

A-107/JWS:pmh

17 Oct. 1950

MEMORANDUM

From: A-107

To: A-200

Subj: Information for "Battle Report"

Ref: (a) Memorandum from A-100 to A-107; A-300 and A-400, dtd 6 Oct. 1950

1. Reference (a) requested that information be forwarded to A-200 outlining the action taken by this office toward fulfilling the Bureau's responsibility in the Korean Campaign.
2. This office is responsible for the Bureau of Yards and Docks and in co-operation with the Bureau of Naval Personnel for the support of the various Reserve Programs sponsored by the Bureau of Yards and Docks. These programs at the present are:
 - a. Organized CB Reserve Program consisting of 246 organized companies with an on board strength at the time of the Korean outbreak of 1022 officers and 7274 enlisted men.
 - b. The Volunteer Civil Engineer Corps Reserve Program consisting of 227 units with a corresponding on board strength of 3190 officers and 1198 enlisted men.
 - c. Volunteer Automotive Transportation Program consisting of 23 units with an on board strength of approximately 170 officers and 127 enlisted men.
3. In general the action taken by this office to support the Korean situation consists of two parts:
 - a. In cooperation with BUPERS providing necessary Civil Engineer Corps Reserve Officer personnel and CB Reserve enlisted personnel to increase the strength of the active duty Naval forces.
 - b. In cooperation with BUPERS intensify^{ing} the recruiting of Civil Engineer Corps Reserve officers and Group VIII CB Reserve personnel in order to compensate for reserve personnel recalled to active duty, and in addition to provide a larger in-active reserve to satisfy future requirements if the international situation deteriorates further.
4. Concerning the recall of reservists to active duty, this office by personal correspondence, and by wider dissemination of official Navy Department directives and by field trips keeps the district Civil Engineer Corps and district Reserve CB Program officers currently informed concerning all matters affecting the

recall of reservists to active duty in order to minimize the existence of any uncertainty or misunderstanding in the field. In addition, this office was also called upon to make individual recommendations concerning the recall to active duty of reserve officers who were specialists in the field of Automotive Transportation.


5. Under existing recall quotas the above enumerated reserve programs will provide approximately 300 officers and 3000 enlisted men for active duty.

6. The Bureau of Naval Personnel directed that Naval Reserve Programs be continued at authorized strength regardless of recalls of reservists to active duty. In order that the Reserve Programs under the sponsorship of this Bureau, could be satisfactorily maintained it was necessary to secure additional replacements from civilian life. This was particularly true in the case of enlisted Group VIII CB ratings. Recruiting under the Standby Reserve Program, also known as the Pilot Program, which had been inaugurated during the first part of January 1949, was intensified. This stepped-up program was conducted in cooperation with BUPERS and the district commandants and the district CB program officers. Arrangements were made to allow main recruiting stations and sub-main recruiting stations to recruit reserve CBs on a more flexible stream-lined basis without resorting to the former practice of referring applicants to CB Reserve Recruiting Boards. With this office cooperating from the standpoint of content and finished edition, A-200~~x~~ forwarded pertinent ^{recruiting} current information to the field.

7. In cooperation with BUPERS this office assisted in the revisions of training curricula for the organized CB Reserve Companies so that the training would be revised, taking into consideration the possibility of recall of additional reservists to active duty at an early date. These revised curricula stressed Navy indoctrination and training in general Naval subjects so that newly acquired reservists would be given the maximum pertinent indoctrination in the shortest possible time to prepare them for active duty.

8. Training of reserve officers in mobilization type billets for two weeks active training duty periods was encouraged in the various Naval districts and specific mobilization type training of this nature was established in this Bureau for selected CEC Reserve officers.

9. The Korean situation disclosed that in many cases the proper reclassification of enlisted men to a correct rating under the post war rating structure had not been effected. In cooperation with BUPERS this office kept the field currently advised concerning steps necessary to reclassify enlisted men properly to a correct current rating. As a result of this assistance many former World War II CBs who had been improperly reclassified into a non-CB rating are now being properly classified and recovered as qualified CB reservists.


J. W. SILLIMAN

22/cj

17 October 1950

MEMORANDUM

From: Code 22

→ To: Code A-200A

Subj: Information for "Battle Report."

Ref: (a) Your memo dtd 5 Oct 1950

1. In accordance with reference (a), the following information is submitted regarding the actions of this office in connection with the Korean campaign:

Considering the fact that the Construction Forces Readiness Office was not established until 14 August 1950 and also the fact that I was not assigned to this duty until 5 September 1950, about two and one half months after the Korean War started, it can readily be seen that this office did not contribute a great deal toward the success of the Korean War.

During the short period of time that this office has been functioning, it has been our responsibility to coordinate the activities of the Construction Forces as they apply to the Bureau of Yards and Docks. This coordination includes the procurement of Officer and Enlisted Personnel and the procurement and scheduling of materials and equipment requested by the Construction Forces who are or may be involved in the War.

The duties of this office are primarily the coordination of effort to facilitate and expedite work in connection with the Construction Forces rather than the responsibility for operation in connection with the planning and execution of directives pertaining to these Forces.


THOMAS J. LEWIS