

# Antiterrorism/Personal Protection Briefing

Small (103) F 6/1/100

## Attacks on DoD Since 1972

- Just over 370 killed
- Just over 690 injured
- Just over 100 million dollars in damage

*The two most significant events are:*

# Marine Barracks - Beirut, Lebanon

23 October 1983


- 241 Dead
- 105 Injured



# Khobar Towers - Dhahran, Saudi Arabia

25 June 1996

- **19 Dead**
- **240 Injured**



# Terrorism

- **The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear, intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious or ideological.**

## **Why DoD is Targeted**

- **Easily identifiable personnel**
- **Largest single contingent of U.S. Gov't reps**
- **Symbols of the U.S.**

# Antiterrorism

- **Defensive measures**
- **Reduce vulnerability**
- **Includes limited response and containment**

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# Force Protection

Active and passive measures to deter and defeat threats to:

- **Military members**
- **Their families**
- **DoD Civilians**
- **Facilities and equipment**

# Self-Protection

*...an important part of Force  
Protection...*



# Threat Levels & THREATCONS

- Terms you should know

# Threat Level Factors

- Existence
- Capability
- Intentions
- History
- Targeting
- Security Environment

# Threat Levels

- **Critical**
- **High**
- **Medium**
- **Low**
- **Negligible**

# THREATCONS

- **NORMAL**
- **ALPHA**
- **BRAVO**
- **CHARLIE**
- **DELTA**

Enc (003) 1/0/94

# Terrorist Attacks

- Bombing
- Assassination
- Armed raids
- Hostage-taking
- Kidnapping
- Skyjacking

# Before Travel

- Current political climate
- Official information
- Newspaper coverage

# Family Training

- Customs, culture & geography
- Emergency phrases
- Phrase cards
- Picture or symbol cards

## Family Security Measures

- **Checking in with each other**
- **Using local telephone service**
- **Safe havens**
- **Emergency procedures**
- **No admittance to strangers**

# Family OPSEC

- **No name on mailbox or house**
- **Answering the phone**
- **Unlisted phone number**
- **Screening of trash**
- **Advice to children**
- **Advice to school officials**

# Target Selection

- **Vulnerable**
- **Predictable**
- **Soft**

# Hard Target

- Inaccessible
- Observant
- Aware

# Overcome Routine

- **Route to and from work**
- **Departure and arrival times**
- **Workout times and places**

# Low Profile

- Blend in
- Clothing
- Local standards of behavior

## **Awareness on the Street**

- **Unexplained absence of locals**
- **Suspicious objects**
- **Suspicious vehicles**
- **Signs of surveillance**
- **Confirming surveillance**
- **Go to a safe haven**

# Safety in Vehicles

- **Maintain vehicle**
- **Gas tank half-full**
- **Locking gas cap**
- **Walk-around inspection**

# Driving Awareness

- Boxing in at stop signs & lights
- Staging auto accident
- Roadblocks

# Security in Airports

- Proceed to secure areas
- Be observant

# On the Plane

- Window seat
- Hiding credentials & passports
- If you are confronted directly...

# • • • Baggage Claim

- **Crowded**
- **Public access**
- **Stay back and wait**

Enrollment for action

## **Hotel Security**

- **Avoid street-level rooms**
- **Escape routes**
- **Caution in lobbies**
- **Make room look occupied**
- **Evacuations**

## **WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)**

- **Devices capable of a high order of destruction, designed or intended to cause serious bodily harm, incapacitation, or death to large numbers of people or to destroy materials and facilities. These include weapons designed to release biological or chemical agents; plant and animal toxins; or radiological materials at a level dangerous to human life. This includes the use of nuclear devices, high yield conventional explosives, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs).**

## **WMD AWARENESS Recognition**

- **Signs and symptoms**
- **Casualty patterns**
  - More than one victim exhibiting signs
  - Might involve animals or birds
- **Things out of the ordinary**
  - Strange smells
  - Unexplained liquids

## **WMD AWARENESS (Avoidance)**

- **Avoid contact with victims**
- **In case of an explosion...**
- **Be aware of a possible secondary device**

WMD AWARENESS *Evacuation and shelter*

- If you are in your home
- If you are outside
- Inside a building (not your home)

## WMD AWARENESS

*(Notification)*

- **Call police, fire, or local emergency number**
- **Give location**
- **Describe:**
  - The scene
  - Number of casualties
  - Symptoms of victims

## Hostage Situations

- **Remain calm**
- **Mentally note details**
- **Discuss nonsubstantive topics**
- **Listen actively**

# Hostage Rescue

- **DO NOT RUN**
- **Drop to the floor if possible**
- **Stand still**
- **Obey all instructions**
- **DO NOT RESIST**

# Crime Prevention Awareness



*...terrorist activity is criminal  
activity....*

# Reporting

- Supervisor
- Security Officer
- NCIS

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL



A Proposal by ENS [REDACTED]

En... (02) 1-020...

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Mission – The mission of the USS COLE Force Protection Cell is to increase Force Protection awareness, training, and effectiveness to ensure the safety of the crew of USS COLE, their families, and protect the ship itself from potential hostile attacks.

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL


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- Goal 1 - To have a full functioning Force Protection Cell and Force Protection Training Team prior to the beginning of POM.
- Goal 2 - To conduct complete and thorough training for all personnel during the POM period.
- Goal 3 - To create and maintain a high state of Force Protection awareness throughout Cole's upcoming deployment.
- Goal 4 - To ensure foundation is in place to carry a successful Force Protection program through deployment and into the next IDTC.

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL


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- Force Protection – What is It ?



# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL


- Organization



Title = Force Protection Officer/  
Physical Security Officer/FPTT  
Leader



Name = LT [REDACTED]  
Training Level = FPO completed




# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization

Title = Assistant Force  
Protection Officer/ Assistant  
Physical Security Officer  
Name = Ens [REDACTED]  
Ens [REDACTED] (to replace  
above at PRD)


Training Level = FPO - TBD



# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization Cont. – Force Protection Assistants (FPA)



Title = Intel Branch


Name = IS1 [REDACTED]

Training Level = FPO course - TBD

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization Cont. – Force Protection Assistants (FPA)



Title = Physical Security Branch


Name = MA1 [REDACTED]

Training Level = FPO course - TBD

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization Cont. – Force Protection Assistants  
(FPA)



Title = Physical Security Branch


Name = FCC [REDACTED]

Training Level = FPO course - TBD

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization Cont. – Force Protection Assistants  
(FPA)




Title = Physical Security Branch  
Name = BMC [REDACTED]  
Training Level = FPO course - TBD

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization Cont. – Force Protection Assistants (FPA)



Title = Anti-Terrorism Branch


Name = GMC [REDACTED]

Training Level = ATTO - Completed

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Organization Cont. – Force Protection Assistants (FPA)



Title = Anti-Terrorism Branch

Name = GMC [REDACTED]

Training Level = ATTO - Completed

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Plans & Policies:

- Physical Security Instruction - complete by end of APR
- Force Protection Instruction - complete by end of JUN, Does it need to combine Physical Security Instruction?
- Force Protection Cliff Notes - A watchstander friendly consolidated handout or brochure.
- New Training Lectures/Topic Guides - Incorporating both Physical Security and Force Protection by end of JTFX

- New Drills - new and more complex drills in DCTT style emphasizing both Physical Security and Force Protection

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- FPTT (Force Protection Training Team)
  - Sec 1 - FC1 [REDACTED] (PRD: FEB 2002)
  - Sec 2 - GM1 [REDACTED]\* (PRD: DEC 2001)
  - Sec 3 - FC1 [REDACTED] (PRD: AUG 2004)
  - Sec 4 - FC3 [REDACTED] (PRD: APR 2004)
  - Sec 5 - MA1 [REDACTED] (PRD: JUL 2003)
  - Sec 6 - BM3 [REDACTED]\* (PRD: NOV 2002)
  - Additional personnel - BMC [REDACTED]\*, GMC [REDACTED]\*

Note: \* denotes also involved with VBSS teams.

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

- Training Requirements: Force Protection Cell

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Training Required</u>
LT [REDACTED]	FPO	none
ENS [REDACTED]	AFPO	FPO
ENS [REDACTED]	AFPO	FPO
IS1 [REDACTED]	FPA	FPO
MA1 [REDACTED]	FPA, FPTT	FPO, SSEW, SSET
BMC [REDACTED]	FPA, FPTT	FPO, SSEW, SSET
FCC [REDACTED]	FPA, FPTT	FPO, SSEW, SSET
GMC [REDACTED]	FPA, FPTT	SSEW, SSET
GMC [REDACTED]	FPA	none (could complete FPO)

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Training Requirements: FPTT

<u>Individual</u>	<u>Role</u>	<u>Training Required</u>
GM1 [REDACTED]	FPTT	SSEW, SSET
FC1 [REDACTED]	FPTT	SSEW, SSET
FC1 [REDACTED]	FPTT	SSEW, SSET
BM3 [REDACTED]	FPTT	SSEW, SSET
FC3 [REDACTED]	FPTT	SSET, SSEW -currently attending

# USS COLE FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Available Training:
  - SSEW - 3 quotas for 22 -26 May, 6 more needed, will try to obtain. Also may need to obtain 3 more quotas if personnel cannot attend 22-26 May dates.
  - SSET - 4 quotas for 05-09 JUN, 5 quotas for 26-30 JUN, no more need.
  - FPO - minimum of 6 quotas needed, will try and get 8 in order to upgrade our to ATTO trained cell members to FPO. Will work with NCIS to get a possible FPO course just for COLE dates TBD.

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Evaluation: Conducted by LEPS (Law Enforcement & Physical Security Assistance Teams) - 2 Types
  - Informal - memo sent request assistance, inbrief and outbrief conducted with requester, report will be left with requester.
  - One or more of this type recommend before Formal
    - Would like to do one of these prior to deployment
  - Formal - Request by CO or authorized representative, formal inbrief and outbrief with CO, report signed by NCIS and forwarded to CO.

Note: Both require 30-45 days notice for LEPS to set up assist

# USS COLÉ FORCE PROTECTION CELL

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- Evaluation: Areas covered by LEPS visit:
  - Physical Security Loss and Prevention
  - Force Protection
  - Review of shipboard plans and SOPs
  - Review of Training program
  - Evaluate Ships Self Defense Force
  - Review/evaluate Force Protection/Physical Security Equipment
  - Training of FPO, AFPOs, FPAs

– **PROVIDE FEEDBACK ON HOW WE ARE  
WELL WE ARE DOING FORCE PROTECTION!**

USS COLE (DDG 67) INSTRUCTION 3300.55

Subj: FORCE PROTECTION PROGRAM

- Ref: (a) DODINST 2200.12 (Series), Protection of DOD Personnel and Activities Against Acts of Terrorism and Political Turbulence  
(b) DODINST 2200.16 (Series), DOD Combating Terrorism Program Standards  
(c) OPNAVINST 3300.55, Navy Combating Terrorism Program Standards  
(d) OPNAVINST 5530.14 (Series), Physical Security and Loss Prevention Manual  
(e) COLEINST 5530.1 (Series), Physical Security Plan  
(f) COLEINST 3502.1 (Series), Shipwide Training Instruction  
(g) COLEINST 5531, (Series), Security Alert Instruction

- Encl: (1) THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan  
(2) Physical Security Lesson Topic Matrix

1. Purpose. To state policy, define terms, assign responsibilities, and establish procedures for the implementation and execution of the Force Protection (FP) program in accordance with references (a) through (d).
2. Cancellation. This instruction supercedes reference (e).
3. Policy. The FP program is designed to protect crewmembers, their families and the ship from acts of violence, of either a terrorist or criminal nature, through training and implementation of protective measures. Education of personnel and their families through this program is crucial to maintaining the highest level of individual awareness. Aggressive intelligence gathering by the Naval Criminal Investigative Service about potential threats is vital to establishing a threat condition (THREATCON) plan that will provide the appropriate level of protection. Thorough implementation of protective measures and a properly trained Ship's Self Defense Force (SSDF) will ensure zero personnel casualties and equipment losses due to terrorist or criminal acts.

4. Applicability. This instruction applies to all personnel and their family members.

5. Definitions.

a. Force Protection:

(1) Security program designed to protect service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, and personal protective services, supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.

b. Baseline Force Protection Posture:

(2) The effective implementation of THREATCON NORMAL measures in combination with daily security operations and procedures. Routine review of its effectiveness is essential to maintaining appropriate protection relative to the threat level. An ability to increase THREATCON in response to threat level changes must be maintained and exercised.

6. Responsibilities.

a. The Commanding Officer will:

(1) Be ultimately responsible for the implementation of the FP program.

(2) Designate in writing the Force Protection Officer (FPO) and the Assistant Force Protection Officer (AFPO).

(3) Propose to the Immediate Superior in Command (ISIC) the appropriate THREATCON as the Threat Level warrants.

(4) Approve a THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan, in accordance with ISIC guidance and using enclosure (1), for each port visit.

b. The Force Protection Officer (FPO) will:

(1) Act as the Commanding Officer's primary resource in matters relating to FP.

(2) Be responsible for the overall implementation and execution of the FP program.

(3) Evaluate the effectiveness of the FP program utilizing the standards identified in reference (c) as guidance.

c. The Assistant Force Protection Officer (AFPO) will:

(1) Be responsible for administrative aspects of the FP program.

(2) Direct the completion and documentation of Level I Anti-Terrorism (AT) training in accordance with reference (d) and ensure training is documented in RADM.

(3) Aggressively obtain timely intelligence reports and threat assessment information.

(4) Submit to the FPO a THREATCON Measures Implementation Plan and Inport Security Plan, ten days prior to each port visit, for review and recommendation to the Commanding Officer.

(5) Create and maintain a FP Emergency Action Binder for use by Combat Systems Duty Officers (CSDOs) to support Command Duty Officers (CDOs). The binder will contain the following:

- a. Definitions of Threat Levels.
- b. Definitions of THREATCONs.
- c. Detailed description of all THREATCON Measures.
- d. Laminated THREATCON Measure Implementation Checklists.
- e. THREATCON Measure Attainment response message template on disk.
- f. Description of the Navy Blue Dart Message Program.
- g. Sample Blue Dart message.
- h. BLUE Dart response message template on disk.
- i. Security Alert Instruction.
- j. Force Protection points of contact.

(6) Maintain a Security Alert Instruction, reference (g), detailing specific procedures for Security Alerts.

(7) Act as the Training Group Supervisor for the FP Training Group in accordance with reference (f). This training group will consist of the FPO, AFPO, and all Anti-Terrorism Training Officers (ATTOs).

(8) Act as the Training Group Supervisor for the SSDF Training Groups in accordance with reference (f). There will be one training group for each inport duty section. Training will cover physical security procedures, counter-terrorism procedures, counter-surveillance procedures, individual protective measures, and security alert drills.

(9) Schedule and coordinate a Force Protection Readiness Review (FPRR) once during each Inter-Deployment Training Cycle in accordance with reference (c).

d. The Anti-Terrorism Training Officers (ATTOs) will:

(1) Assist the AFPO in the administration and documentation of Level I AT training.

(2) Act as Training Team Leaders, in accordance with reference (f), for the SSDF Training Group in their designated inport duty section.

(3) Liaison with the CDO to supervise and conduct training with their SSDF Training Group.

(4) Support the CSDO and CDO as the FP expert for their designated inport duty section.

## 7. Procedures.

a. The FPO will conduct a FP Program Review meeting once each quarter consisting of the AFPO, ATTOs, and CSDOs. This committee will review the FP program and discuss proposed changes.

b. The AFPO will conduct a Threat Assessment Review meeting consisting of the ATTOs ten days prior to every port visit. The purpose of this meeting will be to review current intelligence and develop a THREATCON Measure Implementation Plan.

8. Review. The FPO is responsible for the annual review of this instruction.

KIRK S. LIPPOLD

Distribution: (COLEINST 5216.1B)  
List 1, Class A

5.

COLEINST 3300.55

Encl(103) F 61 00 100



<u>THREATCON BRAVO</u>	<u>IMPLEMENT</u>	<u>RAM</u>	<u>WAIVE</u>
24. Boat Security Sweep			
25. Inspect all packages			
26. Keep craft away from ship			
27. Remove stages, barges, etc			
28. Review Liberty Policy			
29. Quarters at Foul weather parade			
30. List of Bilingual Personnel			
31. Arm quarterdeck watch			
32. Arm sound and security			
33. Review Security alert procedures			
34. Test Communications			
35. Conduct Pier searches			
36. Conduct Hull inspections			
37. Hoist ship's boats aboard			
38. Terminate all public visits			
39. Secure unused entrances			
40. Ensure only one brow rigged			
41. Maintain ability to get U/W			
42. Lay out Fire Hoses			
43. Obstruct Helo landing Areas			
44. Monitor Local Comme			
45. Keep Local Authorities informed			
46. Review THREATCON Charlie			

<u>THREATCON CHARLIE</u>	<u>IMPLEMENT</u>	<u>RAM</u>	<u>WAIVE</u>
47. Maintain Lower THREATCONS			
48. Set Zebra second deck and below			
49. Cancel liberty, execute recall			
50. Be prepared to get U/W			
51. Block vehicle access to the pier			
52. Deploy picket boats			
53. Establish boat exclusion zone			
54. Augment watches with SSDF			
55. Employ radar/sonar/screws			
56. Man repair lockers			

COLEINST 3300.55

- 57. Utilize airborne assets
- 58. Post anti-swimmer watch
- 59. Request security force augment
- 60. Review THREATCON Delta

<u>THREATCON DELTA</u>	<u>IMPLEMENT</u>	<u>RAM</u>	<u>WAIVE</u>
61. Maintain Lower THREATCONS			
62. Secure Weatherdecks			
63. Get underway			
64. Employ weaponry as necessary			

Submitted: Assistant Force Protection Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Date

Reviewed: Force Protection Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Date

Reviewed: Executive Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Date

Approved: Commanding Officer

\_\_\_\_\_  
Signature Date

TOPIC/LTG	LESSON TOPIC #
<b>I. COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE</b>	
COUNTER-SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURES	FP-01
<b>II. PHYSICAL SECURITY</b>	
PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT	FP-02
THREAT ASSESSMENT	FP-03
USE OF DEADLY FORCE	FP-04
SECURITY FROM UNAUTHORIZED VISITORS	FP-05
HOSTAGE SITUATION/INCIDENT PROCEDURES	FP-06
DEFECTORS/REFUGEES/DISASTER SURVIVORS	FP-07
SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES/MAIL BOMBS/BOMB THREATS	FP-08
ANTI-SMALL CRAFT/FLOATING DEVICE	FP-09
REPEL BOARDERS	FP-10
ANTI-SNEAK ATTACK/ANTI-SWIMMER	FP-11
TERRORIST THREATCON RESPONSE	FP-12
OVERHAUL/SHIPYARD SECURITY	FP-13
EMBARKATION SECURITY	FP-14
PIER SECURITY	FP-15
QUARTERDECK PROCEDURES AND VULNERABILITIES	FP-16
SECURITY FROM UNAUTHORIZED VISITORS	FP-17
<b>III. ANTI-TERRORISM</b>	
BASICS OF TERRORISM	FP-18
THREAT LEVELS/THREATCONS	FP-19
TYPES OF TERRORIST ATTACKS	FP-20
IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL TERRORIST ATTACKS	FP-21
RESPONSES TO TERRORIST ATTACKS	FP-22
<b>IV. PROTECTIVE MEASURES</b>	
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIVE MEASURES	FP-23
FAMILY PROTECTIVE MEASURES	FP-24
SHIP PROTECTIVE MEASURES	FP-25

Enclosure (2)

Encl (103) F65 06/100

REVISED: 15 AUGUST 2000

LESSON TOPIC: PHYSICAL SECURITY EQUIPMENT

INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATIONS:

A. DISCUSS the responsibilities of the CSDO in regard to Physical Security Equipment.

CSDO QUALIFIED E-6 OR ABOVE

TRAINING PERIOD: 1 HOUR

RELATED PQS ITEMS:

INSTRUCTION REFERENCES:

NAVEDTRA (SEC FORCE) 43387-2B 103.10.16  
104.1.12

- A. COLEINST 3300.55 (Series)
- B. Navy Law Enforcement Equipment Manual, Feb 1987
- C. Navy Physical Security Equipment Manual, July 1986

APPROVED:

FORCE PROTECTION OFFICER

INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS:

- A. Class II Body Armor
- B. Kevlar Helmet
- C. Standard Baton
- D. Portable handheld radios with headsets
- E. Night Vision Goggles
- F. MCU-2/P Gas Mask
- G. Inspection Mirrors

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

- A. DESCRIBE Physical Security Equipment used during Security Alert

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL:

## OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION

## RELATED INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY

- A. A wide variety of products are available from both civilian and government sources.
- B. Providing the security force with the best available tools may prove to have great impact on their ability to react properly in the event of an incident.
- C. All necessary equipment should be available and well maintained.
- D. Having the proper equipment on hand allows the SSDF flexibility to respond to any situation with the least amount of force required and to ensure maximum safety to SSDF personnel.
- E. The SSDF will have the following equipment available for use:
  - 1) Suitable Weapons. The SSDF may use the 9mm pistol, the 7.62mm M-14 rifle, the 12-gauge shotgun, or other special purpose weapons that may be carried onboard COLE
  - 2) Body Armor.
    - a. Class II weighs approximately 10 pounds and will stop low velocity rounds. It is available through supply.
    - 2) Demonstrate Body Armor to trainees.

## OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION

## RELATED INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY

b. Class II Plus Body Armor, which must be purchased commercially, is specifically designed to stop bullets. It is lighter, more comfortable, and will stop rounds from high velocity weapons.

3) Kevlar Helmets. These provide enhanced protection against fragmentation and will stop low to medium velocity bullets.

4) Standard Batons.

a. When employed correctly, the standard nightstick can be an effective, non-lethal means of deterring, restraining, or apprehending an individual.

b. If used improperly, however, the baton can cause serious or even fatal injuries.

c. The standard baton is made of hard wood or polymer, approximately 26 inches long and 1 1/4 inches in diameter.

d. It is most effective when used against large muscle groups such as the thigh or upper arm.

3) Demonstrate Kevlar Helmets to trainees

4) Demonstrate Baton to trainees

## OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION

## RELATED INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY

e. Primarily used in situations where security personnel are being threatened with a weapon other than a gun.

5) Portable handheld radios with headsets.

a. Radio communications can provide a secure, or at least reliable, means of communicating real time intelligence, tactical directions, or other vital information that may increase the ability of COLE's security force to neutralize the threat.

6) Flashlights

7) Night Vision Goggles

8) MCU-2/P Gas Masks

9) Inspection Mirrors. To be used in searches

5) Demonstrate radios to trainees

6) Demonstrate flashlights to trainees

7) Demonstrate NVGs to trainees

8) Demonstrate gas mask to trainees

9) Demonstrate mirror

F. REVIEW AND SUMMARY

ENS

From:

Sent:

To:

CINCLANTFLT\_NORFOLK\_VA/N34/N467//@

Friday, April 14, 2000 7:03 AM

ALLOFFICERS@COLE.NAVY.MIL; ALSECONDFLT@;

COMNAVREG\_MIDLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;

COMNAVREG\_SE JACKSONVILLE FL@; NAS OCEANA\_VA@;

NAVMECEN\_PORTSOUTH\_VA@; NAVSTA\_NORFOLK\_VA@;

LANTFLT\_HEDSUPACT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;

NAVPHIBASE\_LITTLE\_CREEK\_VA@; WPNSTA\_YORKTOWN\_VA@;

NAVSECGRUACT\_NORTHWEST\_VA@;

NAVCRIMINVSERVFO\_NORFOLK\_VA@; CBC\_GULFPORT\_MS@;

NAS JACKSONVILLE FL@; NAS\_KEY\_WESY\_FL@;

NAVSTA\_GUANTANAMO\_BAY\_CU@; NAVSTA\_MAYPORT\_FL@;

NAVSTA\_PASCAGOULA\_MS@; WPNSTA\_CHARLESTON\_SC@;

SUBASE\_KINGS\_BAY\_GA@

Cc:

COMNAVSURFLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;

COMNAVAILANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@; COMSUBLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;

NAS KEFLAVIK\_IC@; NAVSTA\_ROOSEVELT\_ROADS\_PR@;

COMDT\_AFSC\_NORFOLK\_VA@; CINCLANTFLT\_NORFOLK\_VA@

Subject:

CY00 CINCLANTFLT AT/FP EXERCISE / 132335Z APR 00 SMN  
00001/10500

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS

ACTION PRECEDENCE: P R I O R I T Y

SSIC: 03300

DTG: 132335Z APR 00

BT

\*\*\*THIS IS A 2 PART MESSAGE COLLATED BY NAVMACS II\*\*\*

REF/A/MSG/CINCLANTFLT/032030ZMAR00//

REF/B/MSG/CINCLANTFLT//072255ZZAPR00//

REF/C/DOC/DOD/FEB93//

REF/D/MSG/CNO/191301ZJUN99//

NARR/REF A IS CINCLANTFLT EXERCISE OVERVIEW MESSAGE. REF B IS EXERCISE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION. REF C IS PROTECTION OF DOD PERSONNEL AND ACTIVITIES AGAINST ACTS OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL TURBULENCE. REF D IS SHIPBOARD PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES.//

POC/EDWARDS/LCDR/CLF/N341/DSN:836-6693/COMM: (757)836-6693/E-MAIL:

EDWARDS.JM@CLF.NAVY.MIL OR GREGORY/CIV/CLF/N342/DSN: 836-6363/COMM:

(757) 836-6363/EMAIL: GREGORYRE@CLF.NAVY.MIL//

RMKS/1. THIS MESSAGE AMPLIFIES REFS A AND B AND PROVIDES ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE FOR UNITS AND INSTALLATIONS PARTICIPATING IN THE 3-5 MAY 00 JTFEX 00-2 AT/FP EXERCISE. THREATCON MANAGEMENT WILL BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN MAINTAINING EXERCISE REALISM. NORMALLY, ANY ATTEMPT OR ACTUAL TERRORIST ATTACK WITHIN CLF AOR WOULD STIMULATE AN IMMEDIATE INCREASE TO THREATCON DELTA WITHIN THE TARGETED REGION AND MOST LIKELY THREATCON CHARLIE IN OTHER REGIONS. HOWEVER, THIS REALISTIC INCREASE TO THREATCON DELTA DURING THE EXERCISE WOULD REDUCE TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES FOR OTHER COMMANDS. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE IS PROVIDED TO ENSURE MAXIMUM TRAINING OPPORTUNITY:

1.A. COMMANDS WILL ESCALATE THREATCON BASED SOLELY ON INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTED SCENARIO MESSAGE TRAFFIC.

1.B. ALL OPFOR IMPOSITIONS ON INDIVIDUAL COMMANDS WILL BE CONSIDERED STAND-ALONE EVENTS AND WILL IMPACT THREATCON FOR THAT INDIVIDUAL COMMAND ONLY. HOWEVER, FOR SHIPS BERTHED AT THE SAME PIER, ANY ATTACK ON AN AFLOAT UNIT SHOULD FLEX THE COMMUNICATIONS AND THREATCON ESCALATION FOR SHIPS AT THE PIER.

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2. THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THREATCON MEASURES IS PROVIDED TO ACHIEVE MAXIMUM TRAINING BENEFIT WITHOUT UNNECESSARY COST OR IMPACT TO DAILY OPERATIONS:

2.A. ASHORE MEASURES (REF C):

THREATCON	IMPLEMENT	RELAX	ELIMINATE
ALPHA	1 THROUGH 9	NONE	NONE
BRAVO	11,13,15,16,17,19,20 21,23,24,25,26,27	12,14,18,22	NONE
CHARLIE	30,33,35,36,37,39	31,32,34,38	NONE
DELTA	41,42,47,48,49,50	NONE	43,44,45,46

THE DEGREE AND LENGTH OF EXECUTION IS AT CO'S DISCRETION FOR ALL MEASURES LISTED AS IMPLEMENTED AND RELAXED. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELAXED SHORE MEASURES ARE:

MEASURES 12 AND 31: VERIFY PROCEDURES. NEITHER OVERTIME EXPENSES NOR EXTENDED WORKING HOURS ARE DESIRED.

MEASURE 14: RELOCATE EASY TO MOVE ITEMS AT LEAST 25 METERS FROM BUILDINGS AND MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO MOVE VEHICLES AT LEAST 25 METERS FROM BUILDINGS DURING NON-WORK HOURS. DURING WORK HOURS CERTAIN BUILDINGS MAY BE SELECTED TO EXERCISE THE 25-METER RESTRICTION.

MEASURE 18: APPLIES TO MESSES, CLUBS, AND ALL BUILDINGS WHICH RECEIVE FREQUENT DELIVERIES AND HOST LARGE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE. RANDOM INSPECTIONS OF DELIVERIES SHOULD BE CONDUCTED AND COMMANDS SHOULD VERIFY DELIVERY POINTS HAVE THE MEANS TO CONDUCT PROPER INSPECTIONS.

MEASURE 22: RELAXATION OF INSPECTION OF PERSONNEL ENTERING A FACILITY IS AUTHORIZED DURING HIGH VOLUME ACCESS TIMES.

MEASURE 32: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION TO MINIMIZE IMPACT DURING PEAK TRAFFIC HOURS.

MEASURE 34: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION AS FEASIBLE. HOWEVER, THOSE INSTALLATIONS THAT REQUESTED OPFOR SHOULD CONSIDER FULL IMPLEMENTATION FOR TARGETED BUILDINGS.

MEASURE 38: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION FOR LOCATION AND DURATION THAT BARRIERS REMAIN ERECTED.

2.B. COMBATANT SHIPBOARD THREATCON MEASURES (REF D).

THREATCON	IMPLEMENT	RELAX	ELIMINATE
ALPHA	1 THROUGH 16	NONE	NONE
BRAVO	17,18,19,21,22,25, 28-39,42-44,46	20,26,27,45	23,24,40,41
CHARLIE	47,48,52,53,54, 56,58,60	49,50,55,57	51,59
DELTA	61	62,64	63

THE DEGREE AND LENGTH OF EXECUTION IS AT CO'S DISCRETION FOR ALL MEASURES LISTED AS IMPLEMENTED AND RELAXED. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELAXED COMBATANT SHIPBOARD MEASURES ARE:

MEASURE 20: PIER ACCESS DETERMINED BY PIER SOPA AND WILL BE RESTRICTED TO MISSION CRITICAL PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES.

MEASURES 26 AND 53: LIMITED TO SHIPBOARD ACTION. COORDINATION WITH PORT AUTHORITY NOT REQUIRED.

MEASURE 27: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION BASED ON SHIPS OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS.

MEASURE 45: EXERCISE REPORTING ONLY, CONTACT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES NOT REQUIRED.

MEASURE 49: LIBERTY RESTRICTIONS NOT REQUIRED. COMMANDS SHOULD EXERCISE EMERGENCY RECALL PROCEDURES.

MEASURE 50: COMMANDS PARTICIPATING IN JTFEX 00-2 PREPARE TO GET UNDERWAY IAW JTFEX SORTIE PLAN. NON-JTFEX PARTICIPANTS MAY ELECT TO CONDUCT FAST CRUISE.

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MEASURE 55: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION BASED ON SHIP OPERATIONS AND PORT REGULATIONS.

MEASURES 57 AND 64: CONSIDER/DISCUSS EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS BUT DO NOT IMPLEMENT.

MEASURE 62: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION.

2.C. NONCOMBATANT SHIPBOARD THREATCON MEASURES (REF D).

THREATCON	IMPLEMENT	RELAX	ELIMINATE
ALPHA	1 THROUGH 15	NONE	NONE
BRAVO	16-18,20,21,24,27-28	19,25-26,43	22-23,38,39 29-37,40-42,44
CHARLIE	45,46,50,52-54	47-48,51	49
DELTA	55	57	56

THE DEGREE AND LENGTH OF EXECUTION IS AT THE CO'S DISCRETION FOR ALL MEASURES LISTED AS IMPLEMENTED AND RELAXED. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR RELAXED NONCOMBATANT SHIPBOARD MEASURES ARE:

MEASURE 19: PIER ACCESS DETERMINED BY PIER SOPA AND WILL BE RESTRICTED TO MISSION CRITICAL PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES.

MEASURE 25: LIMITED TO SHIPBOARD ACTION. COORDINATION WITH PORT AUTHORITY NOT REQUIRED.

MEASURE 26: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION BASED ON SHIPS OPERATIONS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS.

MEASURE 43: EXERCISE REPORTING ONLY, CONTACT WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES NOT REQUIRED.

MEASURE 47: LIBERTY RESTRICTIONS NOT REQUIRED. COMMANDS SHOULD EXERCISE EMERGENCY RECALL PROCEDURES.

MEASURE 48: COMMANDS PARTICIPATING IN JTFEX 00-2 PREPARE TO GET UNDERWAY IAW JTFEX SORTIE PLAN. NON-JTFEX PARTICIPANTS MAY ELECT TO CONDUCT FAST CRUISE.

MEASURE 51: COMMANDER'S DISCRETION BASED ON SHIP OPERATIONS AND PORT REGULATIONS.

MEASURE 57: CONSIDER/DISCUSS EMPLOYMENT OPTIONS BUT DO NOT IMPLEMENT.//

BT

ENS

From:  
Sent:  
To:

CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N34//@  
Tuesday, April 11, 2000 6:32 AM  
ALLOFFICERS@COLE.NAVY.MIL; ALSECONDFLT@;  
COMNAVREG\_MIDLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;  
COMNAVREG\_SE\_JACKSONVILLE\_FL@; NAS\_OCEANA\_VA@;  
NAVMECEN\_PORTSOUTH\_VA@; NAVSTA\_NORFOLK\_VA@;  
LANTFLT\_HEDSUPACT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;  
NAVPHIBASE\_LITTLE\_CREEK\_VA@; WPNSTA\_YORKTOWN\_VA@;  
NAVSECGRUACT\_NORTHWEST\_VA@;  
NAVCRIMINVSERVFO\_NORFOLK\_VA@; CBC\_GULFPORT\_MS@;  
NAS\_JACKSONVILLE\_FL@; NAS\_KEY\_WEST\_FL@;  
NAVSTA\_GUANTANAMO\_BAY\_CU@; NAVSTA\_MAYPORT\_FL@;  
NAVSTA\_PASCAGOULA\_MS@; WPNSTA\_CHARLESTON\_SC@;  
SUBASE\_KINGS\_BAY\_GA@; COMSCLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;  
USNS\_PATUXENT@; USNS\_ABLE@; USNS\_LEROY\_GRUMMAN@  
COMNAVSURFLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;  
COMNAVAIRLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@; COMSUBLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA@;  
NAS\_KEFLAVIK\_IC@; NAVSTA\_ROOSEVELT\_ROADS\_PR@;  
COMDT\_AFSC\_NORFOLK\_VA@; CINCLANTFLT\_NORFOLK\_VA@  
CY00 CINCLANTFLT AT/FP EXERCISE LETTER OF INSTRUCTION /  
072255Z APR 00 SMN 00032/10200

Cc:

Subject:

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS  
ACTION PRECEDENCE: R O U T I N E  
SSIC: 03300  
DTG: 072255Z APR 00

BT

\*\*\*THIS IS A 2 PART MESSAGE COLLATED BY NAVMACS II\*\*\*

MSGID/GENADMIN/CINCLANTFLT//

REF/A/MSG/CINCLANTFLT/032030ZFEB00//

REF/B/DOC/SECNAVINST 3300.C//

REF/C/DOC/OPNAVINST 3100.6G//

REF/D/MSG/CNO/242302ZSEP97//

NARR/REF A IS CINCLANTFLT MSG ANNOUNCING SUBJ EXERCISE. REF B IS NAVY COMBATING TERRORISM PROGRAM STANDARDS. REF C IS NAVY INCIDENT REPORTING INSTRUCTIONS. REF D IS NAVY BLUE DART TERRORISM THREAT WARNING MESSAGE (NAVOP 011/97)//

RMKS/1. THIS IS A COORDINATED CINCLANTFLT/COMSECONDFLT MESSAGE.  
2. THIS MSG PROVIDES LOI/CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR SUBJ EXERCISE TO BE CONDUCTED IN CONJUNCTION WITH JTFEX 00-2. THE EXERCISE WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THREE OVERLAPPING PHASES. 21 APR-2 MAY: INTEL BUILD-UP AND SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT, 26 APR-2 MAY: SURVEILLANCE PHASE (NO SURVEILLANCE CONDUCTED OVER 29/30 APR WEEKEND), 03-05 MAY; THREATCON BUILD-UP AND OPFOR PARTICIPATION.

3. BACKGROUND. REF A ANNOUNCES ALLANTFLT AT/FP EXERCISE TO BE CONDUCTED BY CINCLANTFLT, COMSECONDFLT AND REGIONAL COMMANDS. THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF THE EXERCISE IS TO TRAIN SHORE AND AFLOAT COMMANDERS AND PERSONNEL TO OPERATE AND DEPLOY FORCES THROUGHOUT THE THREATCON LEVELS. THIS EXERCISE IS NOT AN INSPECTION BUT RATHER AN OPPORTUNITY FOR COMMANDS TO PRACTICE AT/FP PROCEDURES AND ASSESS CAPABILITIES TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION FOR PERSONNEL, FACILITIES AND ASSETS.

4. GENERAL OBJECTIVES.

A. TRAIN CLF CRC, REGIONAL, TASK FORCE AND INSTALLATION/UNIT

Encl (103) A73 06/00

COMMANDERS TO OPERATE AND DEPLOY FORCES THROUGHOUT THREATCON LEVELS.

B. EXERCISE COMMAND CONTROL AND COMMUNICATION.

C. EXERCISE ABILITY TO RECEIVE, PROCESS AND DISSEMINATE TERRORIST THREAT INFORMATION.

D. EXERCISE OVERALL AFLOAT AND ASHORE COMMAND INTERACTION/LIAISON.

E. EXERCISE SECURITY FORCE AND DUTY OFFICER RESPONSE.

5. SAFETY.

A. SAFETY OBSERVERS ARE ASSIGNED TO EACH OPFOR SCENARIO. THEY ARE NOT PLAYERS FOR EITHER SIDE AND ARE NOT INVOLVED IN THE SCENARIOS. AUTHORITY OF ANY RULING BY OBSERVERS REGARDING ANY ASPECT OF PLAY IS ABSOLUTE. THEIR DIRECTION WILL BE ADHERED TO BY ALL BLUE AND OPFOR PERSONNEL. SAFETY OBSERVERS WILL STOP EXERCISE PLAY AT ANY TIME FOR SAFETY PURPOSES OR FOR ACTUAL EMERGENCIES. THEY WILL BE CLEARLY IDENTIFIED BY A YELLOW IDENTIFICATION CARD.

B. WHENEVER SAFETY OR OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DICTATE, EXERCISE PLAY WILL BE HALTED BY ANY INDIVIDUAL DECLARING AN EXERCISE TIME OUT.

C. AGGRESSIVE PHYSICAL FORCE IS PROHIBITED DURING THE EXERCISE. HOWEVER, DUTY BLUE FORCE SECURITY PERSONNEL AND OPFOR PERSONNEL MAY ENGAGE IN PHYSICAL CONTACT UNDER THE FOLLOWING CONDITIONS:

1. TO PREVENT THE ENDANGERMENT OF LIFE OR LIMB

2. TO THE EXTENT THAT FACILITATES UNIT TRAINING OBJECTIVES ARE MET. (ARREST, APPREHENSION, ETC.)

3. OPFOR PERSONNEL MAY BE RESTRAINED BY BLUE FORCE SECURITY PERSONNEL UTILIZING MINIMUM NECESSARY PHYSICAL CONTACT TO ACHIEVE TRAINING OBJECTIVES TO INCLUDE HANDCUFFS, TRANSPORT, DETENTION, AND INTERROGATION.

D. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL OPFOR RESIST APPREHENSION.

E. SAFETY CONTROLLERS ARE TO PAY SPECIAL ATTENTION TO ALL INCIDENTS OF PHYSICAL CONTACT BETWEEN BLUE AND OPFOR. FURTHERMORE, IT IS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF SAFETY CONTROLLERS TO INTERVENE WHENEVER PHYSICAL CONTACT EXCEEDS DEFINED PARAMETERS.

F. IN THE UNLIKELY EVENT OF PERSONAL INJURY, EXERCISE PLAY WILL BE HALTED UNTIL MEDICAL ATTENTION HAS BEEN ADMINISTERED. IF MEDICAL ATTENTION IS REQUIRED, THE INCIDENT WILL BE IMMEDIATELY REPORTED TO A SAFETY CONTROLLER, WHO WILL THEN AUTHORIZE RESUMPTION OF EXERCISE PLAY ONLY WHEN IT IS APPROPRIATE TO DO SO.

G. OPFOR PERSONNEL ARE NOT AUTHORIZED USE OF ANY PHYSICAL RESTRAINING DEVICES. OPFOR PERSONNEL WILL SUBMIT TO APPREHENSION WHEN CONFRONTED AND CHALLENGED BY BLUE FORCE SECURITY PERSONNEL. THE ON SITE SAFETY CONTROLLER WILL HAVE RULING AUTHORITY.

H. TO ENSURE SAFETY AND TO AVOID ALARMING THE LOCAL POPULACE, EXERCISE PLAY OF ANY KIND WILL NOT BE AUTHORIZED BEYOND THE PERIMETERS OF PARTICIPATING FACILITIES. ADDITIONALLY, EXERCISE PLAY IN MILITARY HOUSING AREAS IS NOT PLANNED OR AUTHORIZED.

I. BLUE FORCE AUXILIARY SECURITY FORCE AND QUARTERDECK SECURITY PERSONNEL SHOULD BE ARMED IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMMANDS NORMAL OPERATING PROCEDURES.

J. ALL OPFOR CAR BOMBS, LETTER BOMBS, PACKAGE BOMBS, AND IED ARE SIMULATED. THESE SIMULATED DEVICES WILL BE CLEARLY MARKED AND SERIALIZED IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER:

1. CAR BOMBS AND IED WILL DISPLAY RED OR ORANGE REFLECTIVE TAPE ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE DEVICE. ADDITIONALLY THESE DEVICES WILL DISPLAY SERIAL NUMBERS ASSIGNED BY OPFOR PERSONNEL.

2. LETTER BOMBS AND PACKAGE/BRIEFCASE BOMBS WILL CONTAIN WITHIN THEM RED OR ORANGE REFLECTIVE TAPE THAT IS CLEARLY VISIBLE UPON

Encl (103) + 7406100

OPENING THE PACKAGE/BRIEFCASE OR LETTER.

K. OPFOR PERSONNEL WILL NOT PLACE BLUE FORCES IN ANY SITUATION THAT REQUIRES THE DRAWING OF A WEAPON. BLUE FORCE WEAPONS WILL NOT BE POINTED AT PERSONNEL AT ANY TIME AS PART OF EXERCISE PLAY. AN ORDER TO HALT FOLLOWED BY A HAND PLACED ON A SIDEARM HOLSTER AND A POINTED FINGER, OR BY A RIFLE OR SHOTGUN HELD AT PORT ARMS, WILL BE SUFFICIENT TO INDICATE CONTROL IN APPREHENSION SITUATIONS.

L. ANY SIMULATED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE WHICH DOES NOT CONTAIN OR DISPLAY MARKINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS INSTRUCTION WILL BE TREATED AS REAL/ACTUAL.

6. COMMUNICATIONS PROCEDURES

A. REPORT IAW REFS C AND D VIA QUICKEST MEANS (DESIGNATED VOICE COMM OR LANDLINE) ANY EXERCISE INCIDENTS. ENSURE THAT ALL COMMUNICATIONS, INCLUDING VOICE COMMUNICATIONS, BEGIN AND END WITH WORDS ((EXERCISE, EXERCISE, EXERCISE)).

B. ALL REPORTS TRANSMITTED VIA MTF MESSAGE FORMAT WILL BE SENT AS A MESSAGE WITH-IN A MESSAGE. THE FOLLOWING FORMAT WILL BE USED:

FM INSTALLATION/SHIP

TO CINCLANTFLT NORFOLK VA//N34//

INFO CHAIN OF COMMAND UP TO NUMBERED FLEET OR REGIONAL COMMANDER//

CLASSIFICATION //N03300//

EXER/CLF ALLANTFLT AT/FP 00//

MSGID/GENADMIN, UNIT SITREP, OPREP ETC.../COMMAND/SERIAL//XXX//

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE

MSGID/GENADMIN/CINCLANTFLT//

POC/NAME/RANK/PRIPHN: AREA CODE NUMBER: DSN//

APPROPRIATE MESSAGE TEXT.

EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE EXERCISE

DECL ((IF CLASSIFIED))//

PHONE NUMBERS

CRRG CDO: 836-5397/5398

CLF EXERCISE CONTROL: 836-6693/6363/6360/6364

7. AREAS OF PLAY. EXERCISE PLAY WILL BE RESTRICTED TO THOSE AREAS THAT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY APPROVED.

8. TRUSTED AGENTS. A REPRESENTATIVE FROM EACH INSTALLATION/SHIP PARTICIPATING IN SUBJ EXERCISE AND SUBJECT TO OPFOR WILL BE REQUIRED TO PROVIDE LIAISON BTW CINCLANTFLT REPRESENTATIVE AND THE COMMANDING OFFICER. TRUSTED AGENTS WILL BE PROVIDED WITH DETAILED INFO ON THE SCENARIOS AND WILL ENSURE THAT THEY WILL NOT INTERFERE WITH COMMAND OPERATIONS/ROUTINES. IN MOST CASES, THE SHIPS AT/FP OFFICER WILL ACT NOT ONLY AS THE TRUSTED AGENT, BUT ALSO AS THE COMMAND SAFETY OBSERVER.

9. SCENARIOS. SITE, TIME, SPECIFIC SCENARIO SCHEDULE WILL BE PROVIDED TO THE TRUSTED AGENTS. IN THE INTEREST OF MAINTAINING REALISM, THERE WILL BE NO GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE EXERCISE SCHEDULE. SCENARIOS REQUESTED INCLUDE SURVEILLANCE, VEHICLE BOMBS, QUARTERDECK PENETRATIONS WITH EXPLOSIVE DEVICES AND OTHERS.

10. SIMULATION OF EVENTS. TO PROVIDE REALISTIC TRAINING AS FEW EVENTS AS POSSIBLE WILL BE SIMULATED//

BT

Encl (103) A 2506/100

ENS [REDACTED]  
From: COMNAVSURFLANT\_NORFOLK\_VA//N412A1/N41A/N412/N412A/N8//@  
Sent: Wednesday, April 19, 2000 10:57 AM  
To: ALLOFFICERS@COLE.NAVY.MIL; ALLHANDS@COLE.NAVY.MIL;  
NAVSURFLANT\_SHIPS@  
Cc: COMNAVSEASYSKOM\_WASHINGTON\_DC@;  
CINCLANTFLT\_NORFOLK\_VA@NAVSEALOGCEN\_MECHANICSBURG\_P  
A@; NAVSEALOGCEN\_FSO\_JACKSONVILLE\_FL@;  
FISC\_PUGET\_SOUND\_WA@; NAVICP\_MECHANICSBURG\_PA@;  
FLTILACT\_PORTSMOUTH\_VA@  
Subject: FORCE PROTECTION (FP) ALLOWANCE EQUIPAGE LIST (AEL) METAL /  
181715Z APR 00 SMN 00045/11000

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLAS  
ACTION PRECEDENCE: R O U T I N E  
SSIC: 04000  
DTG: 181715Z APR 00

BT  
MSGID/GENADMIN/COMNAVSURFLANT//  
DETECTOR//  
REF/A/GENADMIN/COMNAVSURFLANT N41/221547Z MAR 00//  
AMPN/REF A ANNOUNCES DISTRIBUTION OF FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT  
ALLOWANCE LISTS AND DIRECTS SHIPS TO DOWNLOAD AND PROCESS APPLICABLE  
ASI PRODUCTS TO GENERATE OPN FUNDED REQUISITIONS.//  
POC/ROBERT KILLIUS/LT/N412A/-/TEL:(757) 836-3423/TEL:DSN 836-3423//

PAGE 02 RUCOMCB4311 UNCLAS  
POC/STEVE REED/SKCS(SW/SCW)/N412A1/-/TEL:(757) 836-3493  
/TEL:DSN 836-3493//  
RMKS/1. AS DIRECTED REF A, SHIPS SHOULD BE ORDERING NEWLY ALLOWED  
FORCE PROTECTION EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED ON THE AELS DELIVERED BY NORMAL  
ASI PROCESS. THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES UPDATED INFORMATION CONCERNING  
THE ITEMS ON THESE AELS.  
2. AELS 2-320024501, 2-320024502, AND 2-320024503 PROVIDE AN  
ALLOWANCE FOR HAND HELD METAL DETECTORS FOR ALL SHIP CLASSES EXCEPT  
MCMS/MHCS. MCMS AND MHCS RECEIVED THEIR ALLOWANCE FOR METAL DETECTORS  
ON AEL 2- 320024357. SOME SHIPS THAT HAVE ALREADY SUBMITTED  
REQUISITIONS BASED ON THESE ALLOWANCES MAY HAVE SEEN REQUISITION  
CANCELLATION STATUS FOR THE HAND HELD METAL DETECTOR, NSN  
1HS0000-LL-CQA-6961. THIS ITEM IS BEING PROCURED UNDER CONTRACT BY  
FISC PUGET SOUND BUT IS NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER THE NICN PROVIDED. TO  
ENSURE PROPER REQUISITION PROCESSING, ALL SHIPS SHOULD CANCEL ANY  
OUTSTANDING REQUISITIONS FOR THIS NICN AND REORDER, USING STANDARD  
OPN REQUISITIONING PROCEDURES (VO FUND CODE, RTG ID NUV) WITH THE  
WORD METALDETECT IN THE NSN FIELD, CARD COLUMNS 8-18 AS STATED IN  
THE MSG QUOTED BELOW. LEAVE EXTRA COLUMNS BLANK.  
3. SHIPS ARE REMINDED THAT ALL FORCE PROTECTION OUTFITTING

PAGE 03 RUCOMCB4311 UNCLAS  
REQUISITIONS MUST BE SUBMITTED BEFORE THE END OF THE CURRENT FISCAL  
YEAR TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF AVAILABLE FUNDING. IF YOU HAVE NOT  
ALREADY DONE SO, YOU MUST DOWNLOAD THE APPROPRIATE ASI PRODUCTS

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FROM SHIP7S RAD MAILBOX AND PROCESS ALL AVAILABLE ASIS INTO SNAP /  
OMMS / OMMS-NG AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

4. CONTACT CNSL POC WITH ANY QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS. CNSL HAS  
ABILITY TO DOWNLOAD ASI FILES TO PROVIDE TO ANY UNIT THAT MAY BE  
EXPERIENCING PROBLEMS USING RAD //

QUOTE

P 141551Z APR 00 ZYB

FM FISC PUGET SOUND WA//70/71//

TO RUCBTFA/COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA//N41/N43//

RUWDEAA/COMNAVSURFPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N41/N43//

RUWFEEA/COMNAVAIRPAC SAN DIEGO CA//N41/N42/N43//

RUCOSSA/COMNAVAIRLANT NORFOLK VA//N41/N42/N43//

RHHMDBA/COMSUBPAC PEARL HARBOR HI//N41/N43//

RUCBKMC/COMSUBLANT NORFOLK VA//N41/N43//

INFO RULSAMN/NAVSEALOGCEN MECHANICSBURG PA//N52//

RULSSEA/COMNAVSEASYS COM WASHINGTON DC//04L4//

UNCLAS //N04491//

PAGE 04 RUCOMCB4311 UNCLAS

PAGE 04 RUCOMCB4311 UNCLAS

MSGID/GENADMIN/FISC PUGET SOUND WA//APR//

REF/A/MSG/COMNAVSEASYS COM WASHINGTON DC/YMD:000204/040228ZFEB//

POC/CHRIS WADE/CIV/FISC PUGET SOUND C71//TEL:DSN 439-6129

/TEL:COMM (360) 476-6129//

RMKS/1. IRT REF A NICN 0000-LL-CQA-6961 TO BE ORDERED/REORDERED

USING THE WORD METALDETECT IN CARD COLMS 8 THRU 18.

2. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT POC.//

UNQUOTE

BT

Enc (003) F77 of 100

R 191301Z Jun 99 ZYB PSN 964647136

Fm CNO Washington DC

Unclas //N03300// section 01 of 04

Msgid/Genadmin/N34B//

Subj/SHIPBOARD PHYSICAL SECURITY GUIDELINES//

Ref/A/Doc/OPNAVINST 3300.53/-//

NARR/REF a is draft Directive with Policy and Procedures Supporting Antiterrorism Force Protection Program//

Poc/L. Welch/ GS-13/N34/-/TEL(202) 433-9137/ TEL: DSN 288-9137

1. Enclosure (14) to Ref (a) contains shipboard physical security guidelines for Terrorist Threat Conditions (THREATCONS). Providing policy, general guidance, and specific shipboard terrorist THREATCON Measures. This message revises enclosure 14 to Ref A and provides separate THREATCON Measures for combatant and non-combatant ships. Due to the urgency in establishing executable THREATCON Measures, this message contains measures for immediate implementation. It is intended to replace paragraph 8 of enclosure 14 to Ref A. This MSG has been staffed through CINCLANTFLT/ CINCPACFLT/ CINCUSNAVEUR/ NAVCENT/ MSC/ US COAST GUARD/ AND JCS (J34).

2. Replace paragraph 8 of enclosure 14 to Ref A with, the following, quote:

8. SHIPBOARD TERRORIST THREATCON MEASURES (COMBATANT SHIPS)

- A. The measures outlined below are for use aboard U.S. Navy vessels. These measures serve two purposes: **first**, the crew is alerted, additional watches are created, and there is greater security; **second**, these measures display the ship's resolve to prepare for and counter the terrorist threat. These actions will convey to anyone observing the ship's activities that the ship is prepared, the ship is an undesirable target, look elsewhere. The measures outlined below do not account for local conditions and regulations, special evolutions, or current threat intelligence. The command must maintain flexibility. As **THREATCONS** change, the necessary, additional measures must be taken immediately. While the simple solution to **THREATCON Charlie** or **Delta** is to get underway, this option may not always be available.
- B. The decision to arrive at a particular **THREATCON** should be based on multiple factors that may include, the threat, target vulnerability, criticality of assets, security resource availability, operational and morale impact, damage control, recovery procedures, international relations, and planned U.S. Government actions that could trigger a terrorist response.
- C. General guidance: There may be circumstances where the implementation of a specific measure is not possible. In those cases, the Commanding Officer should determine compensatory measures to be implemented to achieve the spirit and intent of the requirement to mitigate a specific vulnerability.
- D. The first section contains the Navy requirements for measures to be enacted on combatant ships during indicated Threat Conditions.

COMBATANT SHIPBOARD THREATCON MEASURES:

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- (1) **THREATCON Normal**: Applies when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.
- (2) **THREATCON Alpha**: This condition is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward an installation, a ship and personnel. The nature and extent of which is unpredictable, and when circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON Bravo measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from higher THREATCONS as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. Forward deployed (OCONUS) ships shall have an in-port force protection plan approved by the operational commander. The measures in this Threat Condition must be capable of being maintained indefinitely.

**Measure 1.** Brief crew on the port specific threat, the security/ force protection plan, and security precautions to be taken while ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures.

**Measure 2.** Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.

**Measure 3.** Review security plans and keep them available. Retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call.

**Measure 4.** Secure and periodically inspect spaces not in use.

**Measure 5.** Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity. Report unusual activities to the OOD.

**Measure 6.** Review pier and shipboard access control procedures.

**Measure 7.** Ensure sentries, roving patrols and the quarterdeck watch have the ability to communicate.

**Measure 8.** Coordinate pier/fleet landing security requirements with SOPA, co-located forces, and/or local authorities. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support and define methods of activation and communication.

**Measure 9.** When in a non-U.S. Navy controlled port, deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from the ship if possible (100 feet U.S. ports and 400 feet outside U.S., minimum stand-off distance).

**Measure 10.** Randomly inspect vehicles entering pier.

**Measure 11.** Randomly inspect hand carried items and packages before they are brought aboard.

**Measure 12.** Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment.

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**Measure 13.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, rig hawsepipe covers and rat guards on lines, cables and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar.

**Measure 14.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, ladders, etc. when not in use.

**Measure 15.** Increase frequency of security drills.

**Measure 16.** Review individual actions in THREATCON Bravo for possible implementation.

- (3) **THREATCON Bravo:** This condition is declared when an increase and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardships, affecting operational capability or aggravating relations with local authorities.

**Measure 17.** Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha measures.

**Measure 18.** Set material condition Yoke, main deck and below.

**Measure 19.** Consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreements, post pier sentries (armed at CO discretion), as necessary.

**Measure 20.** Restrict vehicle access to the pier. Discontinue parking on the pier, consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreements, establish unloading zone(s) and move all containers as far away from the ship as possible (recommend 100 feet in the U.S., 400 feet outside the U.S., minimum stand-off distance).

**Measure 21.** Consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreements, post additional watches (armed at CO discretion), as necessary. If armed, local threat environment and fields of fire should be considered when selecting weapons.

**Measure 22.** Post signs in local language that clearly define visiting and loitering restrictions.

**Measure 23.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, identify and inspect work boats, ferries and commercially rented liberty craft at least daily on a random basis.

**Measure 24.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, direct liberty boats to make a security tour around the ship upon departing from and arriving at the ship with particular focus on the waterline, and under pilings when berthed at a pier.

**Measure 25.** Inspect all hand carried items and packages before allowing them aboard, where available, use baggage scanners and walk through or hand held metal detectors to screen packages and personnel prior to boarding the ship.

**Measure 26.** Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from the ship. Authorized craft should be carefully controlled, coordinate with host nation/local port authority as necessary, and request their assistance in controlling unauthorized craft.

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**Measure 27.** Raise accommodation ladders, stern gates, ladders, etc., when not in use, clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts and lines.

**Measure 28.** Review liberty policy in light of the threat and revise it as necessary, to maintain safety and security of ship and crew.

**Measure 29.** Conduct divisional quarters at foul weather parade.

**Measure 30.** Ensure an up-to-date list of bilingual personnel for area of operations is available. Maintain warning tape in pilot house/ quarterdeck, for use on the ship's announcing system that warns small craft to remain clear in both the local language and English.

**Measure 31.** If not already armed, arm the quarterdeck watch.

**Measure 32.** If not already armed, arm the sounding and security patrol.

**Measure 33.** Review procedures for expedient issue of firearms and ammunition to the shipboard self-defense force (SSDF) and other members of the crew, as deemed necessary by the CO.

**Measure 34.** Test internal and external communications. Include connectivity checks with local agencies/authorities that will be expected to provide support, if required.

**Measure 35.** Instruct watches to conduct frequent, random searches of pier to include pilings and access points.

**Measure 36.** Conduct visual inspections of the ship's hull and boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before it puts to sea.

**Measure 37.** Hoist ship's boats aboard when not in use.

**Measure 38.** Terminate all public visits, in U.S. Navy controlled ports hosted visits (family, friends, small groups sponsored by the ship) may continue at the CO discretion.

**Measure 39.** After working hours, reduce entry points to ships interior by securing infrequently used entrances. Safety requirements must be considered.

**Measure 40.** In non-U.S. Government controlled ports, remove one brow if two are rigged.

**Measure 41.** In non-U.S. Government controlled ports, maintain capability to get underway on short notice or as specified by SOPA.

**Measure 42.** In non-U.S. Government controlled ports, consider layout of fire hoses. Brief designated personnel on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultra-light aircraft.

**Measure 43.** Where applicable, obstruct possible helicopter landing areas.

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**Measure 44.** Where possible, monitor local communications (ship to ship, TV, radio, police scanners. Etc.).

**Measure 45.** Inform local authorities of actions being taken as the THREATCON increases.

**Measure 46.** Review individual actions in THREATCON Charlie for possible implementation.

- (4) **THREATCON Charlie:** This condition is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against installations and personnel is imminent. Implementation of this Threat Condition for more than a short period will probably create hardship and affect the peacetime activities of the ship and its personnel.

**Measure 47.** Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha and Bravo measures.

**Measure 48.** Consider setting material condition zebra, second deck and below.

**Measure 49.** Cancel liberty, execute emergency recall.

**Measure 50.** Be prepared to get underway on short notice. If conditions warrant, request permission to sortie.

**Measure 51.** Block all vehicle access to the pier.

**Measure 52.** If the threat situation warrants, deploy picket boats to conduct patrols in the immediate vicinity of the ship. Brief boat crews and arm them with appropriate weapons, considering the threat, the local environment, and fields of fire.

**Measure 53.** Coordinate with host nation/local port authority to establish small boat exclusion zone.

**Measure 54.** Deploy the SSDF to protect command structure and augment posted watches. Station the SSDF in positions that provide 360-degree coverage of the ship.

**Measure 55.** Energize radar and/or sonar, rotate screws and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals, as needed to assist in deterring, detecting or thwarting an attack.

**Measure 56.** Consider manning repair locker(s). Be prepared to man one repair locker on short notice. Ensure adequate lines of communication are established with Damage Control Central.

**Measure 57.** If available and feasible, consider use of airborne assets as an observation/force protection platform.

**Measure 58.** If a threat of swimmer attack exists, activate an anti-swimmer watch.

**Measure 59.** In non-U.S. Government controlled ports and if unable to get underway, consider requesting augmentation security forces by the FLTCINC.

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Measure 60. Review individual actions in THREATCON Delta for implementation.

- (5) **THREATCON Delta:** This condition is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that terrorist action against a specific location is likely. Normally this threat condition is declared as a localized warning.

Measure 61. Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie measures.

Measure 62. Permit only necessary personnel topside.

Measure 63. If possible, cancel port visit and get underway.

Measure 64. Employ all necessary weaponry to defend against an attack.

- E. This section contains the navy requirements for measures to be enacted on non combatant ships during indicated threat conditions. Noncombatant shipboard THREATCON measures implementation of these measures impacts on the military sealift command and its cost of support to the DoD. The increased cost of security will be borne, as in other business communities, by the Customer.

#### **SHIPBOARD TERRORIST THREATCON MEASURES (NON COMBATANT SHIPS)**

- (1) **THREATCON Normal:** Exists when a general threat of possible terrorist activity exists, but warrants only a routine security posture.
- (2) **THREATCON Alpha:** Is declared when a general threat of possible terrorist activity is directed toward ships and personnel, the nature of which is unpredictable, and where circumstances do not justify full implementation of THREATCON Bravo measures. However, it may be necessary to implement certain selected measures from THREATCON Bravo as a result of intelligence received or as a deterrent. Forward-deployed (OCONUS) ships shall have an in-port Force Protection plan approved by the operational commander. The measures in THREATCON Alpha must be capable of being maintained indefinitely. The measures will be taken consistent with local rules, regulations, Status-of-Forces Agreements and the approved in-port force protection plan.

Measure 1. Brief crew on the port specific threat, the security/ force protection plan, and security precautions to be taken while ashore. Ensure all hands are knowledgeable of various THREATCON requirements and that they understand their role in implementation of measures.

Measure 2. Muster and brief security personnel on the threat and rules of engagement.

Measure 3. Review security plans and keep them available. Whenever possible retain key personnel who may be needed to implement security measures on call.

Measure 4. Secure and periodically inspect spaces not in use.

**Measure 5.** Remind all personnel to be suspicious and inquisitive of strangers, be alert for abandoned parcels or suitcases and for unattended vehicles in the vicinity. Report unusual activities to the master or mate on watch.

**Measure 6.** Review pier and shipboard access control procedures.

**Measure 7.** Ensure mate on watch, roving patrols and the gangway watch have the ability to communicate with one another.

**Measure 8.** Coordinate pier/fleet landing security requirements with SOPA, co-located forces, and/or husbanding agent. Identify anticipated needs for mutual support and define methods of implementation and communication.

**Measure 9.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, request husbanding agent arrange and deploy barriers to keep vehicles away from ship, if possible (100 feet in U.S., and 400 feet outside U.S., minimum stand-off distance).

**Measure 10.** Randomly inspect hand carried items and packages before they are brought aboard.

**Measure 11.** Regulate shipboard lighting to best meet the threat environment.

**Measure 12.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, rig hawsepipe covers and rat guards on lines, cables and hoses. Consider using an anchor collar.

**Measure 13.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, raise accommodation ladders, stern ramp, ladders, etc., When no watchstander is posted.

**Measure 14.** Increase frequency of security drills while in port.

**Measure 15.** Review individual actions in THREATCON Bravo for possible implementation.

- (3) **THREATCON Bravo:** Is declared when an increased and more predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. The measures in this threat condition must be capable of being maintained for weeks without causing undue hardships, without affecting operational capability, and without aggravating relations with local authorities. The measures will be taken consistent with local rules, regulations, Status-of- Forces Agreements and the approved inport force protection plan.

**Measure 16.** Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha measures.

**Measure 17.** Secure all watertight doors and hatches main deck and below.

**Measure 18.** Post pier sentries (armed at Master's discretion), as necessary.

**Measure 19.** Restrict vehicle access to the pier. Discontinue parking on the pier. Consistent with local rules, regulations, and/or the Status of Forces Agreements, establish unloading zone(s) and move all containers as far away from the ship as possible (recommend 100 feet in the U.S. 400 feet outside U.S., minimum stand-off distance).

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**Measure 20.** Post additional watches (armed at Master's discretion), as necessary.

**Measure 21.** Post signs in local language that clearly defines visiting and loitering restrictions.

**Measure 22.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, identify and randomly inspect authorized watercraft daily, i.e., workboats, ferries and liberty launches.

**Measure 23.** When in a non-U.S. Government controlled port, direct liberty launches to make a security tour around the ship upon departing from and arriving at the ship with particular focus on the waterline.

**Measure 24.** Inspect all hand carried items, and packages before allowing them on board. Where available, use baggage scanners and walk through or hand held metal detectors to screen packages and personnel prior to boarding the ship.

**Measure 25.** Implement measures to keep unauthorized craft away from ship. Coordinate with husbanding agent and port authority, as necessary.

**Measure 26.** Clear ship of all unnecessary stages, camels, barges, oil donuts, and lines.

**Measure 27.** Review liberty policy in light of the threat and revise it as necessary to maintain safety and security of ship and crew.

**Measure 28.** Provide watchstanders daily threat updates.

**Measure 29.** Master maintains a crew listing of all bilinguals' personnel for the area of operations. Ensure a warning tape or other suitable media is on the bridge that warns small craft to remain clear of ship. Warning should be in the local language and English. Maintain capability to broadcast warning on an announcing system.

**Measure 30.** Arm the gangway or mate on watch (at master's discretion).

**Measure 31.** Review procedures for expedient issue of firearms and ammunition to the reaction force as deemed necessary by the master.

**Measure 32.** Test internal and external communications. Include connectivity checks with local operational commander and authorities that will be expected to provide support, if required.

**Measure 33.** Instruct watches to conduct frequent, random searches of pier to include pilings and access points.

**Measure 34.** Conduct visual inspections of the ship hull and ships boats at intermittent intervals and immediately before getting underway.

**Measure 35.** Hoistships boats aboard when not in use.

**Measure 36.** Terminate all public visits. In U.S. Government controlled ports hosted visits (family, friends, small groups sponsored by the ship) may continue at the masters' discretion.

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Measure 37. After working hours, reduce entry to ships interior by securing infrequently used entrances.

Measure 38. In non-U.S. Government controlled ports, use only one gangway to access ship.

Measure 39. In non-U.S. Government controlled ports, maintain capability to get underway on short notice or as specified by SOPA.

Measure 40. In non-U.S. Government controlled ports, consider layout of fire hoses, brief crew on procedures for repelling boarders, small boats, and ultra-light aircraft.

Measure 41. Where applicable, obstruct possible helicopter landing areas.

Measure 42. Where possible, monitor local communications (ship to ship, TV, radio, police scanners, etc.).

Measure 43. Inform local authorities of actions being taken as THREATCON increases.

Measure 44. Review individual actions in THREATCON Charlie for possible implementation.

- (4) THREATCON Charlie: Is declared when an incident occurs or intelligence is received indicating that some form of terrorist action against ships and personnel is imminent. Implementation of this Threat Condition for more than a short period will probably create hardship and will affect the peacetime activities of the ship and its personnel. The measures will be taken consistent with local rules, regulations, Status-of-Forces Agreements and the approved in-port Force Protection plan.

Measure 45. Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha and Bravo measures.

Measure 46. Consider securing all access doors and hatches main deck and below.

Measure 47. Cancel liberty, and execute emergency recall.

Measure 48. Prepare to get underway on short notice. If conditions warrant, request permission to get underway.

Measure 49. Request armed security augmentation force from (FLTCINC).

Measure 50. Coordinate with Husbanding Agent and/or local authorities to establish small boat exclusion zone around ship.

Measure 51. Energize radar and/or sonar, rotate screw(s) and cycle rudder(s) at frequent and irregular intervals, as needed to assist in deterring, detecting or thwarting an attack.

Measure 52. Consider manning repair lockers, be prepared to man one repair locker on short notice. Ensure adequate lines of communication are established with damage control central or equivalent location.

Measure 53. If a threat of swimmer attack exists, activate an anti-swimmer watch.

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Measure 54. Review individual actions in THREATCON Delta for implementation.

- (5) THREATCON Delta: Is declared when a terrorist attack has occurred in the immediate area or intelligence has been received that indicates a terrorist action against a specific ship or person is likely. Normally, this threat condition is declared as a localized warning. The measures will be taken consistent with local rules, regulations, Status-of-Forces Agreements and the approved in-port force protection plan.

Measure 55. Maintain appropriate THREATCON Alpha, Bravo, and Charlie measures.

Measure 56. If possible, cancel port visit and get underway.

Measure 57. Employ all necessary weaponry to defend against attack.

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Encl (103) P 87 06/00

Tool

RTTUZYUW RUCOAR0974 3351939-UUUU--RHMCSUU.

ZNR UUUUU

R 011939Z DEC 99

FM USS COLE

TO COMNAVSURFLANT NORFOLK VA//N8/N81/N812//

INFO COMCRUDESGRU TWO

COMDESRON TWO TWO

USS ROSS

BT

UNCLAS //N03500//

MSGID/GENADMIN/COLE/-/DEC//

SUBJ/RECEIPT OF ANTI-TERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (AT/FP) TOOL KIT//

REF/A/MSG/COMNAVSURFLANT/162129ZNOV99//

AMPN/REF A IS DIRECTION TO TRANSFER AF/TP TOOL KITS FROM TRBATGRU TO  
GWBATGRU.//

POC/ [REDACTED], ENS/ORDNANCE OFFICER/COLE/-/TEL:757-445-6005//

RMKS/1. LAW REF A TRANSFER OF AT/FP TOOL KIT FROM USS ROSS TO USS  
COLE TOOK PLACE ON 30 NOV 99. THE FOL TOOL KIT ITEMS WERE RECEIVED:

ITEM	QUANTITY
A. BODY ARMOR	18
B. ROAD FANGS	4
C. EXPANDING FENCE	1
D. WATER BARRIERS	3
E. HEDGE HOG	2
F. METAL DETECTORS	2
G. SEARCH LIGHT	2
H. LIGHTING	1
I. ION DETECTOR	1
J. TACTICAL HELMET	18

2. ENS [REDACTED] (ORDNANCE OFFICER) IS DESIGNATED AS COLE'S POC FOR  
AT/FP TOOL KITS.//

BT

#0974

NNNN

[ ]

# USS COLE (DDG-67) SECURITY TRAINING EXERCISE HOSTAGE SITUATION

WATCH SECTION: DUTY SECTION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

### DUTY SECTION ASSIGNMENTS

CDO	
CSDO	
SECTION LEADER	
DUTY GUNNERS MATE	

The CSDO will brief the Section Leader & CDO on upcoming exercise. Prior to the briefing, a safety walk-thru will be conducted. When it is determined that it is safe to train, the following evolutions/casualty control drills will be conducted:

#### Evolutions to be conducted:

EVENT	TIME	PROCEDURE	SPACE	WATCHSTANDER
1	TBD	CSMC WATCH CALL QUARTERDECK WITH HOSTAGE SITUATION	CSMC	AS PER WATCHBILL
2	TBD	CALL AWAY SECURITY ALERT/ SECURE QDK	QDK	OOD
3	TBD	AWAY SECURITY ALERT PERSONNEL SAT/BAF/RF	SIFR/ ARMORY	CSDO/ DUTY GM
4	TBD	SECURE SPACE	CSMC	CSDO/SAT&BAF
5	TBD	USE APPROPRIATE FORCE/PROCEDURES TO RETRIEVE HOSTAGE	CSMC	CDO/CSDO
6	TBD	SECURE AND DEBRIEF	MESS DECKS	ALL SECURITY PERSONNEL/CDO/ CSDO
9	TBD	TRAINING COMPLETE	MESS DECKS	CDO/CSDO

#### Casualty Control Drills to be conducted if any:

EVENT	TIME	CASUALTY	SPACE	CASUALTY INSERTER

The following limitations/non-standard conditions exist: NONE

Submitted: \_\_\_\_\_  
FPTT COORDINATOR

Reviewed: \_\_\_\_\_  
WEAPONS OFFICER

Reviewed: \_\_\_\_\_  
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
COMMANDING OFFICER

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# USS COLE (DDG-67) SECURITY TRAINING EXERCISE DISTURBANCE ON THE PIER

WATCH SECTION: DUTY SECTION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

### DUTY SECTION ASSIGNMENTS

CDO	
CSDO	
SECTION LEADER	
DUTY GUNNERS MATE	

The CSDO will brief the Section Leader & CDO on upcoming exercise. Prior to the briefing, a safety walk-thru will be conducted. When it is determined that it is safe to train, the following evolutions/casualty control drills will be conducted:

#### Evolutions to be conducted:

EVENT	TIME	PROCEDURE	SPACE	WATCHSTANDER
1	TBD	PROTESTORS GATHER ON THE PIER	PIER	N/A
2	TBD	OOD CALLS AWAY SECURITY ALERT (COVERT)	QDK	OOD
3	TBD	AWAY SECURITY ALERT PERSONNEL SAT/BAF	SIFR/ ARMORY	CSDO/ARMORER
4	TBD	SAT/BAF/RF MAN FIRE HOSES WITH WEAPONS AT A STANDBY AREA	TBD	CSDO/SAT&BAF/ RF
5	TBD	SHARP SHOOTER IS PLACED AT A HIGH POINT ON THE SHIP	TBD	CSDO
6	TBD	SECURE AND DEBRIEF	MESS DECKS	ALL SECURITY PERSONNEL/CDO/ CSDO
9	TBD	TRAINING COMPLETE	MESS DECKS	CDO/CSDO

#### Casualty Control Drills to be conducted if any:

EVENT	TIME	CASUALTY	SPACE	CASUALTY INSERTER

The following limitations/non-standard conditions exist: NONE

Submitted: \_\_\_\_\_  
FPTT COORDINATOR

Reviewed: \_\_\_\_\_  
WEAPONS OFFICER

Reviewed: \_\_\_\_\_  
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
COMMANDING OFFICER

*Encl (103) p 90 of 100*

**USS COLE (DDG-67)  
SECURITY TRAINING EXERCISE  
SECURE SPACE LEFT OPEN & UNMANNED**

WATCH SECTION: DUTY SECTION \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

**DUTY SECTION ASSIGNMENTS**

<b>CDO</b>	
<b>CSDO</b>	
<b>SECTION LEADER</b>	
<b>DUTY GUNNERS MATE</b>	

The CSDO will brief the Section Leader & CDO on upcoming exercise. Prior to the briefing, a safety walk-thru will be conducted. When it is determined that it is safe to train, the following evolutions/casualty control drills will be conducted:

**Evolutions to be conducted:**

EVENT	TIME	PROCEDURE	SPACE	WATCHSTANDER
1	TBD	IEM FINDS SECURE SPACE OPEN AND UNMANNED (I.E. SIFR, ARMORY, COMMS CENTER, REGISTERED PUB LIBRARY, SHIPS STORE, DISBURSING)	TBD	AS PER WATCHBILL
2	TBD	IEM CONTACTS OGD, INFORMS OF OPEN AREA	TBD	AS PER WATCHBILL
3	TBD	CALL AWAY SECURITY ALERT	QDK	OOD
4	TBD	AWAY SECURITY ALERT PERSONNEL SAT/BAF	SIFR/ ARMORY	CSDO/ARMORER
4	TBD	SECURE SPACE	TBD	CSDO/SAT&BAF
5	TBD	QUARTERDECK IS SECURED	QDK	OOD/POOW/RF
6	TBD	SECURE AND DEBRIEF	MESS DECKS	ALL SECURITY PERSONNEL/CDO/ CSDO
9	TBD	TRAINING COMPLETE	MESS DECKS	CDO/CSDO

**Casualty Control Drills to be conducted if any:**

EVENT	TIME	CASUALTY	SPACE	CASUALTY INSERTER

The following limitations/non-standard conditions exist: NONE

Submitted: \_\_\_\_\_  
FPTT COORDINATOR

Reviewed: \_\_\_\_\_  
WEAPONS OFFICER

Reviewed: \_\_\_\_\_  
EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Approved: \_\_\_\_\_  
COMMANDING OFFICER

*Encl (103) 491 8/00*

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

# FIELD INTERVIEW CARD

1. NAME	2. SSN	3. TELEPHONE	4. DATE & PLACE OF BIRTH
5. ADDRESS	6. SEX/RACE/HEIGHT/WEIGHT/HAIR/EYES		
7. SCARS, MARKS, TATTOOS			
8. DATE, TIME, LOCATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING INTERVIEW			
9. STATED REASON FOR BEING IN AREA			
10. INTERVIEWER(S)			
11. REMARKS			
12. SIGNATURE OF INTERVIEWING OFFICIAL(S)		13. LOCATION OF INTERVIEW	

FORM 100 (REV. 1-75) (100)

LESSON TOPIC: GUIDE (FP-26)

USS COLE (DDG-67)

REVISED: 15 AUGUST 2000

LESSON TOPIC: COUNTERSURVEILLANCE

INSTRUCTOR QUALIFICATIONS:

CSDO QUALIFIED E-6 OR ABOVE

- A. DISCUSS the procedures for detecting and reporting adverse surveillance in order to ultimately prevent it from occurring.

TRAINING PERIOD: 1 HOUR

RELATED POS ITEMS:

NONE

INSTRUCTION REFERENCES:

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

FORCE PROTECTION OFFICER

INSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS:

NONE

TRAINING OBJECTIVES:

- A. DESCRIBE characteristics of surveillance to in corporate and utilize active and passive countermeasures.

ADDITIONAL OBJECTIVES FOR SUPERVISORY

PERSONNEL:

FP-26-1

File (One) 189708 100

## OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION

## RELATED INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY

- A. Everyone is susceptible to a terrorist attack and most attacks are planned weeks ahead, beginning with a steady watch on the target.
- B. Being able to observe and assess a situation and the people involved is the first step in countersurveillance.
- C. There are phases of surveillance beginning with target selection and assessment and culminating with the operational and attack phase.
- D. With regards to a base or ship, terrorists are looking for specific characteristics of our forces, such as alert sentries and reactions to suspicious items.
- E. Surveillance can be done utilizing different forms such as by foot, vehicles, or the more advanced leading.
- F. Proactive countersurveillance begins with learning what is normal to eventually recognize the abnormal.

## OUTLINE OF INSTRUCTION

## RELATED INSTRUCTOR ACTIVITY

G. If surveillance is occurring and recognized, then it must be reported. Confrontation is usually not the best idea and should be avoided. If confrontation does not seem to pose a threat, utilize a Field Interview Card to remember what happened later.

Hand out F/I cards

H. Practicing how to utilize descriptive words when describing vehicles, people, and situations to develop skills for proactive countersurveillance.

Show vehicles, people, and license plates for a Moment and then ask audience to describe.

I. After reports of surveillance, the situation is evaluated, the next shift notified, and records of the "sightings" are kept to compare to past and future reports.



J. REVIEW AND SUMMARY

## Letter and Package Bomb Indicators

Source. From FBI Files

### RECOGNITION POINTS

- Excessive Postage
- Incorrect Titles
- Titles but no Names
- Misspellings of Common Words
- Oily Stains or Discoloration's
- No Return Address
- Excessive Weight
- Rigid Envelope
- Lopsided or Uneven Envelope
- Protruding Wires or Tin Foil
- Visual Distractions
- Foreign Mail, Air Mail and Special Delivery.
- Restrictive Markings such as Confidential, Personal, etc.
- Handwritten or Poorly Typed Addresses
- Excessive Securing Material such as No Return Masking Tape, String, etc.



### PRECAUTIONS

- Never accept mail, especially packages, at your home in a foreign country.
- Make sure family members and clerical staff know to refuse all unexpected mail at home or office.
- Remember: **It May Be A Bomb.** Treat it as suspect.

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## Surveillance Detection

1. The following is a list of methods personnel can employ to assist in detecting surveillance. This list is not all inclusive, intended more as a guide for personnel not trained in surveillance activities. Recommend pier sentry be equipped with pen/paper to facilitate reporting suspected/actual activity.

### **a. Guarded Entrances**

1. Mentally note vehicle's license plate, make, model, and color as they approach.
2. Mentally note any oddities, i.e., damage to vehicle, license plates, decals on the vehicles as they approach.
3. Mentally note the vehicles' occupants as they approach.
4. When checking identification papers, engage the occupants in conversation, i.e., a greeting evoking a response from the occupant(s).
5. Mentally note physical description of the occupants.
6. Mentally note the contents of the vehicle (may also serve as a method of engaging conversation)
7. Mentally note physical attributes of personnel approaching via foot, bicycle or other than vehicular.
8. Mentally note items carried by personnel approaching via foot, bicycle or other than vehicular.

### **b. Public Domain - be aware of surroundings**

1. Generally note who and what is in the area.
2. Vary routes of approach, i.e., taking the same route to work, gym, shopping, etc. makes an easy target.
3. Be alert to repetitive sightings of people that appear out of place.

### **c. Suspicious Activity**

1. Vehicles passing same areas frequently or at slower than normal rate.
2. Vehicles with multiple passengers.
3. Dirty vehicle – clean license plate (or vice versa) [indication of recent change]
4. Personnel lingering in area or passing by frequently
5. Note/survey windows in near-by buildings for anything out of the ordinary (open window – cold day // closed window – hot day; frequent movement at the window; new fixtures installed.
6. Personnel or vehicles making evasive movements

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## POTENTIAL INDICATORS OF TERRORIST ACTIVITY

### 1. SURVEILLANCE OF US PERSONNEL & FACILITIES

- PERSONS WHO SEEM OUT OF PLACE SEEN REPEATEDLY NEAR US FACILITIES OR PLACES FREQUENTED
- BY US PERSONNEL
- PERSONS WATCHING, PHOTOGRAPHING, OR VIDEOTAPING US FACILITIES, US MILITARY PERSONNEL,
- DEPENDENTS AND CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CIVILIAN ESTABLISHMENTS FREQUENTED BY US PERSONNEL

### 2. VANDALISM OF US FACILITIES

- VANDALISM ACCOMPANIED BY THREATS, WARNINGS, OR ANTI-US STATEMENTS
- APPARENT VANDALISM AFFECTING SECURITY MECHANISMS (E.G., PERIMETER LIGHTS OR CAMERAS DISABLED)

### 3. ANTI-US PROPAGANDA AND GRAFFITI

- LEAFLETS, SPRAY PAINTED MESSAGES, SLOGANS
- OPEN SOURCE ANTI-US ANNOUNCEMENTS (RADIO, TELEVISION, NEWS, PAPERS AND MAGAZINES)

### 4. DEMONSTRATIONS

### 5. BOMB THREATS

- BOMB THREAT FOLLOWED BY SURVEILLANCE
- PERSONS OBSERVING OR VIDEOTAPING RESPONSE TO BOMB THREAT (E.G., SURVEILLANCE OF EVACUATION PROCEDURES, ASSEMBLY/STAGING AREAS, ROUTES, REINFORCEMENTS, RESPONSE TIMES, ETC.)

### 6. OTHER THREATS TO US PERSONNEL & FACILITIES

- THREATS MAY BE DIRECT OR THROUGH THIRD PARTIES SUCH AS HOST NATION OR STATE SPONSORED ORGANIZATIONS, SOCIAL/FRATERNAL GROUPS, ETC.)

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## 7. RECENTLY ABANDONED VEHICLES

- ON OR NEAR A US FACILITY AND/OR PLACES FREQUENTED BY US PERSONNEL

## 8. UNAUTHORIZED OR SUSPICIOUS PERSONS ON US FACILITIES

- PERSONS WITHOUT INSTALLATION PASSES
- PERSONS WHO LOOK LOST OR APPEAR TO BE LOOKING FOR SOMETHING
- PERSONS ASKING ABOUT PROCEDURES FOR INSTALLATION ACCESS

## 9. SUSPICIOUS PACKAGES

- UNATTENDED BAGS IN A LOCATION WHERE BAGS ARE NOT USUALLY SEEN
- UNSOLICITED PACKAGES RECEIVED THROUGH LOCAL AND/OR US POSTAL SERVICES

## 10. SUSPICIOUS VEHICLES

- VEHICLES PASSING SAME AREAS FREQUENTLY OR SLOWER THAN NORMAL SPEED.
- VEHICLES WITH MULTIPLE PASSENGERS.
- DIRTY VEHICLES WITH CLEAN LICENSE PLATES OR VICE VERSA. (THIS MAY INDICATE PLATES WERE RECENTLY CHANGED.)
- VEHICLE WITH US PLATES, BUT DRIVER IS NOT AN ID CARD HOLDER, OR VEHICLE WITH GERMAN PLATES, DRIVER IS AN ID CARD HOLDER
- VEHICLES MAKING EVASIVE MOVEMENTS
- VEHICLES THAT APPROACH GATES, THEN TURN AROUND

## 11. UNAUTHORIZED REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION (IN PERSON, BY TELEPHONE OR EMAIL)

- UNAUTHORIZED REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION ABOUT UNITS, FACILITIES, PERSONNEL, AND SECURITY MEASURES
- UNEXPECTED EMAIL FROM NON-MILITARY ADDRESS REQUESTING MILITARY INFORMATION

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### 12. COMPUTER INTRUSIONS AND UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS TO INFORMATION SYSTEMS

- ERROR MESSAGES STATING THE COMPUTER WAS IMPROPERLY SHUT DOWN (WHEN USUAL OPERATOR DID NOT TURN OFF COMPUTER).
- THE DATE LAST MODIFIED FILE UNDER MICROSOFT WORD IS MORE RECENT THAN EXPECTED.
- IN WINDOWS 95, UNDER START DOCUMENTS, THERE ARE FILES LISTED THAT YOU HAVE NOT PERSONALLY OPENED
- SETTINGS HAVE BEEN CHANGED ON YOUR COMPUTER.
- WHEN YOU LOG ON, A WINDOW IS OPEN THAT WAS NOT OPEN WHEN YOU SHUT YOUR COMPUTER DOWN
- FILES DELETED OR ALTERED
- FILES CREATED DURING NON-DUTY HOURS

### 13. ATTACKS AND HARASSMENT DIRECTED AGAINST US PERSONNEL

- PERSONS WHO THREATEN OR HARASS GATE GUARDS
- MUGGINGS AND PICKPOCKETING INCIDENTS WHICH CAUSED THE LOSS OF US MILITARY IDENTIFICATION CARD, INSTALLATION PASS, US PASSPORT, ETC.

### 14. ATTEMPTS TO SELL FALSE IDENTIFICATION CARDS OR SOLICIT US PERSONNEL TO ASSIST IN BUYING/SELLING US MILITARY IDENTIFICATION

### 15. POSSIBLE REHEARSAL OF ATTACKS ON US PERSONNEL & FACILITIES

- NOTES, MAPS AND OR OTHER RELATED DOCUMENTS DISCOVERED IN VEHICLE DETAINED BY MILITARY GUARDS AT US INSTALLATION CHECKPOINTS OR DISCOVERED BY LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL

The above information was extracted from a U.S. Army intelligence document dated 03 Sep 98.

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