alert and flight operations went off smoothly. All flights flown since the truce have been briefed and de-briefed as though they were actual combat missions.

5. Flight operations with Task Force SEVENTY SEVEN were supplemented by special exercises conducted by the USS BOXER and Air Task Group ONE while enroute to and from port. Among these was a special window dispenser exercise set up by COMFAIRJAPAN and covered by separate letter. Experimentation was also made with the escort of propellor aircraft by jet aircraft over a long run into a target where enemy air opposition could be expected at any time. The differentiation in speed between the two aircraft presented quite a problem. If the jets attempt to stay with the propeller aircraft, they cannot gain speed rapidly enough to intercept in-coming enemy aircraft. Insufficient flight time did not permit any conclusions to be made. This group has received no reports on experimental tactics along this line. It is strongly recommended that if not already started a project be set up immediately to develop the tactics necessary.

6. For some bombing and rocket flights during this period a towed sled was utilized with destroyers raking the target by triangulation. All flights were supervised by air coordinators on a ship. It is felt that this permitted valuable training in bombing and rocketing a moving target and air discipline on the part of the flight. It also developed pilot technique in making attacks through very limited sectors. It is also considered that the pilots gained excellent experience as air coordinators.

7. During this period all junior pilots, who had previously flown as wingmen or section leaders, were allowed to lead flights. It is felt that valuable experience was gained by all concerned. This procedure permitted a better opportunity to observe and evaluate assigned pilots.

8. During the latter part of the period, a procedure was worked out by which in the majority of cases, pilots of the two F9F-2 squadrons flew their own squadron aircraft. It was found that the efficiency and morale of the personnel involved improved.

9. The MK-51 Bomb Racks and Aero 14A rocket launchers were removed from the F9F-5 on 10 October 1953. Removal of this drag-load resulted in an average speed increase of 30 to 35 knots and a lowering of the fuel consumption rate by approximately 500 per hour. The squadron experienced no low-fuel emergencies during this period, while completing all missions on the basis of a one and a half hour flight.

10. Due to the area separation between the various squadrons attached to Air Task Group ONE and no allotted training period for group tactics during the CONUS training cycle, the truce afforded the group its first opportunity to practice such a program. Although the type of operations carried out during our period of actual combat called for few group tactics, one decided problem was the break-up procedure around the ship. It is felt that a great deal could be accomplished if a group tactics period of training was included for Air Task Groups prior to reporting aboard. This would permit all differences in Squadron techniques to be worked out prior to deployment for Operational Readiness Inspection or actual combat tour.

11. One matter of concern to the group was the number of jet barrier and barricade engagements that resulted in the wiping out of the nose wheel triunion (Class D-2 Damage). Studies of photographs of certain barricade engagements show the aircraft in a nose down attitude with nose wheel oleo

fully compressed upon engagement. The lift of the barricade ramp combined with the downward component of the force of deceleration may be causing the nose wheel triunion to fail. It is recommended that the ramp that houses the lower straps of the barricade be set flush with the deck.

B. Intelligence

1. The Air Intelligence activities of Air Task Group ONE and its component squadrons have markedly changed in pace during the post-hostilities phase of operations which this report covers, and the extremely close attention to day to day details necessary in combat operations has given place to a greater oportunity for disseminating usuable information in the field of Air Intelligence by active participation in the pilots' training progr for the AIO's to broaden their own professional training through reading, study, and conferences, and for taking stock of their work methods in the combat situation — which, of course, it was anticipated, might recur at any time during this period.

2. Specifically, an effective symposium on the situation in Indo-China and its background was presented in briefs by the Air Group and squadron Air Intelligence Office's to all officers of the Air Group. The Group Air Intelligence Officer acted as adviser to the squadron Air Intelligence Officers on the two or three times weekly briefs of current intelligence and current affairs which the latter gave before their units as part of their ground training programs. The group Air Intelligence Officer had the opportunity to confer with Officers concerned with the same field on Staff of COMNAVFE and COMSEVENTHFLT. A program of merchant ship recognition training was instituted among the pilots and pursued. Information on such sightings obtained in pilot debriefs has increased greatly in quantity and detail, during this reporting period. Close and amicable liason has been maintained with the ships Air Intelligence Office and between the unit Air Intelligence Office's and the ships office. Pilot's E & E Kits were returned during the period with 100 per cent accounting for custody items.

C. Maintenance And Material

1. <u>F9F-2 Aircraft.</u>

Maintenance difficulties continue to be centered around the hydraulic system. Numerous leaks and failures of the Aileron Boost on and off valve and line filters has caused the largest percentage of non-availability of the F9F-2 aircraft. Two F9F-2 aircraft were transferred to FASRON ELEVEN in an Able Jig status because of an undetermined failure of the Aileron Boost System at altitudes. Every possible check and test were performed aboard ship with negative results. FASRON ELEVEN personnel and Grumman Representatives conducted various checks and flight tests, but no official report of the results have been forwarded to this activity as yet. RUDMS have been submitted on the Aileron Boost Valve and Hydraulic Line Filters. Two J42-P8 engines were changed during this period due to excessive vibration and metal particles in the oil filters. RUDMS were submitted and engines marked in accordance with General Engine Bulletin No. 64.

C. Maintenance And Material (Cont'd)

2. F9F-5 Aircraft.

Two cases of auto-acceleration of the J48-P-6A engine were encountered at 24,000 feet and 35,000 feet. In both cases a decrease in altitude of only a few thousand feet regained normal operation. Hydraulic leaks continue to be a problem. One engine was changed due to failure of a rear inducer vane.

3. AD Aircraft.

No unusual maintenance problems were encountered during this period. The advent of the Truce and the accompanying end of carrying combat loads resulted in far less strain on aircraft and engines. Relatively few instances of roughness or popping on take-off were encountered. Evaluation of the R56-S spark plugs were continued. R37-S-1 were used in a portion of the aircraft for comparative purposes. In general it was found that the R56-S plugs would break down by 69 hours of operation or less, where as no difficulty was experienced with the R37-S-1 plugs up to 90 hours and in several instances 120 hours operations. Due to the high humidity present during a large portion of the operating period, extensive investigation of the ignition assembly was made to ensure that moisture in distributor bowls was not causing popping and roughness. Two ignition harnesses and bowl assemblies were changed due to moisture. RUDMS were submitted.

One failure of wing actuating cylinder head occurred after installation of AD service change No. 332 due to improper size of the seating ring. A RUDM was submitted. Three rudder hinge brackets R82-D6-4219689 and one top rudder hinge bracket R82-D6-2250753 were found to have failed at the center line of the connecting bolt hole. It is believed these failures occurred prior to delivery of the aircraft to the squadron as a result of improper control locks or battening. RUDM was submitted. Three engine changes were made for the following reasons:

(a) Roller clutch failure in blower assembly.
(b) Oil leak in the external line from rear sump to nose section. Change 317 had been incorporated.
(c) Twisted tail shaft and metal particles found on magnetic sump plug.
(d) In addition to the engine changes, the No. 10 cylinder had to be changed on one engine due to exessive oil consumption.

4. F4U-5N Aircraft.

No unusual maintenance discrepancies to report during this period.

5. F2H-2P Aircraft.

No unusual maintenance discrepancies to report during this period.

C. Maintenance And Material (Cont'd)

6. Material.

Material has been satisfactory with the exception of a few critical items; namely, Aileron Boost Valves and Hydraulic Line Filters. Twenty Four ACOG items were required during this period. The longest period required to procure an ACOG item was sixteen (16) days. Some items issued were lacking the incorporation of certain changes and bulletins applicable indicating the items were overage.

7. Comments And Recommendations.

(a) During periods of inactivity while in port or cruising, a scheduled preventative maintenance program was established for the F9F-2 type aircraft. The aircraft were turned-up every three days, and the complete hydraulic system actuated every five days. Many hydraulic leaks, and hydraulic system malfunctions were found. This program has aided the availability and increased the aircraft safety and readiness upon returning to the operating area.

(b) One set of ejection seat knee braces on the F9F-5 was found to be inoperative due to corrosion. In view of the fact a functional check had been performed on the previous check, it is recommended that units conducting limited air operations inspect ejection seat knee braces every thirty (30) hours vice one hundred twenty (120) hours.

(c) Maintenance and storage space aboard ship have been completely inadequate. Spaces that were originally assigned for Air Groups have been utilized for other purposes. Although the ship cooperated to the fullest, spaces were not available to properly stow tools and equipment. All tool boxes and cruise boxes that a squadron normally operates from, had to be stowed alongside the bulkhead on the Hangar Deck. As a result, some special tools were lost. It is recommended that a survey of spaces be made on all carriers and where practical, spaces originally assigned to Air Groups be reasigned.

D. Ordnance.

1. 2.25" Scars

a. A number of old type scars which utilize the pig tail adapters were used with poor effect because of the electrical discontinuity of the adapter. A rather high percentage of dud scar motors was also encountered. (Ref. Part III). It is recommended that only the newer type scars (ones without the pigtail adapters) be issued for training since it is a waste of effort to load the old type.

b. When malfunctioning scars were returned on MK6 adapters the probability of the scars coming off the adapters upon arrested landing was great. This was due to the weak sheer wire provided to hold the scars on the adapters. It is recommended that a stronger sheer wire be provided, but that the wire not be of such strength as to adversely affect the trajectory of the scars.

D. Ordnance (Cont'd)

2. Aero 4B Miniature Bomb Containers.

a. The ship stocked 60 Aero 4 B containers and 28 had to be reworked before issuing because the nose cap had been dented during shipment, jamming the manual release mechanism.

b. The cam followers on the release shift of 5 containers failed this requiring overhaul of the container.

c. The electrical leads on 3 containers were found to be broken after being in service but a short time.

d. It is recommended that the initial issuing activity provide a thorough inspection prior to shipment and that more care in handling the containers during shipment be stressed.

e. Once the containers were put in good working order, loaded and were airborne, they functioned well save for an occasional electrical failure of the release mechanism.

3. Changing Rocket Launchers And Bomb Racks

a. Many times advance loads alternated between bombs and rockets. With more modern equipment such as the Aero 14A, no problem is encountered. However with the F9F-2 and the MK-9 launchers, the squadrons were continuously changing bomb rack and rocket launchers between flights. This resulted in very rushed work. Rushed work may lead to imporper inspection of bombs, rockets, and fuses. Frequent changes also cause a general deterioration of the launcher racks and fittings on the wing.

4. Boresighting

a. Provisions for the boresighting of guns aboard ships are unsatisfactory. This group has attempted to use a portable templet for F9F aircraft. This system has proven far more expeditious than painting a templet on a bulkhead, space limitations and gun configurations on AD & F4U Aircraft prohibited the use of portable templet or templets painted on bulkheads. It is therefore considered highly important that facilities ashore be made available for boresighting during in-port periods.

5. Out Board Gun Ammunition Boxes.

a. The location of the outboard gun ammunition boxes in the F9F has been a constant detriment to rearming as well as to maintenance. Maintenance of booster motors and outboard feed chutes are definite weak points in the gun ammunition system. A relocation of equipment should definitely be made in order for the outboard gun ammunition to be placed in the nose section, even at the expense of decreasing the total number of rounds carried.

b. A gun installation such as is found in the F2H is much more desirable than in the F9F since the guns, ammunition, and accessories are so much more accessable.

D. Ordnance (Cont'd)

6. MK-9 Rocket Launchers.

a. Mark 9 rocket launchers have proven that they are too weak to withstand the stresses imposed upon them during jet carrier operations. VF-52 RUDM 15-53 was submitted covering this item. Since aircraft configured for this equipment are still in use, some modification should be made.

7. Salvo Feature.

a. It is strongly recommended that the salvo provision for salvoing ordnance carried on the six stations controlled by the station selector in some F9F-2 aircraft be removed. If a salvo feature is considered necessary, another system employing a separate, guarded, firing switch should be installed. VF-52 RUDM 21-53 is being submitted covering this subject in detail.

8. Gun Cameras.

a. The aerial camera gunnery program is at the present time being undertaken in accordance with current OPNAV Notice 3150. Since air to air practice is of great concern to jet squadrons, these squadrons have been using the gun cameras to a great extent. The developed film has offered little assistance in the training of the pilots due to the lack of the Gun Camera Assessing Projector and Screen. It is strongly recommended that the allowance for the above pieces of equipment be revised to make them available to embarked squadrons.

9. Organization Of Ordnance Personnel.

a. Prior to deployment, a definite coordination plan for combined efforts on the part of the ordnancemen from the various squadrons should be worked out. This would preclude any misunderstanding between the various units as to their duties when they are called on to assist another unit. There should also be a training phase for each group prior to deployment whereby ordnancemen become familiar with all types of armament configurations in the group.

E. Electronics:

1. The most significant change in electronics during this period was the conversion from VHF to UHF. No outstanding problems have been encountered either in maintenance or in operations of the AN/ARC-27. For jet carrier operations, the ARC-27 mounting rack has a minimum amount of safety provided. It is recommended that careful and frequent inspection be given for security of mounting rack wing nuts and safety wire. At present there is a shortage of UHF test equipment. It would be desirable to have at least three complete test stations with one located on the hangar deck.

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E. Electronics (Cont'd)

2. The AN/ARR-2, F9F installation, has required more maintenance since the UHF conversion. It is believed that this is due to the absence of a radio master switch and ARR-2 off-on switch. The ARR-2 is always energized every time plug-in power is used and the battery switch is turned on. This frequent energizing has resulted in an increase of vacum tube usage.

3. Maintenance fo the AN/APG-30 radar ranging equipment has been unsatisfactory due to inadequate test facilities. Only one TS-685/APG-30 was available for use and it is believed that each squadron using APG-30 equipment should have its own TS-685. For proper maintenance it would be desirable to have a complete gun sight and AN/APG-30 system set up in a standard test position on all carriers.

4. It is noted that spare parts for the AN/ART-26 are extremely scarce, which resulted in one AD-4W having an inoperative set during the entire period of this report.

F. Survival

1. During the period of this report there has been no voluntary or involuntary use of survival equipment.

2. Exposure suits were not used at any time during the reporting period as the sea water temperature was never below 70°F.

3. All parachutes and life rafts were tested and repacked each Yokosuka in-port period. Facilities afforded by COMFAIRJAPAN were adequate and satisfactory for this work.

4. A shortage of oxygen bailout bottles was noted in the WESTPAC area this tour. (Stock No. R83-ERM214A2). On certain occasions, as few as nine bottles of "break off nipples" or valves which permit the flow of oxygen after the safety pin and the wooden ball toggle have been pulled. On the bottles with the old type break-off nipple, there are no provisions for refilling and the majority used have been of this type. The shortages and the non-fillable type bottle make it extremely difficult to maintain the parachutes in the proper condition. It is recommended that more bottles be carried in stock, especially in view of the number of three jet squadron air groups deployed in the WESTPAC area.

5. The ship received the PSK-2 kit aboard during the final part of the tour; however no use of these were made by the pilots of this group. Therefore, no evaluation of this gear is possible.

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PART VII

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

Page-11: It is felt that full work and training schedules are essential for maintenance of morale and for preparedness of peak combat efficiency.

Page-14: Special exercises flown by ATG-1.

Page-14: It is felt that valuable experience was gained by allowing wingmen to lead flights and sections.

Page-14: It is recommended that squadrons fly own planes.

Page-14: It is recommended that Air Task Groups have group tactics training period during CONUS training cycle.

Page-15: It is recommended that the ramp that houses the lower straps of the barricade be set flush with the deck.

Page-17: It is recommended that units conducting limited Air Operations inspect ejection seat knee braces every 30 hours vice 120 hours.

Page-17: It is recommended that a survey of spaces be made on all carriers and where practical spaces originally assigned to Air Groups be reassigned.

Page-17: It is recommended that a stronger sheer wire be provided on MK6 Adapter.

Page-18: It is recommended that the initial issuing activity provide a thorough inspection of Aero 4B Miniature Bomb Containers prior to shipment.

Page-18: It is recommended that facilities ashore be made available for boresighting.

Page-19: It is recommended that salvo provisions for salvoing ordnance in some F9F-2 A/C be removed.

Page-19: It is strongly recommended that Gun Camera Assessing Projector and Screen be made available to embarked squadrons.

Page-19: At present there is a shortage of UHF test equipment. It is recommended that three (3) test stations be set up aboard ship with one located on Hangar Deck.

Page-20: For proper maintenance it would be desirable to have a complete gun sight and AN/APG - 30 system set up in a standard test position on all carriers.

Page-20: It is noted that spare parts for the AN/ART-26 are extremely scarce.

17. It is recommended that more bail out bottles be carried in stock in the WESTPAC area.